gender reassignment means

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What does it mean for someone to have the protected characteristic of “gender reassignment” under the Equality Act 2010? The government, public bodies, many employers and even employment tribunals are often confused about this.

Having the protected characteristic of gender reassignment does not mean that someone’s sex has changed or give them the right to make other people pretend that it has. 

These FAQs cover the definition of the characteristic and who it covers – and what this means for employers and service providers. 

Download these gender reassignment FAQs as a PDF.

What is the protected characteristic of “gender reassignment”?

What does it mean to have this characteristic , who can have this characteristic , does having the protected characteristic of gender reassignment mean that a person must be treated as the opposite sex , does the equality act outlaw “misgendering”, is it harassment to “out” a person as transgender , can employers have policies which require people to refer to transgender people in particular situations in a particular way , what should employers and service providers do to avoid the risk of harassment claims , should schools have rules about “misgendering”.

The Equality Act 2010 at Section 7 defines the protected characteristic of “gender reassignment” as relating to a person who is: 

“proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.”

The law refers to this as being “transsexual”. But the term more commonly used today is “transgender” or “trans”. This broadly relates to anyone at any stage of a personal process. For example:

• A man tells his employer that he is considering “transitioning” and is seeing a therapist with the potential result of being referred for medical treatment.
• A man identifies as a “transwoman” without having any surgery or treatment.
• A woman identified as a “transman” for several years and took testosterone, but has now stopped and “detransitioned”.

The Equality Act protects people from direct and indirect discrimination, harassment or victimisation in situations that are covered by the Equality Act, such as in the workplace or when receiving goods or services.

Direct discrimination

Direct discrimination is when you are treated worse than another person or other people because:

• you have a protected characteristic
• someone thinks you have that protected characteristic (known as discrimination by perception)
• you are connected to someone with that protected characteristic (known as discrimination by association).

For example: an employee tells their employer that they intend to transition. Their employer alters their role against their wishes to avoid them having contact with clients.

The comparator is a person who is materially similar in other aspects but does not have the protected characteristic (“is not trans”). 

Indirect discrimination

Indirect discrimination happens when a policy applies in the same way for everybody but disadvantages a group of people who share a protected characteristic, and you are disadvantaged as part of this group. This is unlawful unless the person or organisation applying the policy can show that there is a good reason for the policy. This is known as objective justification .

For example: an airport has a general policy of searching passengers according to their sex. Everyone travelling needs to follow the same security procedures and processes, but it makes transgender travellers feel uncomfortable. This could be indirect discrimination, so the airport reviews its policy and changes it so that any passenger may ask to be searched by a staff member of either sex and have a private search, out of view of other passengers. 

Harassment is unwanted behaviour connected with a protected characteristic that has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity or creating a degrading, humiliating, hostile, intimidating or offensive environment.

For example: a transgender person is having a drink in a pub with friends and is referred to by the bar staff as “it” and mocked for their appearance.

Victimisation

Victimisation is when you are treated badly because you have made a complaint of gender-reassignment discrimination under the Equality Act or are supporting someone who has made a complaint of gender-reassignment discrimination. For example:

For example: a person proposing to undergo gender reassignment is being harassed by a colleague at work. He makes a complaint about the way his colleague is treating him and is sacked.

The Equality Act also provides that if a person is absent from work because of gender-reassignment treatment, their employer cannot treat them worse than they would be treated if absent for illness or injury. 

Does a person have to be under medical supervision?

No. This was explicitly removed from the definition in 2010. Gender reassignment can be a personal process. 

Must they have a gender-recognition certificate or be in the process of applying for one?

No. The protected characteristic is defined without reference to the Gender Recognition Act.

Do they have to have made a firm decision to transition? 

No. Protection against discrimination and harassment attaches to a person who is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process).

During the passage of the Equality Act, the Solicitor General stated in Parliament: 

“Gender reassignment, as defined, is a personal process, so there is no question of having to do something medical, let alone surgical, to fit the definition. “Someone who was driven by a characteristic would be in the process of gender reassignment, however intermittently it manifested itself.  “At what point [proposing to undergo] amounts to ‘considering undergoing’ a gender reassignment is pretty unclear. However, proposing’ suggests a more definite decision point, at which the person’s protected characteristic would immediately come into being. There are lots of ways in which that can be manifested – for instance, by making their intention known. Even if they do not take a single further step, they will be protected straight away. Alternatively, a person might start to dress, or behave, like someone who is changing their gender or is living in an identity of the opposite sex. That too, would mean they were protected. If an employer is notified of that proposal, they will have a clear obligation not to discriminate against them.” 

In the case of Taylor v Jaguar Land Rover , a male employee told his employer that he was “gender fluid” and thought of himself as “part of a spectrum, transitioning from the male to the female gender identity”. He said to his line manager: “I have no plans for surgical transition.” He started wearing women’s clothing to work, asked to be referred to by a woman’s name and raised a question about which toilets he should use. The Employment Tribunal concluded that he was covered by the protected characteristic. 

Can children have the protected characteristic? 

Yes. In the case of AA, AK & Ors v NHS England , NHS England argued that children who are waiting for assessment by the Tavistock Gender Identity Development Service (GIDS) do not have the protected characteristic as they have not yet reached the stage of proposing to transition. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. It noted that the definition of “gender reassignment” does not require medical intervention and can include actions such as changing “one’s name and/or how one dresses or does one’s hair”.

The court concluded:

“There is no reason of principle why a child could not satisfy the definition in s.7 provided they have taken a settled decision to adopt some aspect of the identity of the other gender.”

It noted that the decision did not have to be permanent. 

Is “Gillick competence” relevant to the protected characteristic?

No. “Gillick competence” refers to the set of criteria that are used for establishing whether a child has the capacity to provide consent for medical treatment, based on whether they have sufficient understanding and intelligence to fully understand it.

Having the protected characteristic of gender reassignment (that is, being able to bring a claim for gender-reassignment discrimination) does not depend on having any diagnosis or medical treatment. Therefore Gillick competence is not relevant to the Equality Act criteria. 

No. There is nothing in the Equality Act which means that people with the protected characteristic of “gender reassignment” need to be treated in a particular way, or differently from people without the characteristic. 

Article 9 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights protect the fundamental human rights of freedom of speech and freedom of belief. 

In the case of Forstater v CGDE [2021] it was established that the belief that men are male and women are female, and that this cannot change and is important, is protected under Article 9 and in relation to belief discrimination in the Equality Act. 

This means that employers and service providers must not harass or discriminate against people because they recognise that “transwomen” are men and “transmen” are women. Employers and service providers cannot require people to believe that someone has changed sex, or impose a blanket constraint on expressing their belief. 

No. “Misgendering” is not defined or outlawed by the Equality Act. 

In general, people who object to “misgendering” mean any reference to a person who identifies as transgender by words that relate to their sex. This can include using the words woman, female, madam, lady, daughter, wife, mother, she, her and so on about someone who identifies as a “transman”, or man, male, sir, gentleman, son, husband, father, he, him and so on about someone who identifies as a “transwoman”. 

Any form of words may be harassment, but this depends on the circumstances and the purpose and effect of the behaviour. Harassment is unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic that has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for a person.   An employment tribunal would also consider:

• that person’s perception
• the other circumstances of the case
• whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

Tribunals have emphasised that when judging harassment context is everything, and warned against a culture of hypersensitivity to the perception of alleged victims.

Employment tribunal judgments

As Lord Justice Nicholas Underhill found in Dhellwal v Richmond Pharmacology [2009], a case decided under the Race Relations Act:

“What the tribunal is required to consider is whether, if the claimant has experienced those feelings or perceptions, it was reasonable for her to do so. Thus if, for example, the tribunal believes that the claimant was unreasonably prone to take offence, then, even if she did genuinely feel her dignity to have been violated, there will have been no harassment within the meaning of the section.”

In the Forstater case, the employment appeal tribunal said that it was not proportionate to “impose a requirement on the Claimant to refer to a trans woman as a woman to avoid harassment”. It said that:

“ Whilst the Claimant’s belief, and her expression of them by refusing to refer to a trans person by their preferred pronoun, or by refusing to accept that a person is of the acquired gender stated on a GRC, could amount to unlawful harassment in some circumstances, it would not always have that effect. In our judgment, it is not open to the Tribunal to impose in effect a blanket restriction on a person not to express those views irrespective of those circumstances.”

In the case of de Souza v Primark Stores [2017] , a transgender claimant who went by the name of Alexandra, but whose legal name was Alexander, was found to have been harassed by colleagues who made a point of using the male form of name when they knew he did not want them to, but not by being issued with a “new starter” badge that showed his legal name. 

