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Arguments For and Against Veganism

For veganism.

• ANIMAL WELFARE: Eating meat requires the death of a living being. Eating dairy usually involves animals being separated from their children, causing distress to both mother and calf. Dairy cattle frequently develop bovine mastitis (a painful infection and inflammation of the udders), and factory farmed animals are kept in cramped conditions and pumped full of antibiotics and growth hormones in order to maximise profit. Unlike wild animals, humans do not require meat to survive (and definitely not dairy products from other animals). Eating meat is a choice and, as moral actors, the correct choice is surely to give up meat and dairy.
• ENVIRONMENT: When cows eat grass, microbes in their gut break down their meal and produce methane. This methane (a greenhouse gas) is released into the atmosphere via the magic of cow burps and farts, making livestock farming one of the biggest contributors to global warming. Factor in deforestation from land clearance, biodiversity loss, and air and water pollution, and animal agriculture is terrible for the environment.
• HEALTH: Vegan diets tend to be rich in foods that have proven health benefits: fresh fruit, vegetables, seeds, nuts, beans and pulses. A vegan diet is typically higher in fibre, and  lower  in cholesterol, protein, calcium and salt compared to a non-vegan diet. Research suggests that vegans may have a lower risk of heart disease than non-vegans. It is true that vegans need to supplement their diets with B12, but this is easy to do (e.g. via yeast extracts such as Marmite).

AGAINST Veganism

• NATURE: Humans (and our ancestors) have eaten meat for an estimated  2.6 million years . In fact, scientists argue that animal protein was vital for helping early hominids develop larger brains, meaning that humans likely wouldn’t even exist if it weren’t for eating meat. We evolved to have meat as part of our diets. Animals eat meat and it would be cruel to prevent them from doing so. Well, guess what? Humans are animals too, and meat is a natural part of our diets.
• CULTURE: Food is a central part of all human cultures. And, around the world, people celebrate their cultures by cooking meat dishes. If the world went vegan, we would lose iconic cultural traditions such as bolognese sauce, tandoori chicken, sashimi, currywurst, and Peking duck.
• HEALTH: A balanced diet is a healthy diet. Eating moderate amounts of fish, meat, and dairy alongside fruit, vegetables and pulses gives us all the vitamins, minerals, fatty acids, and other things we need to stay healthy. Research does suggest that vegans have a lower risk of heart disease, but that same research also indicates they have a higher risk of strokes (possibly due to B12 deficiency), and it’s unclear whether the supposed health benefits of veganism are anyway less about diet and more about broader lifestyle (e.g. vegans tend to exercise more, be non-smokers, not drink to excess, be more moderate in what they consume, etc.).

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Essays About Veganism: Top 5 Examples and 10 Prompts

Veganism is on the rise. See below for our great examples of essays about veganism and helpful writing prompts to get started. 

Veganism is the practice of abstaining from animal-based foods and products. The movement originated from the philosophies against using animals as commodities and for capitalist gains. Now a booming industry, veganism promises better health benefits, a more humane world for animals, and an effective solution to global warming. 

Here is our round-up of essays examples about veganism:

1. A Brief History of Veganism by Claire Suddath

2. animal testing on plant-based ingredients divides vegan community by jill ettinger, 3. as vegan activism grows, politicians aim to protect agri-business, restaurateurs by alexia renard, 4. bezos, gates back fake meat and dairy made from fungus as next big alt-protein by bob woods, 5. going vegan: can switching to a plant-based diet really save the planet by sarah marsh, 1. health pros and cons of veganism, 2. veganism vs. vegetarianism, 3. the vegan society, 4. making a vegan diet plan, 5. profitability of vegan restaurants, 6. public personalities who are vegan, 7. the rise of different vegan products, 8. is vegan better for athletes, 9. vegans in your community, 10. most popular vegan activists.

“Veganism is an extreme form of vegetarianism, and though the term was coined in 1944, the concept of flesh-avoidance can be traced back to ancient Indian and eastern Mediterranean societies.”

