case study on nuclear accidents in india

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The Kalpakkam `incident'

Published : Aug 29, 2003 00:00 IST

The nuclear establishment describes as "serious" the January 21 incident in which six workers of the Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant were exposed to radiation levels exceeding annually permissible limits, but argues that it was not a case of dangerous exposure.

ON January 21, 2003, six employees of the Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant (KARP) were exposed to radiation exceeding the annual dosage limit prescribed by the regulatory authorities. In a press conference on August 6, their first since the incident, the authorities of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), which controls KARP, admitted that the incident was a "serious" one. The incident led to the closure of the main plant at KARP, where plutonium is reprocessed, for more than six months and the plant is now scheduled to reopen before the end of August.

While conceding during the press conference that it was the "worst accident" in the Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) history, BARC Director Dr. B. Bhattacharjee insisted that the incident was a minor one falling between Levels 1 and 2 in the International Nuclear Event Scale. (The scale ranges from 1(anomaly) to 7 (major accident). The Chernobyl disaster was a Level 7 event and the Three Mile Island incident was classified as one of Level 5. Any event between 1 and 4 is categorised as an incident and events above 4 are called accidents.)

Bhattacharjee asserted that "there is no way of classifying it (the KARP incident) as an accident". He blamed the incident on "a little bit of over enthusiasm", an "error in the technical judgment" of the employees, and a failure of equipment that went unnoticed. Bhattacharjee, however, refused to reveal the radiation doses received by the affected personnel, claiming that "it is not proper to disclose them". He admitted that the doses they received had "exceeded the annual [prescribed] dose limit of 20 millisievert" but asserted that they were "much, much lower than the [prescribed] life-time dose limit of one sievert" (1,000 millisievert). He described the six personnel as "cheerful".

The incident took place when a valve separating a high-level radioactive liquid waste tank and a low-level liquid waste tank malfunctioned and started leaking. This resulted in high-level radioactive waste mixing with the low-level waste, which led to an increase in the radioactivity in the low-level tank. Six employees on the night shift, who went to collect samples of the low-level liquid received radiation doses that were higher than the annual permissible limit. There were no monitors to detect the radiation level in the area, which is described as a low-activity area or low-probability zone. The workers were not wearing the personal thermo luminescent dosimeter (TLD) badges either, which register the radiation doses received. Blood samples of the affected personnel, including a woman, were sent to the Biomedical Division of BARC in Mumbai, which assessed that there had been "no clinical damage to their health".

Bhattacharjee blamed the incident on an error of judgement since the six persons were under the impression that they were collecting samples of only a low-level liquid and they did not wear their TLDs. Bhattacharjee also said that since the capacity of the high-level liquid waste tank was three lakh litres, a small decrease in the level in any one section was difficult to notice, especially with analog instruments. The instruments were now being made digital. He maintained that there was no need to reveal the incident (to the press) because it was "an internal issue". Besides, he said, there was no release of any radio activity into the environment and the public had not been harmed. New digital gamma monitors had been installed when presspersons visited the low-level liquid tank area.

The safe limits of radiation doses that nuclear plant personnel and people living outside nuclear plants can receive are prescribed by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which keeps tabs on safety and radiation issues in nuclear facilities in the country. These facilities work under the DAE. At the international level, limits are prescribed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).

According to the AERB, a nuclear facility worker may receive up to 100 millisievert of radiation over a five-year period with an average of 20 millisievert a year, but the dose should not exceed 30 millisievert in a given year. The ICRP has stipulated the same five-year dosage but it is more liberal in allowing an annual dose limit of up to 50 millisievert. The life-term dose that a nuclear plant worker can receive is one sievert (1,000 millisievert).

Members of the BARC Facilities' Employees Association at KARP are also unwilling to reveal the doses received by the six affected workers. A former office-bearer of the association claimed: "Nobody knows authentically the doses they received." Informed sources, however, said the affected persons received doses ranging from 30 millisievert to 52 millisievert.

Dr. Anil Kakodkar, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and Secretary, DAE, said: "Naturally, we had to go through all safety reviews, which have been done. The main plant was shut down. The affected people are in good health. There is absolutely no question of any radioactivity being released into the environment or affecting people living outside. Things were blown out of proportion."

In a letter to Dr. Bhattacharjee on January 24, 2003, the employees' association said the incident occurred when an employee, Srinivasa Raju, was sent to the Waste Tank Farm to sample a solution whose history was not known. The area had no air monitors. The date of the last survey done there was not known. The letter said: "As soon as the sample was kept in a tray in the process control laboratory, the area gamma monitor started giving visual alarm. The audio alarm was not working... Had there been an area gamma monitor, this whole episode could have been avoided. The plant management is at fault for not ensuring an area gamma monitor in the work place... The Health Physics Division was at fault for not conducting regular surveys at the workplace." All this led to the young employee being exposed to "a very high" dose of 40 millisievert, it alleged. It demanded a full-fledged inquiry into the incident.

The association called for a series of safety measures at KARP, including the appointment of a full-time trained security officer, who will be responsible for planning and executing tests to avoid untoward incidents, the installation of gamma monitors in all workplaces, surveying by the Health Physics Division in all areas, the display of tags indicating the radiation level and the ready availability of TLD readings to the respective area-in-charge. It also suggested that clear instructions be given to employees on what they should do when monitors sound the alarm and wanted facilities to wash one's hands and feet in all access galleries, and the presence of an association representative at local safety committee meetings.

Association members resorted to a work-to-rule agitation in the second week of May, demanding, besides safety measures, promotion for 32 helpers at KARP as tradesmen. The DAE transferred association president R.K. Shenoi and joint secretary Cherian to nuclear facilities at Tarapur and Nashik respectively. A member of the DAE top brass said: "Workers wanted en masse promotion, which is not possible. So they agitated. They are back to work now."

Association members divulged little information on the issue to the press. A former office-bearer declined to talk to this reporter on July 31, saying: "We are not authorised to talk to the press." When asked why the association did not reveal the incident to the press for five months after it took place, he replied: "There is no remedy in talking to the press." He added that the BARC authorities were "responding to whatever (safety measures) we ask for. Still certain incidents (like the one on January 21) take place". Another office-bearer pointed out: "If I talk to you, I can be booked under the Official Secrets Act."

Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee inaugurated KARP, which is one of the three reprocessing facilities in the country along with Trombay and Tarapore, on September 15, 1998 (Frontline, October 9, 1998). KARP is a radiochemical plant that recovers plutonium and uranium from the spent fuel of the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), which are key components of India's nuclear electricity generation programme. The PHWRs use natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as both moderator and coolant. Reprocessing leads to the separation of vast amounts of radioactivity in nitric acid solutions known as high level waste (HLW), which are kept in underground tanks away from the main plant. This underground storage facility is not manned because it is not a regular work area. Persons are engaged to work in this area under special procedures.

Reprocessing of plutonium forms an "important link" between the first stage of India's nuclear electricity programme, which comprises the PHWRs, and the next stage, under which Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) will be built. The plutonium recovered from the spent fuel of the existing PHWRs will be used as fresh fuel in the FBRs. A pilot-scale Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) is already operational at Kalpakkam. The construction of a massive 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) has begun there. Since the DAE plans to build a series of FBRs in the coming years, there was a necessity to establish KARP and start reprocessing plutonium.

KARP was categorised as a "strategic facility" after India's nuclear tests in Pokhran in May 1998. Although plutonium from research reactors is generally used in making atom bombs, it is not difficult to use plutonium reprocessed from power reactors to make nuclear bombs. In April 2000, the DAE decided to keep "the safety and regulatory functions" at BARC, Trombay, out of the purview of the AERB. India's nuclear weapons programme is essentially based at BARC. The satellite facilities under BARC, such as KARP and Rare Materials Project, Mysore, are also beyond the AERB's scope of control. An internal safety committee was set up to oversee regulatory and safety functions at BARC and its satellite facilities.

Dr. V. Pugazhendhi, a medical practitioner who lives close to Kalpakkam township and specialises in the effect of ionising radiation on nuclear workers and nearby residents, says plutonium radiation has a long-term effect because its half-life is 24,000 years.

T. Mohan, general secretary, Atomic Energy Employees' Association, Kalpakkam, said the primary demand of his organisation was that a separate safety officer be appointed for KARP. He also pointed out that helpers, who were not qualified, were sent to collect samples and suggested that frequent classes be held to educate workers on safety aspects. "There is nothing wrong in providing awareness to workers on safety," Mohan said. In all Western countries, nuclear utilities periodically disclose the radiation doses received by workers. Mohan alleged that this was not done in India. He maintained that radiation doses received by nuclear workers should be put up every week in the facilities.

S. Basu, Director, KARP, called it "a rare event" which occurred in "a low probability area". The six persons had been taken out of their work spot in the radiation zone, he said and added that the Operating Plants' Safety Review Committee had made several recommendations to enhance safety and they were being implemented. More radiation monitors were being installed. Additional training was being given to personnel. "The entire staff are given refresher courses," he said. Basu said the plant personnel "understood" the situation and were "cooperative". Their demands on safety were being fully implemented, he said.

In a press release, BARC alleged that the employees' association used the incident as a "respectable safety cover" to settle other disputes and added that the agitation was against "public interest" and "accordingly, was dealt with firmly". After two "instigating" personnel were transferred, others had resumed normal work from June 25, it added.

Dr. V. Venkat Raj, Director, Health, Safety and Environment Group, BARC, said on August 6 that three levels of safety committees had cleared the restarting of the main reprocessing plant. A regulatory inspection team from BARC was to visit KARP in 10 days. A decision would be taken after the team's visit on when to allow the plant to function again.

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Explained | What are the ambiguities in India’s nuclear liability law?

What are the provisions of the indian nuclear liability law what does it say about supplier liability in the event of a nuclear accident why do some provisions in the law continue to make foreign companies wary of signing deals with india  .

April 26, 2023 10:50 pm | Updated April 27, 2023 11:01 am IST

Police officers guard the proposed site of the Nuclear Power Project near Jaitapur in 2011. | Photo Credit: AFP

The story so far: The issues regarding India’s nuclear liability law continue to hold up the more than a decade-old plan to build six nuclear power reactors in Maharashtra’s Jaitapur, the world’s biggest nuclear power generation site under consideration at present. An official at the French energy company Electricite de France (EDF), which submitted its techno-commercial offer for the construction of the 9,900 MW project two years ago, told The Hindu that the issues arising out of the liability law “would have to be solved before any contract” could be signed with India.

What is the law governing nuclear liability in India?

Laws on civil nuclear liability ensure that compensation is available to the victims for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident or disaster and set out who will be liable for those damages. The international nuclear liability regime consists of multiple treaties and was strengthened after the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident. The umbrella Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) was adopted in 1997 with the aim of establishing a minimum national compensation amount. The amount can further be increased through public funds, (to be made available by the contracting parties), should the national amount be insufficient to compensate the damage caused by a nuclear incident.

Even though India was a signatory to the CSC, Parliament ratified the convention only in 2016. To keep in line with the international convention, India enacted the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) in 2010, to put in place a speedy compensation mechanism for victims of a nuclear accident. The CLNDA provides for strict and no-fault liability on the operator of the nuclear plant, where it will be held liable for damage regardless of any fault on its part. It also specifies the amount the operator will have to shell out in case of damage caused by an accident at ₹1,500 crore and requires the operator to cover liability through insurance or other financial security. In case the damage claims exceed ₹1,500 crore, the CLNDA expects the government to step in and has limited the government liability amount to the rupee equivalent of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or about ₹2,100 to ₹2,300 crore. The Act also specifies the limitations on the amount and time when action for compensation can be brought against the operator.

India currently has 22 nuclear reactors with over a dozen more projects planned. All the existing reactors are operated by the state-owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL).

What does the CLNDA say on supplier liability?

The international legal framework on civil nuclear liability, including the annex of the CSC is based on the central principle of exclusive liability of the operator of a nuclear installation and no other person. In the initial stages of the nuclear industry’s development, foreign governments and the industry agreed that excessive liability claims against suppliers of nuclear equipment would make their business unviable and hinder the growth of nuclear energy, and it became an accepted practice for national laws of countries to channel nuclear liability to the operators of the plant with only some exceptions. Two other points of rationale were also stated while accepting the exclusive operator liability principle — one was to avoid legal complications in establishing separate liability in each case and the second was to make just one entity in the chain, that is the operator to take out insurance, instead of having suppliers, construction contractors and so on take out their own insurance.

Section 10 of the annex of the CSC lays down “only” two conditions under which the national law of a country may provide the operator with the “right of recourse”, where they can extract liability from the supplier — one, if it is expressly agreed upon in the contract or two, if the nuclear incident “results from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage”.