In the case of Taylor v Jaguar Land Rover [2020] , a male claimant who wore women’s clothing  to work was judged to have been exposed to harassment by colleagues saying “What the hell is that?”, “So what’s going on? Are you going to have your bits chopped off?”, “Is this for Halloween?” and referring to the claimant as “it”. 

Not necessarily. 

A person can be “outed” as transgender in two different ways: 

• Their sex is commonly known and recorded, but their transsexualism is not (for example a man who cross-dresses at the weekend and is considering transitioning is “outed” at work by someone who has seen them at a social event).
• They are disappointed in the expectation of being treated as one sex when they are actually the other (for example a person who identifies as a “trans woman” is referred to as male by a woman in a changing room).

In Grant v HM Land Registry [2011] , which concerned the unwanted disclosure that an employee was gay, Lord Justice Elias found that this did not amount to harassment: 

“Furthermore, even if in fact the disclosure was unwanted, and the claimant was upset by it, the effect cannot amount to a violation of dignity, nor can it properly be described as creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. Tribunals must not cheapen the significance of these words. They are an important control to prevent trivial acts causing minor upsets being caught by the concept of harassment.”

The perception (or hope) of transgender people that they “pass” as the opposite sex is often not realistic. Their sex is not in fact hidden, but is politely ignored by some people in some situations. It is not reasonable for them to be offended by other people recognising their sex, particularly if they are seeking access to a single-sex service. Acknowledging someone’s sex, particularly where there is a good reason, is unlikely to be harassment. 

In the first-instance case of Chapman v Essex Police , a transgender police officer felt embarrassed and upset when a police control-room operator double-checked his identity over the radio because his male voice did not match the female name that the operator could see. The tribunal did not uphold a complaint of harassment, finding that the claimant was “too sensitive in the circumstances”.

Yes, but those policies must be proportionate. Employers cannot have blanket policies against “misgendering”, but can have specific policies concerning how staff should refer to transgender people in particular situations. Organisations should recognise that these policies constrain the expression of belief, and therefore they should seek to achieve their specific aims in the least intrusive way possible.

When determining whether an objection to a belief being expressed is justified, a court will undertake a balancing exercise. This test is set out in the case of Bank Mellat v HM Treasury :

• Is the objective the organisation seeks to achieve sufficiently important to justify the limitation of the right in question?
• Is the limitation rationally connected to that objective?
• Is a less intrusive limitation possible that does not undermine the achievement of the objective in question?
• Does the importance of the objective outweigh the severity of the limitation on the rights of the person concerned?

For example: 

• A company provides a specialist dress service to transsexual and transvestites. The men who use the service expect to be called “she” and “her” and referred to as Madam. It is justified for the employer to train and require staff to use this language when serving customers. 
• Staff at a full-service restaurant greet customers as “Sir” and “Madam” as they arrive. The restaurant’s policy is that staff should use the terms which appear most appropriate based on gendered appearance, and to defer to customer preference if one is expressed. This is justified by the aim of creating the service and ambience that the restaurant owners seek to provide. 
• A public body assesses claimants for medical benefits, including individuals with mental-health conditions. It directs its staff to refer to claimants using the terms which the claimants prefer, including using opposite-sex pronouns when requested, in order to make them feel comfortable. However, it recognises that in recording medical information, assessors must be able to be accurate about claimants’ sex. This is justified by the aim of providing a service that is accessible and effective for vulnerable clients. 

The case of David Mackereth v AMP and DWP concerned a doctor who lost his job undertaking claimant health assessments for the Department for Work and Pensions because he refused to comply with its policy on using claimants’ preferred pronouns. The employer’s policy was found not to have amounted to unlawful harassment or discrimination against Dr Mackereth, in the particular circumstances of his job. However, the Employment Appeal Tribunal stated that “misgendering” would not necessarily be harassment: 

“Such behaviour may well provide grounds for a complaint of discrimination or harassment but, as the EAT in Forstater made clear, that will be a fact-specific question to be determined in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.”

Relevant considerations

In Higgs v Farmor’s School [2023] Mrs Justice Eady sets out the considerations that are likely to be relevant considering whether constraining the expression of a belief (“manifestation”)  in order to avoid harassment or discrimination is justified in the context of employment. These include:

• the content of the manifestation
• the tone used
• the extent of the manifestation
• the worker’s understanding of the likely audience
• the extent and nature of the intrusion on the rights of others, and any consequential impact on the employer’s ability to run its business
• whether the worker has made clear that the views expressed are personal, or whether they might be seen as representing the views of the employer, and whether that might present a reputational risk
• whether there is a potential power imbalance given the nature of the worker’s position or role and that of those whose rights are intruded upon;
• the nature of the employer’s business, in particular where there is a potential impact on vulnerable service users or clients
• whether the limitation imposed is the least intrusive measure open to the employer.

Employers cannot force employees to believe that people can change sex, or prevent them expressing that lack of belief except in limited circumstances. So what should employers do to protect transgender people from harassment, and themselves from liability? 

They should have ordinary policies against bullying and harassment, including jokes, name-calling, humiliation, exclusion and singling people out for different treatment.

They should seek to avoid putting people in situations they will reasonably experience as hostile or humiliating.

Ambiguous rules put people in situations where it is reasonable to feel offended. For example, an employer provides “female” toilets, showers and changing rooms, but allows some male staff in because they identify as transgender. This creates a hostile environment: 

• female staff are surprised, shocked, humiliated and upset to find themselves sharing with a colleague of the opposite sex
• male staff members who want people to treat them as women may be challenged or face comments that are intended to intimidate, humiliate or degrade them.

This was the situation faced by the Sheffield Hospital Trust , which had a policy that transgender staff could use opposite-sex facilities. It had to deal with the fall-out when women complained about seeing a half-naked male in their changing room and the male staff member sued for harassment after being questioned about this.

Rather than putting these two groups of people together in a environment where both will reasonably feel harassed, employers should have clear rules about facilities that are single-sex, and also, where possible, provide a unisex alternative for anyone who needs it, including people who feel that they have “transitioned away from their sex” and therefore do not wish to use single-sex facilities shared with members of their own sex. The EHRC last year provided guidance on single-sex services which encouraged clear rules and policies.

It should be made clear to people who have the protected characteristic of “gender reassignment” that having this characteristic does not mean it is reasonable for them to expect others to believe or pretend to believe they have changed sex, or for them to be allowed to break (or expect to be an exception to) rules that aim to protect the dignity and privacy of others. 

If a person breaks a clear rule against entering a space provided for the opposite sex, it is not reasonable for them to feel offended when this is pointed out. 

No. It would not be lawful for schools to have a policy that forbids, punishes or denigrates pupils who use clear words about the sex of other people (such as pronouns, but also boy/girl, male/female and so on), nor to require pupils to refer to some classmates as if they were the opposite sex.

• To do so constrains the freedom of speech of pupils in a way that is unjustified and discriminates against them on the basis of belief. 
• It is inconsistent with schools’ safeguarding duty of care , and with their record-keeping responsibilities, for staff to misrepresent the sex of pupils in their records or in introducing them to their peers. 
• In order to explain and enforce sex-based rules designed to keep children safe (such as who is allowed in which showers, toilets, dormitories or sports teams), schools must be able to use clear and unequivocal language. 
• It is not reasonable to expect that a child at school, or transferring between schools, can avoid being “outed” as the sex that they are . 

We do not think that any policy which tells teachers or pupils to lie about the sex of pupils, constrains them from using clear sex-based language or treats them detrimentally if they do would pass the proportionality test. It is an unreasonable constraint on speech that is neither required nor justified in order to avoid discrimination on the basis of gender reassignment. 

Schools form part of a system that is regulated at a national level. In England that system is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Education. It is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to make this legal situation clear across the English school system by issuing the long-awaited DfE guidance. 

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Gender Reassignment

• Equality, Diversity & Inclusion
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Gender reassignment is a protected characteristic and the term refers to someone who is transgender. It includes anyone who has proposed, started or completed a process to change his or her sex. The Equality Act extends pre-existing protections for transsexual people by, for example, prohibiting indirect discrimination and removing the need for a transsexual person to be under medical supervision to benefit from legal protection. In employment, the Act also requires organisations to treat absences from work because someone proposes to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone gender reassignment in the same way or better as absences due to illness or injury.

There is limited data on the number of transgender people working or studying in the University. It is believed that there are likely to be more transgender people in higher education than in the population at large.

• A colleague who was born female decides to spend the rest of his life living as a man. He tells his departmental administrator, who makes appropriate arrangements. He then starts life at work and home as a man. After discussion with his doctor and a Gender Identity Clinic, he begins hormone treatment and several years later he has gender reassignment surgery. In this case he would be protected by the gender reassignment provisions of the Equality Act. His departmental administrator should seek guidance from the School's Human Resources Business Manager who will be able to provide support in managing the transition process.
• A student who was born physically male decides to spend the rest of her life as a woman. She starts and continues to live as a woman. As she successfully ‘passes’ as a woman, the student decides that she does not want to seek medical advice nor undergo any medical procedure/treatment. She would similarly be protected by the gender reassignment provisions of the Equality Act.