Suddath maps out the historical roots of veganism and the global routes of its influences. She also laid down its evolution in various countries where vegan food choices became more flexible in considering animal-derived products critical to health. 

“Along with eschewing animal products at mealtime, vegans don’t support other practices that harm animals, including animal testing. But it’s a process rampant in both the food and drug industries.”

Ettinger follows the case of two vegan-founded startups that ironically conducts animal testing to evaluate the safety of their vegan ingredients for human consumption. The essay brings to light the conflicts between the need to launch more vegan products and ensuring the safety of consumers through FDA-required animal tests. 

“Indeed, at a time when the supply of vegan products is increasing, activists sometimes fear the reduction of veganism to a depoliticized way of life that has been taken over by the food industry.”

The author reflects on a series of recent vegan and animal rights activist movements and implies disappointment over the government’s response to protect public safety rather than support the protests’ cause. The essay differentiates the many ways one promotes and fights for veganism and animal rights but emphasizes the effectiveness of collective action in shaping better societies. 

“Beyond fungus, Nature’s Fynd also is representative of the food sustainability movement, whose mission is to reduce the carbon footprint of global food systems, which generate 34% of greenhouse emissions linked to climate change.”

The essay features a company that produces alternative meat products and has the backing of Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, and Al Gore. The essay divulges the company’s investments and plans to expand in the vegan market while providing a picture of the burgeoning alternative foods sector. 

“Experts say changing the way we eat is necessary for the future of the planet but that government policy is needed alongside this. If politicians are serious about wanting dietary changes, they also need to incentivise it, scientists and writers add.”

The article conveys the insights and recommendations of environmental and agriculture experts on how to turn more individuals into vegans. The experts emphasize the need for a whole-of-society approach in shifting more diets to vegan instead of putting the onus for change on an individual. 

10 Writing Prompts on Essays About Veganism

Here is our round-up of the best prompts to create interesting essays about veganism: 

While veganism has been a top choice for those desiring to lose weight and have a healthier lifestyle, some studies have also shown its detrimental effects on health due to deficiencies in specific vitamins. First, find out what existing research and experts say about this. Then, lay down the advantages and disadvantages of going vegan, explain each, and wrap up your essay with your insights.

Differentiate veganism from vegetarianism. Tackle the foods vegans and vegetarians consume and do not consume and cite the different effects they have on your health and the environment. You may also expand this prompt to discuss the other dietary choices that spawned from veganism. 

The Vegan Society is a UK-based non-profit organization aimed at educating the public on the ways of veganism and promoting this as a way of life to as many people. Expound on its history, key organizational pillars, and recent and future campaigns. You may also broaden this prompt by listing down vegan organizations around the world. Then discuss each one’s objectives and campaigns. 

Write down the healthiest foods you recommend your readers to include in a vegan diet plan. Contrary to myths, vegan foods can be very flavorful depending on how they are cooked and prepared. You may expand this prompt to add recommendations for the most flavorful spices and sauces to take any vegan recipe a notch higher. 

Vegan restaurants were originally a niche market. But with the rise of vegan food products and several multinational firms’ foray into the market, the momentum for vegan restaurants was launched into an upward trajectory—research on how profitable vegan restaurants are against restos offering meat on the menu. You may also recommend innovative business strategies for a starting vegan restaurant to thrive and stay competitive in the market. 

From J.Lo to Bill Gates, there is an increasing number of famous personalities who are riding the vegan trend with good reason. So first, list a few celebrities, influencers, and public figures who are known advocates of veganism. Then, research and write about stories that compelled them to change their dietary preference.

The market for vegan-based non-food products is rising, from makeup to leather bags and clothes. First, create a list of vegan brands that are growing in popularity. Then, research the materials they use and the processes they employ to preserve the vegan principles. This may prompt may also turn into a list of the best gift ideas for vegans.

Many believe that a high-protein diet is a must for athletes. However, several athletes have dispelled the myth that vegan diets lack the protein levels for rigorous training and demanding competition. First, delve deeper into the vegan foods that serve as meat alternatives regarding protein intake. Then, cite other health benefits a vegan diet can offer to athletes. You may also add research on what vegan athletes say about how a vegan diet gives them energy. 

