what is the role of critical thinking in producing the argumentative or documented essay

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Essay writing: argument and criticality.

• Argument and criticality

What is an argument?

Essays are generally structured as arguments . 

After you analyse the essay question, you read (or re-read) texts from your reading list and texts found through your own research. On the basis of your reading, you develop a general view, or answer, to the essay question, which you then defend with the evidence found in your reading. 

The view that you defend in your essay is called a thesis statement . 

Thesis statements

What is a thesis statement ?

Your thesis statement states your position on the essay question, which you will defend with one or more arguments in the body of the essay. Your thesis statement is essentially your answer to the essay question, expressed in a single sentence, and will be based on your reading.

Your thesis statement is:

• Is developed through reading. What does the literature say about the issue referred to in the essay question?
• Provided in the introduction 
• Usually follows a brief outline of the problem, or issue, addressed by the essay question 
• Is specific and relevant to the essay question

Examples of thesis statements

Essay question:  ‘Discuss the claim that mass public schooling provides equal access to high quality education.’

Thesis:   This essay will argue  that  while the introduction of mass public schooling was a great advancement in ensuring equal access to education, the influence of socio-economic status on educational attainment has not yet been overcome.  

"This essay will argue"  → Signposting phrase to introduce your argument             

 "while mass public schooling was a great advancement in ensuring equal access to education, the influence of socio-economic status on educational attainment has not yet been overcome"  → Clearly indicates your position on the issue   

Example 2: 

Essay question:  To what extent is there a 'participation crisis' in UK politics?

Thesis:  If we define 'participation' as xyz, it can be argued that there is not in fact a participation crisis in UK politics. 

A note on thesis statements : 

It can feel scary to commit yourself to a thesis statement because thesis statements seem to speak with tremendous certainty! But..."The influence of socio-economic status on educational attainment has not yet been overcome" simply indicates the general destination that the essay will be moving toward. It does not have to be a highly developed statement of how things are. Try to develop a general, 'working' thesis to give your writing direction. You can make it more precise and nuanced as you work through various drafts of your essay. 

Additional help with thesis statements

Effective argumentation

To write an effective argument, you will need to provide the following:

• Thesis statement
• Evidence in the form of literature, data, research findings etc.
• Logic: the thesis statement must be supported logically by the evidence.
• Consideration of counter-arguments
• You can present concessions to counter-arguments, but should reject their key points with your evidence/reasoning.
• Confident whenever possible
• Cautious, qualifying, hedging, when there are uncertainties and limitations

Writing effective arguments

In defending your thesis statement, you will likely have to break it down into separate issues, or aspects, which are dealt with separately.

In discussing these separate aspects, you might develop smaller thesis statements, which are related to your larger thesis statement . 

This means that your essay will have a "tree structure". 

Essay tree structure

An example of a more developed tree structure:

Thesis: Digital technology will lead to greater social mistrust and dysfunctionality rather than greater social cohesion

The handout below looks at the difference between everyday arguments and arguments in academic writing:

• Academic vs. Everyday Arguments An analysis of the similarities and differences between academic arguments and everyday arguments

Argument structure

• The order and structure of an argument can vary

Claim: We should go to the cinema today.

Argument structure A:

1. Counter arguments/concessions:

It is true that…

Cinema is costly (topic 1)

It is hard to agree on a movie (topic 2)

Tomorrow we have lectures in the morning (topic 3)

2. Rebuttals with evidence:

              But

                             We have saved money by working… (topic 1)

There is a new sci-fi movie that you should like and I’m finding quite intriguing... (topic 2) 

                             We haven’t been out in a while and I need some

                              inspiration to study more efficiently... (topic 3) 

Argument structure B:

1. Counterargument/concession plus rebuttal of topic 1

Cinema is costly, at £10 per ticket, but we have saved money by working…

2. Counterargument/concession plus rebuttal of t opic 2 

It is hard to agree on a movie, but there is a new sci-fi movie that you should like and I’m finding quite intriguing..

3. Counterargument/concession plus rebuttal of t opic 3

Tomorrow we have lectures in the morning, but we haven’t been out in a while and I need some inspiration to study more efficiently

Obviously your academic writing will be more complex, will deal with more serious questions, will use evidence and will refer to the relevant academic literature!

Critical thinking and writing

Your essay needs to demonstrate some degree of analysis and critical thinking. The more you progress in higher education, the more you are expected to  use  and  apply  knowledge. This is reflected  in critical writing , whereby  you move from mere description to analysis and evaluation .

Critical thinking entails:

• Being objective
• Looking for weaknesses in arguments
• Checking arguments are logical
• Checking arguments are accurate
• Looking at an idea or data from different perspectives

It also involves asking questions about your own work as well as the work of others such as:

• Is this true?
• How reliable is this information?
• Can I support the arguments and claims I am making?

If you have ever been told that your writing is ‘too descriptive’ and not ‘critical’ enough then consider the differences between analytical writing and descriptive writing:

• Descriptive writing summarises, reports, lists and outlines information, theories and sources.
• Critical writing looks for links between sources, identifies issues, challenges established ideas and considers alternatives.

Check the guide on  Critical Thinking and Writing  for more information on writing critically. 

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• How to write an argumentative essay | Examples & tips

How to Write an Argumentative Essay | Examples & Tips

Published on July 24, 2020 by Jack Caulfield . Revised on July 23, 2023.

An argumentative essay expresses an extended argument for a particular thesis statement . The author takes a clearly defined stance on their subject and builds up an evidence-based case for it.

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Table of contents

When do you write an argumentative essay, approaches to argumentative essays, introducing your argument, the body: developing your argument, concluding your argument, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about argumentative essays.

You might be assigned an argumentative essay as a writing exercise in high school or in a composition class. The prompt will often ask you to argue for one of two positions, and may include terms like “argue” or “argument.” It will frequently take the form of a question.

The prompt may also be more open-ended in terms of the possible arguments you could make.

Argumentative writing at college level

At university, the vast majority of essays or papers you write will involve some form of argumentation. For example, both rhetorical analysis and literary analysis essays involve making arguments about texts.

In this context, you won’t necessarily be told to write an argumentative essay—but making an evidence-based argument is an essential goal of most academic writing, and this should be your default approach unless you’re told otherwise.

Examples of argumentative essay prompts

At a university level, all the prompts below imply an argumentative essay as the appropriate response.

Your research should lead you to develop a specific position on the topic. The essay then argues for that position and aims to convince the reader by presenting your evidence, evaluation and analysis.

• Don’t just list all the effects you can think of.
• Do develop a focused argument about the overall effect and why it matters, backed up by evidence from sources.
• Don’t just provide a selection of data on the measures’ effectiveness.
• Do build up your own argument about which kinds of measures have been most or least effective, and why.
• Don’t just analyze a random selection of doppelgänger characters.
• Do form an argument about specific texts, comparing and contrasting how they express their thematic concerns through doppelgänger characters.

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See an example

An argumentative essay should be objective in its approach; your arguments should rely on logic and evidence, not on exaggeration or appeals to emotion.

There are many possible approaches to argumentative essays, but there are two common models that can help you start outlining your arguments: The Toulmin model and the Rogerian model.

Toulmin arguments

The Toulmin model consists of four steps, which may be repeated as many times as necessary for the argument:

• Make a claim
• Provide the grounds (evidence) for the claim
• Explain the warrant (how the grounds support the claim)
• Discuss possible rebuttals to the claim, identifying the limits of the argument and showing that you have considered alternative perspectives

The Toulmin model is a common approach in academic essays. You don’t have to use these specific terms (grounds, warrants, rebuttals), but establishing a clear connection between your claims and the evidence supporting them is crucial in an argumentative essay.

Say you’re making an argument about the effectiveness of workplace anti-discrimination measures. You might:

• Claim that unconscious bias training does not have the desired results, and resources would be better spent on other approaches
• Cite data to support your claim
• Explain how the data indicates that the method is ineffective
• Anticipate objections to your claim based on other data, indicating whether these objections are valid, and if not, why not.

Rogerian arguments

The Rogerian model also consists of four steps you might repeat throughout your essay:

• Discuss what the opposing position gets right and why people might hold this position
• Highlight the problems with this position
• Present your own position , showing how it addresses these problems
• Suggest a possible compromise —what elements of your position would proponents of the opposing position benefit from adopting?

This model builds up a clear picture of both sides of an argument and seeks a compromise. It is particularly useful when people tend to disagree strongly on the issue discussed, allowing you to approach opposing arguments in good faith.

Say you want to argue that the internet has had a positive impact on education. You might:

• Acknowledge that students rely too much on websites like Wikipedia
• Argue that teachers view Wikipedia as more unreliable than it really is
• Suggest that Wikipedia’s system of citations can actually teach students about referencing
• Suggest critical engagement with Wikipedia as a possible assignment for teachers who are skeptical of its usefulness.

You don’t necessarily have to pick one of these models—you may even use elements of both in different parts of your essay—but it’s worth considering them if you struggle to structure your arguments.

Regardless of which approach you take, your essay should always be structured using an introduction , a body , and a conclusion .

Like other academic essays, an argumentative essay begins with an introduction . The introduction serves to capture the reader’s interest, provide background information, present your thesis statement , and (in longer essays) to summarize the structure of the body.

Hover over different parts of the example below to see how a typical introduction works.

The spread of the internet has had a world-changing effect, not least on the world of education. The use of the internet in academic contexts is on the rise, and its role in learning is hotly debated. For many teachers who did not grow up with this technology, its effects seem alarming and potentially harmful. This concern, while understandable, is misguided. The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its critical benefits for students and educators—as a uniquely comprehensive and accessible information source; a means of exposure to and engagement with different perspectives; and a highly flexible learning environment.

The body of an argumentative essay is where you develop your arguments in detail. Here you’ll present evidence, analysis, and reasoning to convince the reader that your thesis statement is true.

In the standard five-paragraph format for short essays, the body takes up three of your five paragraphs. In longer essays, it will be more paragraphs, and might be divided into sections with headings.

Each paragraph covers its own topic, introduced with a topic sentence . Each of these topics must contribute to your overall argument; don’t include irrelevant information.

This example paragraph takes a Rogerian approach: It first acknowledges the merits of the opposing position and then highlights problems with that position.

Hover over different parts of the example to see how a body paragraph is constructed.

A common frustration for teachers is students’ use of Wikipedia as a source in their writing. Its prevalence among students is not exaggerated; a survey found that the vast majority of the students surveyed used Wikipedia (Head & Eisenberg, 2010). An article in The Guardian stresses a common objection to its use: “a reliance on Wikipedia can discourage students from engaging with genuine academic writing” (Coomer, 2013). Teachers are clearly not mistaken in viewing Wikipedia usage as ubiquitous among their students; but the claim that it discourages engagement with academic sources requires further investigation. This point is treated as self-evident by many teachers, but Wikipedia itself explicitly encourages students to look into other sources. Its articles often provide references to academic publications and include warning notes where citations are missing; the site’s own guidelines for research make clear that it should be used as a starting point, emphasizing that users should always “read the references and check whether they really do support what the article says” (“Wikipedia:Researching with Wikipedia,” 2020). Indeed, for many students, Wikipedia is their first encounter with the concepts of citation and referencing. The use of Wikipedia therefore has a positive side that merits deeper consideration than it often receives.

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An argumentative essay ends with a conclusion that summarizes and reflects on the arguments made in the body.

No new arguments or evidence appear here, but in longer essays you may discuss the strengths and weaknesses of your argument and suggest topics for future research. In all conclusions, you should stress the relevance and importance of your argument.

Hover over the following example to see the typical elements of a conclusion.

The internet has had a major positive impact on the world of education; occasional pitfalls aside, its value is evident in numerous applications. The future of teaching lies in the possibilities the internet opens up for communication, research, and interactivity. As the popularity of distance learning shows, students value the flexibility and accessibility offered by digital education, and educators should fully embrace these advantages. The internet’s dangers, real and imaginary, have been documented exhaustively by skeptics, but the internet is here to stay; it is time to focus seriously on its potential for good.

If you want to know more about AI tools , college essays , or fallacies make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples or go directly to our tools!

• Ad hominem fallacy
• Post hoc fallacy
• Appeal to authority fallacy
• False cause fallacy
• Sunk cost fallacy

College essays

• Choosing Essay Topic
• Write a College Essay
• Write a Diversity Essay
• College Essay Format & Structure
• Comparing and Contrasting in an Essay

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An argumentative essay tends to be a longer essay involving independent research, and aims to make an original argument about a topic. Its thesis statement makes a contentious claim that must be supported in an objective, evidence-based way.

An expository essay also aims to be objective, but it doesn’t have to make an original argument. Rather, it aims to explain something (e.g., a process or idea) in a clear, concise way. Expository essays are often shorter assignments and rely less on research.

At college level, you must properly cite your sources in all essays , research papers , and other academic texts (except exams and in-class exercises).

Add a citation whenever you quote , paraphrase , or summarize information or ideas from a source. You should also give full source details in a bibliography or reference list at the end of your text.

The exact format of your citations depends on which citation style you are instructed to use. The most common styles are APA , MLA , and Chicago .