Support is provided to Transgender staff members of the University, College or associated institution through the LGBT Staff Network.

Support for Transgender Students is provided by the CUSU LBGT Campaign .

The University has produced Guidance on Gender Reassignment for Staff which provides information on good practice to support staff and institutions in implementing the University's Equal Opportunity Policy in relation to gender reassignment.

The University has produced Thinking Globally , which provides information for LGB&T staff and students working and studying at home and abroad.

Additional information and guidance is available from the Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Section.

The ECU has produced revised guidance on Trans Staff and Students in Higher Education .

The University has produced a glossary to explain terms related to gender reassignment.

Find out about Trans rights in Europe

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height above sea level

Keeping up appearances (Talking about how things seem)

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7 Gender reassignment E+W+S

(1) A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.

(2) A reference to a transsexual person is a reference to a person who has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

(3) In relation to the protected characteristic of gender reassignment—

(a) a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a transsexual person;

(b) a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a reference to transsexual persons.

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Gender Reassignment Discrimination

Anne morris.

• 7 September 2020

IN THIS SECTION

As an employer, it is illegal to treat someone unfairly at work because they intend to undergo, are undergoing or have undergone gender reassignment. It is also unlawful to fail to take timely and appropriate action when others at work discriminate against, or bully or harass someone else, because they are transsexual.

Below we look at what the law says about gender reassignment discrimination in the workplace, including what happens when employers get this wrong and the steps that you can put in place to help prevent this type of discrimination .

This is a developing area of law, with a recent tribunal decision finding that protection of non-binary and gender-fluid individuals falls within the scope of gender reassignment under the Equality Act.

What is gender reassignment discrimination?

Gender reassignment discrimination is where someone is treated unfairly because they are ‘transsexual’, ie; someone whose gender identity is different from the gender assigned to them when they were born. Other more commonly used terminology could include transgender, trans male/female, or simply trans.

The unfair treatment could be a one-off action or series of actions, or even as a result of a workplace rule or policy that is applied equally to everyone but puts a transsexual or trans person at a particular disadvantage.

To be protected from gender reassignment discrimination, a person does not need to have undergone any specific treatment or surgery to change from their birth sex to their preferred gender. This is because changing their physiological or other gender attributes is a personal process rather than a medical one.

What is the law on gender reassignment discrimination?

The law relating to gender reassignment discrimination is set out under the Equality Act 2010. The Act makes it unlawful for a person to be discriminated against, or harassed or victimised , because of one or more of the nine protected characteristics , where gender reassignment is one of these.

All transsexual or trans people share the common characteristic of gender reassignment. This could be where someone who was born male has made the decision to spend the rest of her life as a woman, or vice versa.

To be afforded the protection from discrimination, harassment and victimisation, the person can be at any stage in the transition process, from planning to reassign their gender, to undergoing or having completed this process. This includes anyone who has started the process but then decided not to continue.

Protection is also afforded to anyone dressing in a certain way to express their chosen gender, although those who only choose to temporarily adopt the appearance of the opposite gender, such as transvestites, are not protected under the legislation. This is because their cross-dressing is not part of the process of transitioning to live as their non-birth gender.

What employment protections do transsexual employees have?

Under the Equality Act, all transsexual employees are afforded protection from four main types of discriminatory behaviour in the workplace:

• Direct discrimination: where you treat an employee less favourably than you treat or would treat others because they are proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone all or part of a process for the purpose of reassigning their sex by changing physiological or other gender attributes.
• Indirect discrimination : where a workplace provision, criterion or practice that applies equally to everyone puts a transsexual employee at a disproportionate disadvantage when compared with others.
• Harassment: where a transsexual employee is subjected to unwanted conduct at work because of their gender reassignment, and this has the purpose or effect of violating their dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.
• Victimisation: where someone suffers from detrimental treatment at work because they have made or supported a complaint about harassment or gender reassignment discrimination at work, or it is believed they have or may make or support such a complaint.

The Act applies to all employees, as well as job applicants, trainees, contract workers and office holders, such as company directors and partners. The Act also covers all areas of employment including recruitment, training and promotion, terms and conditions of employment, redundancy and dismissal.

Examples of gender reassignment discrimination

Direct gender reassignment discrimination.

Direct gender reassignment discrimination is where you treat someone at work worse than another person in a similar situation because they are trans. For example, having found out that an employee intends to spend the rest of their life living as a different gender, you decide to transfer them into another position, against their wishes, so they no longer have a customer-facing role.

Direct discrimination also covers the following scenarios:

• Discrimination by perception: where you discriminate against a person because you believe they are trans, even if that perception is incorrect, for example, where they occasionally cross-dress or is gender variant.
• Discrimination by association : where you discriminate against a person for being connected with someone who is, or is wrongly thought to be, transsexual. This could include a co-worker, family member or friend.

Indirect gender reassignment discrimination

Indirect gender reassignment discrimination refers to the application of a rule or policy at work that, on the face of it, applies equally to persons who are not transsexual but which particularly disadvantages transsexual or trans people.

An example of indirect discrimination might be where you have a company policy for an employee’s ID tag to always feature their photograph as it appeared on the day they joined the company. However, because they have changed their gender since then, this might cause them significant embarrassment.

Harassment because of gender reassignment

The definition of harassment under the Act is wide enough to include all types of unwanted conduct because of gender reassignment. This could include nicknames, insults, abusive language, threats, jokes, banter, gossip, asking intrusive or inappropriate questions, excluding or ignoring someone, or even excessive monitoring or excessive criticism of someone’s work.

It does not matter if the harassment is intentional or unintentional, and doesn’t necessarily need to be aimed at the person witnessing it. Examples of this might include the telling or tolerating of trans-phobic jokes and the use of derogatory trans-phobic terms as part of an accepted workplace culture.

As an employer, you are potentially liable for the discriminatory acts of your employees where those employees are acting in the course of their employment. This is known as vicarious liability. You are also liable for the harassment of your staff by third parties, such as clients, customers or suppliers.

This means that if you are aware that a trans person is being harassed at work, either by a member of staff or a third party, and you fail to take reasonable steps to prevent this from happening again, you may be breaking the law.

Victimisation because of gender reassignment

This is where someone at work is subjected to a detriment because they have made, tried to make, helped someone else to make or assumed to have made, a complaint or grievance of discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment.

A detriment could include, for example, an employee being denied a pay rise or promotion because they have made allegations of gender reassignment discrimination, or where they have given evidence in support of a complaint made by a transsexual person, even though they themselves are not transsexual.

What are the special protections relating to absences from work?

Under the Equality Act 2010, there are special protections relating to absences from work because of gender reassignment.

This means that if someone is absent from work because of gender reassignment you cannot treat that person less favourably than you would treat any other person off work due to sickness or injury, or due to some other reason and it is not reasonable to treat the transsexual person less favourably.

For example, if you refuse, without good reason, to let someone have time off work to undergo treatment for gender reassignment, or you permit them to take time off but pay that person less than they would have received if they were off sick, this is likely to amount to direct discrimination under the Act.

This protection extends to any medical appointment associated with the gender reassignment process, including taking time off for counselling.

Can gender reassignment discrimination ever be justified?

Direct gender reassignment discrimination, harassment and victimisation can never be justified. However, there are certain circumstances in which indirect discrimination can be objectively justified , as long as you can show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

The process of determining whether discrimination is justified involves weighing up the legitimate needs of your business against the discriminatory effect on the group of employees who are trans. Where the same aim could have been achieved in a less discriminatory way, the discrimination cannot be justified.

In rare cases, there may also be strict occupational requirements that preclude a transsexual person from applying, although you would need to show that ‘not being trans’ is crucial to the role. This could be, for example, roles in organised religion, where being trans would not comply with the doctrines of that religion.

Equally, there may be cases where a person is required to be transsexual, for example, a gender identity support leader, although again, ‘being trans’ in this instance, must be crucial and not just one of many important factors.

It is also important to note that you can take positive steps to support transgender people who are under-represented in your workforce or otherwise disadvantaged. This could be by way of encouraging applications from trans people or providing special training. This is known as taking positive action .

What are the consequences of gender reassignment discrimination?

If you get the law wrong in relation to gender reassignment discrimination, even if you are trying to take positive steps to assist transsexual people, or you unintentionally discriminate against a trans person, you may find yourself facing a claim for unlawful discrimination before an employment tribunal.