However, India, going beyond these two conditions, for the first time introduced the concept of supplier liability over and above that of the operator’s in its civil nuclear liability law, the CLNDA. The architects of the law recognised that defective parts were partly responsible for historical incidents such as the Bhopal gas tragedy in 1984 and added the clause on supplier liability. So, apart from the contractual right of recourse or when “intent to cause damage” is established, the CLNDA has a Section 17(b) which states that the operator of the nuclear plant, after paying their share of compensation for damage in accordance with the Act, shall have the right of recourse where the “nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services”.

Why is the supplier liability clause an issue in nuclear deals?

Foreign suppliers of nuclear equipment from countries as well as domestic suppliers have been wary of operationalising nuclear deals with India as it has the only law where suppliers can be asked to pay damages. Concerns about potentially getting exposed to unlimited liability under the CLNDA and ambiguity over how much insurance to set aside in case of damage claims have been sticking points for suppliers.

Suppliers have taken issue with two specific provisions in the law, Section 17(b) and Section 46. The latter clause goes against the Act’s central purpose of serving as a special mechanism enforcing the channelling of liability to the operator to ensure prompt compensation for victims. Section 46 provides that nothing would prevent proceedings other than those which can be brought under the Act, to be brought against the operator. This is not uncommon, as it allows criminal liability to be pursued where applicable. However, in the absence of a comprehensive definition on the types of ‘nuclear damage’ being notified by the Central Government, Section 46 potentially allows civil liability claims to be brought against the operator and suppliers through other civil laws such as the law of tort. While liability for operators is capped by the CLNDA, this exposes suppliers to unlimited amounts of liability.

What are existing projects in India?

The Jaitapur nuclear project has been stuck for more than a decade — the original MoU was signed in 2009 with EDF’s predecessor Areva. In 2016, EDF and NPCIL signed a revised MoU, and in 2018, the heads of both signed an agreement on the “industrial way forward” in the presence of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and French President Emmanuel Macron. In 2020, the EDF submitted its techno-commercial offer for the construction of six nuclear power reactors but an EDF official told that the issue arising from India’s nuclear liability law remains an item on the “agenda for both countries”. Multiple rounds of talks have not yet led to a convergence on the issue. Other nuclear projects, including the nuclear project proposed in Kovvada, Andhra Pradesh, have also been stalled. Despite signing civil nuclear deals with a number of countries, including the U.S., France and Japan, the only foreign presence in India is that of Russia in Kudankulam — which predates the nuclear liability law.

What is the government’s stand?

• The central government has maintained that the Indian law is in consonance with the CSC. About Section 17(b), it said that the provision “permits” but “does not require” an operator to include in the contract or exercise the right to recourse.

However, legal experts have pointed out that a plain reading of Section 17 of the CLNDA suggests that Section 17(a), (b) and (c) are distinctive and separate, meaning even if the right to recourse against the supplier is not mentioned in the contract [as provided by Section 17 (a)], the other two clauses stand. This effectively means that the supplier can be sued if defective equipment provided or if it can be established that the damage resulted from an act of intent. Besides, it would not be sound public policy if the NPCIL, a government entity, entered into a contract with a supplier and waived its right to recourse in the contract, despite the fact that the law provides for such recourse.

Further, the Ministry of External Affairs had said that Parliament debates over the CLNDA had rejected amendments to include the supplier, and therefore the supplier cannot be liable under this kind of “class-action suit”. However, private sector players were not convinced and experts point out that during a trial, what would be considered is what is enshrined in the statute and not what was discussed in Parliament.

As for the Jaitapur project, the government has said that the issues regarding the liability law would be resolved before French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to India, which was first scheduled for March but has been pushed to September.

• The issues regarding India’s nuclear liability law continue to hold up the more than a decade-old plan to build six nuclear power reactors in Maharashtra’s Jaitapur, the world’s biggest nuclear power generation site under consideration at present.
• Laws on civil nuclear liability ensure that compensation is available to the victims for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident or disaster and set out who will be liable for those damages.

Related Topics

Text and Context / Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project / nuclear policy / nuclear power / The Hindu Explains / nuclear accident

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India’s nuclear liability law and associated issues – Explained, pointwise

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• 1 Introduction
• 2 What is nuclear liability?
• 3 What is the need for nuclear liability law in India?
• 4 What is India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act and its key provisions?
• 5 What are the advantages of India’s nuclear liability law?
• 6 What are the challenges associated with India’s nuclear liability law?
• 7 What should be done to ensure proper nuclear liability?

Introduction

India’s nuclear liability law, the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLND) 2010, outlines the legal framework for handling liability in the event of a nuclear accident. It governs compensation for victims and holds nuclear facility operators responsible for any damage caused. While this law aims to protect citizens and the environment, it has also faced challenges and controversies.  

What is nuclear liability?

Nuclear liability refers to the legal responsibility of an operator or supplier of a nuclear facility for any damages or injuries caused as a result of a nuclear incident. This liability typically includes compensation for loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and environmental damage caused by the release of radioactive materials or the occurrence of a nuclear accident.

In most countries, nuclear liability laws establish a framework to ensure that adequate compensation is available to the affected parties and that the financial burden is fairly distributed among the responsible entities, such as the operator or supplier of a nuclear power plant.   

What is the need for nuclear liability law in India?

Improper compensation structures for victims : A nuclear liability law is needed to establish a legal framework that guarantees victims of nuclear accidents are compensated fairly and promptly. For example, in the case of a nuclear accident, the law would ensure that affected individuals or communities are compensated for damages to health, property, and the environment.   

Low investment in the nuclear sector: The law is necessary to encourage investment in the Indian nuclear sector by providing a clear and predictable liability regime, which minimizes uncertainties for investors, operators, and suppliers. For instance, foreign suppliers may be hesitant to invest in the Indian nuclear industry without a clear understanding of their potential liabilities in case of an accident, so a well-defined liability law helps to alleviate their concerns.   

Incompatibility with international standards: India needs a nuclear liability law to align its domestic regulations with international standards and facilitate cooperation with other countries in the nuclear field. For example, by adopting a liability law consistent with international norms, India can more easily engage in collaborative projects, such as importing advanced nuclear technology or exporting domestically developed technology to other countries.   

Legal accountability: A nuclear liability law is essential to create a system that holds operators and suppliers legally accountable for their actions, encouraging adherence to safety measures and fostering a culture of responsibility. For instance, if an operator fails to follow safety regulations and an accident occurs, the liability law would hold them accountable for the consequences, which could include financial penalties or legal action.   

Lack of negligence: The law is necessary to deter potential negligence by establishing a clear legal and financial liability framework for the nuclear power sector, which ultimately leads to safer operations. For example, if an operator knows that they will be held financially responsible for any damages resulting from a nuclear accident due to negligence, they will be more likely to prioritize safety and avoid cutting corners.   

Increasing focus on nuclear power : India currently has 22 reactors, all of which are operated by the NPCIL. Apart from this, it has 10 reactors that are at various stages of construction and 10 more have been sanctioned. All of these are expected to start functioning by 2031 so a comprehensive law is essential.

What is India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act and its key provisions?

India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act was passed in 2010 to establish a legal framework addressing liability and compensation in the event of a nuclear accident. The Act outlines the responsibilities of nuclear plant operators, suppliers, and the government, ensuring prompt and fair compensation for affected individuals and communities.   

Here are some of the key provisions of the Act:   

Operator liability: The Act designates the nuclear plant operator as the primary entity responsible for compensating victims in case of a nuclear accident. This “strict liability” means that the operator is liable regardless of whether or not they were at fault.   

Financial cap on liability: The Act sets a financial cap on the operator’s liability at INR 1,500 crore (approximately USD 205 million) for each nuclear incident. If the compensation amount exceeds this cap, the central government is responsible for providing additional funds up to the rupee equivalent of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which is approximately INR 3,300 crore (USD 450 million).   

Right of recourse: The Act addresses supplier liability in Section 17, which grants the operator a right of recourse against the supplier under certain conditions. This right of recourse can be invoked if (a) the contract between the operator and supplier contains such provisions, (b) the nuclear incident occurs due to the supplier’s negligence, or (c) the supplier provided defective equipment or services that caused the incident. This provision aims to ensure accountability among suppliers and share the burden of liability in case of a nuclear accident.  

Claims Commission: The Act provides for the establishment of a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission to adjudicate claims arising from nuclear accidents. This commission ensures a streamlined process for victims to seek compensation and resolves disputes between operators, suppliers, and affected individuals or communities.   

Time limits for claims: The CLND Act sets a time limit for filing claims for compensation. Claims related to personal injury or death must be filed within 20 years of the nuclear incident, whereas claims for damage to property must be filed within 10 years.   

Mandatory insurance: The Act requires nuclear plant operators to obtain insurance or financial security to cover their liability. This ensures that funds are available for compensation in the event of an accident.   

What are the advantages of India’s nuclear liability law?

Some of the key advantages are:   

Victim protection : The CLND Act prioritizes the protection of victims by ensuring that they receive prompt and adequate compensation in the event of a nuclear incident. By channelling liability exclusively to the operator and setting clear time limits for compensation claims, the Act simplifies the compensation process for victims.  

Operator accountability: The Act holds the operators of nuclear installations strictly liable for any damages caused by a nuclear incident at their facility, regardless of fault or negligence. This promotes safety and encourages operators to maintain high safety standards to minimize the risk of accidents.   

Supplier accountability: The Act provides operators with a right to recourse against suppliers in certain cases, such as when the nuclear incident results from the supplier’s negligence or defective equipment. This provision holds suppliers responsible for the quality of their products and services, promoting a culture of safety within the supply chain.   

Financial security: By mandating that operators obtain insurance coverage or financial security to cover their liability for nuclear damage, the CLND Act ensures that operators have the necessary resources to compensate victims in the event of an accident.   

Government support: The Act outlines the role of the Indian government in providing additional compensation if the operator’s liability limit is exceeded, or in exceptional circumstances such as acts of terrorism or natural disasters. This provision demonstrates the government’s commitment to protecting its citizens and supporting the nuclear industry.   

Legal clarity: The CLND Act establishes a clear legal framework for liability and compensation in the event of a nuclear incident, reducing uncertainties and ambiguities in the process. This clarity benefits both operators and victims by outlining their respective rights and responsibilities.   

International compatibility: The Act aligns India’s nuclear liability regime with international standards and conventions, such as the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), which India joined in 2016. This compatibility fosters cooperation and collaboration with other countries in the field of nuclear energy.   

What are the challenges associated with India’s nuclear liability law?

Inadequate Liability Cap for Operators: The liability cap on the operator may not be sufficient to compensate victims in the event of a major nuclear disaster. Compared to other countries, this cap is relatively low and may prevent India from accessing an international pool of funds for compensation purposes.   

Uncertainty over Private Operators : The cap on the operator’s liability may not be necessary if all nuclear plants are owned by the government. It is unclear whether the government intends to allow private operators to manage nuclear power plants, creating uncertainty around liability concerns.   

Potential Conflict of Interest: The government is responsible for notifying the extent of environmental damage and economic loss. This could create a conflict of interest in cases where the government is also the party liable to pay compensation, possibly affecting the compensation process.   

Non-compliance with International Agreements : The right of recourse against the supplier provided in the Act may not be compliant with international agreements that India may wish to sign, potentially limiting India’s ability to cooperate with other countries on nuclear matters.  

Limited Timeframe for Compensation Claims: The ten-year time limit for claiming compensation may be inadequate for those suffering from nuclear damage, as some health effects or damages may not become apparent until after this period.   

Ambiguity in Applicable Laws: The Act allows operators and suppliers to be liable under other laws, but it is not clear which specific laws apply. Different interpretations by courts could either constrict or unduly expand the scope of such a provision, leading to inconsistencies in the application of liability rules.  

Challenges faced by India Nuclear Insurance Pool (INIP): It faces several challenges, including the collection of adequate funds to cover the mandated liability amount under the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA). The current INIP funds are insufficient, amounting to only half of the required INR 1,500 crores. Furthermore, limited reinsurance support hampers the ability of insurance companies to contribute fully. Finally, experts question the adequacy of the capped liability amount to cover all nuclear installations in India, potentially leaving some without proper insurance coverage.  

What should be done to ensure proper nuclear liability?

Strengthen the India Nuclear Insurance Pool (INIP) : Increase the funds collected by INIP to meet the required liability amount under the CLNDA. Encourage more insurance companies to participate and contribute to the pool, ensuring a more robust risk transfer mechanism.

Review liability caps : Reevaluate the current liability caps for operators and suppliers to determine if they are adequate to cover potential damages in the event of a nuclear incident. Comparing the liability caps with international standards and practices can help inform this assessment.

Improve reinsurance support : Develop mechanisms to enhance reinsurance support for nuclear risk liability. This may include working with international reinsurance markets to provide additional coverage and encouraging domestic reinsurers to participate in nuclear risk coverage.