The majority of the essays written at university are some sort of argumentative essay . Unless otherwise specified, you can assume that the goal of any essay you’re asked to write is argumentative: To convince the reader of your position using evidence and reasoning.

In composition classes you might be given assignments that specifically test your ability to write an argumentative essay. Look out for prompts including instructions like “argue,” “assess,” or “discuss” to see if this is the goal.

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• > Critical Reasoning and the Art of Argumentation
• > How to analyse arguments

Book contents

• Frontmatter
• CHAPTER 1 What is critical reasoning?
• CHAPTER 2 Obstacles to clear thinking: Preconceived ideas and fallacies
• CHAPTER 3 Working with arguments
• CHAPTER 4 How to analyse arguments
• CHAPTER 5 Definitions, counterexamples and counterarguments
• CHAPTER 6 Evaluating arguments
• CHAPTER 7 Applying your knowledge and skills to the evaluation of arguments
• CHAPTER 8 Constructing arguments and writing argumentative essays

CHAPTER 4 - How to analyse arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 February 2020

If you think that your belief is based upon reason, you will support it by argument, rather than by persecution, and will abandon it if the argument goes against you.

A s critical thinkers, we should know how to analyse arguments clearly. This is because a complete analysis of an argument helps us to arrive at a better understanding of the meaning of the argument. The word ‘analyse’ means to dissect, or to lay bare. When we analyse an argument we want to lay bare the components of the argument. Differently put, we want to reveal the argument's structure. In order to do this, we should know how to identify premises and conclusions in arguments. This is often made easier by underlining the signal words in an argument. Signal words in an argument indicate which statements are premises and which statements are conclusions. In the first section of this chapter, I will explain the role of conclusion and premise indicators in arguments.

Identifying premises and conclusions

Arguers often supply signal words in their arguments that help us to identify their premises and conclusions. In the following example the person advancing the argument provides clues that help us to identify the conclusion of the argument:

If private enterprise does better than the South African government at running businesses, then it will do better at running railway services. Private enterprise does better at running businesses. We can conclude that private enterprise will do better at running railway services.

In the example above the arguer tells us which statement is the conclusion of the argument: he or she uses the phrase ‘we can conclude that’. Such phrases or expressions serve as clues to identify the conclusion of an argument and we call them conclusion indicators .

The following words and phrases usually signal conclusions:

Let us look at another example where the person offering an argument gives clues that identify the premises of the argument:

Since smoking can harm those around us, we can conclude that there should be tight restrictions on the production of cigarettes. This is because , if smoking is harmful to those around us, then cigarette companies are manufacturing harmful substances; and if cigarette companies are manufacturing harmful substances, there should be tight restrictions on the production of cigarettes.

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• How to analyse arguments
• M. E. S. Van den Bergh
• Book: Critical Reasoning and the Art of Argumentation
• Online publication: 20 February 2020
• Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.25159/858-0.004

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8 Arguments and Critical Thinking

J. anthony blair, introduction [1].

This chapter discusses two different conceptions of argument, and then discusses the role of arguments in critical thinking. It is followed by a chapter in which David Hitchcock carefully analyses one common concept of an argument.

1. Two meanings of ‘argument’

The word ‘argument’ is used in a great many ways. Any thorough understanding of arguments requires understanding ‘argument’ in each of its senses or uses. These may be divided into two large groupings: arguments had or engaged in , and arguments made or used . I begin with the former.

1.1 A n ‘a rgument’ as something two parties have with each othe r, something they get into, the kind of ‘argument’ one has in mind in de scribing two people as “arguing all the time ”

For many people outside academia or the practice of law, an argument is a quarrel . It is usually a verbal quarrel, but it doesn’t have to use words. If dishes are flying or people are glaring at each other in angry silence, it can still be an argument. What makes a quarrel an argument is that it involves a communication between two or more parties (however dysfunctional the communication may be) in which the parties disagree and in which that disagreement and reasons, actual or alleged, motivating it are expressed—usually in words or other communicative gestures.

Quarrels are emotional. The participants experience and express emotions, although that feature is not exclusive to arguments that are quarrels. People can and do argue emotionally, and (or) when inspired by strong emotions, when they are not quarrelling. Heated arguments are not necessarily quarrels; but quarrels tend to be heated.

What makes quarrels emotional in some cases is that at least one party experiences the disagreement as representing some sort of personal attack, and so experiences his or her ego or sense of self-worth as being threatened. Fear is a reaction to a perceived threat, and anger is a way of coping with fear and also with embarrassment and shame. In other cases, the argument about the ostensible disagreement is a reminder of or a pretext for airing another, deeper grievance. Jealousy and resentment fuel quarrels. Traces of ego-involvement often surface even in what are supposed to be more civilized argumentative exchanges, such as scholarly disputes. Quarrels tend not to be efficient ways of resolving the disagreements that gives rise to them because the subject of a disagreement changes as the emotional attacks escalate or because the quarrel was often not really about that ostensible disagreement in the first place.

In teaching that ‘argument’ has different senses, it is misleading to leave the impression (as many textbooks do) that quarrels are the only species of argument of this genus. In fact they are just one instance of a large class of arguments in this sense of extended, expressed, disagreements between or among two or more parties.

A dispute is an argument in this sense that need not be a quarrel. It is a disagreement between usually two parties about the legality, or morality, or the propriety on some other basis, of a particular act or policy. It can be engaged in a civil way by the disputants or their proxies (e.g., their spokespersons or their lawyers). Sometimes only the disputing parties settle their difference; sometimes a third party such as a mediator, arbitrator or judge is called in to impose a settlement.

A debate is another argument of this general kind. Debates are more or less formalized or regimented verbal exchanges between parties who might disagree, but in any case who take up opposing sides on an issue. Procedural rules that govern turn-taking, time available for each turn, and topics that may be addressed are agreed to when political opponents debate one another. Strict and precise rules of order govern who may speak, who must be addressed, sometimes time limits for interventions, in parliamentary or congressional debates in political decision-making bodies, or in formal intercollegiate competitive debates. Usually the “opponent” directly addressed in the debate is not the party that each speaker is trying to influence, so although the expressed goal is to “win” the debate, winning does not entail getting the opponent to concede. Instead, it calls for convincing an on-looking party or audience—the judge of the debate or the jury in a courtroom or the television audience or the press or the electorate as a whole—of the superior merits of one’s case for the opinion being argued for in the debate.

To be distinguished from a debate and a dispute by such factors as scale is a controversy . Think of such issues as the abortion controversy, the climate change controversy, the same-sex marriage controversy, the LGBT rights controversy, the animal rights controversy. The participants are many—often millions. The issues are complex and there are many disputes about details involved, including sometimes even formal debates between representatives of different sides. Typically there is a range of positions, and there might be several different sides each with positions that vary one from another. A controversy typically occurs over an extended period of time, often years and sometime decades long. But an entire controversy can be called an argument, as in, “the argument over climate change.” Controversies tend to be unregulated, unlike debates but like quarrels, although they need not be particularly angry even when they are emotional. Like quarrels, and unlike debates, the conditions under which controversies occur, including any constraints on them, are shaped by the participants.

Somewhere among quarrels, debates and controversies lie the theoretical arguments that theorists in academic disciplines engage in, in academic journals and scholarly monographs. In such arguments theorists take positions, sometimes siding with others and sometimes standing alone, and they argue back and forth about which theoretical position is the correct one. In a related type of argument, just two people argue back and forth about what is the correct position on some issue (including meta-level arguments about what is the correct way to frame the issue in the first place).

The stakes don’t have to be theories and the participants don’t have to be academics. Friends argue about which team will win the championship, where the best fishing spot is located, or what titles to select for the book club. Family members argue about how to spend their income, what school to send the children to, or whether a child is old enough to go on a date without a chaperone. Co-workers argue about the best way to do a job, whether to change service providers, whether to introduce a new product line, and so on. These arguments are usually amicable, whether or not they settle the question in dispute.

All of these kinds of “argument” in this sense of the term—quarrels, friendly disputes, arguments at work, professional arguments about theoretical positions, formal or informal debates, and various kinds of controversy—share several features.

• They involve communications between or among two or more people. Something initiates the communication, and either something ends it or there are ways for participants to join and to exit the conversation. They entail turn-taking (less or more regimented), each side addressing the other side and in turn construing and assessing what the other has to say in reply and formulating and communicating a response to the replies of the other side. And, obviously, they involve the expression, usually verbal, of theses and of reasons for them or against alternatives and criticisms.
• They have a telos or aim, although there seems to be no single end in mind for all of them or even for each of them. In a quarrel the goal might be to have one’s point of view prevail, to get one’s way, but it might instead (or in addition) be to humiliate the other person or to save one’s own self-respect. Some quarrels—think of the ongoing bickering between some long-married spouses—seem to be a way for two people to communicate, merely to acknowledge one another. In a debate, each side seeks to “win,” which can mean different things in different contexts ( cf. a collegiate debate vs. a debate between candidates in an election vs. a parliamentary debate). Some arguments seemed designed to convince the other to give up his position or accept the interlocutor’s position, or to get the other to act in some way or to adopt some policy. Some have the more modest goal of getting a new issue recognized for future deliberation and debate. Still others are clearly aimed not at changing anyone’s mind but at reinforcing or entrenching a point of view already held (as is usually the case with religious sermons or with political speeches to the party faithful). Some are intended to establish or to demonstrate the truth or reasonableness of some position or recommendation and (perhaps) also to get others to “see” that the truth has been established. Some seem designed to maintain disagreement, as when representatives of competing political parties argue with one another.
• All these various kinds of argument are more or less extended, both in the sense that they occur over time, sometimes long stretches of time, and also in the sense that they typically involved many steps: extensive and complex support for a point of view and critique of its alternatives.
• In nearly every case, the participants give reasons for the claims they make and they expect the other participants in the argument to give reasons for their claims. This is even a feature of quarrels, at least at the outset, although such arguments can deteriorate into name-calling and worse. (Notice that even the “yes you did; no I didn’t;…; did; didn’t” sequence of the Monty Python “Having an argument” skit breaks down and a reason is sought.)

The kinds of argument listed so far are all versions of having an argument (see Daniel J. O’Keefe, 1977, 1982). Some might think that this is not the sense of ‘argument’ that is pertinent to critical thinking instruction, but such arguments are the habitat of the kinds of argument that critical thinkers need to be able to identify, analyze and evaluate.

1.2 An argument a s something a person makes (or constructs, invents, borrows) consisting of purported reasons alleged to suggest, or support or prove a point and that is used for some purpose such as to persuade someone of some claim, to justify someone in maintaining the position claimed, or to test a claim .

When people have arguments—when they engage in one or another of the activities of arguing described above—one of the things they routinely do is present or allege or offer reasons in support of the claims that they advance, defend, challenge, dispute, question, or consider. That is, in having “arguments,” we typically make and use “arguments.” The latter obviously have to be arguments in different sense from the former. They are often called “reason-claim” complexes. If arguments that someone has had constitute a type of communication or communicative activity, arguments that someone has made or used are actual or potential contributions to such activities. Reason-claim complexes are typically made and used when engaged in an argument in the first sense, trying to convince someone of your point of view during a disagreement or dispute with them. Here is a list of some of the many definitions found in textbooks of ‘argument’ in this second sense.

“… here [the word ‘argument’] … is used in the … logical sense of giving reasons for or against some claim.” Understanding Arguments, Robert Fogelin and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 6th ed., p. 1. “Thus an argument is a discourse that contains at least two statements, one of which is asserted to be a reason for the other.” Monroe Beardsley, Practical Logic, p. 9. “An argument is a set of claims a person puts forward in an attempt to show that some further claim is rationally acceptable.” Trudy Govier. A Practical Study of Arguments, 5th ed., p. 3. An argument is “a set of clams some of which are presented as reasons for accepting some further claim.” Alec Fisher, Critical Thinking, An Introduction, p. 235. Argument: “A conclusion about an issue that is supported by reasons.” Sherry Diestler, Becoming a Critical Thinker, 4th ed., p. 403. “ Argument: An attempt to support a conclusion by giving reasons for it.” Robert Ennis, Critical Thinking, p. 396. “Argument – A form of thinking in which certain statements (reasons) are offered in support of another statement (conclusion).” John Chaffee, Thinking Critically, p. 415 “When we use the word argument in this book we mean a message which attempts to establish a statement as true or worthy of belief on the basis of other statements.” James B. Freeman, Thinking Logically, p. 20 “Argument. A sequence of propositions intended to establish the truth of one of the propositions.” Richard Feldman, Reason and Argument, p. 447. “Arguments consist of conclusions and reasons for them, called ‘premises’.” Wayne Grennan, Argument Evaluation, p. 5. Argument: “A set of claims, one of which, the conclusion is supported by [i.e., is supposed to provide a reason for] one or more of the other claims. Reason in the Balance, Sharon Bailin & Mark Battersby, p. 41.

These are not all compatible, and most of them define ‘argument’ using other terms—‘reasons’, ‘claims’, ‘propositions’, ‘statements’, ‘premises’ and ‘conclusions’—that are in no less need of definition than it is. In the next chapter, David Hitchcock offers a careful analysis of this concept of an argument.