The importance of understanding and preventing all forms of discrimination at work should never be underestimated. The cost to your business in terms of reputational damage and legal proceedings can be significant.

The Equality Act does not require any minimum length of employment, or any employment at all in the case of a job applicant, for an unlawful discrimination claim to be made. The tribunal also has the power to award one or more of the following three remedies if it finds there has been discrimination:

• A declaration setting out the rights of the parties
• An uncapped award of damages, including an award for injury to feelings and to compensate the individual for any financial loss suffered
• A recommendation that you should take certain steps to remove or reduce the discrimination in your workplace

How can employers prevent gender reassignment discrimination?

Employers should take steps to help prevent gender reassignment discrimination and minimise the possibility of workplace issues, grievances or tribunal claims.

These steps could include a programme of equality and diversity training for all your staff on how different forms of gender reassignment discrimination can arise; putting in place appropriate procedures to deal with grievances, both informally and formally; and reviewing your workplace policies on equal opportunities, dignity at work, and bullying and harassment.

In this way you will help to create a positive workplace culture in which gender reassignment discrimination is not tolerated, and victims or witnesses of discrimination feel able to report any complaints without fear of reprisal.

Need assistance?

DavidsonMorris’ employment lawyers can help with all aspects of workplace discrimination. Working closely with our specialists in HR , we can advise on steps to improve diversity and equality in your organisation, while minimising the legal risk of discrimination claims. For help and advice, speak to our experts .

Gender reassignment discrimination FAQs

Gender reassignment discrimination takes place when someone is treated unfairly on the basis of their actual or proposed gender reassignment. The unfair treatment could be a one-off action or a blanket workplace rule or policy that puts a transsexual or trans person at a particular disadvantage.

What are the different types of gender reassignment discrimination?

There are four main types of gender reassignment discrimination set out under the Equality Act 2010. These include direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, harassment and victimisation. The Act also affords trans people special protection from being treated less favourably in cases of absences from work because of gender reassignment.

What discrimination rights do trans employees have?

Trans employees have the right not to be treated less favourably at work, put at a disadvantage, or harassed or victimised, because they are transsexual, or perceived to be or connected with someone who is trans.

Last updated: 7 September 2020

Founder and Managing Director Anne Morris is a fully qualified solicitor and trusted adviser to large corporates through to SMEs, providing strategic immigration and global mobility advice to support employers with UK operations to meet their workforce needs through corporate immigration.

She is a recognised by Legal 500 and Chambers as a legal expert and delivers Board-level advice on business migration and compliance risk management as well as overseeing the firm’s development of new client propositions and delivery of cost and time efficient processing of applications.

Anne is an active public speaker, immigration commentator , and immigration policy contributor and regularly hosts training sessions for employers and HR professionals

• Anne Morris https://www.davidsonmorris.com/author/anne/ Government Responds to MAC Review into Graduate Route
• Anne Morris https://www.davidsonmorris.com/author/anne/ Employment Case Law Update May 2024
• Anne Morris https://www.davidsonmorris.com/author/anne/ Updated Absence Rule for EU Settled and Pre Settled Status Holders
• Anne Morris https://www.davidsonmorris.com/author/anne/ Switching from Pre Settled to Settled Status

About DavidsonMorris

As employer solutions lawyers, DavidsonMorris offers a complete and cost-effective capability to meet employers’ needs across UK immigration and employment law, HR and global mobility .

Led by Anne Morris, one of the UK’s preeminent immigration lawyers, and with rankings in The Legal 500 and Chambers & Partners , we’re a multi-disciplinary team helping organisations to meet their people objectives, while reducing legal risk and nurturing workforce relations.

Legal Disclaimer

The matters contained in this article are intended to be for general information purposes only. This article does not constitute legal advice, nor is it a complete or authoritative statement of the law, and should not be treated as such. Whilst every effort is made to ensure that the information is correct at the time of writing, no warranty, express or implied, is given as to its accuracy and no liability is accepted for any error or omission. Before acting on any of the information contained herein, expert legal advice should be sought.

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Preparation and Procedures Involved in Gender Affirmation Surgeries

If you or a loved one are considering gender affirmation surgery , you are probably wondering what steps you must go through before the surgery can be done. Let's look at what is required to be a candidate for these surgeries, the potential positive effects and side effects of hormonal therapy, and the types of surgeries that are available.

Gender affirmation surgery, also known as gender confirmation surgery, is performed to align or transition individuals with gender dysphoria to their true gender.

A transgender woman, man, or non-binary person may choose to undergo gender affirmation surgery.

The term "transexual" was previously used by the medical community to describe people who undergo gender affirmation surgery. The term is no longer accepted by many members of the trans community as it is often weaponized as a slur. While some trans people do identify as "transexual", it is best to use the term "transgender" to describe members of this community.

Transitioning

Transitioning may involve:

• Social transitioning : going by different pronouns, changing one’s style, adopting a new name, etc., to affirm one’s gender
• Medical transitioning : taking hormones and/or surgically removing or modifying genitals and reproductive organs

Transgender individuals do not need to undergo medical intervention to have valid identities.  

Reasons for Undergoing Surgery

Many transgender people experience a marked incongruence between their gender and their assigned sex at birth.   The American Psychiatric Association (APA) has identified this as gender dysphoria.

Gender dysphoria is the distress some trans people feel when their appearance does not reflect their gender. Dysphoria can be the cause of poor mental health or trigger mental illness in transgender people.

For these individuals, social transitioning, hormone therapy, and gender confirmation surgery permit their outside appearance to match their true gender.  

Steps Required Before Surgery

In addition to a comprehensive understanding of the procedures, hormones, and other risks involved in gender-affirming surgery, there are other steps that must be accomplished before surgery is performed. These steps are one way the medical community and insurance companies limit access to gender affirmative procedures.

Steps may include:

• Mental health evaluation : A mental health evaluation is required to look for any mental health concerns that could influence an individual’s mental state, and to assess a person’s readiness to undergo the physical and emotional stresses of the transition.  
• Clear and consistent documentation of gender dysphoria
• A "real life" test :   The individual must take on the role of their gender in everyday activities, both socially and professionally (known as “real-life experience” or “real-life test”).

Firstly, not all transgender experience physical body dysphoria. The “real life” test is also very dangerous to execute, as trans people have to make themselves vulnerable in public to be considered for affirmative procedures. When a trans person does not pass (easily identified as their gender), they can be clocked (found out to be transgender), putting them at risk for violence and discrimination.

Requiring trans people to conduct a “real-life” test despite the ongoing violence out transgender people face is extremely dangerous, especially because some transgender people only want surgery to lower their risk of experiencing transphobic violence.

Hormone Therapy & Transitioning

Hormone therapy involves taking progesterone, estrogen, or testosterone. An individual has to have undergone hormone therapy for a year before having gender affirmation surgery.  

The purpose of hormone therapy is to change the physical appearance to reflect gender identity.

Effects of Testosterone

When a trans person begins taking testosterone , changes include both a reduction in assigned female sexual characteristics and an increase in assigned male sexual characteristics.

Bodily changes can include:

• Beard and mustache growth  
• Deepening of the voice
• Enlargement of the clitoris  
• Increased growth of body hair
• Increased muscle mass and strength  
• Increase in the number of red blood cells
• Redistribution of fat from the breasts, hips, and thighs to the abdominal area  
• Development of acne, similar to male puberty
• Baldness or localized hair loss, especially at the temples and crown of the head  
• Atrophy of the uterus and ovaries, resulting in an inability to have children

Behavioral changes include:

• Aggression  
• Increased sex drive

Effects of Estrogen

When a trans person begins taking estrogen , changes include both a reduction in assigned male sexual characteristics and an increase in assigned female characteristics.

Changes to the body can include:

• Breast development  
• Loss of erection
• Shrinkage of testicles  
• Decreased acne
• Decreased facial and body hair
• Decreased muscle mass and strength  
• Softer and smoother skin
• Slowing of balding
• Redistribution of fat from abdomen to the hips, thighs, and buttocks  
• Decreased sex drive
• Mood swings  

When Are the Hormonal Therapy Effects Noticed?

The feminizing effects of estrogen and the masculinizing effects of testosterone may appear after the first couple of doses, although it may be several years before a person is satisfied with their transition.   This is especially true for breast development.

Timeline of Surgical Process

Surgery is delayed until at least one year after the start of hormone therapy and at least two years after a mental health evaluation. Once the surgical procedures begin, the amount of time until completion is variable depending on the number of procedures desired, recovery time, and more.

Transfeminine Surgeries

Transfeminine is an umbrella term inclusive of trans women and non-binary trans people who were assigned male at birth.

Most often, surgeries involved in gender affirmation surgery are broken down into those that occur above the belt (top surgery) and those below the belt (bottom surgery). Not everyone undergoes all of these surgeries, but procedures that may be considered for transfeminine individuals are listed below.