Enhance regulatory oversight : Strengthen the role of regulatory bodies, such as the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), to ensure strict compliance with safety standards and guidelines in nuclear power plants.

Clarify legal provisions : Address ambiguities in the CLNDA by providing clear guidelines on the application of the Act to suppliers and operators. This could include specifying the extent of liability and the applicable laws in case of nuclear damage.

International cooperation : India should actively engage in international forums and work with other countries to share best practices, technical expertise, and strategies to address nuclear liability issues. This includes participation in treaties and conventions, such as the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC).

Public awareness and transparency : Increase transparency in the nuclear sector and enhance public awareness about nuclear liability, safety measures, and emergency preparedness plans. This would help build trust and confidence in India’s nuclear power program

Sources :  The Hindu ( Article 1 , Article 2 and Article 3 ), TOI , Aljazeera , The Diplomat , Indian Express , 

Syllabus : GS 2: Governance – Government policies and interventions for development in various sectors and issues arising out of their design and implementation.

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India’s nuclear industry pours its wastes into a river of death and disease

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Jadugoda, Jharkhand, INDIA — The Subarnarekha River roars out of the Chota Nagpur plateau in eastern India, before emptying 245 miles downstream into the Bay of Bengal, making it a vital source of life, and lately, of death.

The name means streak of gold and for centuries prospectors around Ranchi, the traffic-choked capital of Jharkhand state, have sought fortunes by panning for nuggets in its headwaters, which wash over a region flecked with minerals and ore.

Its link to widespread misfortune is not admitted by the Indian government. But the authorities’ role in the deaths of those who live near it first became clear when professor Dipak Ghosh, a respected Indian physicist and dean of the Faculty of Science at Jadavpur University in Kolkata decided to chase down a rural “myth” among the farmers along its banks. They had long complained that the Subarnarekha was poisoned, and said their communities suffered from tortuous health problems.

When Ghosh’s team seven years ago collected samples from the river and also from adjacent wells, he was alarmed by the results. The water was adulterated with radioactive alpha particles that cannot be absorbed through the skin or clothes, but if ingested cause 1,000 times more damage than other types of radiation. In some places, the levels were 160 percent higher than safe limits set by the World Health Organization.

“It was potentially catastrophic,” Ghosh said in a recent interview. Millions of people along the waterway were potentially exposed.

What the professor’s team uncovered was hard evidence of the toxic footprint cast by the country’s secret nuclear mining and fuel fabrication program. It is now the subject of a potentially powerful legal action, shining an unusual light on India’s nuclear ambitions and placing a cloud over its future reactor operations.

A comprehensive new energy plan approved by the government in October declared that nuclear power is “a safe, environmentally benign and economically viable source to meet the increasing electricity needs of the country.” And Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while standing beside President Obama at a Paris conference on global warming Nov. 30, said “India is a very nature-loving country and we are setting out, as always, to protect nature in the world” while producing energy.

On August 21, 2014, however, a justice in this state’s court ordered an official inquiry into allegations that the nuclear industry has exposed tens of thousands of workers and villagers to dangerous levels of radiation, heavy metals or other carcinogens, including arsenic, from polluted rivers and underground water supplies that have percolated through the foodchain — from fish swimming in the Subarnarekha River to vegetables washed in its tainted water.

Given the absolute secrecy that surrounds the nuclear sector in India, the case is a closed affair, and all evidence is officially presented to the judge. But the Center for Public Integrity has reviewed hundreds of pages of personal testimony and clinical reports in the case that present a disturbing scenario.

India’s nuclear chiefs have long maintained that ill health in the region is caused by endemic poverty and and the unsanitary conditions of its tribal people, known locally as Adivasi, or first people. But the testimony and reports document how nuclear installations, fabrication plants and mines have repeatedly breached international safety standards for the past 20 years. Doctors and health workers, as well as international radiation experts, say that nuclear chiefs have repeatedly suppressed or rebuffed their warnings.

The industry’s aim, according to local residents, has been to minimize evidence of cancer clusters, burying statistics that show an alarming spate of deaths. The case files include epidemiological and medical surveys warning of a high incidence of infertility, birth defects, and congenital illnesses among women living in proximity to the industry’s facilities. They also detail levels of radiation that in some places were almost 60 times the safe levels set by organizations like the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, although India’s Atomic Energy Commission, the country’s top authority, disputes these findings.

The Indian commission argues all problems at the nuclear complex have been corrected and that no cases of radiation poisoning have been proven. But the court files include compelling stories of how residents have been stonewalled and criminalized, and their communities strong-armed, to ensure that nothing gets in the way of India’s nuclear dream.

Poor conditions for those who work or live near nuclear facilities have been largely unchanged for decades. When we drove into Jadugoda, we quickly spotted laborers, barefooted, and without protective clothing, riding trucks laden with uranium ore through villages, their tarpaulins gaping and dust spewing. Ore was scattered everywhere: on the roads, over the fields and into the rivers and drains. Uranium tailing ponds that dribbled effluent into neighboring fields were readily accessible, and children played nearby as their parents gathered wood. Washed clothes hung from tailings pipes carrying irradiated slurry. Four months after we left, last March, some of these pipes burst, again sending toxic slurry into Chatikocha village, where residents were supposed to have removed, but remain.

Alarms about these activities were circulating as long ago as 2005, when India and the United States began work on a pact expanding cooperation on civil nuclear power. A joint statement that year by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh about the pact included a promise to safeguard the environment, but hailed reactors as a way to meet “global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner.”

The pact was signed by the two governments in October 2008, despite an American diplomat’s warning from Kolkata in a confidential cable to Washington the previous year that the Indian government’s “lax safety measures … are exposing local tribal communities to radiation contamination.”

Henry V. Jardine, a career foreign service officer and former Army captain, expressed blunt dismay in the cable about India’s “notoriously weak” worker protections and substandard safety procedures around mines. If safety at civil nuclear projects like these was “an apparent failure,” Jardine wondered “what standards are being maintained in India’s nuclear facilities not visible to the public.”

The source of the poisonings

Charting the trail of disease and ill health back to its source, Ghosh’s team learned that the alpha radiation they had recorded came from the mines, mills and fabrication plants of East Singhbhum, a district whose name means the land of the lions, where the state-owned Uranium Corporation of India Ltd is sitting on a mountain of 174,000 tons of raw uranium. The company, based in Jadugoda, a country town 160 miles west of Kolkata, is the sole source of India’s domestically-mined nuclear reactor fuel, a monopoly that has allowed it to be both combative and secretive.

After starting work in 1967 with a single mine, the corporation now controls six underground pits and one opencast operation that stretch across 1,313 hilly acres, extracting an estimated 5,000 tons of uranium ore a day, generating an annual turnover of $123 million. It supplies nine of the reactors that help India produce plutonium for its arsenal of nuclear weapons, and is thus considered vital to India’s security.

The company crushes the ore below ground and treats it with sulfuric acid, transforming it into magnesium diuranate or “yellowcake,” which is then loaded into drums and taken to the Rakha Mines railway station. From there, it is transported to the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad, 861 miles to the southwest. Workers ultimately process it into uranium dioxide pellets that are stacked in rods, inserted into reactors all over India.

Wherever uranium is extracted, anywhere in the world, from Australia to New Mexico, it is a messy, environmentally disruptive process. However, the poor quality of ore eked out of these wooded hills means that for every kilogram of uranium extracted, 1750 kilograms of toxic slurry, known as tailings, must be discarded into three, colossal ponds. Studies by scientists from North America, Australia and Europe show that while these ponds contain only small quantities of uranium, equally hazardous isotopes connected to uranium’s decay are also present, including thorium, radium, polonium and lead, some of which have a half-life of thousands of years. Arsenic is a byproduct, as is radon, a carcinogen.

The tailing ponds in Jharkhand, Ghosh’s team and other scientists discovered, have never been lined with rubble, concrete or special plastics, as organizations like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have advised for domestic ponds, and as a result their contents leached in winters into the water table. Lacking a cap, the ponds evaporated in summers, leaving a toxic dust that blew over nearby villages. Thirty five thousand people live in seven villages that lie within a mile and half of the three huge ponds, most of them members of tribal communities.

Moreover, during the monsoon season, the ponds regularly overflowed onto adjacent lands, with contaminants reaching streams and groundwater that eventually tainted the Subarnarekha River, according to studies of the issue by Ghosh’s team and other scientists. Pipes carrying radioactive slurry also frequently burst, leaching into rivers and across villages, according to photographs taken by residents. Lorries hired by the mines also dumped toxic effluent in local fields when the ponds were full, actions caught in photographs and on video taken by villagers and shown to the Center.

When Ghosh published his team’s results, there was no reaction from the mine or the Indian government. A senior official in the U.S. State Department declined to discuss the contents of Jardine’s leaked cable, but said he was aware of criticisms about the uranium corporation.

The evidence begins to pile up

Uranium was first discovered in the hills above Jadugoda in 1951, by Indian geologists working alongside the Associated Drilling Company, of London. The geological makeup of the area makes the natural — or “background” — radiation in this area higher than other parts of India, but scientists say nothing besides man’s activities can explain the extraordinary levels discovered in their tests.

Long ago, the local tribes already feared the place the geologists were drawn to, according to Ghanshyam Birulee, a round-faced political activist for the Adivasi.

“My father told me of a [castor oil] tree in the forest and even back then everyone thought this tree was haunted,” he said. Village lore warned that “if a pregnant woman passed the trunk, she would suffer a miscarriage, or the child would be born with deformities. Everyone avoided it,” except those digging the hole.

The bore became a mine, and Birulee’s father, like many others, was contracted to wrest ore from the subterranean galleries and shovel the resulting yellowcake into drums. His father died of lung cancer in 1984. “Contract laborers were not issued with any respirators or dosimeters to measure radiation,” Birulee said, talking in the granular accent of his tribe, known as Ho. Sometimes they worked barefoot.

Then in 1991, Birulee’s mother also died of lung cancer. “We were stunned by her death. She had never worked in the mines. I searched for a reason,” he said. Friends and neighbors meanwhile were in mourning for their own relatives. According to the uranium corporation’s own records, 17 UCIL laborers died in 1994, 14 more in 1995, 19 in 1996 and 21 in 1997; no cause of death was revealed in the records seen by the Center, but critics claim most if not all were radiation-related.

The corporation will not discuss the causes of these deaths. But a spokesman for the Jarkhandi Organization Against Radiation (JOAR), a local group formed in 1998 out of a student lobby for indigenous rights, said it has investigated these cases and that “from what we can see all of them contracted illnesses associated with radiation or exposure to heavy metals.” The spokesman, who asked the Center to withhold his name because intelligence officials and police have arrested him in the past and accused him of “anti-national activities,” claimed the number of deaths was actually “four times higher” than UCIL admitted.

Birulee contacted doctors and public health researchers at Jawaharlal Nehru University, in Delhi, one of India’s best government-funded institutions. They came up with a hypothesis about his mother’s death, blaming the family’s laundry. “My father,” Birulee said, “would bring back his cotton uniform, caked in uranium dust, to be washed once a week, as did all the other contract laborers. There were no facilities in the mines and no warnings.”

Birulee wondered how many other families had been similarly affected and, working with the JNU doctors, helped arrange for midwives to visit nearby villages. They found that 47% of women suffered disruptions to their menstrual cycle, while 18% had had miscarriages or stillborn babies over the previous 5 years. One third were infertile. Many complained their children were born with partially formed skulls, blood disorders, missing eyes or toes, fused fingers or brittle limbs. Livestock too were suffering, with veterinarians reporting that buffaloes and cows were infertile or suffering from blood disorders.

Arjun Soren was one of those affected. Born in Bhatin village, adjacent to another uranium mine on the other side of the tailing pond, Soren became the first member of the Santhal tribe to get a medical degree, and one of his first cases was to track the deteriorating health of his family. “My aunt died of cancer of the gallbladder,” Soren recalled. “My nephew has a rare blood disorder.” Then Soren himself was diagnosed with leukemia and transferred to Mumbai for treatment. “Radiation and toxins from the mining processes has to be the reason,” Soren said. “I spent my childhood playing, breathing, drinking, eating there.”

The mining corporation dismissed the 1995 Jawaharlal Nehru University study, asserting that it failed to link these health problems conclusively to radiation exposure. When the company needed to create the third of its tailing ponds in 1996, its agents uprooted families in the Adivasi village of Chatikocha, which was in their way. Dumka Murmu, a local activist from there, recalled how on Jan. 27, at 11 a.m., armed police escorted the mining company’s diggers into town. “They tore down houses belonging to 30 families,” he said. Their fields were also dug up, groves of trees that served as a religious site were felled, and a graveyard was flattened.