Some define argument in this second sense as a kind of communication; others conceive it as a kind of set of propositions that can serve communicative functions, but others as well (such as inquiry). Either way, the communicative character, or function, of arguments has been the subject of much of the research in the past several decades. Most recently what some have called “multi-modal” argument has attracted attention, focusing on the various ways arguments can be communicated, especially visually or in a mix of verbal and visual modes of communication. Some have contended that smells and sounds can play roles in argument communication as well. This area of research interest would seem to have relevance for the analysis of arguments on the web.

1.3 Argumentation

‘Argumentation’ is another slippery term. It is used in several different senses.

Sometimes it is used to mean the communicative activity in which arguments are exchanged: “During their argumentation they took turns advancing their own arguments and criticizing one another’s arguments.” Sometimes ‘argumentation’ denotes the body of arguments used in an argumentative exchange: “The evening’s argumentation was of high quality.” And occasionally you will find it used to refer to the reasons or premises supporting a conclusion, as in: “The argumentation provided weak support for the thesis.” ‘Argumentation theory’ is the term often used to denote theory about the nature of arguments and their uses, including their uses in communications involving exchanges of arguments.

2 The relation between critical thinking and argument

2 .1 arguments are both tools of critical thinking and objects of critical thinking.

In … [one] sense, thought denotes belief resting upon some basis, that is, real or supposed knowledge going beyond what is directly present. … Some beliefs are accepted when their grounds have not themselves been considered …. … such thoughts may mean a supposition accepted without reference to its real grounds. These may be adequate, they may not; but their value with reference to the support they afford the belief has not been considered. Such thoughts grow up unconsciously and without reference to the attainment of correct belief. They are picked up—we know not how. From obscure sources and by unnoticed channels they insinuate themselves into acceptance and become unconsciously a part of our mental furniture. Tradition, instruction, imitation—all of which depend upon authority in some form, or appeal to our advantage, or fall in with strong passions—are responsible for them. Such thoughts are prejudices, that is, prejudgments, not judgments proper that rest upon a survey of evidence. (John Dewey, How We Think , pp. 4-5, emphasis added.)

People—all of us—routinely adopt beliefs and attitudes that are prejudices in Dewey’s sense of being prejudgments, “not judgments proper that rest upon a survey of evidence.” One goal of critical thinking education is to provide our students with the means to be able, when it really matters, to “properly survey” the grounds for beliefs and attitudes.

Arguments supply one such means. The grounds for beliefs and attitudes are often expressed, or expressible, as arguments for them. And the “proper survey” of these arguments is to test them by subjecting them to the critical scrutiny of counter-arguments.

Arguments also come into play when the issue is not what to believe about a contentious issue, but in order just to understand the competing positions. Not only are we not entitled to reject a claim to our belief if we cannot counter the arguments that support it; we are not in possession of an understanding of that claim if we cannot formulate the arguments that support it to the satisfaction of its proponents.

Furthermore, arguments can be used to investigate a candidate for belief by those trying “to make up their own minds” about it. The investigator tries to find and express the most compelling arguments for and against the candidate. Which arguments count as “most compelling” are the ones that survive vigorous attempts, using arguments, to refute or undermine them. These survivors are then compared against one another, the pros weighed against the cons. More arguments come into play in assessing the attributed weights.

In these ways, a facility with arguments serves a critical thinker well. Such a facility includes skill in recognizing, interpreting and evaluating arguments, as well as in formulating them. That includes skill in laying out complex arguments, in recognizing argument strengths and weaknesses, and in making a case for one’s critique. It includes the ability to distinguish the more relevant evidence from the less, and to discriminate between minor, fixable flaws and major, serious problems, in arguments. Thus the critical thinker is at once adept at using arguments in various ways and at the same time sensitive in judging arguments’ merits, applying the appropriate criteria.

Moreover, arguments in the sense of “reasons-claim” complexes surround us in our daily lives. Our “familiars”, as Gilbert (2014) has dubbed them—our family members, the friends we see regularly, shopkeepers and others whose services we patronize daily, our co-workers—engage us constantly in argumentative discussions in which they invoke arguments to try to get us to do things, to agree, to judge, to believe. The public sphere—the worlds of politics, commerce, entertainment, leisure activities, social media (see Jackson’s chapter)—is another domain in which arguments can be found, although (arguably) mere assertion predominates there. In the various roles we play as we go through life—child, parent, spouse or partner, student, worker, patient, subordinate or supervisor, citizen (voter, jurist, community member), observer or participant, etc.—we are invited with arguments to agree or disagree, approve or disapprove, seek or avoid. We see others arguing with one another and are invited to judge the merits of the cases they make. Some of these arguments are cogent and their conclusions merit our assent, but others are not and we should not be influenced by them. Yet others are suggestive and deserve further thought.

We can simply ignore many of these arguments, but others confront us and force us to decide whether or not to accept them. Often it is unclear whether someone has argued or done something else: just vented, perhaps, or explained rather than argued, or merely expressed an opinion without arguing for it, or was confused. So we initially might have to decide whether there is an argument that we need to deal with. When it is an argument, often in order to make up our minds about it we need first to get clear about exactly what the argument consists of. So even before we evaluate this argument we have to identify and analyze it. (These operations are discussed in Chapter 12.)

In the end we have to decide for ourselves whether the argument makes its case or falls short. Does the conclusion really follow from the premises? Is there enough evidence to justify the conclusion? Is it the right kind of evidence? Are there well-known objections or arguments against the conclusion that haven’t been acknowledged and need to be answered satisfactorily? Can they be answered? And are the premises themselves believable or otherwise acceptable? Are there other arguments, as good or better, that support the claim?

Critical thinking can (and should!) come into all of these decisions we need to make in the identification, the analysis and the assessment of arguments.

2 .2  Critical thinking about things other than arguments

Many critical thinking textbooks focus exclusively on the analysis and evaluation of arguments. While the centrality of arguments to the art of critical thinking is unquestionable, a strong case can be made that critical thinking has other objectives in addition to appreciating arguments. In their analysis of the concept of critical thinking, Fisher and Scriven suggest the following definition:

Critical thinking is skilled and active interpretation and evaluation of o b servations and communications , information and argumentation. (1997, p. 21, emphasis added)

We agree with the gist of this claim, but notice what Fisher and Scriven propose as the objects to which critical thinking applies. Not just argumentation, but as well observations, communications and information. About observations, they note that:

What one sees (hears, etc.) are usually things and happenings, and one often has to interpret what one sees, sometimes calling on critical thinking skills to do so, most obviously in cases where the context involves weak lighting, strong emotions, possible drug effects, or putatively magical or parapsychological phenomena. Only after the application of critical thinking—and sometimes not even then—does one know what one “really saw”. … When the filter of critical thinking has been applied to the observations, and only then, one can start reasoning towards further conclusions using these observations as premises. ( Ibid ., p, 37)

An example is the recent large number of convictions in the U.S.A. that originally relied on eyewitness testimony but that have been overturned on the basis of DNA evidence. [2] ,  [3]

The DNA evidence proved that the accused was not the culprit, so the moral certainty of the eyewitness had to have been mistaken. The observation of the eyewitness was flawed. He or she did not think critically about whether the conditions need ed to make a reliable o b servation were present (e.g., were strong emotions like fear involved? was the lighting good? has he or she ordinarily a good memory for faces? was there time to observe carefully? were there distractions present?). Neither, probably, did the lawyers on either side, or else they immorally suppressed what should have been their doubts. As a consequence, innocent people languished in jail for years and guilty parties went free.

Communications are another object for critical thought. When in reply to Harry’s question, “How are you doing?” Morgan says, in a clipped and dull voice and a strained expression on her face, “I’m fine”, Harry needs to be aware that “How are you doing?” often functions as equivalent to a simple greeting, like “Hi” and so the response “Fine” could similarly be functioning as a polite return of the greeting, like “Hi back to you”, and not as an accurate report of the speaker’s condition. Harry needs to notice and interpret other aspects of Morgan’s communication—her lethargic tone of voice and her anxious facial expression—and to recognize the incompatibility between those signals and the interpretation of her response as an accurate depiction of Morgan’s state of well-being. He needs to employ critical interpretive skills to realize that Morgan has communicated that she is not fine at all, but for some reason isn’t offering to talk about it.

If President Trump did in fact say to his then F.B.I. director James Comey, about the F.B.I. investigation of former National Security Advisor Michaell Flynn “I hope you can let this go”, was it legitimate for Comey to interpret the President’s comment as a directive? And was Comey’s response, which was simply to ignore President Trump’s alleged comment, an appropriate response? What was going on? It takes critical thinking to try to sort out these issues. Taking the President’s alleged comment literally, it just expresses his attitude towards the FBI investigation of Flynn. But communications from the President in a tête-à-tête in the White House with the Director of the FBI are not occasions for just sharing attitudes. This was not an occasion on which they could step out of their political roles and chat person-to-person. The President can legitimately be presumed to be communicating his wishes as to what his FBI Director should do, and such expressions of wishes are, in this context, to be normally understood as directives. On the other hand, for the President to direct that an ongoing investigation by the FBI be stopped, or that it come up with a pre-determined finding, is illegal: it’s obstruction of justice. So Comey seemed faced with at least two possible interpretations of what he took the President to be saying: either an out-of-place expression of his attitude towards the outcome of the Flynn investigation or an illegal directive. Which was the President’s intention? However, there are other possibilities.

Was President Trump a political tyro whose lack of political experience might have left him ignorant of the fact that the FBI Director has to keep investigations free of political interference? Or might Trump have thought that the Presidency conveys the authority to influence the outcome of criminal investigations? Or might President Trump have been testing Mr. Comey to see if he could be manipulated? And Mr. Comey could have responded differently. He could have said, “I wish we could let this go too, Mr. President, but there are questions about General Flynn’s conduct that have to be investigated, and as you know, we cannot interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation”. Such a response would have forced the President to take back what he allegedly said, withdrawing any suggestion that his comment was a directive, or else to make it plain that he was indeed directing Comey to obstruct justice. In the event, apparently Mr. Comey did not take this way out, which would at once have displayed loyalty to the President (by protecting him from explicitly obstructing justice) and also have affirmed the independence of the FBI from interference from the White House. Perhaps he thought that the President clearly had directed him to obstruct justice, and judged that giving him an opportunity explicitly to withdraw that directive amounted to overlooking that illegal act, which would be a violation of his responsibilities as Director of the FBI. If so, however, simply not responding to the President’s comment, the path Comey apparently chose, also amounted to turning a blind eye to what he judged to be President Trump’s illegal directive.

As these two examples illustrate, the interpretation of communications, and the appropriate response to them can require critical thinking: recognizing different functions of communication, and being sensitive to the implications of different contexts of communication; being sensitive to the roles communicators occupy and to the rights, obligations, and limits attached to such roles.

As Fisher and Scriven acknowledge, “defining information is itself a difficult task.” They make a useful start by distinguishing information from raw data (“the numbers or bare descriptions obtained from measurements or observations”, op . cit., p. 41). No critical thinking is required for the latter; just the pains necessary to record raw data accurately, In many cases, though, the interpretation of raw data, the meaning or significance that they are said to have, can require critical thinking.

One might go beyond Fisher and Scriven’s list of other things besides arguments to which critical thinking can be applied. A thoughtful appreciation of novels or movies, plays or poetry, paintings or sculptures requires skilled interpretation, imagining alternatives, thoughtful selection of appropriate criteria of evaluation and then the selection and application of appropriate standards, and more. A good interior designer must consider the effects and interactions of space and light and color and fabrics and furniture design, and coordinate these with clients’ lifestyles, habits and preferences. Advanced practical skills in various sciences come into play. A coach of a sports team must think about each individual team member’s skills and deficiencies, personality and life situation; about plays and strategies, opponents’ skills sets; approaches to games; and much more. Conventional approaches need to be reviewed as to their applicability to the current situation. Alternative possibilities need to be creatively imagined and critically assessed. And all of this is time-sensitive, sometimes calling for split-second decisions. The thinking involved in carrying out the tasks of composing a review of some work of literature or art or of coaching a sports team can be routine and conventional, or it can be imaginative, invoking different perspectives and challenging standard criteria.

The list could go on. The present point is that, while argument is central to critical thinking, critical thinking about and using arguments is not all there is to critical thinking. [4]

Bailin, Sharon & Battersby, Mark. (2010). Reason in the Balance , An I n quiry Approach to Critical Thinking , 1 st ed. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Beardsley, Monroe C. (1950). Practical L ogic . Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Chaffee, John. 1985. Thinking Critically . Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Dewey, John. (1910, 1991). How We Think . Lexington, MAD.C. Heath; Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.

Diestler, Sherry. (2005). Becoming a Critical Thinker , 4 th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.

Ennis, Robert H. (1996). Critical Thinking . Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Feldman, Richard. (1993). Reason and Argument , 2 nd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Fisher, Alex.(2001). Critical Thinking, An Introduction . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fisher, Alec & Scriven, Michael. (1997). Critical Thinking, Its Definition and Assessment . Point

Reyes, CA: EdgePress; Norwich, UK: Center for Research in Critical Thinking.