Top surgery includes:

• Breast augmentation  
• Facial feminization
• Nose surgery: Rhinoplasty may be done to narrow the nose and refine the tip.
• Eyebrows: A brow lift may be done to feminize the curvature and position of the eyebrows.  
• Jaw surgery: The jaw bone may be shaved down.
• Chin reduction: Chin reduction may be performed to soften the chin's angles.
• Cheekbones: Cheekbones may be enhanced, often via collagen injections as well as other plastic surgery techniques.  
• Lips: A lip lift may be done.
• Alteration to hairline  
• Male pattern hair removal
• Reduction of Adam’s apple  
• Voice change surgery

Bottom surgery includes:

• Removal of the penis (penectomy) and scrotum (orchiectomy)  
• Creation of a vagina and labia

Transmasculine Surgeries

Transmasculine is an umbrella term inclusive of trans men and non-binary trans people who were assigned female at birth.

Surgery for this group involves top surgery and bottom surgery as well.

Top surgery includes :

• Subcutaneous mastectomy/breast reduction surgery.
• Removal of the uterus and ovaries
• Creation of a penis and scrotum either through metoidioplasty and/or phalloplasty

Complications and Side Effects

Surgery is not without potential risks and complications. Estrogen therapy has been associated with an elevated risk of blood clots ( deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary emboli ) for transfeminine people.   There is also the potential of increased risk of breast cancer (even without hormones, breast cancer may develop).

Testosterone use in transmasculine people has been associated with an increase in blood pressure, insulin resistance, and lipid abnormalities, though it's not certain exactly what role these changes play in the development of heart disease.  

With surgery, there are surgical risks such as bleeding and infection, as well as side effects of anesthesia . Those who are considering these treatments should have a careful discussion with their doctor about potential risks related to hormone therapy as well as the surgeries.  

Cost of Gender Confirmation Surgery

Surgery can be prohibitively expensive for many transgender individuals. Costs including counseling, hormones, electrolysis, and operations can amount to well over $100,000. Transfeminine procedures tend to be more expensive than transmasculine ones. Health insurance sometimes covers a portion of the expenses.

Quality of Life After Surgery

Quality of life appears to improve after gender-affirming surgery for all trans people who medically transition. One 2017 study found that surgical satisfaction ranged from 94% to 100%.  

Since there are many steps and sometimes uncomfortable surgeries involved, this number supports the benefits of surgery for those who feel it is their best choice.

A Word From Verywell

Gender affirmation surgery is a lengthy process that begins with counseling and a mental health evaluation to determine if a person can be diagnosed with gender dysphoria.

After this is complete, hormonal treatment is begun with testosterone for transmasculine individuals and estrogen for transfeminine people. Some of the physical and behavioral changes associated with hormonal treatment are listed above.

After hormone therapy has been continued for at least one year, a number of surgical procedures may be considered. These are broken down into "top" procedures and "bottom" procedures.

Surgery is costly, but precise estimates are difficult due to many variables. Finding a surgeon who focuses solely on gender confirmation surgery and has performed many of these procedures is a plus.   Speaking to a surgeon's past patients can be a helpful way to gain insight on the physician's practices as well.

For those who follow through with these preparation steps, hormone treatment, and surgeries, studies show quality of life appears to improve. Many people who undergo these procedures express satisfaction with their results.

Bizic MR, Jeftovic M, Pusica S, et al. Gender dysphoria: Bioethical aspects of medical treatment . Biomed Res Int . 2018;2018:9652305. doi:10.1155/2018/9652305

American Psychiatric Association. What is gender dysphoria? . 2016.

The World Professional Association for Transgender Health. Standards of care for the health of transsexual, transgender, and gender-nonconforming people . 2012.

Tomlins L. Prescribing for transgender patients . Aust Prescr . 2019;42(1): 10–13.  doi:10.18773/austprescr.2019.003

T'sjoen G, Arcelus J, Gooren L, Klink DT, Tangpricha V. Endocrinology of transgender medicine . Endocr Rev . 2019;40(1):97-117. doi:10.1210/er.2018-00011

Unger CA. Hormone therapy for transgender patients . Transl Androl Urol . 2016;5(6):877-884.  doi:10.21037/tau.2016.09.04

Seal LJ. A review of the physical and metabolic effects of cross-sex hormonal therapy in the treatment of gender dysphoria . Ann Clin Biochem . 2016;53(Pt 1):10-20.  doi:10.1177/0004563215587763

Schechter LS. Gender confirmation surgery: An update for the primary care provider . Transgend Health . 2016;1(1):32-40. doi:10.1089/trgh.2015.0006

Altman K. Facial feminization surgery: current state of the art . Int J Oral Maxillofac Surg . 2012;41(8):885-94.  doi:10.1016/j.ijom.2012.04.024

Therattil PJ, Hazim NY, Cohen WA, Keith JD. Esthetic reduction of the thyroid cartilage: A systematic review of chondrolaryngoplasty . JPRAS Open. 2019;22:27-32. doi:10.1016/j.jpra.2019.07.002

Top H, Balta S. Transsexual mastectomy: Selection of appropriate technique according to breast characteristics . Balkan Med J . 2017;34(2):147-155. doi:10.4274/balkanmedj.2016.0093

Chan W, Drummond A, Kelly M. Deep vein thrombosis in a transgender woman . CMAJ . 2017;189(13):E502-E504.  doi:10.1503/cmaj.160408

Streed CG, Harfouch O, Marvel F, Blumenthal RS, Martin SS, Mukherjee M. Cardiovascular disease among transgender adults receiving hormone therapy: A narrative review . Ann Intern Med . 2017;167(4):256-267. doi:10.7326/M17-0577

Hashemi L, Weinreb J, Weimer AK, Weiss RL. Transgender care in the primary care setting: A review of guidelines and literature . Fed Pract . 2018;35(7):30-37.

Van de grift TC, Elaut E, Cerwenka SC, Cohen-kettenis PT, Kreukels BPC. Surgical satisfaction, quality of life, and their association after gender-affirming aurgery: A follow-up atudy . J Sex Marital Ther . 2018;44(2):138-148. doi:10.1080/0092623X.2017.1326190

American Society of Plastic Surgeons. Gender confirmation surgeries .

American Psychological Association. Transgender people, gender identity, and gender expression .

Colebunders B, Brondeel S, D'Arpa S, Hoebeke P, Monstrey S. An update on the surgical treatment for transgender patients . Sex Med Rev . 2017 Jan;5(1):103-109. doi:10.1016/j.sxmr.2016.08.001

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gender reassignment

• male-to-female or female-to-male transformation involving surgery and hormone treatment

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Example sentences.

Last May, Israel lowered the minimum age for gender reassignment surgery from 21 to 18.

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gender reassignment surgery

Definition of gender reassignment surgery

Note: This term is sometimes considered to be offensive in its implication that a transgender or nonbinary person takes on a different gender through surgery, rather than using surgery to align their outward appearance with their gender identity. Gender confirmation surgery and gender-affirming surgery are the preferred terms in the medical and LGBTQ+ communities, and surgery is seen as one of many possible ways to affirm one's gender identity, rather than as an essential part of transitioning (see transition entry 2 sense 2 )

Examples of gender reassignment surgery in a Sentence

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'gender reassignment surgery.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

1969, in the meaning defined above

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Cite this Entry

“Gender reassignment surgery.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gender%20reassignment%20surgery. Accessed 31 May. 2024.

Medical Definition

Medical definition of gender reassignment surgery.

Note: This term is sometimes considered to be offensive in its implication that a transgender or nonbinary person takes on a different gender through surgery, rather than using surgery to align their outward appearance with their gender identity. Gender confirmation surgery and gender-affirming surgery are the preferred terms in the medical and LGBTQ+ communities, and surgery is seen as one of many possible ways to affirm one's gender identity, rather than as an essential part of transitioning (see transition entry 2 ).

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Federal judge upholds California law that lets males in female prisons

By Zachary Stieber  

Contributing Writer  

A U.S. judge has thrown out a legal challenge to a California law that enables males, even if they haven’t undergone gender reassignment surgery, to be housed with females in prisons. 

Senate Bill 132, which took effect in 2021, lets males who self-identify as women, non-binary, or gender fluid serve their sentences in women’s correctional facilities. Some women sued state officials, arguing the law violates their constitutional rights, including their right to free exercise of religion, and subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment. 

In the May 14 ruling, U.S. District Judge Jennifer Thurston dismissed the suit. 

Arguments based on California’s Constitution need to be dismissed under court precedent, Thurston, an appointee of President Joe Biden, wrote. As to the federal claims, despite neither party raising the 11th Amendment, the court decided the amendment’s immunity means the rest of the claims must be tossed. 