Outraged, the activist group contacted local politicians and civil servants. Demonstrations at the site grew, indigenous people incensed by the destruction of their place of worship, until on Feb. 25, 1997, thousands of Adivasi from all over the district converged on the site and forced work on the new pond to stop. The mining company had to change tack. It offered the demonstrators a compensation package and promised more jobs, which divided them. “Everyone needs money,” Murmu said bitterly, “and UCIL broke the will of poor people by buying them off with jobs that might kill them in an industry that was poisoning the district.”

Birulee lodged a protest with the state’s Environment Committee, in Bihar’s capital. Its chairman, Gautam Sagar Rana, directed UCIL to finance an independent health inquiry, led by two professors from Patna Medical College, who were accompanied by the uranium conglomerate’s deputy general manager, R.P. Verma; and the head of its health unit, A.R. Khan. Analyzing a representative sample of those between 4 and 60 years old living within a mile and a half of the third tailing dam, the researchers hired by UCIL concluded that the residents were “affected by radiation.”

In a report dated Nov. 14, 1997, thirty-one persons were said to need hospitalization. Their symptoms included swollen joints, spleens and livers, and coughing up blood. The UCIL report also described “osteoporosis, defective limbs, and habitual abortion,” as well as many complaints of “missed menstrual cycle” and a cluster of cancer cases.

Two more inspections by doctors occurred later that month and a separate report that month signed by professors K.K. Singh and D.D. Gupta and printed on UCIL stationery warned that the toxic tailings ponds were unprotected and the site lacked warning signs about the dangers of radiation or other toxic substances, according to a copy seen by the Center. Cattle grazed freely around the poisonous ponds, while villagers gathered firewood beside them and children built sand castles from the toxic grit, the report said.

While mine officials said they had provided regular medical checkups for the workers, one miner told the researchers, in an interview documented by Shri Prakash, a local filmmaker, that his last examination had been 10 years before. “Some test was done, but the results were not given out,” he said.

The researchers called on the corporation to fence in the ponds immediately, and to move the tens of thousands of villagers who lived in seven communities around the three tailing ponds to new sites at least three miles away. The report noted that security at the sites was “very poor” and “totally lax”, carried out in such an uncaring way, that “any mischief on life or nation cannot be ruled out.”

Four months later, on March 23, 1998, R.K. Verma, a deputy general manager, claimed in a letter sent to the civil surgeon, a public health official, in Jamshedpur, that improvements had been made. But the Bihar Environmental Committee complained in a June statement that “no wire, fences, signs: security remains abysmal, health conditions as before.”

Denying what scientists documented

India’s nuclear project is seen as the country’s most prestigious enterprise, a tangible expression of the nation’s resilience and resourcefulness. This idea was cemented when India tested nuclear devices in 1998, in twin blasts. Feeding the weapons program was UCIL’s duty, and protecting the mines became paramount.

As a result, the UCIL-funded health studies were not welcomed by the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, the country’s premier civil and military nuclear research facility, which has a Health Physics Laboratory in Jadugoda. It said in 1999, after a quick visual inspection of villagers living close to the mines, that its own experts “unanimously agreed that the disease pattern could not be ascribed to radiation exposure.” The complainers were “backwards people” who suffered from “alcoholism, malaria and malnutrition,” the company said. But it took no soil, water or air samples and launched no epidemiological study.

UCIL subsequently reversed its own position. “There is no radiation or any related health problems in Jadugoda and its surrounding areas,” J.L. Bhasin, the managing director of UCIL, concluded in 1999, in a press conference before local reporters in Jadugoda. A.N. Mullick, UCIL’s chief medical officer for 25 years, issued a press statement a few months later that “I have not come across any radiation-related ailments during my entire career.”

One safety practice changed: Miners were now given personal dosimeters, although they were taken away at the end of a shift and the readings were kept secret, a circumstance that prevails now, according to more than a dozen miners interviewed by the Center. Also, a few warning signs were posted beside the tailing ponds, according to several of the residents. But the signs were later removed by the corporation, which called them “alarmist” — a circumstance confirmed by three residents from Chatikocha village, who attended a public meeting called by the mining corporation.

In 1999, Birulee and his friends, who had begun to teach themselves about the impact of radiation by reaching out to nuclear blast survivor groups in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, decided to contact a husband-wife scientific team, Sanghamitra and Surendra Gadekar, who had studied the health of laborers at a nuclear reactor in the western desert state of Rajasthan. Surendra Gadekar, a nuclear physicist, began taking soil, water and air samples around Jadugoda the following year.

Their study was published in 2004 in Anumukti, a now-defunct pacifist magazine. It said radiation levels inside the villages aound the tailing ponds were almost 60 times the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission “safe level.” They wrote that a football pitch, a school close to Rakha Railway Station, a dam, and some walls built around homes in several villages had been constructed by UCIL with radioactive mining rubble. Radiation readings at a UCIL laboratory were 20 times the U.S. safe limit, they said, blaming unsafe work practices.

The report pointed to “extremely high levels of chronic lung disease in mill and mine workers,” and highlighted case studies of 52 men and 34 women with “severe deformities.” The Gadekars also documented the existence in neighboring populations of children with malformed torsos and deformed heads and the wrong number of fingers, as well as a cluster of cases where infants’ bodies grew at different rates, giving them a lopsided gait. Some had hyperkeratosis, a condition known as “toad skin” due to the striated patterns and raised lumps it causes. Dr. Sanghamitra Gadekar concluded in her report: “In my opinion radiation or heavy metals are the likely cause.”

Their study was ignored by India’s nuclear chiefs but caught the attention of Hiroaki Koide, a nuclear engineer who teaches at the Research Reactor Institute, Kyoto University. In late 2000, Koide flew to Jharkhand, discreetly carrying activated charcoal and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD) to study background gamma radiation. He stealthily took soil and water samples, with the help of local residents, and carried them back to Japan, where they could be tested for radon, uranium and other nuclides.

Four years later, Koide, who had access to more modern equipment than the Indian researchers and to a research reactor at Kyoto University, revealed that radiation levels in villages close to the mines and radiation levels in residential areas near the tailing ponds exceeded international safe limits by tenfold. Levels in the areas next to the ponds were 12 times higher. “These figures were exceptionally worrying,” Koide said. “No one should have been living anywhere near, but UCIL was repeatedly told to move people [and] has not done so.” Orders from the state government for villagers to be relocated, first issued in 1996, had never been implemented.

More worrying, Koide confirmed that uranium rock and finely ground mine tailings had been used as ballast for road leveling and house building, and to construct a local school and clinic. UCIL declined to make an attributed comment about these claims, but a senior UCIL official who talked to the Center on condition of anonymity confirmed these construction projects using irradiated materials had gone ahead as “part of a community outreach project.” He added: “Scientists at [Bhabha Atomic Research Centre] told us the material was of no risk, so we listened to the scientists.” BARC declined to comment.

A worrisome contaminant shows up

Koide’s also identified a radioisotope in the tailing ponds that he found especially disturbing: cesium-137. It’s created when uranium and plutonium undergo fission in a reactor or during the explosion of a nuclear weapon. Since no reactor exists in this region, “this was nuclear waste from somewhere else in India that had been transported to Jadugoda and discarded, like this heavily-populated district was simply some kind of nuclear dump,” Koide said.

There is no safe limit for cesium, since it is easily absorbed by the body, and concentrates in soft tissues. According to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, cesium “moves easily through the air … dissolves easily in water [and] binds strongly to soil and concrete,” contaminating plants and vegetation. Exposure to minute quanitities can increase the risk of contracting cancer.

Koide also was troubled by his discovery that levels of radon gas close to the mines and the tailing ponds were 160 percent higher than the limit set by the World Health Organization. Radiation levels in villages exceeded the Japanese safety limit by thirty-fold, as did levels at the Rakha Mines railway station where drums of uranium were transported to fabrication plants across India. Four miners who worked at the Rakha Mines station until they left their job in 2008 described to the Center frequent spillages of yellowcake from leaking drums, which they cleaned up with shovels, without gloves or masks, as none of them had been been issued with protective clothing or advice on possible contamination. A local journalist secretly shot video of them at work in the station.

Many Western nations have prepared “ fact sheets ” on yellowcake that warn against breathing its dust or fumes and say that workers should wash thoroughly and avoid eating, drinking or smoking while in contact with it. A safety alert prepared by the Australian government for those preparing to transport it warns that ingesting or inhaling it causes “damage to the kidneys, liver and lungs through prolonged or repeated exposure” and warns against release to the environment. But a BARC doctor working at its Health, Safety and Environment unit, U.C. Mishra, when confronted with footage of leaking drums and workers with no protective clothing, downplayed the risks in a press conference in 1999, an event that was filmed. “You can handle it,” Dr. Mishra said, “and nothing will happen to you.”

India’s Supreme Court began its own inquiry into the health crisis at the mines in 1998, in response to a petition filed by a pro-nuclear lawyer from Delhi who was upset by a news magazine’s photos of children with severe birth defects from villages near tailings ponds. The lawyer argued that “right to life” was enshrined in the Indian Constitution, but even so the court on April 15, 2004, said it believed an affidavit signed by its atomic energy department’s chairman that all radiological, safety and security issues at the mines had been resolved.

“The nuclear establishment is allowed to police itself, and to investigate itself, [with] the courts endorsing them,” Birulee said. “But out in the countryside, we are still living toxic lives.”

A series of radioactive leaks

Then, on Dec. 24, 2006, a pipe transferring toxic, radioactive slurry to the tailing ponds burst close to Dungridih village, 50 miles northwest of Jadugoda, and poured into a tributary of the Subarnarekha River for nine hours, causing shoals of dead fish to float on the surface. No government investigation was undertaken downstream and no thorough cleanup, upstream. Anil Kakodkar, head of the Department of Atomic Energy, described the incident as “a small leak” of no risk to anyone, according to an Indian analyst’s report . Five villagers interviewed by the Center described how they merely piled mud over the effluent.

Four months later, on April 10, 2007, “1.5 tons of solid radioactive waste and 20,000 liters of liquid radioactive waste” spilled from a new pipe, close to Jadugoda town, according to a corporation report, seen by the Center.

In Jardine’s cable to Washington in July of that year, he confirmed the leak and relayed widespread concerns about a recent expansion of UCIL’s operations. A new uranium ore mine in Banduhurang and a uranium mine located in Jharkhand’s Saraikela-Kharswan district were projected to produce 2,400 tons and 410 tons of uranium ore per day, respectively, he noted. These would add to the 2,090 tons of ore daily processed at a mill in Jadugoda and the 3,000 tons processed at a second in Turamdih. Local media and independent groups claimed that officials in Jadugoda dumped the waste from the processing of this ore into local fields, Jardine said, although UCIL denied it.

Photos of the leak cleanup he had seen “apparently show…workers with no safety equipment and wading in the tailing sludge,” Jardine wrote. He added that his staff had visited the mines and seen “lax safety and security measures.” Uranium ore was transported “by open trucks,” with “mine workers riding on top of the ore,” which often fell over the road. He signed off with a warning: “Given the existing conditions at India’s uranium mines, increasing the exploitation of domestic reserves will likely result in increasing radiation exposure.” The cable was disclosed by Wikileaks in 2011.

The following February, another tailing pipe burst, causing thick, gray sludge to snake into homes in Dungridih village and cover part of a road there, as well as carpet many residential front yards. Five months afterwards, record rains caused one of the tailing ponds to overflow into Talsa village. P. Dubey, a UCIL spokesman, told the Hindustan Times : “The radioactive waste flowing through the village is harmless, as incessant rains have diluted the intensity of radioactivity of the waste.”

Jardine told Washington, in a new cable on June 6, 2008 — four months before the U.S.-India nuclear pact was signed — that still another epidemiological study had concluded “indigenous groups … living close to the mines reportedly suffer high-rates of cancer, physical deformities, blindness, brain damage and other ailments.” He noted that UCIL “refuses to acknowledge these issues.” Jardine wrapped up: “Post contacts, citing independent research, say that it is difficult to point out any reason other than radiation for the apparent human and environmental problems at Jadugoda.” He criticized UCIL for not alerting communities living downstream about the February pipe burst and added: “The Indian nuclear establishment will have to adopt more transparent safety policies and procedures if it seeks to expand its capacity.”

The epidemiological study that Jardine referred to was written by Dr. Shakeel ur Rahman, of Indian Doctors for Peace and Development, a not-for-profit research group in Bihar. His team interviewed 2,118 families around the mines in May and June 2007 and found that those who lived closest had the best education, the most wealth, and a significantly higher incidence of “congenital deformities, sterility and cancer.”

K.S. Parthasarathy, a former secretary of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, the industry’s safety watchdog, wrote to most of India’s national newspapers to dispute the research, claiming it had not been peer reviewed and relied on “cherry picked” data.