Fogelin, Robert & Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. (2001). Understanding A r guments , An Introduction to Informal Logic , 6 th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Freeman, James B. (1988.) Thinking Logically , Basic Concepts of Reaso n ing . Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Grennan, Wayne . (1984). Argument Evaluation . Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Govier, Trudy. (2001). A Practical Study of Argument , 5 th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

O’Keefe, Daniel J. (1977). Two concepts of argument. Journal of the Amer i can Forensic Association , 13 , 121-128.

O‘Keefe, Daniel J. (1982). The concepts of argument and arguing. In J. R. Cox & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Advances in Argumentation Theory and R e search , pp. 3-23. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

• © J. Anthony Blair ↵
• According to the Innocence Project, “Eyewitness misidentification is the greatest contributing factor to wrongful convictions proven by DNA testing, playing a role in more than 70% of convictions [in the U.S.A.] overturned through DNA testing nationwide.” (https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/eyewitness-misidentification/, viewed August 2017). ↵
• I owe the general organization and many of the specific ideas of this chapter to a series of lectures by Jean Goodwin at the Summer Institute on Argumentation sponsored by the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric at the University of Windsor. ↵

Studies in Critical Thinking Copyright © by J. Anthony Blair is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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• Published: 08 April 2022

Assessing critical thinking through L2 argumentative essays: an investigation of relevant and salient criteria from raters’ perspectives

• Takanori Sato   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1483-966X 1  

Language Testing in Asia volume  12 , Article number:  9 ( 2022 ) Cite this article

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Although some second language (L2) pedagogical approaches recognize critical thinking (CT) as an important skill, its assessment is challenging because it is not a well-defined construct with varying definitions. This study aimed to identify the relevant and salient features of argumentative essays that allow for the assessment of L2 students’ CT skills. This study implemented a convergent mixed-methods research design, collecting and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data to collate the results. Five raters assessed 140 causal argumentative essays written by Japanese university students attending Content and Language Integrated Learning courses based on five criteria: Task Achievement, Coherence and Cohesion, Lexical Resource, Grammatical Range and Accuracy, and CT Skills. A standard multiple regression was conducted to examine the relationships among these criteria. Additionally, raters’ written verbal protocols were collected to identify the essay features to be considered when assessing students’ CT skills. The results indicated that raters’ judgments of students’ CT were closely linked to Task Achievement. Furthermore, their assessments were affected by the essay’s relevancy to the question, content development, logicality, and quality of ideas. This study’s findings help to conceptualize CT as a construct and should be incorporated into the assessment criteria of various L2 educational contexts.

Introduction

Some second language (L2) pedagogical approaches, including English for academic purposes (EAP) and Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL), stress the importance of critical thinking (CT) since the skills are vital in academia and help students engage with world knowledge (de Chazal, 2014 ; Mehisto & Ting, 2017 ). Being an integral part of such instructional approaches, the assessment of CT must be conducted to foster decisions on summative and formative purposes in the course. In this context, essay writing assignments are considered as an effective tool for assessing CT skills, as they provide students with time to carefully consider reasons for their assertions and refine their ideas (Nosich, 2022 ; Wade, 1995 ).

However, assessing CT through essay writing is challenging because “the term ‘critical thinking’ is a notoriously fuzzy construct in education” (Yuan & Stapleton, 2020 , p. 41) and “critical thinking as a concept is diffuse” (Wilson, 2016 , p. 257). While performance assessment requires rating scales to enable assessors to measure students’ L2 output (McNamara, 1996 ), the elusive construct of CT makes it difficult to clearly decide what to assess. Although numerous elements of CT have been explicated for general education (e.g., Paul & Elder, 2014 ), it has not been operationalized specifically for L2 pedagogical settings, and hence relevant and salient criteria have not been established for assessing L2 students’ CT through their essays. In particular, delineating this construct is warranted for argumentative writing, which is an imperative type of writing that L2 students are likely to engage in various academic contexts (Hirvela, 2017 ).

One effective approach to disentangling such an elusive construct is to investigate people’s intuitive judgments of it. In other words, studies on how essay readers evaluate the writers’ CT skills can provide empirical data that can help researchers identify relevant and salient features of the construct. Nevertheless, no existing studies have implemented this research approach to delineate CT for L2 writing assessment. Therefore, this study aimed to identify the features of argumentative essays that allow for the assessment of L2 students’ CT by investigating how readers rate and judge the writers’ CT skills through their argumentative essays. This study’s findings contribute to the conceptualization of CT as a construct and the development of rating scales for measuring it in L2 educational contexts.

Literature review

Ct theories and argumentative writing.

CT is known as a fuzzy and elusive concept because of its various competing definitions and interpretations (Wilson, 2016 ). Davies and Barnett ( 2015 ) indicate how widely CT has been defined by summarizing its concepts in three movements: the critical thinking movement, which focuses on argumentation skills and dispositions; the criticality movement, which addresses ethical actions and morality in society; and the critical pedagogy movement, which aims to overcome the oppression that restricts human freedom. One widely utilized definition for CT is “Critical thinking is a reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe and do” (Ennis, 2011 , p. 10). This conception outlines 12 dispositions (e.g., trying to be well informed and being open-minded) and 16 abilities (e.g., analyzing arguments and judging the credibility of sources) that describe the characteristics of ideal critical thinkers. While argumentative skills are required to demonstrate reflective thinking, this view focuses on judgment formation and decision-making than the mechanisms of argumentation (Davies & Barnett, 2015 ). Ennis ( 2011 ) claims that CT “should be a very important part of our personal, civic, and vocational lives and should receive attention in our education system” (p. 10).

CT skills in L2 pedagogies are built on Ennis’s ( 2011 ) conception and focus on promoting argumentation and cognitive thinking skills. Dummett and Hughes ( 2019 ) defined CT in the English language teaching context as “a mindset that involves thinking reflectively (being curious), rationally (thinking analytically), and reasonably (coming to sensible conclusions)” [emphasis in original] (p. 4) and illustrated how it is associated with Anderson and Krathwohl’s ( 2001 ) categories of cognitive process dimensions. Anderson and Krathwohl ( 2001 ) specified six cognitive process categories that education should incorporate to help students improve their retention abilities and the transfer of learning. These categories are as follows: to remember (retrieving knowledge from memory), understand (building connections between prior and new knowledge), apply (using the acquired knowledge in new situations), analyze (breaking down concepts into constituent parts and verifying how they relate to each other), evaluate (making judgments using certain criteria), and create (making new products using previous learning experience). They are regarded as relevant skills for CT development that should be taught in EAP (de Chazal, 2014 ) and CLIL (Coyle et al., 2010 ). Among them, “analyze” and “evaluate” are most often associated with CT (de Chazal, 2014 ).

The ability to present arguments is an essential CT skill because it involves presenting one’s views with both reasons and evidence (Chaffee, 2019 ; Fisher, 2011 ; Nosich, 2022 ). As Cottrell ( 2017 ) states, “essays are exercises in critical thinking” (p. 161). Notably, in argumentative essay writing tasks—with or without source materials—students must not only present their ideas but also assess their own reasoning. At a minimum, essay writing involves remembering (retrieving relevant information), creating (writing an essay), and evaluating (critiquing one’s own ideas) (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001 ). As fundamental CT abilities, critiquing one’s own reasoning and engaging in dialectical thinking (Tanaka & Gilliland, 2017 ), as well as the need for refinement, make essay writing appropriate for assessing students’ CT skills (Wade, 1995 ).

CT assessment criteria

Scholars have proposed various criteria for assessing CT skills, including cognitive thinking and reasoning skills. Chaffee ( 2019 ) and Fisher ( 2011 ) provided two criteria focusing on reasoning: whether the reasons support its conclusion (validity) and whether the reasons are true and acceptable (truth). An argument that includes accurate reasons that fully support the writer’s claims is considered a sound argument. Furthermore, Paul and Elder ( 2014 ) proposed the following nine intellectual standards for assessing reasoning: (a) clarity of statements, (b) accuracy of information (i.e., truth), (c) precision of statements, (d) relevance of ideas, (e) depth of thoughts, (f) breadth of viewpoints, (g) logicalness (i.e., validity), (h) significance of information, and (i) fairness of arguments (see also Nosich, 2022 ). These were proposed for use by those who study CT to evaluate a given argument and improve the quality of their own reasoning. Thus, these criteria were not specifically designed for assessing the CT skills of L2 learners through their argumentative essays. Yanning ( 2017 ) developed a rating scale based on Paul and Elder’s ( 2014 ) standards and implemented it to measure Chinese students’ CT through their L2 argumentative essays. However, as the aim of the study was to gauge the effectiveness of a pedagogical approach, the appropriateness of the scale itself was not scrutinized.

Some scholars have proposed certain criteria to specifically assess CT skills through argumentative essays. Cottrell’s ( 2017 ) description of critical writers enlists the following features of essays that reflect CT skills: presenting arguments clearly to make them comprehensible to readers, selecting the most controversial points to discuss in detail, placing arguments in logical order to emphasize the most controversial points, and using discourse markers to help readers understand the arguments. Additionally, the Washington State University (WSU) Center for Teaching, Learning, and Technology ( 2009 ) developed a rating scale for CT skills displayed in argumentative essays consisting of seven criteria with detailed descriptors. The rating scale examines students’ (a) identification of an issue, (b) consideration of the issue’s context, (c) presentation and assessment of supporting evidence, (d) integration of diverse perspectives, (e) presentation of their own perspectives, (f) identification of implications and consequences, and (g) communication of the message. These criteria were identified based on the practical experiences of WSU’s staff members. This scale has also been included in writing-intensive courses in a U.S. university’s general education curriculum (Morozov, 2011 ). Although Cottrell’s ( 2017 ) description and WSU’s rating scale connect CT skills with writing abilities, they were neither developed specifically to assess L2 learners’ CT skills nor based on research. Hence, these criteria, developed for native English speakers, do not necessarily consider the characteristics of L2 students’ writing.

Finally, Stapleton ( 2001 ) created a scheme to quantify CT as displayed in argumentative passages written in English by Japanese university students. This covers the key elements of CT and examines the numbers of (a) arguments presented (opinions and their reasons), (b) evidence given in support of each reason, (c) presentation of opposing arguments, (d) refutations of these counterarguments, and (e) any potential fallacies. Nevertheless, the quantified outcomes here do not necessarily reflect the essay’s CT level or logical quality. For example, presenting numerous pieces of supporting evidence does not mean that the writer possesses high CT skills. Thus, the scheme cannot readily be adopted to measure L2 students’ level of CT displayed in their argumentative essays.

In summary, a wide range of criteria has been suggested to assess CT skills based on theories conceptualizing CT. A significant limitation of the current CT criteria is that they are neither empirically derived nor supported for use in L2 educational contexts. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the suggested criteria are relevant to and salient in L2 essay writing assessments and whether other important criteria exist that have not yet been acknowledged.

Conceptualizing constructs for the development of a rating scale

Investigating raters’ intuitive judgments of CT skills is helpful in forming its conceptualization in L2 educational contexts. An empirical investigation of raters’ judgments would reveal the construct’s components and facilitate the development of a rating scale. Researchers have identified the influential features of various constructs in applied linguistics, including oral fluency (e.g., Bosker et al., 2013 ), accentedness and comprehensibility (e.g., Saito et al., 2017 ), oral communicative ability (Sato, 2012 ; Sato & McNamara, 2019 ; McNamara, 1990 ), and writing proficiency (e.g., Cumming et al., 2001 ). These studies scrutinized raters’ intuitive judgments of the targeted constructs without using descriptors and rigorous training to assess them.

Furthermore, they identified the influential components of raters’ intuitive judgments of the constructs using one of the following three approaches. The first approach investigated the correlation between raters’ judgments and objective measurements of the linguistic features of the performances (Bosker et al., 2013 ; Saito et al., 2017 ). The second approach examined the relationship between raters’ judgments and their ratings of specific performance features (Sato, 2012 ; McNamara, 1990 ). The third approach required raters to judge performances and verbalize their rating process to identify features that affected their judgments (Sato & McNamara, 2019 ; Cumming et al., 2001 ). The first and second approaches identify features that unconsciously influence raters’ judgments (e.g., McNamara, 1990 ). However, they do not consider the influence of other factors. The third approach compensates for this limitation. Nonetheless, analyzing verbal protocols may not be sufficient because raters’ reports may not accurately represent the actual factors that affected their judgments (Gass & Mackey, 2017 ).

These studies have had important implications for the development of rating scales for oral fluency as well as overall speaking and writing proficiency. However, investigation of raters’ judgments in the context of assessing L2 learners’ CT through argumentative essay writing has not been conducted yet.

Theoretical background

Rating scales are tools, composed of criteria which assess test-takers’ performance. Consequently, it is important to shortlist criteria that should be included in the scales by operationally defining the target construct and specifying its constituents. In general, a theory explicating the target construct is an important frame of reference for operationally defining it (Bachman & Palmer, 2010 ). However, there is no agreed theory of writing explaining the construct of L2 writing itself (Knoch, 2022 ), and none of the CT assessment models was developed specifically for L2 writing based on research (e.g., Paul & Elder, 2014 ). In this context, the empirically identified components of CT contribute to conceptualizing it for L2 writing assessment and can be included as features into a rating scale.