“As a state agency, it is a long-established principle that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is immune from suit in federal court under the 11th Amendment,” Thurston said, citing a 2009 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit and other rulings. “While not fully briefed by CDCR the court cannot conclude that CDCR has unequivocally waived immunity and consented to federal jurisdiction. Though CDCR has appeared and defended this action through the filing of a motion to dismiss, these actions do not constitute unequivocally expressing a waiver of immunity or consent to suit.” 

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation did not respond to a request for comment. 

Before the law was enacted, some males could serve their sentences in women’s prisons, but only if they were designated by medical personnel as displaying symptoms of gender dysphoria. Supporters said the law was needed to protect men who identify as women. 

The judge also addressed other arguments, including the plaintiffs’ argument that the state’s position on people being able to change their sex and being based in part on thoughts and feelings constituted “a government-sanctioned religious doctrine that is not based in material reality.” 

“As a matter of law, the court cannot plausibly determine that transgenderism is a religion,” the judge said. 

She barred plaintiffs from filing an updated complaint against CDCR, but said they may within 21 days file an amended action against state officials who were also named as defendants. 

Women’s Liberation Front, which brought the suit, highlighted how recently prosecutors in Madera County charged Tremaine Carroll, a male being housed with women, with two counts of forcible rape and dissuading a witness from testifying. Carroll had told federal court in a sworn declaration in the case that he could “sympathize with the plaintiffs” and was “not a threat to them.” 

California’s Office of the Inspector General has previously acknowledged that some pregnancies could occur in California prisons since men are being housed with women. It said that state officials confirmed “numerous allegations of consensual sexual misconduct” between recently transferred male and female inmates. And, according to Women’s Liberation Front, officials began handing out condoms shortly after the law was enacted. 

The suit was brought on behalf of inmates Janine Chandler, Tomiekia Johnson, Krystal Gonzalez, and Nadia Romero. 

“We have already seen the devastating result of these policies in the two years it took to get a response from the court: rape, pregnancy, and repeated violation of women’s constitutional rights. This is not the end of our fight,” the group said in a statement. “We will continue pursuing every avenue of justice for Janine, Tomiekia, Krystal, Nadia, and all incarcerated women in California.” 

Lambda Legal, among the intervenors in the case, cheered the ruling. 

“We are relieved that the court saw through this legally flawed challenge, and rejected its distorted arguments,” Nora Huppert, an attorney with the organization, said in a statement. “In dismissing this challenge, the court recognized that California has an obligation to protect the safety of incarcerated transgender people.” 

The post Federal judge upholds California law that lets males in female prisons  appeared first on Santa Clarita Valley Signal .

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https://educationhub.blog.gov.uk/2024/05/16/new-rshe-guidance-what-it-means-for-sex-education-lessons-in-schools/

New RSHE guidance: What it means for sex education lessons in schools

R elationships, Sex and Health Education (RSHE) is a subject taught at both primary and secondary school.  

In 2020, Relationships and Sex Education was made compulsory for all secondary school pupils in England and Health Education compulsory for all pupils in state-funded schools.  

Last year, the Prime Minister and Education Secretary brought forward the first review of the curriculum following reports of pupils being taught inappropriate content in RSHE in some schools.  

The review was informed by the advice of an independent panel of experts. The results of the review and updated guidance for consultation has now been published.   

We are now asking for views from parents, schools and others before the guidance is finalised. You can find the consultation here .   

What is new in the updated curriculum?  

Following the panel’s advice, w e’re introducing age limits, to ensure children aren’t being taught about sensitive and complex subjects before they are ready to fully understand them.    

We are also making clear that the concept of gender identity – the sense a person may have of their own gender, whether male, female or a number of other categories   – is highly contested and should not be taught. This is in line with the cautious approach taken in our gu idance on gender questioning children.  

Along with other factors, teaching this theory in the classroom could prompt some children to start to question their gender when they may not have done so otherwise, and is a complex theory for children to understand.   

The facts about biological sex and gender reassignment will still be taught.  

The guidance for schools also contains a new section on transparency with parents, making it absolutely clear that parents have a legal right to know what their children are being taught in RSHE and can request to see teaching materials.   

In addition, we’re seeking views on adding several new subjects to the curriculum, and more detail on others. These include:   

• Suicide prevention  
• Sexual harassment and sexual violence  
• L oneliness  
• The prevalence of 'deepfakes’  
• Healthy behaviours during pregnancy, as well as miscarriage  
• Illegal online behaviours including drug and knife supply  
• The dangers of vaping   
• Menstrual and gynaecological health including endometriosis, polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS) and heavy menstrual bleeding.  

What are the age limits?   

In primary school, we’ve set out that subjects such as the risks about online gaming, social media and scams should not be taught before year 3.   

Puberty shouldn’t be taught before year 4, whilst sex education shouldn’t be taught before year 5, in line with what pupils learn about conception and birth as part of the national curriculum for science.  

In secondary school, issues regarding sexual harassment shouldn’t be taught before year 7, direct references to suicide before year 8 and any explicit discussion of sexual activity before year 9.  

Do schools have to follow the guidance?  

Following the consultation, the guidance will be statutory, which means schools must follow it unless there are exceptional circumstances.   

There is some flexibility w ithin the age ratings, as schools will sometimes need to respond to questions from pupils about age-restricted content, if they come up earlier within their school community.   

In these circumstances, schools are instructed to make sure that teaching is limited to the essential facts without going into unnecessary details, and parents should be informed.  

When will schools start teaching this?  

School s will be able to use the guidance as soon as we publish the final version later this year.   

However, schools will need time to make changes to their curriculum, so we will allow an implementation period before the guidance comes into force.     

What can parents do with these resources once they have been shared?

This guidance has openness with parents at its heart. Parents are not able to veto curriculum content, but they should be able to see what their children are being taught, which gives them the opportunity to raise issues or concerns through the school’s own processes, if they want to.

Parents can also share copyrighted materials they have received from their school more widely under certain circumstances.

If they are not able to understand materials without assistance, parents can share the materials with translators to help them understand the content, on the basis that the material is not shared further.

Copyrighted material can also be shared under the law for so-called ‘fair dealing’ - for the purposes of quotation, criticism or review, which could include sharing for the purpose of making a complaint about the material.

This could consist of sharing with friends, families, faith leaders, lawyers, school organisations, governing bodies and trustees, local authorities, Ofsted and the media.  In each case, the sharing of the material must be proportionate and accompanied by an acknowledgment of the author and its ownership.

Under the same principle, parents can also share relevant extracts of materials with the general public, but except in cases where the material is very small, it is unlikely that it would be lawful to share the entirety of the material.

These principles would apply to any material which is being made available for teaching in schools, even if that material was provided subject to confidentiality restrictions.

Do all children have to learn RSHE?  

Parents still have the right to withdraw their child from sex education, but not from the essential content covered in relationships educatio n.  

You may also be interested in:

• Education Secretary's letter to parents: You have the right to see RSHE lesson material
• Sex education: What is RSHE and can parents access curriculum materials?
• What do children and young people learn in relationship, sex and health education

Tags: age ratings , Gender , Relationships and Sex Education , RSHE , sex ed , Sex education

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Breaking News

RELIST WATCH

Restrictions on gender-affirming medical care – and assault weapons.

The Relist Watch column examines cert petitions that the Supreme Court has “relisted” for its upcoming conference. A short explanation of relists is available here .

After going two conferences without any new relists, the Supreme Court ended the relist drought this week with a vengeance. We have 12 new relists, several of which are potential blockbusters if the court grants review.

Gender-affirming care

Three of the cases involve constitutional challenges brought against state prohibitions on providing gender-affirming care to minors: United States v. Skrmetti ,   L. W. v. Skrmetti , and  Jane Doe 1 v. Kentucky ex rel. Cameron . Last year, Tennessee and Kentucky were among a group of more than 20 states that enacted laws that prohibit giving transgender youths under the age of 18 medical treatment to align their appearance with their gender identity.

Tennessee’s law forbids medical treatments that are intended to allow a minor “to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to treat “purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.” Kentucky’s law prohibits medical treatments “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of, or to validate a minor’s perception of, [a] minor’s sex.” Both provisions outlaw a range of treatments, including gender-reassignment surgery. But the challenges before the court specifically concern two nonsurgical treatments: the administration of puberty blockers to stop physical changes brought on by puberty; and hormone therapy, which seeks to produce physiological changes to conform physical appearance with gender identity.