In August 16, 2008, yet another uranium waste pipe burst, this time inundating eight houses in Dungridih where the toxic slurry formed an ankle deep carpet, before pouring into the river. UCIL declined to comment, however a spokesman for the Atomic Energy Regulation Board, responsible for safety, and supposedly an independent body, said in a statement issued to reporters then that “uranium ore in these mines are of very low grade …. We checked the radiation level soon after the leak. It was much below the normal range.”

That same year, UCIL won an award from the Director General of Mines Safety, coming in second place among contestants throughout India. In 2013, it also received the Golden Peacock Global Award for Corporate Social Responsibility from India’s Institute of Directors, a national group of 35,000 business executives at India’s best known companies.

No government institution acted until last year, when the Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi ordered an inquiry into congenital diseases, mainly among children near the mines, after reviewing local coverage on the issue. But Chief Justice R. Banumathi said that “given the sensitivities surrounding the corporation, and the role it plays, that investigation is to be internal.”

Activist and former miner Birulee was furious. “They claim national security prevents any outside forces vetting them,” he said. “But given how long they have prevaricated, and the cost of these delays to the population, how can we trust them to inspect themselves?”

In response to detailed questions from the Center, UCIL’s spokesman and director both declined comment about its internal epidemiological and radiation studies, or about the court case. But its reputation hasn’t exactly suffered since the judicial inquiry began. Greentech, a Delhi-based, corporate-backed nonprofit that campaigns for industrial safety, last year complimented one of its mines for its “training excellence” and gave other operations commendations for safety, innovation and environmental policies, as well as its “compassionate outreach work.” Last year, UCIL’s chairman, Diwakar Acharya, was decorated , again by Greentech, as an “outstanding HR Oriented CEO.”

Last July, Acharya, who has been with the company since 1988, gave a rare interview to Bloomberg News, in which he dismissed the epidemiological and radiological studies pointing towards a link between radiation exposures and disease patterns. Radiation levels in the area are “quite low and short duration exposure has no adverse effect on health,” he said.

Commenting on reports connecting the mines to birth defects, cases of sterility and disabilities, Archaya said “I wouldn’t be surprised if a lot of those [disabled children and sick adults] are imported from elsewhere.” He added: “See, what happens is, you say you are a specialist and you’ll come and treat. But all you do is, you are convinced UCIL is evil and you have come here only with the sole motive of finding reasons which would validate your preconceived notions.”

Another senior UCIL official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told the Center that everything happening in the mines was tied to the Bhabha Directive, an aspirational credo for the nuclear state named after Homi Bhabha, an Indian nuclear physicist considered the father of its bomb. “Radioactive material and sources of radiation should be handled … in a manner, which not only ensures that no harm can come to workers … or anyone else,” Bhabha wrote, “but also in an exemplary manner so as to set a standard which other organizations in the country may be asked to emulate.”

Around the villages of Jadugoda and out in the flood plain of the Subarnarekha River, however, residents told us repeatedly these words had lost their meaning. “Inside UCIL, they see themselves as under siege, defending the nation, one atom at a time,” Biruli said, “and outside … we are absorbing those atoms and whatever else the corporation spews out from its broken pipes and dams. We’re drinking it all up, feeding it to our kids, and our wives, if they can conceive, are absorbing them into their blood stream.”

This story is the first in a four-part series about india’s civil and military nuclear program, co-published with the Huffington Post worldwide and Foreign Policy magazine in Washington, D.C. The other articles can be found here: https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/nuclear-waste .

Adrian Levy is a London-based investigative reporter and filmmaker whose work has appeared in the Guardian, The Observer, The Sunday Times, and other publications. His most recent books are: The Meadow , about a 1995 terrorist kidnapping of Westerners in Kashmir, and The Siege: The Attack on the Taj , about the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

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India’s nuclear future

Last updated on May 31, 2024 by ClearIAS Team

India’s nuclear future is poised at a critical juncture, balancing the need for energy security, environmental sustainability, and geopolitical considerations. Read further to understand the global nuclear race and India’s stand.

Nuclear concerns are on the rise once again across the world. Nuclear deterrence tactics are being reexamined in light of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and China’s ambition. Talk of France and Britain working together and bolstering NATO ‘s nuclear capabilities is becoming increasingly prevalent throughout Europe.

Similarly, Arab countries are being pushed towards atomic capabilities by concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme . The development of robotic weapons and artificial intelligence also raises concerns over the mechanisation of nuclear decision-making.

As a country with burgeoning energy demands and commitments to reducing carbon emissions, nuclear power plays a pivotal role in India’s energy strategy as well as strengthening its stand among the ever-threatening nuclear powers.

Here’s an in-depth look at India’s nuclear future, covering its current status, plans, challenges, and strategic implications.

Table of Contents

India’s Nuclear Program: Current status

• Nuclear Power Capacity : As of now, India has 22 operational nuclear reactors with a total installed capacity of about 6,780 MW. These reactors are spread across several states, including Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Rajasthan.
• Fuel Cycle : India operates a closed fuel cycle, involving uranium mining, fuel fabrication, reactor operation, reprocessing of spent fuel, and waste management. This cycle is aimed at maximizing the utilization of nuclear material and minimizing waste.
• Technology and Reactor Types : India primarily uses Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) and has also developed indigenous technology such as the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR).
• The country has ambitious plans to deploy Thorium-based reactors as part of its three-stage nuclear program, leveraging its vast Thorium reserves.

India’s nuclear future

• Expansion of Nuclear Capacity : The Indian government aims to increase its nuclear power capacity to 22,480 MW by 2031, with nuclear accounting for nearly 9% of India’s electricity by 2047.
• This involves the construction of new reactors, including Light Water Reactors (LWRs) and Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs).
• New Projects : Several new nuclear projects are in the pipeline, including the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (in collaboration with Russia) and the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project (planned with French collaboration).
• Indigenous Development : India continues to focus on the development of its indigenous Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) to establish self-reliant technology and infrastructure.
• International Collaborations : India has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with several countries, including the United States, Russia, France, and Japan. These agreements facilitate technology transfer, fuel supply, and collaborative research.

Challenges Facing India’s Nuclear Future

Regulatory and Safety Concerns :

• Ensuring the highest standards of safety and regulatory compliance is paramount, especially in the wake of global nuclear accidents like Fukushima.
• The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) oversees nuclear safety in India, but there is a need for continuous enhancement of regulatory frameworks and practices.

Public Acceptance and Environmental Impact :

• Public opposition and environmental concerns can pose significant challenges to the expansion of nuclear facilities. Ensuring transparent communication and robust environmental impact assessments are crucial.

Technological and Financial Constraints :

• Developing and maintaining advanced nuclear technology is capital-intensive. Securing sufficient investment and managing the financial viability of nuclear projects are ongoing challenges.

Nuclear Fuel Supply :

• While India has substantial Thorium reserves, it relies on imported Uranium. Ensuring a stable supply of nuclear fuel through international agreements and indigenous development is essential for the sustainability of India’s nuclear program.

Strategic Implications

• Energy Security : Expanding nuclear capacity will significantly contribute to India’s energy security by providing a stable and reliable source of power, reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and mitigating the impact of volatile global energy markets.
• Climate Change Mitigation : Nuclear power, as a low-carbon energy source, aligns with India’s commitments under the Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Expanding nuclear energy can help India achieve its climate goals by reducing its carbon footprint and promoting sustainable development.
• Geopolitical Influence : India’s nuclear program enhances its geopolitical stature by fostering strategic partnerships and technological collaborations with leading global powers. This can bolster India’s influence in international forums and negotiations.
• Technological Advancement : Investing in nuclear technology drives innovation and advances in related fields such as materials science, engineering, and safety protocols. It also enhances the country’s scientific and technical workforce.

Key Initiatives for Future

• Stage 1 : Utilizes natural uranium in PHWRs to generate electricity and produce plutonium.
• Stage 2 : Involves the use of plutonium in Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) to breed more plutonium and thorium-based U-233.
• Stage 3 : Focuses on Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWRs) using thorium and U-233 to achieve a sustainable nuclear fuel cycle.
• India’s vast thorium reserves offer a unique opportunity to develop a long-term, sustainable nuclear fuel cycle. Thorium-based reactors are expected to be safer and produce less long-lived radioactive waste.
• Strengthening international partnerships and securing nuclear fuel supplies through agreements with countries like Canada, Kazakhstan, and Australia.

Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR)

India’s Indigenous Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and its abundant thorium reserves are indeed pivotal to the country’s future energy security.

The PFBR, located at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) in Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu, is a key project in India’s nuclear energy program. It represents the second stage of India’s three-stage nuclear power program.

• The PFBR uses a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, composed of plutonium-239 and uranium-238. It is designed to produce more fuel than it consumes by converting uranium-238 into plutonium-239, which can then be used as fuel.
• Capacity : The PFBR has a design capacity of 500 MWe (megawatts electric), with plans for future breeders of higher capacity.
• Breeding Ratio : The reactor is designed to achieve a breeding ratio greater than one, meaning it produces more fissile material than it consumes. This is crucial for the sustainability of nuclear fuel.
• Safety : Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) operate at higher temperatures and require advanced safety mechanisms. The PFBR includes features like passive cooling and a robust containment structure to enhance safety.

Role in Energy Security

• Fuel Utilization : The PFBR can significantly extend the life of uranium resources by converting fertile uranium-238 into fissile plutonium-239, effectively increasing the availability of nuclear fuel.
• Reduced Dependency on Uranium : By breeding plutonium, the PFBR reduces India’s reliance on imported uranium, contributing to energy self-sufficiency.
• Technological Leadership : The successful operation of the PFBR places India at the forefront of advanced nuclear technology, showcasing its capability to develop and manage complex nuclear systems.

Thorium Reserves in India

India possesses one of the largest thorium reserves in the world, estimated at around 360,000 tonnes. Thorium is not fissile on its own but can be converted into fissile uranium-233 in a reactor.

Utilization in Nuclear Power:

• Three-Stage Nuclear Power Program
• Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) : The AHWR is designed to use thorium and U-233, providing a bridge to large-scale utilization of thorium. This reactor represents the third stage of India’s nuclear program.

Advantages of Thorium

• Abundance : Thorium is more abundant than uranium and widely available in India, providing a long-term resource for nuclear energy.
• Safety : Thorium-based reactors have inherent safety features, including lower production of long-lived radioactive waste and greater resistance to proliferation.
• Environmental Benefits : Using thorium reduces the environmental impact of nuclear waste, as it produces less long-lived actinides compared to uranium-based fuel cycles.

Significance of PFBR

• Energy Security : The combination of PFBR technology and thorium reserves can provide a stable and long-term energy supply, reducing dependency on imported fossil fuels and uranium.
• Sustainability : The closed fuel cycle, which involves reprocessing and recycling spent fuel, ensures maximum utilization of resources and minimal waste, aligning with sustainable energy practices.
• Economic Impact : Developing indigenous nuclear technology and leveraging thorium reserves can boost the domestic economy, create jobs, and promote technological advancements.
• Geopolitical Influence : India’s leadership in thorium-based nuclear technology can enhance its geopolitical standing, enabling it to collaborate with other nations on advanced nuclear projects and export its technology.

India’s Indigenous Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor and its abundant thorium reserves are central to the nation’s strategy for achieving energy security and sustainability.

The PFBR, by breeding more fuel than it consumes, extends the life of India’s uranium resources, while thorium provides a vast and underutilized energy resource.

Together, they promise a future where India can meet its growing energy demands sustainably and securely, reducing reliance on imports and positioning itself as a leader in advanced nuclear technology.

As these technologies mature, they will play an increasingly critical role in India’s energy landscape, driving economic growth and technological innovation.

India’s nuclear future is a crucial component of its overall energy strategy, offering a pathway to energy security, environmental sustainability, and technological advancement.

While challenges remain, including regulatory, financial, and public acceptance issues, the strategic benefits of a robust nuclear program are significant.

By leveraging its technological capabilities, natural resources, and international partnerships, India can pave the way for a sustainable and secure energy future. The continued focus on innovation, safety, and public engagement will be key to realizing the full potential of India’s nuclear ambitions.

Related articles:

• India’s nuclear weapon program
• Nuclear energy
• Nuclear waste

-Article by Swathi Satish

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India and the Small Island Developing States

Nuclear security vol 18, no 15, the lesser known men : navigating the complexities of iran’s new leadership, challenges of islamic radicalisation in assam and secularisation of education, swarm drones in india: a growing capability.