This study aimed to identify the features of argumentative essays that allow for the assessment of CT by investigating how readers judge the writers’ CT skills. More specifically, the study addresses the following research questions (RQs):

What is the relationship between rater judgments of students’ CT skills and their ratings using the assessment criteria for L2 writing proficiency?

What essay features do raters consider when judging students’ CT skills?

The second and third approaches (see the “Conceptualizing Constructs for the Development of a Rating Scale” section) were applied to answer RQs 1 and 2, respectively. RQ1 is concerned with raters’ intuitive judgments of writers’ CT skills corresponding to any criteria used to measure L2 writing proficiency. Additionally, to explore any influential features other than the criteria uncovered by RQ1, a verbal protocol analysis was employed for RQ2. Therefore, this study aims to conceptualize CT by combining both research approaches and compensating for their limitations.

Methodology

The present study is exploratory research employing inductive reasoning, as its purpose is to identify the relevant and salient CT features of argumentative essays without applying existing CT theoretical frameworks. This study implemented a convergent mixed-methods research design, which involves the collection and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data to merge the results (Creswell, 2015 ). More specifically, the scores for students’ argumentative essays awarded by five raters were analyzed to examine the relationships among the assessment criteria. Additionally, the raters’ verbal protocol data were analyzed to reveal the essay features that influenced the raters’ judgments of the students’ CT skills.

Participants

Eighty-nine first- and second-year university students who attended CLIL courses participated in this study and took both pre- and post-test (see the “Data Collection Instrument” section). They were from two elementary, three lower-intermediate, and two upper-intermediate English courses. Based on their Test of English for Academic Purposes scores (a placement test), it was determined that the students’ proficiency grades were roughly equivalent to levels A2 to B1 of the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) (Council of Europe, 2001 ). In the CLIL courses, the students were taught an academic subject selected by each instructor (e.g., Japanese culture and world Englishes) and encouraged to use the four English language skills (reading, listening, speaking, and writing). CT development is an explicit aim stated in the course syllabus, although the degree to which it was covered in the classes depended on each instructor. Moreover, details about CT—including its definition and assessment—were not included in the syllabus. The students signed an informed consent form to agree to have their essays used for research purposes.

Five native English speakers with work experience as examiners of the International English Language Testing System (IELTS) participated in the study as raters. Table  1 shows their background information. All raters had a Master’s degree and at least 16 years’ experience in English language teaching and 6 years’ experience as IELTS examiners. They were chosen because this research examined the effectiveness of the CLIL program using the IELTS rating scale.

Data collection instrument

This study used students’ performance data derived from a course evaluation project that examined the effectiveness of a CLIL program offered at a private Japanese university. Students of seven 28-class (14-week) CLIL courses underwent identical speaking and writing tests on two occasions: during the 2nd/3rd class (pre-test) and the 27th class (post-test). This study then used the students’ essays in the pre- and post-writing tests and their subsequent ratings in its analysis.

Pre- and post-tests to measure students’ productive skills were developed for the course evaluation. A timed-independent writing task was developed by the researcher along with his colleague, in which students were instructed to write an essay to answer the following prompt: “What motivates students to study their subject at university? Give specific details and examples to explain your answer.” They were asked to write approximately 300 words in 30 min using either a computer or pen and paper. This is a causal argumentative essay task in which students are required to speculate on the possible causes of a given phenomenon (Ramage et al., 2015 ). The task was considered suitable to elicit students’ CT skills because it involved critiquing and refining one’s reasoning while formulating arguments. Moreover, a similar writing task has also been employed by some well-known English proficiency tests (e.g., IELTS and the Test of English as a Foreign Language) to assess argumentation of L2 learners (Hirvela, 2017 ). The topic was selected because it was assumed that students do not need any specialized background knowledge to respond to it, but rather are able to use their creativity and personal examples to construct their argument.

Data collection procedure

Students were informed that the test’s purpose was to examine improvements in their productive language skills following a one-semester CLIL course. They were also told that their test results would not affect their grades in this course. However, they were not informed that their CT skills would be assessed through the tests.

The handwritten essays were typed in Microsoft Word, and the same formatting style was applied to all of them, including those typed by the students themselves (Times New Roman, 12-point, single-spaced). Then, two essays each from the 70 students, who had produced, were collected, and hence a total of 140 essays (70 each from the pre- and post-tests) were procured. These students were chosen from among those who wrote more than 120 words, as it would have been difficult to assess multiple linguistic features and CT skills in shorter essays. Furthermore, the sample comprised approximately an equal number of students randomly selected from each of the three English courses (elementary: n = 23, lower-intermediate: n = 24, and upper-intermediate: n = 23). The essays ranged between 121 and 356 words, with an average word count of 205.6.

Next, the five raters were given the 140 essays for assessment. Each essay was scored by two to three of the five raters, with the connectivity required for a Rasch analysis being established. Each rater was requested to assess 60 essays. The five raters were asked to rate the essays using the IELTS Task 2 Writing band descriptors (public version) (British Council, n.d. ), which consist of four criteria: Task Achievement, Coherence and Cohesion, Lexical Resource, and Grammatical Range and Accuracy. The IELTS scale was used because it includes a wide range of writing proficiency components with detailed descriptors. Additionally, as Plakans and Gebril ( 2017 ) claim, argumentation could be measured by these criteria. Although the IELTS rating scale includes 10 levels (0–9), this study only used six (1–6) because the students’ proficiency was not high enough for them to obtain scores above seven.

In addition to assessing the essays according to the IELTS criteria, the raters were also asked to judge the level of each student’s CT skills. The following two definitions of CT from online English dictionaries were provided:

“The objective analysis and evaluation of an issue in order to form a judgement” (Oxford Dictionary).

“The process of thinking carefully about a subject or idea, without allowing feelings or opinions to affect you” (Cambridge Dictionary).

These definitions include the key elements of CT addressed in L2 pedagogies, such as careful thinking (reflective thinking), objective analysis and evaluation (rational thinking), and judgment formation (reasonable thinking) (Dummett & Hughes, 2019 ). Definitions from English dictionaries, rather than those found in the CT literature, were provided because they are concise and easy to understand. The raters scored the students’ CT skills using a six-level semantic differential scale ranging from one “Poor” to six “Excellent” with unspecified midpoints. Descriptors and training in using the scale were not provided because this study’s main aim was to investigate raters’ interpretation of students’ CT without the influence of any pre-existing rating scale. The raters were informed that this criterion was adopted for research purposes rather than for course evaluation.

Each rater performed a retrospective written verbal protocol (Gass & Mackey, 2017 ) by writing comments on eight to 10 randomly selected essays. The raters were asked to indicate which part of the students’ essays influenced the judgments of their CT skills and explain how these identified portions influenced the scores assigned using Microsoft Word’s comment function immediately after scoring the essays. In total, 103 comments were given to 18 essays. Unfortunately, a written verbal protocol could undermine the validity of the reports because the raters would be able to write about things that they did not think about while actually rating students’ CT skills. However, an oral concurrent verbal protocol could not be adopted because the raters concurrently scored other features of the essays, whereas the focus of this study was only on CT.

Data analysis

The scores given to the 140 essays were statistically analyzed to answer RQ1. First, the rater reliability was confirmed using the many-facet Rasch measurement. The pre- and post-test data were separately analyzed using the FACETS 3.83.0 software (Linacre, 2019 ). Rater infit mean-square values, which indicate rater reliability, were within the acceptable range (0.7–1.3). This suggests that all the raters scored the students’ argumentative essays consistently using the IELTS band descriptors and a scale for assessing CT skills. Second, a multiple regression (MR) was conducted using the raw scores to examine the relative importance of the four IELTS criteria (the predictor variables) in predicting the raters’ judgments of students’ CT skills (the outcome variable). As there is no hypothesis about the strength of the predictors, this study performed a standard MR simultaneously with all predictors. The pre- and post-test data were separately analyzed using SPSS Statistics version 26. The assumptions for the MR (the number of data cases, multicollinearity, normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity) were examined. This study had 150 data points each in the pre- and post-tests, which was larger than the required 15 cases of data per predictor (Field, 2018 ). As the variance inflation factor values ranged from 1.89 to 2.74, staying far under 10, multicollinearity was not present among the predictor variables. The last three assumptions were examined using the scatterplots of residual, histogram, and P-P plot. All the assumptions were satisfied except for normally distributed errors for both the pre- and post-tests. However, the violation of this assumption is not of great concern because of the amount of data in this study (Field, 2018 ).

The raters’ verbal protocol data were then analyzed to answer RQ2. Thematic analysis, which involves identifying themes within the data (Braun & Clarke, 2013 ), was carried out to identify the features of students’ argumentative essays affecting their CT scores as assessed by the raters. First, each of the raters’ comments was read to generate initial codes that grouped similar concepts. Second, coding categories, based on the generated codes, were developed, with all comments being sorted into the developed categories using NVivo 11. Third, the coding categories were reexamined and collated to identify any overarching themes. Therefore, the analysis was inductive, with the identified themes being linked to the data. Finally, a PhD student in applied linguistics was asked to code 30% of the data to ensure inter-coder reliability. The kappa coefficient was 0.71, demonstrating adequate agreement. Disagreements were resolved through subsequent discussions, and the categories were finalized.

This section will present the results of the MR answering RQ1 (identifying the relationship between rater judgments of students’ CT skills and their ratings of other criteria for L2 writing proficiency) and the thematic analysis answering RQ2 (exploring the essay features that the raters consider while judging students’ CT skills).

Relationship between CT and other criteria

Tables  2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics of the scores on each criterion and the results of the MR analyses, respectively. The regression results indicate that the Task Achievement scores made the largest contribution to the raters’ intuitive judgments of CT skills in both the pre- and post-tests ( β s = .39 and .30, p s = .000 and .002, respectively). Additionally, the contribution of Lexical Resource was statistically significant and found to be the second largest predictor in the post-test ( β = .29, p = .006). In contrast, the other criteria had minor contributions and were not significant ( p s > .05). Overall, the four IELTS criteria explained 47% and 33% of the variance in CT skills in the pre- and post-tests, respectively, suggesting that elements other than the IELTS criteria explain rater judgments of CT. To summarize, the raters’ judgments of participants’ CT skills were explained by their Task Achievement scores most strongly, followed by the Lexical Resources scores.

Influential features on rater judgments of CT

Table  4 shows the findings of the thematic analysis of the comments written by the raters. The following five features, representing the criteria used by the raters to judge the students’ CT skills, were explored: Relevancy, Content Development, Logicality, Quality of Ideas, and Other Features. The first category, Relevancy, concerned the question of whether the written ideas were addressing the given question (What motivates students to study their subject at the university?). The raters positively evaluated essays that maintain their focus on the question and negatively judged pieces of content deviated from it. Second, Content Development referred to how deeply students discussed their ideas by including supporting details and examples. Essays with a sufficient amount of details, examples, and ideas were considered as those displaying high CT skills. Third, the raters noted the logicality of the arguments, the link between written ideas, and coherence. The raters considered that high CT skills were demonstrated by logical connections among ideas, especially the link between the writers’ main claim and supporting evidence. Fourth, the raters evaluated the quality of ideas focusing on the validity and originality of ideas as well as on the width of perspective presented in the essays. Students discussing well-thought and original ideas from multiple points of view were regarded as those possessing high CT skills, whereas those presenting poor and ubiquitous thoughts based only on their own personal experience were evaluated otherwise. Finally, linguistic accuracy and miscellaneous features were categorized as Other Features.

Three raters (R1, R2, and R3) made some comments on linguistic errors found in the essays. For example, R3 pointed out linguistic accuracy by saying, “Despite the inaccuracies in language and grammar, the student is able to present a weak link between motivation and being able to pursue one’s own interests.” However, linguistic features were not regarded as an independent factor that influences rater judgments of students’ CT skills. First, comments on linguistic errors were not prevalent within the protocol data (5.2% of all the comments). Second, half of the comments on linguistic errors were in although clauses or despite phrases as in the example above, suggesting that the influence of linguistic features may be weaker than that of the other features presented in Table  4 .

To illustrate the essay features that affected raters’ judgments of students’ CT skills, three essays, and the corresponding raters’ feedback, are presented in Tables  5 , 6 , and 7 . These essays received positive, positive and negative, and negative comments, respectively. Additionally, they included a wide range of features, as presented in Table  4 .

Table  5 presents the body paragraph of the essay written by Student 15 in the pre-test. The essay was rated by R1, R3, and R5, and the scores for CT skills given by the raters were 5, 4, and 3.5, respectively. The body paragraph contained two factors that motivate students to study their subjects at the university and supporting details. Comments 1 to 3 were given to the first factor, while Comments 4 to 6 were given to the second factor.