Transgender youths and their parents in both states quickly brought constitutional challenges in federal court, seeking to enjoin the laws before they went into effect. The challengers first argue that the restrictions discriminate on the basis of sex and therefore violate the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause. They contend that the laws allow the use of puberty blockers and hormone therapy to conform a minor’s appearance to their birth sex, while barring transgender minors from using the same treatments. Second, the challengers argue that the prohibitions violate the 14th Amendment’s due process clause by infringing upon parents’ rights to make medical decisions for their children. The Biden administration intervened on the challengers’ side in the Tennessee case.

Federal district courts in both states granted the challengers’ requests to block the laws from going into effect. Kentucky and Tennessee then asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit to lift those orders while they appealed. The court of appeals refused, instead expediting argument. By a split vote, the 6th Circuit then reversed the lower courts’ rulings , concluding that the states were likely to win their appeals. The court thus allowed the laws go into effect.

The Biden administration, together with the Tennessee and Kentucky families, seek reversal of the 6th Circuit’s ruling. All three challengers maintain that the laws violate the equal protection clause, arguing that under Bostock v. Clayton County (in which the Supreme Court held that firing transgender employees on the basis of their gender identity violates federal employment discrimination laws) drawing distinctions on the basis of gender identity constitute prohibited action on the basis of sex. The private challengers also argue that the laws violate the due process clause because the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down state restrictions on parents’ ability to raise their children as they see fit.

Just last month, the Supreme Court granted Idaho’s request for a partial stay of a lower-court injunction, thus permitting the state’s ban on gender-affirming care to go into effect until the court rules on any cert petition – although the injunction still remained in force as to the plaintiffs in that case, thus permitting the plaintiffs there to receive treatment.

There are some differences in the case – in the Idaho case, the district court’s decision to grant relief beyond the plaintiffs – a so-called “universal injunction” – was more prominent.  But the grant of a stay suggests that a majority of the court believes the issue is certworthy and that the state is likely to succeed. A grant in this case would make next term very interesting indeed.

Assault weapons

In early 2023, Illinois adopted the Protect Illinois Communities Act, which prohibits the possession of assault weapons and high-capacity magazines. The state law’s definition of “assault weapon” essentially followed the federal-law definition. The act prohibits possession of certain semiautomatic pistols and rifles. A semiautomatic rifle falls under the law’s proscriptions if it has a detachable magazine and one or more of the following features: a pistol grip or thumbhole stock; any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip for the non-trigger hand; a folding, telescoping, thumbhole, or detachable stock or a stock that otherwise enhances the concealability of the weapon; a flash suppressor; a grenade launcher; or a barrel shroud. The definition also includes a semiautomatic rifle with a fixed magazine capacity of more than 10 rounds (except those that accept only .22 caliber rimfire ammunition). Finally, there is a lengthy list of particular models that fall within the scope of the statute, notably all “AK” weapons (modeled after the Russian AK-47) and all “AR” weapons (those modeled after the AR-15). People who owned such weapons before the effective date of the law are permitted to retain them, subject to some geographic restrictions on use; otherwise, possession is a crime. Several Illinois municipalities adopted similar legislation.

Gun owners, dealers, and interest groups brought a number of lawsuits arguing that the law violated their rights under the Second Amendment to keep and bear arms and sought to block the state from enforcing the law. Roughly speaking, plaintiffs in northern Illinois, which is more urban, lost; plaintiffs in southern Illinois, which is more rural, were successful, and a judge there held that the statute was unconstitutional in all its applications and barred the state from enforcing it.

In a consolidated appeal, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the denial of relief for the northern cases and reversed the grant of relief for the southern ones. The panel said that, “[u]sing the tools of history and tradition to which the Supreme Court directed us in [ District of Columbia v. ] Heller  and [ New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. ] Bruen ,” which instructed courts to look for analogous laws in history when considering the constitutionality of restrictions on the personal right to bear arms, “the state and the affected subdivisions have a strong likelihood of success in the pending litigation.” The 7th Circuit reasoned that “these assault weapons and high-capacity magazines are much more like machineguns and military-grade weaponry” that are not protected by the Second Amendment “than they are like the many different types of firearms that are used for individual self-defense,” and thus they can be regulated or banned.

Six petitions have been filed seeking review of that determination: Harrel v. Raoul , Herrera v. Raoul , Barnett v. Raoul , National Association for Gun Rights v. City of Naperville, Illinois , Langley v. Kelly , and Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. Raoul . Given the ubiquity of AR- and AK-type firearms, this case will likely be a blockbuster if granted.

Environmental law

The Clean Water Act of 1972 regulates the discharge of pollutants into regulated waters. The city and county of San Francisco received a permit from the EPA under the law’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System that allowed San Francisco to discharge from its wastewater treatment facility into the Pacific Ocean. San Francisco challenged the terms of its permit, arguing that the permit contained terms so vague that it failed to tell the city how much it needed to limit or treat its discharges to comply with the act, while simultaneously exposing it to liability for violating the permit provisions. After exhausting administrative remedies, San Francisco petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit for review.

A divided panel of the 9th Circuit denied San Francisco’s petition , concluding that the provisions are not unduly vague and are “consistent with the CWA and its implementing regulations.” In dissent, Judge Daniel Collins concluded that those provisions were “inconsistent with the text of the CWA.” He argued that the permit violated the CWA by making the permittee responsible for maintaining water quality standards without specifying what limitations on discharges would satisfy its responsibility.

San Francisco now seeks review , arguing that the 9th Circuit’s decision conflicts with decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit and the Supreme Court itself. The government denies that there’s any such split.

Yes, that Michael Avenatti

Michael Avenatti enjoyed his 15 minutes of fame representing porn star Stormy Daniels in her suit against then-President Donald Trump. Afterwards, while representing youth basketball coach Gary Franklin in sponsorship negotiations with sports clothing company Nike, Avenatti threatened to disclose certain documents (that his client had not authorized him to disclose) unless Nike paid him and a colleague more than $10 million to do an “internal investigation” into sports corruption. Based on the conduct, Avenatti was convicted in federal court of extortion and fraud for depriving his client of his “honest services,” prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1346. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed his conviction.

In his petition in Avenatti v. United States , Avenatti raises two claims . First, he argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is void “both on its face and” as applied to him because, as Justice Neil Gorsuch said in his concurring opinion in last year’s Percoco v. United States , “[t]o this day, no one knows what ‘honest-services fraud’ encompasses.” Avenatti claims that he did not defraud his client – he “at worst … abus[ed] his fiduciary duty as Franklin’s attorney by leveraging Franklin’s claims to pursue compensation for himself.” Second, he argues that most courts besides the 2nd Circuit have held that civil litigation conduct — and in particular, an attorney’s settlement demand — cannot support federal criminal extortion liability. Avenetti argues that under the 2nd Circuit’s rule, what would normally be handled by bar discipline is converted into a 20-year felony. The government responds that Avenatti raised neither claim before the court of appeals and that they are therefore procedurally defaulted; and even if they weren’t, those claims are meritless.

The Surpeme Court has long been skeptical of the honest-services fraud statute and the risks of overcriminalizing sharp business dealings, so one or more of the justices is surely taking a close look at this case.

Last up is a capital case, Medrano v. Texas . Rodolfo Medrano was a member of a south Texas gang charged with capital murder for the shooting deaths of six rival gang members during a robbery. When Medrano was arrested, he invoked his Miranda rights and told police he wanted to speak to an attorney. Police then spoke to Medrano’s wife and told her (falsely) that he was not believed to be involved and would be released if he spoke to police. She persuaded Medrano to talk, and he confessed to providing the guns. Medrano protested that he only provided guns for a robbery and was not present and did not expect the shootings to occur, but the jury found him criminally responsible. That testimony was then introduced against him at trial, and he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and his first petition for state post-conviction relief was denied.

Medrano then filed a second petition for state post-conviction relief, alleging that his Miranda rights were violated because police responded to his invocation of his right to silence by persuading his wife to talk to him. He also argued that expert testimony introduced against him violated his due process rights. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Medrano’s application failed to satisfy a state rule of criminal procedure governing successive petitions, and therefore dismissed his application as an “abuse of the writ” of habeas corpus.

In his petition , Medrano renews his argument that law enforcement officers violated his Miranda rights by using his wife to circumvent his invocation of his right to silence. He also argues that the rule invoked by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was not actually an “adequate and independent state ground” precluding review of his petition on the merits. He explains that the rule itself permitted a subsequent petition if the defendant could make a showing that but for a violation of the Constitution, no rational juror could have found him guilty. That condition is satisfied here, Medrano says, because the principal evidence introduced against him was the confession he says was improperly procured. In a supplemental brief , Medrano says that his second question is related to an issue the court will be considering next term in Glossip v. Oklahoma , so at minimum, the court should hold his petition for resolution of that case.

We’ll know more soon. Until next time!