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India’s nuclear power journey: why has it grown in fits and starts, author: dr manpreet sethi , distinguished fellow, centre for air power studies, keywords : nuclear energy, homi bhabha, kaps 3&4, india’s nuclear power programme, clnda, o n february 22, 2024, pm modi dedicated units 3 and 4 of the kakrapar atomic power station (kaps) to the nation. the construction of both units had started in november 2010 with a plan to complete it in five years. eventually, it took double that time for kaps 3 to go critical on july 22, 2020. it took another three years for some commissioning issues to be sorted out. unit 4 achieved criticality on december 17, 2023 and was connected to the power grid just two days before the pm’s latest visit., at 700 mwe capacity, kaps 3 and 4 are the scaled-up versions of earlier variants of candu pressurised heavy water reactors (phwrs) that india first built with canadian help. having graduated from the two 540 mwe that india had upscaled in the 2000s from the 220 mwe, they are currently the largest capacity reactors that india has indigenously designed and built. with these two, india now has 24 operational nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 8,180 mwe., the target now is to get to 22,480 mwe by the start of the next decade. nuclear power corporation of india ltd. (npcil), currently india’s only operator of nuclear reactors, announced in february 2024 that it will add 18 more nuclear reactors to produce another 13,800 mwe of electricity by 2031-32. india wishes to avail advantages of economies of scale by standardising the design of 700 mwe capacity reactors for ‘fleet construction’. ten of these have already been sanctioned to be built at gorakhpur in haryana, kaiga in karnataka, chutka in mp and mahi banswara in rajasthan and are at various stages of construction., will india be able to achieve these targets will these plants come up as expected, with one new plant being commissioned every year, as was announced by the minister in charge of atomic energy at the start of this decade scepticism is natural given the experience in india of the long gestation of nuclear plants. on many occasions, ambitious targets have had to be revised. why has india missed targets so often why has the perception grown that india’s nuclear power potential is over-promised but under-achieved, factors responsible for the fits and starts, early initiation into nuclear energy, the indian nuclear programme was amongst the first high-end science and technology efforts to be announced after independence as pm nehru was laying the foundation of modern india. he had a worthy teammate in homi j bhabha, the architect of india’s nuclear programme, who had, in fact, written a letter on march 12, 1944, to the trustees of sir dorabjee tata trust proposing the establishment of an institute to train nuclear scientists. this was even before the use of atomic bombs by the usa. bhabha expressed his vision thus, “when nuclear energy has been successfully applied for power production, in say a couple of decades from now, india will not have to look abroad for its experts, but will find them ready at hand.” [1] nehru too acknowledged the importance of atomic energy in his presidential address to the indian science congress in 1947, where he said atomic energy “may be used for war or may be used for peace. we cannot neglect it because it may be used for war… we shall develop it, i hope, in cooperation with the rest of the world and for peaceful purposes.” [2] therefore, the initial focus was to tap the civilian potential of the atom. accordingly, india legislated the atomic energy act on april 15, 1948, leading to the creation of the atomic energy commission on august 10 of the same year., it may be recalled that internationally, too, this was the period of nuclear euphoria [3] when people believed that nuclear electricity would be so cheaply produced that it would not require to be metered. us president eisenhower announced the atoms for peace programme in 1953, whereunder the usa entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with many countries. this proved to be timely for india, as was bhabha’s chairmanship of the international conference on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in 1955. in his opening address, he highlighted the importance of this energy for developing nations: “for the full industrialization of the underdeveloped countries and for the continuance of our civilization and its further development, atomic energy is not merely an aid, it is an absolute necessity .” [4], making use of his contacts abroad, bhabha secured nuclear cooperation for india from a number of sources. in june 1954, he requested sir john cockroft, his colleague from cambridge and an important figure in the british atomic programme, to help india build a low-power research reactor. ‘apsara,’ a research reactor that he designed with initial fuel from the uk, went critical in august 1956. the second research reactor to attain criticality, in 1960, was cirus–a 40 mw reactor built with canadian help and with the heavy water supplied by usa. canada also helped india set up its first power reactor, a phwr, at rawat bhatta in rajasthan. meanwhile, the us helped india construct two 200 mwe (later 160 mwe) boiling water reactors (bwrs) at tarapur. built through a turnkey project, tarapur atomic power stations (taps) went critical in 1969 and provided india with valuable reactor construction and operating expertise, besides electricity to the grid., it should also be mentioned that bhabha had conceptualised a three-stage plan for india’s nuclear energy trajectory. after the first phase of construction of phwrs, he planned the second phase with fast breeder reactors and then the third stage of thorium utilisation. the details of this plan and its relevance in today’s times will be discussed in a future column, but suffice it to say that india’s investment in nuclear energy was with a clear blueprint in mind. nuclear energy was seen as a long-term commitment to achieve energy self-sufficiency., first shock of 1974, the plans, however, began to look shaky once india conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion (pne) in 1974. washington perceived this as a betrayal of trust by india, for it had used the heavy water supplied for cirus and the plutonium produced therefrom in its nuclear explosive device. hence, under us laws, it ceased all cooperation with india and also reneged on its contractual obligations to supply enriched uranium to fuel the two power plants at tarapur. india, however, maintains that it violated no contractual commitments in conducting the pne since these, during the 1960s and 70s, were considered legitimate civil engineering purposes, with the us and ussr themselves conducting several pnes. [5], notwithstanding this argument, india came under sanctions and was denied access to dual-use technology, the list for which went on expanding through the 1980s and 1990s. therefore, india’s nuclear power programme was forced, after 1974, to rely on indigenous r&d and domestic industrial efforts. this resulted in time delays and cost overruns for existing projects. installed capacity in 1979-80 was about 600 mwe, and it could climb to no more than 950 mwe by 1987. in fact, after raps 1 went online in 1973, there was a long gap until 1981 when raps 2 started commercial power production. only two other power plants, maps 1 and 2 at madras, became critical in the 1980s. four more–naps 1 and 2 at narora & kaps 1 and 2 at kakrapar–came online in the 1990s. by 2000, the total nuclear energy generation stood at a mere 2,720 mwe., so, the pne impacted the pace of india’s nuclear power programme by putting a hard stop to ongoing nuclear cooperation and compelling india to rely on its own scientific and technological resources. it brought india onto the nuclear proliferation radar and made it a victim of technology denial regimes, many of which were created as a consequence of the indian action. thereafter, the power programme struggled over the next two decades., second shock of 1998, it was only by the second half of the 1990s that the nuclear power programme began to get back on its feet. indigenous efforts led to the construction of the first 540 mwe nuclear reactor. overall, seven plants were under construction by 1998. that is when india chose to overtly demonstrate its nuclear weapons capability. though this time, the pace of work on power reactors remained largely unaffected, constraints on further growth of the programme began to be felt in the early years of the new millennium. these were felt not in nuclear technology, expertise or financing but in the availability of uranium as fuel for an expanding power programme. this challenge, and the desire of the dae to rapidly enhance nuclear power production through the induction of additional imported, larger capacity power reactors, persuaded the government of the day to explore options for international civilian nuclear cooperation., a window of opportunity opened when president bush offered the promise of a constructive nuclear engagement with india. his vision was encapsulated in the joint indo-us statement of july 18, 2005, signed when prime minister manmohan singh visited washington. this was an implicit recognition of india as a rising economic power with substantial energy requirements and as a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”. therefore, from being viewed as an outcast to being chastised for “illegal” nuclear weapons possession, the then indian pm described it in the indian parliament as a step where: “the existence of our strategic programme is being acknowledged even while we are being invited to become a full partner in international civil nuclear energy cooperation”. [6], nuclear accident at fukushima, 2011, it took three years of negotiations between india and the usa to arrive at an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. debates within both countries examined the pros and cons of such engagement. meanwhile, washington had to amend its own legislation to enable cooperation with india, and new delhi had to envisage and engage in a separation plan to distance its civil and strategic nuclear programmes. finally, in 2008, after fixing all the necessary national and international requirements, india and the usa signed the 123 agreement. thereafter, the nuclear suppliers group granted a waiver to india to partake in international nuclear commerce., between 2008 and 2011, india signed several mous with many countries for the import of uranium as nuclear fuel and also for the construction of large-capacity imported nuclear reactors. nuclear enthusiasm and dreams of rapid reactor expansion soared, only to be dashed by an accident at the fukushima nuclear power plants in japan in 2011. this cast a pall of gloom on nuclear energy programmes worldwide. concerns about nuclear safety compelled governments to institute safety reviews and scale back expansion plans. india, too, became a victim of this even as it was getting ready to take steps towards opening up its nuclear sector to entry of domestic and international private players., nuclear liability law, 2011, fukushima brought attention to civil liability in case of an accident. in the case of india, the npcil, created in 1986, had been the sole designer, constructor and operator of all nuclear reactors in india. accordingly, the liability rested with the government of india. but, as the prospects of entry of private players into the field grew after 2008, it became necessary to enact the required legislation. influenced by the experience of fukushima, as also by that of the bhopal gas tragedy of 1984, when an accident in a gas plant run by an american company, union carbide, had led to the death of 20,000 people, the government drafted a stringent civil liability for nuclear damages act (clnda). in fact, at the time that the act was being debated in india, the verdict for the bhopal gas leak accident was announced, and the public mood was critical of the inordinate delay in providing compensation to the victims and the inadequacy of the compensation amount. therefore, the opposition parties then insisted on a strong nuclear liability law., as it came into being, the clnda made both the suppliers and operators liable in case of an accident. while this was done to assuage public concerns, it was seen as a harsh move by the private industry, and it turned away prospective nuclear suppliers from wanting to invest in the nuclear sector. subsequently, to reassure the suppliers that they would not be held liable and that the npcil as operator would be the one in charge, the government provided clarifications through a special notification in 2015. in 2016, it also set up an insurance pool to facilitate confidence by covering suppliers’ risk. a special nuclear liability fund of rs 2000 crores was created to cover damages resulting from a nuclear accident in case they exceeded the limit specified at  rs 1500 crores for nuclear power operators under the clnda. however, private participation in the construction and operation of nuclear reactors in india has yet to see the light of the day. while private industry has long been engaged in supplying equipment to the npcil, the hope of their teaming up with npcil for a partnership has not yet occurred., meanwhile, another public enterprise, the national thermal power corporation (ntpc), did form a joint venture company (jvc) named anusakthi vidyut nigam limited (ashvini) with npcil in 2011. atomic energy act was amended in 2015 to enable such joint ventures of public sector units (psus) to build, own and operate nuclear power plants in india. press reports of may 2023 indicated that the jv will build the 2 x 700mw chutka madhya pradesh atomic power project and the mahi banswara rajasthan atomic power project, which has a 4 x 700mw capacity. [7], meanwhile, in another attempt to rejuvenate the possibility of private participation, it was reported in february 2024 that india would seek funding from private industries up to the tune of us$ 26 billion to accelerate the nuclear power programme as a way of reaching india’s commitment of 50 per cent electricity from non-fossil fuels by 2030. [8] under the proposed plan, private companies like tata power, reliance power, adani power and vedanta, will invest in the nuclear plants, acquire land, and undertake construction in areas outside the reactor complex of the plants since the right to build and run the stations and their fuel management will rest with npcil. but, the private companies are expected to earn revenue from the power plant’s electricity sales and npcil would operate the projects for a fee. it remains to be seen whether this hybrid model will receive enough traction from the domestic private industry., with more than six decades of operational experience and 24 operating nuclear power plants, india’s nuclear establishment has shown its scientific and technological prowess. it is also clear that this experience can come in handy to enable india to meet its climate commitments. the benefit of nuclear energy as a baseload source of low-carbon electricity is unmatchable by the currently popular renewable sources such as solar and wind. but nuclear energy can make a worthwhile contribution to electricity generation only if it can see rapid expansion., for this, the nuclear sector needs public-private partnerships. this partnership refers not only to npcil and private industry but also to a pact of trust between the nuclear establishment and the public. interestingly, the international mood for providing help to india with nuclear fuel and technology is favourable. fortunately, india also has the indigenous expertise and engineering experience to make the most of the time. however, domestic outreach to the indian public is imperative to explain to them the need for nuclear energy as an environmentally friendly source of electricity and the amount of effort put into nuclear safety and security. this could help overcome some of the scepticism., several factors are responsible for why the indian programme has not performed as well as it could have given the early start. this understanding is important to retain faith in this source of electricity generation, whose importance will only grow as climate change concerns require urgent mitigation and a growing economy demands more and more electricity. the value of india’s nuclear power programme should not be underestimated despite its low contribution to overall electricity production at this moment. if all things go right, including the operationalisation of the prototype fast breeder reactor that would herald the start of the second stage of its programme, the sector could yet take off. further discussions on the opportunities and challenges will continue in future issues of this column., click to view the pdf.

[1] HN Sethna, Atomic Energy (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1972), p.1.

[2] As quoted by Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), p. 47.