In the essay, Student 15 argues that curiosity motivates students to study at the university and explains it by providing a negative case in which students are not curious about math, which eventually leads to less concentration, interest, and motivation. In the latter half of the paragraph, she points out that positive feelings toward learning motivate students to study and presents a concrete example of how learning leads to more interest in the subjects. Overall, the raters’ comments on Student 15’s CT skills were positive. Raters appeared to perceive that both factors were supported by logical reasoning and relevant examples, which positively contributed to their judgments of her CT skills. For example, a chain of reasoning explaining why curiosity is important (from second to fifth sentences) was perceived as logical and connected to motivation for studying. The second argument (positive feelings toward learning) was also judged to be connected to motivation by R3 and R6. Furthermore, Comment 6 made by R5 indicates that the originality of the idea was part of CT from the raters’ perspective. The example of learning about Chinese literature was considered original and evaluated positively. Simply presenting ubiquitous arguments and supporting details may give the impression that students did not consider the given question carefully.

Table  6 presents the entire essay written by Student 69 in the post-test. The essay was rated by R1, R3, and R5, and the scores for CT skills given by the raters were 3, 3.5, and 3, respectively. It contained two factors that motivate students to study at the university and supporting details. Comments 1 to 3 were given to the first factor, while Comments 4 to 6 were given to the second factor.

In the essay, Student 69 argues that students’ dreams and Grade Point Averages (GPAs) motivate them to study at the university. First, she claims that university students’ dreams motivate them to study by providing a personal example in which she is able to study science hard because being a scientist is her dream for the future. Second, the student mentions that GPA is an incentive to study as students cannot study at the laboratory they wish if they have a low GPA. Raters acknowledged that her arguments successfully addressed the question (Comments 1 and 3). However, they negatively commented that the supporting evidence was based primarily on the student’s personal experience, therefore considering it egocentric. Although the support for the second factor was positively judged by R5 (as the student explains how low GPA influences all university students and not only herself), R3 commented that the argument should have been supported with more logical reasoning. The inclusion of her personal feeling (“If I could not enter the room which we are not interesting in, I’m very sad and I can’t do my best.”) may have made the second factor sound less logical and coherent. Finally, R1 wrote that the essay does not display the student’s CT skills (Comment 6). In a different essay, he also noted: “Perhaps it is difficult to show great CT skills with this task, as they are not really analyzing a text or doing any research.” This suggests that R1 appears to believe that timed independent essay writing cannot appropriately elicit the writer’s CT skills.

Table  7 presents the body paragraphs in the essay written by Student 50 in the pre-test. The essay was rated by R2 and R4, and the scores for CT skills given by the raters were 2 and 3, respectively. The comments refer to the entire essay.

In his essay, Student 50 discusses three points of personal dream plan for future, plan to travel abroad, and desire to make friends. However, he fails to explain clearly and explicitly how the three points motivate students to study. R2 perceived that these points were not relevant to the question and evaluated that the student did not engage in the topic appropriately. R2 also mentioned that it was difficult to rate the student’s CT skills because of the irrelevant opinions presented. Although his arguments are based solely on his personal experience as in Student 69’s essay, this feature was not mentioned by the raters. Furthermore, R4 commented that the three points raised by the student are basic and universal, which influenced his rating of the student’s CT skills. As discussed above, the presentation of universal opinions may negatively affect the raters’ impression of the writer’s CT skills. Nevertheless, it was not clear how the raters judged the extent to which written thoughts were universal or original.

RQ1 asked: “What is the relationship between rater judgments of students’ CT skills and their ratings on the criteria used to measure L2 writing proficiency?” The results indicate that raters’ judgments of students’ CT skills are most strongly explained by Task Achievement scores, although Lexical Resource scores were found to be another significant predictor in the post-test.

Task Achievement measures how adequately a student addresses all parts of the task, presents their position, and develops their main ideas with relevant details (British Council, n.d. ). Therefore, in the argumentative essay task used in this study, this criterion concerned itself with the extent to which students adequately answered the prompt and supported their answers by giving relevant and specific details, as well as examples. As some literature indicates, these elements are related to CT. Specifically, these are equivalent to two intellectual standards proposed by Paul and Elder ( 2014 ): relevance (how well the idea is connected to the question) and clarity (how well the idea is explained and elaborated). Moreover, Task Achievement appears to involve some aspects recognized in Stapleton’s ( 2001 ) scheme: the presence of arguments (opinions and their reasons) and supporting evidence. This finding suggests that the raters’ judgment of writers’ CT skills might be influenced by the content of argument more than how it is presented even in learners’ essays including linguistic errors.

This study found a weak relationship between CT skills and the linguistic features displayed in the participants’ essays, suggesting that demonstrating a high linguistic quality does not guarantee positive judgments of CT skills from readers. This supports the claim made by de Chazal ( 2014 ) that language proficiency is not a predictor of CT ability. However, using diverse and accurate vocabulary, measured by the Lexical Resource criterion, may lead to better impressions of one’s CT skills on readers. This may be since diverse vocabulary results in development of an idea, which was judged as a relevant element of CT. Additionally, errors in vocabulary in the L2 students’ essays might have undermined the clarity and comprehensibility of the content. As the clarity of statement is a fundamental element in the sense that other elements cannot be evaluated unless the content is written clearly (Nosich, 2022 ; Paul & Elder, 2014 ), the use of vocabulary influencing accurate conveyance of messages could be a linguistic feature relevant to CT skills especially in L2 argumentative writing. However, it remains unknown why Lexical Resource scores were not a significant predictor of CT in the pre-test.

To further examine the essay features that contributed to raters’ judgments of CT, RQ2 asked, “What essay features do raters consider when judging students’ CT skills?” The analysis of the protocol data revealed five categories: relevancy to the question, content development, logicality, quality of ideas, and other features. The first two categories support the results of RQ1 and align with the concepts of relevancy and clarity in Paul and Elder’s ( 2014 ) criteria. Few comments on linguistic features also partially concur with the outcome of RQ1. Overall, the raters seemed to construe CT skills displayed through the writing task as argumentation skills as emphasized in critical thinking movement (Davies & Barnett, 2015 ) and the CT literature (e.g., Cottrell, 2017 ; Fisher, 2011 ; Nosich, 2022 ).

Rater judgments of CT skills also included elements that were not addressed by the Task Achievement criterion: logicality and quality of ideas (see Table  4 ). Comments on logicality (logical structure, connection between ideas, and reasons supporting claims) showed that raters seemed to focus on the logical reasoning supporting students’ claims and fallacies, which is regarded as an assessment criterion for both arguments and CT skills (Paul & Elder, 2014 ; Stapleton, 2001 ). This is partly addressed by the Coherence and Cohesion criterion in the IELTS rating scale (logical sequencing of information and ideas) (British Council, n.d. ). This feature was considered as an essential component of CT in the argumentative writing task, in which “an author states a claim, uses some form of evidence—data, reasons, examples, etc.—to support the claim, and shows how the evidence supports the claim” (Hirvela & Belcher, 2021 , p. 1). The central purpose of the writing task could influence the raters’ attention to logicality. Moreover, the raters might have applied their critical reading skills, which involve appraising the degree to which the students adequately justified their opinions (Wallace & Wray, 2021 ).

The quality of ideas was primarily related to the range of perspectives displayed in the essay and their originality. First, supporting a claim by simply citing personal experience was judged negatively and regarded as egocentric (see Table  6 ). In contrast, raters positively evaluated writers who explained how a certain factor motivates university students in general, not solely for them, to study at university. This suggests that the type of evidence used influences rater judgments of a writer’s CT, and anecdotal evidence can be perceived less persuasive than other types, including causal evidence (Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007 ). Additionally, supporting claims via personal experiences can be perceived as failing to consider the question from other perspectives. This may negatively influence the judgment of a writer’s CT skills, as engaging in broader thinking by seeing situations from different perspectives has been identified as a key component of CT (Chaffee, 2019 ; Nosich, 2022 ; Paul & Elder, 2014 ). Second, raters positively judged original thoughts but negatively evaluated common and universal ideas. This is related to a disposition of critical thinkers known as intellectual autonomy (Paul & Elder, 2014 ), which entails having authorship of one’s own thoughts rather than simply accepting or borrowing those of others. Raters’ focus on originality of thought resonates with a conceptualization of CT given by academics of history, philosophy, and literary/cultural studies in Moore’s ( 2013 ) study. In particular, originality may be relevant to tasks involving creating or producing ideas (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001 ), including the argumentative writing used in this study.

It was found that raters neither mentioned all of the features recognized in the literature nor focused on the same features in the essays written by different students. For example, the raters seldom commented on the accuracy of supporting evidence (Paul & Elder, 2014 ) and did not comment on the breadth of thinking or the inclusion of counterarguments in the essays (Stapleton, 2001 ; Washington State University Center for Teaching, Learning, and Technology, 2009 ). This may be because only a few students supported their ideas using evidence other than personal experiences and included counterarguments that challenged their own points. It suggests that relevant and salient CT criteria depend on writing tasks (e.g., independent or integrated). In this study, the raters’ foci might be narrower than theoretical models because the students were required to write an argument, without any external resources, in a short period of time. Furthermore, raters focused on the essay’s relevancy to the question in those written by students who obtained low CT scores (Table  7 ) and focused more on logicality and the quality of ideas in essays written by those who obtained medium to high CT scores (Table  5 ). This suggests that the essay features influencing raters’ judgments depend, not only on CT features displayed in the essays, but also on the students’ overall CT level.

This study investigated five raters’ judgments of students’ CT skills through reading and rating their argumentative essays, thereby revealing the features of the essays that contributed to their judgments. The results indicate that the raters’ intuitive perceptions of students’ CT skills were linked to the Task Achievement and, partly, Lexical Resource criteria in the IELTS (British Council, n.d. ). Additionally, raters’ written comments revealed that their judgments of the writers’ CT skills were affected by the essay’s relevancy to the question, content development, logicality, and quality of ideas.

The findings of this study help to delineate the CT skills addressed in L2 pedagogies so that they can be assessed through argumentative essays. In particular, test developers and teachers who are keen to assess test-takers’ CT skills could incorporate the explored features into the assessment criteria. Since there are distinct elements pertinent to CT skills, it is possible to address them in different criteria for assessing essays. If a pre-established rating scale needs to be adopted because of practical constraints, the Task Achievement category in the IELTS rating scale (British Council, n.d. ), addressing relevancy and content development, can be a viable option as scores predict students’ CT skills to some degree. However, it is recommended to incorporate other features explored by this study into rating scales for a more precise measurement of CT skills, because positive judgments from raters are likely to require more than what the Task Achievement category comprehends, such as logicality, range of perspectives (or types of evidence), and originality of ideas. Logicality can be assessed through the category of coherence, which typically focuses on progression of ideas and logical sequencing (Knoch, 2007 ). Although it already entails some components of logicality explored in the study, the category can explicitly mention the connection between a claim and supporting evidence to measure CT more precisely. The quality of ideas and originality could be evaluated though the category of content. While some existing content categories address relevancy and content development (e.g., Jacobs et al., 1981 ), the creativity of ideas and their ability to create interest can also be addressed in the criterion (see Bae et al., 2016 ), although the assessment of these features is highly subjective.

It is also possible to create a single-independent assessment criterion for CT by including all the features discovered by the study. This option is beneficial because the same features are not necessarily relevant and salient across different proficiency levels. This study indicated that raters focused on the essay’s relevancy to the question written by students who obtained low CT scores and focused more on logicality and quality of ideas in the essays written by those who obtained medium to high CT scores. This finding suggests that descriptors for low CT levels should focus on the essay’s relevancy to the topic, while descriptors for higher levels should address the logicality and originality in the content.

This study’s findings also have some implications for classroom-based assessment activities, especially for self- and peer-assessment (Brown & Abeywickrama, 2019 ). In the EAP and CLIL classrooms, which emphasize cultivating CT skills, self- and peer-assessment is recognized as a useful activity for improving students’ task performance (e.g., Coyle et al., 2010 ; Ferris, 2018 ). The explored features can be incorporated into the development of checklists, which convey the students the construct in a simple manner and are suitable for use in self- and peer-assessment (Green, 2021 ). For instance, after reading their own or peers’ argumentative essays, students could be asked to respond to statements such as “The essay discusses the given prompt without any irrelevant piece of content,” or “The essay includes opinions from various perspectives” by indicating yes or no. Can-do statements can also be created based on the study’s findings for self-assessment, including statements such as “I can give sufficient examples supporting my opinion” or “I can connect ideas logically.” In so doing, students can grasp the elusive concept of CT and realize the characteristics of highly evaluated essays without deeply learning about the definition of CT itself.