New Relists

L.W. v. Skrmetti , 23-466 Issues : (1) Whether Tennessee’s  Senate Bill 1 , which categorically bans gender-affirming healthcare for transgender adolescents, triggers heightened scrutiny and likely violates the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause; and (2) whether Senate Bill 1 likely violates the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children guaranteed by the 14th Amendment’s due process clause. (rescheduled before the Mar. 15, Mar. 22, Mar. 28, Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26 and May 9 conferences; relisted after the May 16 conference)

United States v. Skrmetti , 23-477 Issue : Whether Tennessee  Senate Bill 1 , which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow “a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to treat “purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity,” violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. (rescheduled before the Mar. 15, Mar. 22, Mar. 28, Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26 and May 9 conferences; relisted after the May 16 conference)

Jane Doe 1 v. Kentucky ex rel. Coleman, Attorney General , 23-492 Issues : (1) Whether, under the 14th Amendment’s due process clause,  Kentucky Revised Statutes Section 311.372(2) , which bans medical treatments “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of, or to validate a minor’s perception of, the minor’s sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex,” should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because it burdens parents’ right to direct the medical treatment of their children; (2) whether, under the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause, § 311.372(2) should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because it classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status; and (3) whether petitioners are likely to show that § 311.372(2) does not satisfy heightened scrutiny. (rescheduled before the Mar. 15, Mar. 22, Mar. 28, Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26 and May 9 conferences; relisted after the May 16 conference)

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency , 23-753 Issue : Whether the  Clean Water Act  allows the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform. (relisted after the May 16 conference)

Harrel v. Raoul , 23-877 Issues : (1) Whether the Constitution allows the government to prohibit law-abiding, responsible citizens from protecting themselves, their families, and their homes with semiautomatic firearms that are in common use for lawful purposes; (2) whether the Constitution allows the government to prohibit law-abiding, responsible citizens from protecting themselves, their families, and their homes with ammunition magazines that are in common use for lawful purposes; and (3) whether enforcement of Illinois’s semiautomatic firearm and ammunition magazine bans should be enjoined. (relisted after the May 16 conference)

Herrera v. Raoul , 23-878 Issues : (1) Whether semiautomatic rifles and standard handgun and rifle magazines do not count as “Arms” within the ordinary meaning of the Second Amendment’s plain text; and (2) whether there is a broad historical tradition of states banning protected arms and standard magazines from law-abiding citizens’ homes. (relisted after the May 16 conference)

Barnett v. Raoul , 23-879 Issue : Whether Illinois’ sweeping ban on common and long-lawful arms violates the Second Amendment. (relisted after the May 16 conference)

National Association for Gun Rights v. City of Naperville, Illinois , 23-880 Issues : (1) Whether the state of Illinois’ ban of certain handguns is constitutional in light of the holding in  District of Columbia v. Heller  that handgun bans are categorically unconstitutional; (2) whether the “in common use” test announced in  Heller  is hopelessly circular and therefore unworkable; and (3) whether the government can ban the sale, purchase, and possession of certain semi-automatic firearms and firearm magazines that are possessed by millions of law-abiding Americans for lawful purposes when there is no analogous Founding-era regulation. (relisted after the May 16 conference)

Langley v. Kelly , 23-944 Issues : (1) Whether the state of Illinois’ absolute ban of certain commonly owned semi-automatic handguns is constitutional in light of the holding in  District of Columbia v. Heller  that handgun bans are categorially unconstitutional; (2) whether the state of Illinois’ absolute ban of all commonly owned semi-automatic handgun magazines over 15 rounds is constitutional in light of the holding in  Heller  that handgun bans are categorially unconstitutional; and (3) whether the government can ban the sale, purchase, possession, and carriage of certain commonly owned semi-automatic rifles, pistols, shotguns, and standard-capacity firearm magazines, tens of millions of which are possessed by law-abiding Americans for lawful purposes, when there is no analogous historical ban as required by  Heller  and  New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen . (relisted after the May 16 conference)  

Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. Raoul , 23-1010 Issue : Whether Illinois’ categorical ban on millions of the most commonly owned firearms and ammunition magazines in the nation, including the AR-15 rifle, violates the Second Amendment. (relisted after the May 16 conference)

Medrano v. Texas , 23-5597 Issues : (1) Whether under all the circumstances, including an officer’s knowing and deliberate deployment of Petitioner’s wife to elicit statements from Petitioner while he was in custody, the falsity of the information the officer gave her to convey to the petitioner, the strength of the incentive he proffered to induce the Petitioner to speak, and the fact that similar tactics were deliberately employed to obtain confessions Petitioner’s codefendants, introduction of the resulting statement Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (2) Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that the Petitioner’s subsequent petition failed to satisfy the requirements of Article 11.071, § 5(a)(2) was an adequate and independent state ground precluding merits review of his claim where that provision authorizes a subsequent petition when “by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” and the confession whose constitutionality Petitioner is challenging was the only significant evidence linking him to the capital murder with which he was charged. (relisted after the May 16 conference)

Avenatti v. United States , 23-6753 Issues : (1) whether 18 U.S.C. § 1346, making it a crime to engage in “honest services fraud,” is void for vagueness; (2); whether civil litigation conduct – in particular, an attorney’s settlement demand – can support federal criminal extortion liability. (relisted after the May 16 conference)

Returning Relists

Hamm v. Smith , 23-167 Issues : (1) Whether  Hall v. Florida  and  Moore v. Texas  mandate that courts deem the standard of “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” for determining intellectual disability in  Atkins v. Virginia  satisfied when an offender’s lowest IQ score, decreased by one standard error of measurement, is 70 or below; and (2) whether the court should overrule  Hall  and  Moore , or at least clarify that they permit courts to consider multiple IQ scores and the probability that an offender’s IQ does not fall at the bottom of the lowest IQ score’s error range. (relisted after the Jan. 5, Jan. 12, Jan. 19, Feb. 16, Feb. 23, Mar. 1, Mar. 15, Mar. 22, Mar. 28, Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Cunningham v. Florida , 23-5171 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony (rescheduled before the Nov. 17, Dec. 1, Dec. 8, Jan. 5, Jan. 12, Jan. 19, Feb. 16, Feb. 23, Mar. 1, Mar. 15, Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Guzman v. Florida , 23-5173 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony (rescheduled before the Dec. 1, Dec. 8, Jan. 5, Jan. 12, Jan. 19, Feb. 16, Feb. 23, Mar. 1, Mar. 15, Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Crane v. Florida , 23-5455 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony (rescheduled before the Dec. 1, Dec. 8, Jan. 5, Jan. 12, Jan. 19, Feb. 16, Feb. 23, Mar. 1, Mar. 15, Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Arellano-Ramirez v. Florida , 23-5567 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony (rescheduled before the Dec. 1, Dec. 8, Jan. 5, Jan. 12, Jan. 19, Feb. 16, Feb. 23, Mar. 1, Mar. 15, Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Jackson v. Florida , 23-5570 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony (rescheduled before the Dec. 1, Dec. 8, Jan. 5, Jan. 12, Jan. 19, Feb. 16, Feb. 23, Mar. 1, Mar. 15, Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Sposato v. Florida , 23-5575 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony (rescheduled before the Dec. 1, Dec. 8, Jan. 5, Jan. 12, Jan. 19, Feb. 16, Feb. 23, Mar. 1, Mar. 15, Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Morton v. Florida , 23-5579 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony (rescheduled before the Dec. 1, Dec. 8, Jan. 5, Jan. 12, Jan. 19, Feb. 16, Feb. 23, Mar. 1, Mar. 15, Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Aiken v. Florida , 23-5794 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony. (rescheduled before the Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Enrriquez v. Florida , 23-5965 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony. (rescheduled before the Mar. 15, Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Bartee v. Florida , 23-6143 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony. (relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Manning v. Florida , 23-6049 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony. (rescheduled before the Mar. 22 and Mar 28 conferences; relisted after the Apr. 12, Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Tillman v. Florida , 23-6304 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony. (relisted after the Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Sanon v. Florida , 23-6289 Issue: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony. (relisted after the Apr. 19, Apr. 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)

Posted in Cases in the Pipeline

Cases: Barnett v. Raoul , National Association for Gun Rights v. City of Naperville, Illinois , Langley v. Kelly , Hamm v. Smith , Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. Raoul , L. W. v. Skrmetti , Medrano v. Texas , United States v. Skrmetti , Avenatti v. United States , Jane Doe 1 v. Kentucky ex rel. Coleman, Attorney General , City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency , Harrel v. Raoul , Herrera v. Raoul

Recommended Citation: John Elwood, Restrictions on gender-affirming medical care – and assault weapons , SCOTUSblog (May. 24, 2024, 10:49 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/05/restrictions-on-gender-affirming-medical-care-and-assault-weapons/

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