[3] For instance David Dietz, an American journalist and Pulitzer prize winner wrote, “With energy as abundant as air we breather, there will be no longer any reason to fight for oil or coal…” in his Atomic Energy in the Coming Era (Dodd Mead: 1945) pp. 12-23. Glenn Seaborg , adviser to US Atomic Energy Commission in 1950s too described it as a “magician’s potion that could free industrial society permanently from all practical bounds”, in Seaborg and William Corliss, Man and Atom: Building a New World through Nuclear Technology (Dutton, 1971).

[4] United Nations, First International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (New York, 1955), vol. 16, p. 33. Emphasis added.

[5] Germany too, in the early 1970s conducted a feasibility study for a project to build a canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Western Desert of Egypt using nuclear demolition. This project proposed to use 213 devices, with yields of 1 to 1.5 megatons detonated at depths of 100 to 500 m, to build this canal for the purpose of producing hydroelectric power.

[6] PM’s statement in Parliament on 27 Feb 2006. Full text available in The Hindu , 28 Feb 2006

[7] “NTPC and NPCIL to jointly develop nuclear power plants in India’, Power Technology, May 2, 2023. Available at https://www.power-technology.com/news/ntpc-npcil-nuclear-power-plants/ . Accessed on Feb 23, 2024.

[8] Read more at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/renewables/india-seeks-26-bln-of-private-nuclear-power-investments/articleshow/107848710.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst/ . Accessed on Feb 26, 2024.

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre for Air Power Studies [CAPS])

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The importance of safety culture in the safe and reliable operation of nuclear organizations is not a new concept. The greatest barriers to this area of research are twofold: (1) the definition and criteria of safety culture for a nuclear organization and (2) the measurement of those attributes in an objective and systematic fashion. This paper will discuss a proposed resolution of those barriers as demonstrated by the collection of data across nuclear and non-nuclear facilities over a two year period.

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Nuclear Accidents In India

This write-up helps know the incidents of nuclear accidents in India.

Nuclear accidents After Fukushima nuclear accident, there were widespread doubts in mind of every person regarding to safety of nuclear power stations in India. There were apprehensions if the same happens, what Indian government can do for the safety of people. There are six nuclear power plants in India and twenty nuclear reactors were installed in these nuclear power plants. Some groups have called for shutting down of these reactors. Some have called for moratorium on nuclear power plants under construction. Are there any nuclear accidents in India? There are nuclear accidents in India, but there is no nuclear disaster in India . India had so many accidents in its kitty, but they are not prominent as only economical loss is incurred but not the human loss. Some accidents caused heavier losses to environment too in addition to economical losses. 1987 Kalpakkam accident Kalpakkam atomic power station is located in Tamil Nadu. It is nuclear power generating station with capacity of 440MW. This power station is run by Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited. The accident occurred on 4th May, 1987. The accident occurred while refuelling process was going on for fast breeder test reactor which greatly damaged the reactor core. This led to the shutting down of the nuclear reactor for two years. As per 2006 monetary value, the loss incurred was 300 million dollars. 1989 Tarapur accident Tarapur power plant is the highest nuclear energy producer with total capacity of 1400MW in India. It is located in Maharashtra. The accident occurred on 10th September, 1989. The leakage of radioactive iodine was the reason of this accident. It took one year for repairing which had cost around 78 million dollar according to 2006 value. 1992 Tarapur accident Tarapur nuclear reactor tube released radioactivity due to its malfunctioning on 13th May, 1992. There is no untoward incident reported. 1993 Narora fire accident Narora atomic power station is situated in Uttar Pradesh. Fire at turbine blades was the reason for accident. All important cables were burnt by this incident incurring 220 million dollar loss. Even though there is fire accident, there is no damage to reactor. 1995 RAPS leakage incident Rajasthan atomic power station at Kota leaked helium. The heavy water was mixed with water of Rana Pratap Sagar river. The power station was closed for two years for repairs. The loss was estimated at 280 million dollars as per 2006 monetary value. 2002 Kalpakkam accident Kalpakkam fast breeder reactor leaked the radioactive sodium which damaged the valves and systems led to the accident. This caused 30 million dollar loss. 2010 Mayapuri incident Mayapuri is a place in Delhi. Negligence is the prime reason for this accident. Delhi University used an irradiator. But, it decided to sell it to scrap dealer as it was not in use for a longer time without observing the things in it. The workers of scrap shop went on cutting it unknowingly. They came into contact with radioactive cobalt substance which led to severe health problems and death of a person. Disaster management in India is poor when we take into account of nuclear accidents between 1993 and 1995. In this period, India experienced more incidents of radioactive exposures to humans. There is need of taking safety measures to avoid nuclear hazardous incidents. To know about safety measures visit Nuclear accidents reasons and safety measures .

Tarapur accident 89 and 92, what was the INES level ? Did leaks damaged environment ?

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Radioactive Discharges from Indian Nuclear Plants

• 01 Feb 2024
• 10 min read
• GS Paper - 3
• Water Resources
• Environmental Pollution & Degradation
• Disaster Management

For Prelims: Minimal Radioactive Discharges from Indian Nuclear Plants, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) , Nuclear Fission , Implications of Radioactive Discharge.

For Mains: Minimal Radioactive Discharges from Indian Nuclear Plants, Environment Impact Assessment.

Why in News?

Recently, the researchers from Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in an analysis has found that the Radioactive Discharges from Indian Nuclear Plants have been Minimal.

• The researchers analyzed the radiological data from six nuclear power plants in India over a period of 20 years (2000-2020).

Radioactive discharge refers to the release of radioactive substances into the environment as a result of human activities, typically from nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants, research reactors, or other industrial processes involving radioactive materials.

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre

• BARC is India’s premier nuclear research facility based in Mumbai, Maharashtra.
• It is a multi-disciplinary research center with extensive infrastructure for advanced research and development.
• Its core mandate is to sustain peaceful applications of nuclear energy, primarily for power generation.

What are the Key Findings of the Analysis?

• The radioactive discharges from the nuclear plants were found to have a minimal impact on the environment.
• The concentrations of fission products beyond 5 km radius have been below the minimum detectable activity of the instruments used, implying that the monitored values are “insignificant”.
• Gaseous waste released into the atmosphere includes fission product noble gases, Argon 41, radioiodine, and particulate radionuclides (cobalt-60, strontium-90, caesium-137, and tritium).
• Radioactive discharges are carried out through dilution and dispersion, adhering to strict radiological and environmental regulatory regimes.
• Average gross alpha activity in air particulates at all seven nuclear plants was less than 0.1 megabecquerel (mBq) per cubic meter.
• The Narora Atomic Power Station, Uttar Pradesh, exhibited higher maximum values, attributed to a higher atmospheric dust load.
• Average concentrations of radionuclides (iodine-131, caesium-137, and strontium-90) in air particulates across all sites were below 1 mBq per cubic meter.
• Concentrations of caesium-137 and strontium-90 in rivers, lakes, and sea water near the nuclear plants were below specified levels.
• The concentrations of caesium-137 and strontium-90 in sediments were within the statistical variation of values observed in natural sediments, without showing any trend of deposition or accumulation.
• Tritium was detectable above the minimum detectable activity at all sites except the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Station.
• Tritium concentrations were relatively higher at the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station.

What is the Significance of the Findings?

• The findings hold potential significance for reinforcing India’s commitment to advancing its nuclear power programme. The minimal public doses underscore the safe operation of Indian nuclear power plants.

What are the Implications of Radioactive Discharge?

• Radioactive substances released into the environment can impact ecosystems, affecting plants, animals, and microorganisms.
• In 1986, the Chernobyl Disaster released a significant amount of radioactive particles into the atmosphere. These particles settled on soil and water bodies, leading to widespread contamination. The nearby Pripyat River and its tributaries were affected, impacting aquatic life.
• Radioactive discharges can expose nearby populations to ionizing radiation. Prolonged or high-level exposure may increase the risk of radiation-related health issues, including cancer.
• In the Chernobyl disaster, the exposed population, including workers and nearby residents, experienced increased rates of thyroid cancer due to the release of iodine-131.
• Exposure to certain radioactive substances, such as strontium-90 and caesium-137, is associated with an increased risk of cancer, particularly if the exposure is prolonged.
• Ionizing radiation can potentially cause genetic mutations, increasing the risk of hereditary disorders in future generations.
• If radioactive substances enter the food chain, agricultural products and livestock may become contaminated, posing risks to consumers.
• In the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, nuclear radiation contaminated agricultural products, such as rice and fish, raising concerns about food safety.
• Areas near nuclear facilities that experience radioactive discharges may see a decline in property values due to concerns about safety.
• Three Mile Island Accident (1979) contributed to a decline in public confidence in nuclear power, leading to increased regulatory scrutiny and a slowdown in the development of new nuclear projects in the United States.

What are the Initiatives Related to Safe Radioactive Discharge?

• The treaty requires countries to provide prompt notification of any nuclear accident that may affect other countries.
• It aims to address the safety of spent fuel management and radioactive waste management, including the prevention of accidents and minimizing potential radiological hazards.
• Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS): The CNS is a legally-binding treaty that was adopted in 1994 and aims to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants. The CNS is an incentive-based treaty that requires states to establish and maintain a regulatory framework for nuclear safety. The CNS also aims to protect people, society, and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.
• The directive also requires countries to create and implement national programs for managing these materials.
• Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB): AERB serves as the regulatory body for nuclear and radiation safety in India. It establishes and enforces regulations, guidelines, and standards to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities, including measures for radioactive discharge.
• Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): Nuclear projects, including power plants, are subject to rigorous environmental impact assessments. These assessments evaluate potential environmental and health impacts, including radioactive discharges, before a project is approved.
• Effluent Treatment and Dilution: Nuclear facilities employ effluent treatment systems to manage liquid radioactive waste before discharge. Dilution and dispersion techniques are often used to minimize the concentration of radioactive substances in discharges.

Previous Year Question (PYQ)

Q. To meet its rapidly growing energy demand, some opine that India should pursue research and development on thorium as the future fuel of nuclear energy. In this text, what advantage does thorium hold over uranium? (2012)

• Thorium is far more abundant in nature than uranium.
• On the basis of per unit mass of mined mineral, thorium can generate more energy compared to natural uranium.
• Thorium produces less harmful waste compared to uranium.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

(a) 1 only  (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

Q. Which among the following has the world’s largest reserves of Uranium? (2009)

(a) Australia  (b) Canada  (c) Russian Federation (d) USA

Nuclear Power in India, Significance, Recent Developments

Nuclear power is a reliable source of electricity, it can help to reduce India's reliance on fossil fuels. Know all about Nuclear Power in India and related recent Developments.

Table of Contents

Context : The first largest indigenous 700 MWe Kakrapar Nuclear Power Plant Unit-3 in Gujarat starts operations at full capacity.

Nuclear Power in India

Nuclear power in India is a major source of electricity, accounting for about 9% of the country’s total generation. India has 22 nuclear power reactors in operation, with a total capacity of over 6,700 megawatts. Nuclear power is a reliable source of electricity, and it can help to reduce India’s reliance on fossil fuels. It is a clean source of energy, and it does not produce greenhouse gases.

India’s nuclear program began in the early 1950s, and the country’s first nuclear power reactor, the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, was commissioned in 1969. India has since become a major nuclear power producer, and its nuclear program is now one of the largest in the developing world.

The Indian government has ambitious plans to expand its nuclear power program in the coming years. The government has set a target of generating 25% of the country’s electricity from nuclear power by 2050. To achieve this target, India is planning to build up to 100 new nuclear power reactors over the next few decades.

What is Nuclear Energy?

Nuclear energy is a type of energy that is generated by the process of nuclear reactions- either nuclear fission or nuclear fusion. The energy released during these reactions can be harnessed and used to produce electricity, heat, or other forms of energy.

Nuclear Fission

It is a process in which the nucleus of an atom is split into two or more smaller nuclei, releasing a large amount of energy in the process. This process is used in nuclear power plants to generate electricity. One example of nuclear fission is the reaction that occurs in a nuclear reactor when uranium atoms are split into smaller atoms.

Nuclear Fusion

It is a process in which two or more atomic nuclei come together to form a single, more massive nucleus, releasing a large amount of energy in the process. This process occurs naturally in stars, including our own sun. One example of nuclear fusion is the reaction that occurs in a hydrogen bomb.

Nuclear Enrichment

• Natural uranium consists of two different isotopes – nearly 99% U-238 and only around 0.7% of U-235.
• U-235 is a fissile material that can sustain a chain reaction in a nuclear reactor.
• The enrichment process increases the proportion of U-235 through the process of isotope separation (U-238 is separated from U-235).
• For nuclear weapons, enrichment is required up to 90% or more which is known as weapons-grade uranium.
• Low-enriched uranium, which typically has a 3-5% concentration of U-235, can be used to produce fuel for commercial nuclear power plants.
• Highly enriched uranium has a purity of 20% or more and is used in research reactors.