This study has some limitations. First, this study collected data from only five native English speakers who have worked as IELTS examiners. Because of this small sample size, it is difficult to generalize these findings in broader contexts, including readers with different backgrounds. Moreover, the raters did not necessarily have a deep understanding of CT and exhibited raters’ bias in their ratings. Second, this study collected data from students with relatively low English proficiency levels. Students with higher English proficiency may display a wider range of features related to CT skills, including reflecting on their own supporting evidence (Chason et al., 2017 ). Third, written verbal protocol data may suffer from non-veridicality, such that the results reported may have included features that raters did not actually consider while rating or may not have comprehensively included all of the features that they considered (Gass & Mackey, 2017 ). Post-marking interviews should have been conducted to triangulate the findings. Fourth, the assigned essay topic and writing task also had some limitations. Whether or not the students were able to demonstrate their CT skills through the topic was not determined. In other words, the topic’s appropriateness was not examined. Lastly, only one type of writing assignment (timed, independent, causal argumentative essay writing) was employed to examine the relevant criteria for measuring CT skills. As noted by R1, the task adopted in this study did not involve any analysis and research, meaning that it may not always be suitable to assess CT. Using other types of essays, such as source-based argumentative writing (Plakans & Ohta, 2021 ), might reveal different dimensions of CT, that is, different essay features might have been found to be relevant to raters’ judgments of CT skills.

Therefore, further research is recommended to investigate the way in which CT skills are related to various essay writing tasks, including integrated writing tasks or research projects, which can be done by examining rater judgments and collecting data that compensate for limitations of verbal protocols (e.g., interviews). Such research will help in revealing the elusive concept of CT skills in L2 pedagogies.

Availability of data and materials

The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Abbreviations

Common European Framework of Reference

Content and Language Integrated Learning

• Critical thinking

English for academic purposes

Grade point average

International English Language Testing System

Second language

Multiple regression

Research question

Washington State University

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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• The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities , by Robert H. Ennis

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On Reasoning and Argument

Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical Thinking

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• David Hitchcock 0

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Argumentation

Arguments and Reason-Giving

On Defining ‘Argument’

David Hitchcock

• Reasoning and Argument
• J. Anthony Blair
• Deduction, induction and conduction
• Types of validity
• linked-convergent distinction
• Material consequence
• Enthymematic arguments
• Toulmin's warrants
• Counter-factuals
• Patterns of reasoning
• Reasoning by analogy
• Argumentation schemes

Table of contents (33 chapters)

Front matter, deduction, induction and conduction, the linked-convergent distinction, material consequence, enthymematic arguments, does the traditional treatment of enthymemes rest on a mistake, toulmin’s warrants, non-logical consequence, inference claims, material consequence and counterfactuals, patterns of reasoning, validity in conductive arguments, reasoning by analogy: a general theory, pollock on practical reasoning, the generation of argument schemes, instrumental rationality, appeals to considerations, authors and affiliations, about the author.

David Hitchcock, professor emeritus of philosophy at McMaster University, is the founding president of the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, author of Critical Thinking (Methuen, 1983), co-author of Evidence-Based Practice: Logic and Critical Thinking in Medicine (AMA Press, 2005), and co-editor of Arguing on the Toulmin Model (Springer, 2006).

Bibliographic Information

Book Title : On Reasoning and Argument

Book Subtitle : Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical Thinking

Authors : David Hitchcock

Series Title : Argumentation Library

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3

Publisher : Springer Cham

eBook Packages : Religion and Philosophy , Philosophy and Religion (R0)

Copyright Information : Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Hardcover ISBN : 978-3-319-53561-6 Published: 19 April 2017

Softcover ISBN : 978-3-319-85184-6 Published: 25 July 2018

eBook ISBN : 978-3-319-53562-3 Published: 06 April 2017

Series ISSN : 1566-7650

Series E-ISSN : 2215-1907

Edition Number : 1

Number of Pages : XXVII, 553

Number of Illustrations : 1 b/w illustrations, 6 illustrations in colour

Topics : Philosophy of Language , Classical Studies , Philology , Literacy , Logic

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Article Contents

Introduction, critical thinking and the role of knowledge—an empirically based discussion, conclusions and appeal.

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On the role of knowledge in critical thinking—using student essay responses to bring empirical fuel to the debate between ‘generalists’ and ‘specifists’

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Kristoffer Larsson, On the role of knowledge in critical thinking—using student essay responses to bring empirical fuel to the debate between ‘generalists’ and ‘specifists’, Journal of Philosophy of Education , Volume 55, Issue 2, April 2021, Pages 314–322, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12545

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To develop students’ critical thinking is one of the primary goals of a modern democratic school system. However, what is to be developed has been the matter of long-standing debate. One particular area of conflict has been what role is played by the knowledge concerning the object to be critically thought about. The ‘specifists’ have asserted that knowledge about the object is the core. The ‘generalists’ have claimed that there is no need for any actual profound knowledge. Typically, this debate has been held at a theoretical and philosophical level. In this paper, I will make an empirically based contribution to the debate. In a unique approach, I will use a number of student essay responses to argue in favour of a specifist view, and at the same time to question some of the generalists’ basic assumptions. The paper ends with an appeal to the generalists to provide us with proper clarification regarding the questions I raise. This is important as they hold the dominant position in the field. If they are to continue to do so, we need to be clear about the accuracy of their basic assumptions. This becomes even more essential as the generalist research has been severely criticised for producing inconclusive results, as well as the fact that the generalist view on critical thinking has been adopted by major policymakers both in Europe and the United States.

Developing students’ critical thinking is often agreed upon as one of the most important assignments of a modern democratic school system, promoting personal as well societal progress (Behar-Horenstein and Niu, 2011 ; Beyer, 1995; European Commission, 2016 ; Facione, 2006 ; Martin, 2005 ; NGA/CCSSO, 2010; Paul & Elder, 2009 ; Elder & Paul, 2010 ; Tsui, 1998 ). However, what is actually to be developed by the students has been a matter of debate over the decades, since there has been no agreement on the actual definition or construct of critical thinking (Brodin, 2007 ; Johnson and Hamby, 2015 ; Petress, 2004 ). At the heart of the matter is the ongoing battle fought between the so-called ‘specifists’ 1 and ‘generalists’ (Davies, 2006 , 2013 ; Moore, 2004 , 2011 , 2013 ). The specifists have talked about critical thinking as something specific, not generalisable outside certain realms (Gardner & Johnson, 1996 ; McPeck, 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b ; Moore, 2004 , 2011 , 2013 ). The most radical of these is McPeck, claiming that there are ‘almost as many different kinds of critical thinking as there are different kinds of things to think about’ (McPeck, 1990a , p. 10). The generalists, on the other hand, have talked about critical thinking as something generic, an ability that can be applied to more or less every object of thought belonging to any discipline, subject etc. (Davies, 2006 , 2013 ; Ennis, 1987 , 1989 , 1990 ; Higgins & Baumfield, 1998 ; Paul, 1985 ; Quinn, 1994 ).

One particular controversy in this debate has been the role of knowledge about the object to be critically thought about (Ennis, 1989 , 1990 ; McPeck, 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b , 1990c , 1990d ; Paul, 1985 ).

The specifists have claimed that this kind of knowledge is the actual key to good critical thinking. McPeck ( 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b ) argues that critical thinking amounts to a reflective approach towards the knowledge one has about the object of thought, proclaiming that ‘one's abilities here are a function of one's knowledge’ ( 1985b , p. 51), and over the years he has offered several examples of what he means. In one of these, he sets himself in a situation where he is to think about what to believe concerning different descriptions of the status of the US economy. He concludes that it is impossible for him to make use of some toolbox of generic critical thinking to evaluate the different descriptions. What he needs is more knowledge about Laffer curves, zero-sum systems, monetary versus fiscal policy and so on, since such an evaluation would require ‘being in possession of, and comprehending, large amounts of complex information’ ( 1990b , p. 11).

The generalists, in contrast, have claimed that knowledge about the object, though necessary to some degree, is neither a sufficient nor the most prominent criterion for critical thinking; more important is one's ability to apply generic critical thinking (Davies, 2013 ; Ennis, 1989 ; Scriven, 1990 ; Siegel, 1991 ; Bailin & Siegel, 2003 ). Scriven ( 1990 , pp. x–xi) perhaps explicates this view in the most straightforward way, stating that when it comes to critical thinking about an object, there is no ‘need for delving into vast subject matters’; it is about ‘using a finite box of [generic] tools’. What these tools actually are has been described in several different taxonomies. One of the most renowned taxonomies is the Ennis ( 1993 ) taxonomy, with tools such as to: ‘identify assumptions’, ‘judge the quality of an argument’, ‘be open-minded’ and ‘draw conclusions when warranted, but with caution’.

To sum it up somewhat bluntly, the specifists equate the ability to think critically to one's knowledge about the object to be thought about, adding merely the reflective eye. The generalists see knowledge about the object to be thought about as a subordinate part of one's ability to think critically, the application of generic critical thinking abilities being the superior and decisive part.

The discussion on the matter among scholars has typically been held at a philosophical level, with close to nothing more than general praise, supported by purely theoretically founded arguments, of either knowledge as the demarcation of one's critical thinking ability or knowledge as being neither sufficient for nor vital to one's critical thinking ability (Bailin & Siegel, 2003 ; Davies, 2006 , 2013 ; Ennis, 1989 , 1990 ; Gardner and Johnson, 1996 ; McPeck, 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b , 1990c , 1990d ; Moore, 2004 , 2011 ; Scriven, 1990 ; Siegel, 1991 ). ‘Indeed, one has to admit to a lack of empirical evidence …’, as Moore ( 2011 , p. 264) puts it. However, both sides have stressed the need for further use of empirical data when discussing the topic (Ennis, 1989 ; Moore, 2004 , 2011 ). The aim of this paper is to make such an empirically founded contribution. In a unique approach, I will use a number of essay responses by students trying to think critically, in order to argue for a specifist point of view concerning the role of knowledge. In doing so, I will dispute some of the generalists’ basic assumptions and I will conclude my line of reasoning with a direct appeal to the generalists to properly clarify the questions raised at their expense.

To sort out the questions raised is actually of vital importance for the future of critical thinking. The generalists have over the years held a predominant position in the field. For instance, important policy documents describe critical thinking in terms of a transversal phenomenon. Examples include A New Skills Agenda For Europe, declared by the European Commission (the EU's executive body) (European Commission, 2016 ), and the Common Core State Standards set by the National Governors Association Center for Best Practices and the Council of Chief State School Officers (Lai, 2011 ; NGA/CCSSO, 2010 ) and so far adopted by 43 of the states in the United States. The empirical research on improving critical thinking among students has also for the most part approved of this generic perspective: as Tiruneh et al. ( 2014 , p. 3) put it in their review of the field, the studies mainly consider critical thinking to be ‘clearly identifiable and definable thinking skills which are domain-independent’. If the generalist is to continue to hold this dominant position, we need to be absolutely clear about the accuracy of the assumptions underpinning their view, not least as reviewers of the field have continually and severely criticised the research conducted within this generalist perspective for arriving at inconclusive results (Behar-Horenstein & Nui, 2011; McMillan, 1987 ; Tsui, 1998 ). Behar-Horenstein and Nui (2011, p. 38) go as far as asking readers ‘to consider the trustworthiness of the publications and to critically analyse the substance of empirical studies on teaching critical thinking’.

Before going further into the discussion, I would like to make some clarifications. In the literature, there are several terms, such as being ‘informed’ and having ‘knowledge’, that are used when discussing how knowledgeable one ought to be about the object to be thought about. I will use the term ‘knowledge’ throughout this paper, with the exception of direct quotations.

It is also important to recognise that, in this paper, knowledge (about the object of thought) is seen as some kind of a progressive continuum. It stretches from having no knowledge or very sparse knowledge about the object of thought to having deep and profound knowledge, including such things as knowing the structure and the rationale behind the knowledge, that is, questions concerning the epistemic status of the knowledge involved (McPeck, 1985a ). 2

Moreover, it is important to stress that the phrase ‘knowledge about the object to be thought about’ amounts to knowledge about that specific object of thought. It is not knowledge in a discipline, domain or subject in a general sense, it is knowledge directly required or called for by the specific object of thought. This kind of knowledge could, of course, most often be obtained from a certain discipline, but it could also be obtained from several different disciplines or other domains of knowledge. This particular distinction might be especially important to notice, as many times when the role of knowledge in critical thinking is discussed, it is done with regard to having knowledge in a certain discipline , domain or subject . However, these concepts have been found to be vague and often not to the point when discussing what actual knowledge might come into play when thinking critically about a certain thing (Ennis, 1989 , 1990 ; McPeck, 1990a ). Therefore, McPeck has focused the discussion on the actual knowledge required by the specific object to be thought about, whichever domains etc. that particular knowledge needs to be retrieved from (McPeck, 1985b , 1990a ). Thus, in this paper I use the phrase ‘knowledge about the object to be thought about’ to describe that specific knowledge required by the problem at hand. The empirical examples and the arguments I use to further the discussion are to be viewed accordingly.

As stated, I will use essay responses as empirical data to put forward my argument. These essay responses are taken from a classroom setting, primarily because it is in these kinds of pedagogical contexts that the educational goal of developing students’ critical thinking is to be fulfilled. More specifically I will use three essay responses written by three 15-year-old students who, with nothing more than pen and paper, were asked individually to develop their thoughts on how a deontological ethicist 3 would argue concerning the case of the death penalty. I will discuss each of these three responses in turn and elaborate my thoughts on them. I will look at how a specifist would be likely to view the response but also how a generalist might view it. In doing so, I will argue for the specifist standpoint on knowledge in critical thinking, putting the pressure on the generalists. It is worth noting here that my purpose is to make a well-reasoned and empirically well-grounded interpretation of the students’ responses on behalf of the specifists and the generalists. I do not claim that my interpretations are the only ones, or that all specifists or generalists would agree on these interpretations (as that would be futile) but I argue that these interpretations are reasonable and plausible. Let us now consider the first response:

A deontological ethicist would say that the death penalty is wrong because you can use a rule that ‘it is always wrong to kill’, which says that the act is wrong regardless of consequences or intention. A deontological ethicist could also say that the death penalty is right and lean on rules like ‘an eye for an eye’, when he says that if someone committed a murder he should also be killed as punishment. The principle, however, would only justify the death penalty if the perpetrator committed a murder. 4

Viewed from a specifist perspective, I would like to put forward this response as a manifestation of critical thinking. The response displays accurate and sufficiently extensive knowledge on deontological ethics and the death penalty, and indicates a reflective dimension. If we look deeper into what knowledge could be claimed to be present in this response, I argue that the response exhibits basic knowledge of what rules and the death penalty are. In relation to the specific rules presented, the response further demonstrates knowledge concerning the circumstances under which the rules are applicable in relation to the death penalty (most profoundly evident in the third sentence). The response also shows knowledge about the fact that deontological ethics revolve around rules, and furthermore, that rules are to determine one's standpoint or action concerning an issue or a situation (for example, the first sentence). Moreover, I argue that the response displays knowledge about the role of the chosen rule in deontological ethics and the possibility of coming up with a different conclusion on an issue based on what rules are used to guide the decision (the first and second sentences). In sum, this exhibition of knowledge about deontological ethics and the death penalty amounts to a dimension of reflection on deontological ethics and the death penalty, i.e. critical thinking. Using this line of argument, I would claim that the critical thinking manifested is best described as a function of the knowledge displayed, opening the way for the specifist standpoint on the role of knowledge in critical thinking.

However, a generalist could problematise my way of reasoning. 5 For example, they could use the earlier mentioned Ennis taxonomy of generic abilities (Ennis, 1993 ) and argue that the response shows patterns linked to at least three of those. They could start by claiming a pattern linked to the ability to ‘be open-minded’ when engaging with an object of thought, indicated by the first and second sentences, when the student shifts from one rule and one standpoint to another rule and another standpoint. Using the same pattern of shifting, they could also claim an indication of the ability to ‘identify assumptions’, as these sentences could be said to show an identification of the role of rules in deontological ethics, that is, varying standpoints could be taken on the same issue depending on the rule favoured. The generalist could further assert the presence of a third pattern that it is possible to link to yet another generic ability. Looking at sentences two and three, they could argue that this ought to be seen as a display of a pattern linked to the ability to ‘draw conclusions when warranted, but with caution’, as sentence three states under which circumstances the conclusion made in sentence two is relevant, and thereby shows caution in terms of the conclusion reached. The generalist could even claim that another pattern is linked to this ability, as the shift in perspective between sentences one and two could be viewed as indicating a certain caution regarding which conclusion a deontological ethicist would come to, opening the way for at least two different conclusions, depending on the preferred rule. Based on this counterargument, the generalist can claim that the major explanatory factor behind the critical thinking displayed in the response is the application of the above-mentioned abilities, not the knowledge about the object of thought, its subordinate.

Even if this is seen as a thoughtful objection to the specifist standpoint, I have two concerns that would call its validity into question. Firstly, if the response is primarily explained in terms of the generic abilities in question, it implies that the response is not achievable without applying these generic critical thinking abilities. Looking at the response, it seems impossible, with any certainty, to put forward such an argument. In fact, everything in the response is satisfactorily explained as merely a display of knowledge about deontological ethics and the death penalty, nothing more, and this display is thorough enough to demonstrate a reflective stance. On the other hand, the patterns that could possibly be linked to generic critical thinking can only be used ad hoc to prove their own plausible existence. Secondly, if the generic abilities offer the cardinal explanation, and are to be of some true use, it also implies that some of the knowledge being displayed in the response ought to be derived by applying generic critical thinking, and not by knowledge about the object. That is, it ought to be possible to arrive at this response without having all the knowledge about the object being displayed, instead generating this knowledge by applying generic critical thinking abilities to the case. By looking at the response as it is, this kind of knowledge-generating process is in no way obvious; in fact, it is impossible to infer something even close to this from the response. Even if such a process were in theory possible, it seems both extremely far-fetched in any practical sense and paved with pitfalls that may lead to incorrect ‘knowledge’ about the object of thought being generated.

To continue the discussion, let's look at another of the student responses:

A deontological ethicist would probably say that we shouldn't have it [the death penalty] as it becomes wrong in our laws, but he could also say that we should have it [the death penalty], as it could be needed in some brutal cases (the absolute worst) for certain criminals.

From a specifist point of view, I argue that this response lacks manifestations of critical thinking, as it is tainted by a knowledge deficit concerning the object of thought. The only relevant knowledge that the response seems to contain is some vague knowledge about what the death penalty is and under which circumstances this is often discussed (the most brutal cases). Otherwise, there appears to be no obvious knowledge displayed concerning what a rule actually is and certainly no knowledge shown concerning deontological ethics. In sum, the response can be confidently argued to manifest deficient knowledge in relation to the object to be thought about, thereby making any display of relevant reflection on the knowledge impossible, as such a reflection is a function of pertinent knowledge about the object of thought.

What, then, could generalists say about this response? I think they would indeed agree that the response lacks manifestations of critical thinking, as there is no accurate reasoning concerning deontological ethics and the death penalty displayed in the response. However, if I shine a torch on the generalist standpoint, and use the same tactic as in the previous response, something interesting occurs. To be specific, even in this response, it is possible to argue for the presence of patterns that can be linked to generic critical thinking abilities. The shift in perspective between the first part of the sentence, before the first comma, and the second part of the sentence could be seen as an indication of a pattern that can be linked to the ability to ‘be open-minded’, as the response here states that a deontological ethicist could be both for and against the death penalty and presents reasons for this. This shift in perspective can also be seen as a pattern that can be linked to the ability to ‘draw conclusions when warranted, but with caution’, as it opens the way for deontological ethicists to be able to take different standpoints regarding the issue of the death penalty.

I would argue that this kind of situation paves the way for further questioning the generalist idea of the superiority of generic abilities over knowledge. To start, the presence of patterns linked to generic critical thinking, even though no actual critical thinking is evident in the response, contradicts the core of this idea. If the main force behind critical thinking is generic abilities, how could there be a presence of these abilities without any critical thinking taking place? This presence also entails another deceitful risk which should not be underestimated, namely, to mislead the interpretation, making what is corrupt critical thinking appear as critical thinking. A generalist would perhaps counter such a claim by arguing that this risk can be avoided by applying generic critical thinking abilities to discover the corruption. However, I would claim that this line of reasoning is crooked. The only way to see through this illusion ought to be by knowing more about the object to be thought about, as the actual problem with the response is knowledge deficit, nothing more, nothing less. Add to this the fact that the knowledge deficit in the response contradicts even the generalist implication of generic critical thinking as a generator of knowledge about the object to be thought about. Though there are patterns linked to generic critical thinking abilities, there is no sign of applicable knowledge being generated by this presence. If any such process (in theory) is at work, it is generating flawed knowledge.

Before closing this argument, let us look at one last response:

A deontological ethicist would probably say that the death penalty is wrong because you are not allowed to kill someone. That is a rule and the action must follow that rule.

As with the previous response, I would argue that from a specifist perspective, this response is not a representation of critical thinking. Comparatively though, there is more pertinent knowledge present in this response, as it would be reasonable to say that it displays basic knowledge about what rules and the death penalty are. Further, it is also fair to say that it contains some knowledge about deontological ethics, such as that deontological ethics concerns rules, and that rules determine the standpoint to be taken on an issue. Even so, I would claim that this response is mostly characterised by its knowledge deficit. It is of the utmost importance to recognise that a specifist view does not claim that every display of knowledge is to be considered as critical thinking. In fact, the basic idea of this view is the opposite. Critical thinking is a function of knowledge about the object of thought. If a response lacks critical thinking but displays some knowledge about the object, this would be considered as a lack of knowledge that is deep enough to manifest a reflective approach towards the object of thought, i.e. critical thinking. There is no way, as McPeck ( 1990d , p. 117) puts it, that ‘a minimal amount of understanding of that which is to be thought about’ can generate critical thinking about that object. If compared with the first response discussed (claimed to be characterised by critical thinking), this response, for example, lacks any display of knowledge about the role of the rule in deontological ethics and the possibility of coming up with diverse standpoints on an issue based on what rule is followed.

The argument put forward above may well seem fine from a specifist standpoint, but there might be a way for a generalist to attack the specifist standpoint based on this response and my line of reasoning. This attack would involve commencing with a claim that they also see this response as lacking any manifestation of critical thinking according to the Ennis taxonomy (1993), continuing by admitting that they too see that there is relevant knowledge on the object of thought displayed, and then consolidating these two into an argument by asserting that the problem is not a knowledge deficit as in my specifist claim—there is knowledge enough in the response—but that the crux of the matter is that there is a lack of generic critical thinking.

Yet, I would say that this is a fraudulent way for the generalist to travel. I would grant them that there are no patterns of generic critical thinking evident in the response as it is. I would also, as already articulated, grant them that relevant knowledge about the object to be thought about is present. But there is also an obvious knowledge deficit in the response compared to a response that displays critical thinking, such as the first one. This deficit cannot be explained away. The generalist claim that what is missing in the response is any application of generic abilities and that such an application could turn this response into critical thinking, once again, has to explain how these generic abilities can generate knowledge, such as the kind displayed in the first response discussed.

To sum this discussion up, I would claim that the type of empirically based argument presented here makes a strong case for the specifist's standpoint on the role of knowledge in critical thinking and quite a weak case for the generalist standpoint.

As the specifist standpoint seems to be applicable to all the instances I have presented in this paper, I would maintain that the argumentation presented sharpens the McPeckian assertion that knowledge about the object to be thought about is the vehicle for, and the only real explanatory factor for, critical thinking (McPeck, 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b , 1990c , 1990d ).

The generalist view that knowledge about the object is a subordinate part of critical thinking, is, as I have shown, on the other hand, flawed in several ways. The possible presence of generic critical thinking in a response perceived as a displaying critical thinking by both generalists and specifists cannot preclude the possibility that the response displays nothing more than knowledge. Nor can this presence explain which knowledge it is necessary to have about the object and which knowledge ought to be generated by applying generic critical thinking abilities (i.e. by means of the assumed immanent knowledge-generating capacity of generic critical thinking). Further, the fact that generic critical thinking abilities can be present in a response that both sides view as lacking any actual critical thinking, seriously brings into question the generalist view on generic critical thinking as the main driving force behind critical thinking. This also relates to the risk of creating an illusion of critical thinking in a response where there is none—an illusion that logically can only be dispelled by knowing more about the object to be thought about.

Based on the argument I have made in this paper, I urge the generalist side to come up with a proper reply to the questions raised here. They need to clarify:

how generic critical thinking actually adds something to the critical thinking that knowledge about the object cannot explain;

how generic critical thinking abilities are the driving force behind critical thinking (and not knowledge about the object), especially when these abilities can be present without any critical thinking taking place;

how generic critical thinking can generate knowledge about the object not already obtained; and

how to come to terms with the chimera of generic critical thinking posing as genuine critical thinking, and to do so in terms of the use of generic critical thinking rather than knowing more about the object to be thought about.

As stated in the introduction, a clarification on the matters concerned is, in fact, of the utmost importance, and not only for the sake of the argument made. The generalist side has over the years held a dominant position in the field of critical thinking. Major policymakers in Europe and in the United States have adopted a generalist view (European Commission, 2016 ; Lai, 2011 ; NGA/CCSSO, 2010 ). The lion's share of research on improving students’ critical thinking has been conducted from a generalist perspective (Tiruneh et al ., 2014 ). To this we need to add the continual and severe criticism by reviewers that this research has arrived at surprisingly inconsistent results and suffers from an overall lack of trustworthiness (Behar-Horenstein & Nui, 2011; McMillan, 1987 ; Tsui, 1998 ). If the generalists are to hold their predominant position in the future, we need to be absolutely clear about the adequacy of their basic assumptions. Otherwise, the risk is that we will go even further down a path that is destined to end in a blind alley.

Sometimes called ‘specificists’.

Although they are not investigated in this paper, it is worth noting that the epistemological properties of critical thinking per se have been part of the wider debate between generalists and specifists (e.g. McPeck, 1985a ; Moore, 2004 ; Norris, 1985 ; Siegel, 1991 ).

The normative ethical position that judges the morality of an action based on rules.

This student response, and those presented below, have been translated from Swedish to English by the author. An effort has been made to stay as close to the original written response as possible.

In fact, the generalist Quinn identified patterns linked to generic critical thinking abilities in a student response of similar kind (Quinn, 1994 , p. 110).

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