Methods for Uranium Enrichment

• The most common method of enrichment is through the use of centrifuges, which spin at high speeds to create a centrifugal force that separates the isotopes based on their weight.
• Another method is gaseous diffusion, where uranium hexafluoride gas is forced through a series of barriers, allowing the lighter U-235 to diffuse more rapidly and become more concentrated.

Significance of Nuclear Energy

• Low carbon emissions : Nuclear energy is a low-carbon source of power that does not release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, unlike fossil fuels.
• Reliability : Nuclear power plants can run for long periods of time without interruption and are highly reliable sources of electricity.
• High energy density : Nuclear fuel contains a high energy density, meaning that it can produce a large amount of energy from a small amount of fuel.
• Independence from fossil fuels : Nuclear power does not depend on fossil fuels, which are finite resources subject to price fluctuations and environmental pollution.
• Base load power : Nuclear power can provide reliable baseload power to complement intermittent renewable energy sources like wind and solar power.
• Energy security : Nuclear power can help to increase energy security by reducing reliance on foreign sources of oil and gas.
• Advanced technologies : Nuclear power research and development have led to advances in technologies like medical imaging, food irradiation, and space exploration.

Concerns Associated with Nuclear Energy

• Nuclear accidents: Nuclear accidents can have catastrophic consequences, as seen in Chornobyl and Fukushima.
• The Fukushima disaster in 2011 resulted in a significant release of radioactive materials into the environment. These materials (nuclear waste), can remain radioactive and dangerous for thousands of years.
• This has forced the country to import a significant portion of its uranium requirements, making the country’s nuclear energy program vulnerable to global market conditions and political tensions.
• Proliferation risk : The technology and materials used in nuclear power plants can be used to make nuclear weapons, making nuclear power a proliferation risk.
• High cost: Nuclear power plants are expensive to build and maintain, and the high costs can make it difficult for countries to justify building new plants.
• Security risks : Nuclear power plants and nuclear waste storage facilities can be targets for terrorism or other security threats.
• Decommissioning challenges : Decommissioning nuclear power plants at the end of their useful life is a complex and costly process that can take decades to complete.
• This has limited its access to advanced nuclear technology and fuel supplies from other countries.
• Public opposition: Nuclear energy is a polarizing issue that can generate significant public opposition due to concerns about safety and waste storage.

India’s Nuclear Energy Progress and Potential

• Nuclear energy currently accounts for around 3% of India’s total electricity generation.
• India has over 22 nuclear reactors in 7 power plants across the country which produces 6780 MW of nuclear power.
• Also, the government plans to commission 20 more nuclear power plants by 2031 and will add nearly 15,000 MW to power generating capacity.
• Today, India is the sixth largest in the world in the number of functional reactors and the second largest in the total number of reactors including those under construction.
• India has significant reserves of thorium, a naturally occurring radioactive element that can be used as a fuel in nuclear reactors.
• With the world’s largest reserves of thorium, estimated at around 360,000 tonnes, India has the potential to become a major player in the nuclear energy sector.
• In addition to thorium, India also has significant reserves of uranium (70,000 tonnes), which can be used as fuel in nuclear reactors.

India’s Three-Stage Nuclear Power Programme

• India’s three-stage nuclear power programme was formulated by Homi Bhabha in the 1950s to secure the country’s long term energy independence, through the use of uranium and thorium reserves found in the monazite sands of coastal regions of South India.
• The ultimate focus of the programme is on enabling the thorium reserves of India to be utilized in meeting the country’s energy requirements.

Recent Developments in India’s Nuclear Landscape

• As a result, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) is now in two joint ventures with the National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (NTPC) and the Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL).
• As an example, the upcoming nuclear power plant in Gorakhpur town of Haryana, which will become operational in the near future.
• Indigenization : The world’s first thorium-based nuclear plant, “Bhavni,” using Uranium-233, is being set up at Kalpakkam in Tamil Nadu. This plant will be entirely indigenous and will be the first of its kind. The experimental thorium plant “Kamini” already exists in Kalpakkam.

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Nuclear Power in India FAQs

How many nuclear power in india.

There are 22 nuclear power reactors in operation in India, with a total capacity of 6780 MW.

Who invented nuclear power in india?

Nuclear power was not invented in India. It was first harnessed for commercial purposes in the United States in the 1950s. However, India has made significant contributions to the development of nuclear power technology.

Does India have nuclear power plants?

Yes, India has 22 nuclear power plants that produce 6780 MW of electricity.

Why did india become a nuclear power?

India became a nuclear power for a variety of reasons, including Energy security, Military deterrence, Scientific prestige, Economic development etc.

What are the benefits of nuclear power in India?

Nuclear power is a reliable source of electricity, and it can help to reduce India's reliance on fossil fuels. Nuclear power is also a clean source of energy, and it does not produce greenhouse gases. Nuclear power can also help to create jobs and boost the economy.

What are the drawbacks of nuclear power in India?

Nuclear power is expensive to build and operate. Nuclear power plants can also be dangerous if they are not properly managed. Nuclear waste is also a long-term problem that needs to be carefully managed.

Is nuclear power safe in India?

India has a good safety record when it comes to nuclear power. However, there have been some accidents and incidents in the past. The Indian government is committed to improving nuclear safety, and it has taken a number of steps to do so.

What is the future of nuclear power in India?

The Indian government has ambitious plans to expand its nuclear power program in the coming years. The government has set a target of generating 25% of the country's electricity from nuclear power by 2050. To achieve this target, India is planning to build up to 100 new nuclear power reactors over the next few decades.

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Nuclear accidents and holocaust: definition, causes and consequences of accidents.

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Nuclear Accidents and Holocaust: Definition, Causes and Consequences of Accidents!

A nuclear and radiation accident is defined by the International Atomic agency as an “event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility”.  Examples include lethal effects to individuals, large radioactivity release to the environment, or “reactor core melt.”

The prime example of a “major nuclear accident” is one in which a reactor core is damaged and significant amounts of radiation are released, such as in the Chernobyl Disaster in 1986. The impact of nuclear accidents has been a topic of debate practically since the first nuclear reactors were constructed. It has also been a key factor in public concern about nuclear facilities.

Some technical measures to reduce the risk of accidents or to minimize the amount of radioactivity released to the environment have been adopted. Despite the use of such measures, “there have been many accidents with varying impacts as well near misses and incidents”.

Benjamin K. Sovacool has reported that worldwide there have been 99 accidents at nuclear power plants. Fifty-seven accidents have occurred since the Chernobyl disaster, and 57% (56 out of 99) of all nuclear-related accidents have occurred in the USA.

Serious nuclear power plant accidents include the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (2011), Chernobyl disaster (1986), Three Mile Island accident (1979), and the SL-1 accident (1961). Stuart Arm states, “apart from Chernobyl, no nuclear workers or members of the public have ever died as a result of exposure to radiation due to a commercial nuclear reactor incident.”

Nuclear-powered submarine mishaps include the K-19 reactor accident (1961), the K-27 reactor accident (1968), and the K-431 reactor accident (1985). Serious radiation accidents include the Kyshtym disaster, Wind scale fire, radiotherapy accident in Costa Rica, radiotherapy, and radiation accident in Morocco, Goiania accident, radiation accident in Mexico City, radiotherapy unit accident in Thailand, and the Mayapuri radiological accident in India.

Two of the major nuclear accidents are as follows:

(i) Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster:

26th of April 1986 witnessed one of the world’s worst Nuclear Disaster ever in Chernobyl. Chernobyl is approximately 80 miles (which is 120 kilometers) north of the capital city of the Ukraine, Kiev. The accident took lives of 30 people immediately and vast evacuation of 135000 people within 20 mile radius of the power plant was carried out after the accident.

Causes of the Accident :

There was not one cause of this accident, there were several which all contributed to it. This accident happened while testing an RMBK reactor. A chain reaction occurred in the reactor and got out of control, causing explosions and a huge fireball which blew off the heavy concrete and steel lid on the reactor.

These are the causes:

1. Design fault in RBMK reactor

2. A violation, of procedures

3. Breakdown of communication

4. Lack of a ‘Safety Culture’ in the power plant

Consequences of the Accident :

1. environmental consequences:.

The radioactive fallout caused radioactive material to deposit itself over large areas of ground. It has had an effect over most of the northern hemisphere in one way or another. In some local ecosystems within a 6 mile (10 km) radius of the power plant the radiation is lethally high especially in small mammals such as mice and coniferous trees. Luckily within 4 years of the accident nature began to restore itself, but genetically these plants may be scarred for life.

2. Health effects:

Firstly, there was a huge increase in Thyroid Cancer in Ukrainian children (from birth to 15 years old). From 1981-1985 there was an average of 4-6 patients per million but between 1986 and 1997 this increased to an average of 45 patients per million.

It was also established that 64% of Thyroid Cancer patients lived in the most contaminated areas of the Ukraine (Kiev province, Kiev city, provinces of Rovno, Zhitomir, Cherkassy and Chernigov).

3. Psychological consequences:

There has been an increase in psychological disorders such as anxiety, depression, helplessness and other disorders which lead to mental stress. These disorders are not a consequence of radiation, but a consequence from the stress of evacuation, the lack of information given after the accident and the stress of knowing that their health and their children’s health could be affected.

4. Economic, political and social consequences:

The worst contaminated areas were economically, socially and politically declining as the birth rate had decreased and emigration numbers had substantially risen which had caused a shortage in labour force. These areas could not evolve industrially or agriculturally because of strict rules that were introduced because the area was too contaminated.

The few products made were hard to sell or export because people were aware that it had come from the Ukraine and so were scared of being affected, this caused a further economic decline. Socially people have been limited on their activities making everyday life very difficult.

Now in the year 2000, everything is looking a lot better and is starting to rise again and probably in about 10 years time almost everything will be as good as normal in the Ukraine.

(ii) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster:

The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was a series of equipment failures, nuclear meltdowns, and releases of radioactive materials at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami on 11 March, 2011. It is the largest nuclear disaster since the Chernobyl disaster of 1986.

The plant comprises six separate boiling water reactors originally designed by General Electric (GE), and maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). At the time of the quake, Reactor 4 had been de-fuelled while 5 and 6 were in cold shutdown for planned maintenance.

The remaining reactors shut down automatically after the earthquake, and emergency generators came online to control electronics and coolant systems. The tsunami resulted in flooding of the rooms containing the emergency generators.

Consequently those generators ceased working, causing eventual power loss to the pumps that circulate coolant water in the reactor. The pumps then stopped working, causing the reactors to overheat due to the high decay heat that normally continues for a short time, even after a nuclear reactor shut down.

The flooding and earthquake damage hindered external assistance. In the hours and days that followed. Reactors 1, 2 and 3 experienced full meltdown. As workers struggled to cool and shut down the reactors, several hydrogen- air chemical explosions occurred.

The hydrogen gas was produced by high heat in the reactors causing a hydrogen-producing reaction between the nuclear fuel metal cladding and the water surrounding them. The government ordered that seawater be used to attempt to cool the reactors this had the effect of ruining the reactors entirely. As the water levels in the fuel rods pools dropped, they began to overheat. Fears of radioactivity releases led to a 20 km (12 mi)-radius evacuation around the plant.

During the early days of the accident workers were temporarily evacuated at various times for radiation safety reasons. Electrical power was slowly restored for some of the reactors, allowing for automated cooling.

Related Articles:

• Dangers from Nuclear Power Plants and Nuclear Reactors
• Nuclear Energy: Essay on Nuclear Energy (548 Words)

Nuclear Accidents

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Uniqueness of India's nuclear trajectory premised on principle of 'no first use massive retaliation' CDS Chauhan

    New Delhi, Jun 26 (PTI) The uniqueness of India's nuclear trajectory is premised on the principle of "no first use" and "massive retaliation", Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan said on Wednesday.     In an address at a seminar, he highlighted the changing nature and characteristics of conventional warfare and geopolitical turmoil being witnessed in various parts of the world.     The Chief of Defence Staff also noted that the threat from nuclear weapons has once again occupied centre-stage in the geopolitical landscape, according to the defence ministry.     Gen Chauhan reiterated that the uniqueness of India's nuclear trajectory is premised on the principle of 'no first use and massive retaliation', it said in a statement.     He made the remarks while delivering an address on 'Nuclear Strategy: Contemporary Developments and Future Possibilities' at the seminar organised by the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS).     He stressed on the need for development of new doctrines as well as importance of deterrence and safeguarding "nuclear C4I2SR" (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) infrastructure.     Months after India carried out five nuclear tests in 1998, India came out with a nuclear doctrine.     In the doctrine released in 1999, India declared a "no first use" policy that essentially said the country would not be the first to launch a nuclear weapon.     At the same time, the policy says India retains the right to retaliate in response to any nuclear attack.

(This story has not been edited by THE WEEK and is auto-generated from PTI)

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