Interview people in your community who are vegan. Write about how they made the decision and how they transitioned to this lifestyle. What were the initial challenges in their journey, and how did they overcome these? Also, ask them for tips they would recommend to those who are struggling to uphold their veganism.

Make a list of the most popular vegan activists. You may narrow your list to personalities in digital media who are speaking loud and proud about their lifestyle choice and trying to inspire others to convert. Narrate the ways they have made and are making an impact in their communities. 

To enhance your essay, read our guide explaining what is persuasive writing . 

If you’d like to learn more, check out our guide on how to write an argumentative essay .

Yna Lim is a communications specialist currently focused on policy advocacy. In her eight years of writing, she has been exposed to a variety of topics, including cryptocurrency, web hosting, agriculture, marketing, intellectual property, data privacy and international trade. A former journalist in one of the top business papers in the Philippines, Yna is currently pursuing her master's degree in economics and business.

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The Ethics of Veganism: Ethical Reasons to Go Vegan

Ethics is in origin the art of recommending to others the sacrifices required for cooperation with oneself.    -Bertrand Russell

Main Reasons for Going Vegan

On a basic level, there are generally three main reasons people cite for going vegan:

• Health Reasons for Veganism – A vegan diet, rich in fruit and veg, seeds, nuts and pulses, is seen by many as healthier than most omnivorous diets. This view is supported by plenty of scientific research.
• Environmental Reasons for Veganism – There have been numerous scientific studies that suggest a vegan diet has far less of a negative impact on the environment than one which includes meat (including fish), eggs and/or dairy.
• Ethical Reasons for Veganism – There is little doubt breeding, caging and slaughtering animals for food and other products causes those animals suffering. For many people this is not acceptable from a moral perspective.

In reality, the motivational factors that cause a person to follow a vegan lifestyle are nuanced and based on various personal convictions; but the three main reasons mentioned above, in whatever combination, play a significant role. Here we shall tackle the third of these and delve into the sometimes esoteric world of ethics.

We’ll start with a brief summary of the ethical case for veganism, and follow that with a basic explanation about what the term “ethics” refers to; but don’t worry, this isn’t going to be a long-winded philosophical treatise assessing the work of every great moral philosopher from Socrates, Plato and Artistotle to Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill (though you could do worse than read their pearls of wisdom on the subject)!

Instead, we will focus here on applied ethics in relation to veganism and the use of animals. We’ll also take a glance at the ethics of suffering, personhood, and environmental ethics with the aim of expanding on the summary of the moral case for veganism.

The Ethical Case for Veganism

The whole point of veganism is to minimise the exploitation of and cruelty to animals. Everyone gets that. But why? What is it about animals in particular, as opposed to trees or even lampposts, for example, that makes vegans so keen to protect them?

On a basic level, it is the ability of animals to suffer, to have the capacity to experience physical and – many would argue – psychological pain, which makes them worthy of our protection in the eyes of vegans, and many non-vegans for that matter.

There are a number of reasons within the ethical realm that motivate people to go vegan, including:

The abovementioned negatives of eating/farming meat must be weighed against the positives (as perceived by meat eaters); namely, meat can taste nice, it can be convenient, it can provide protein and other nutrients, it can be traditional (e.g. turkey at Christmas). So, the moral equation people should ask is: do the positives of eating meat outweigh the negatives? For vegans, the answer is no.

Here we’ll expand on some of the points introduced above, looking at suffering in more detail and glancing at other ethical issues relating to veganism. We will also take a look at some common arguments against veganism.

Veganism & the Ethics of Suffering

As English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, stated in relation to animals in his 1789 book The Principles of Morals and Legislation , “the question is not, Can they reason? nor, can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” The implication being that if animals can indeed suffer, then it is wrong to cause them to suffer when there is an alternative (like eating a cauliflower steak, instead of a cow steak).

There have been several scientific studies over the years that have shown that animals do indeed possess the capacity to feel pain. And, there have been studies that also indicate some animals are capable of feeling empathy – a subject covered in some depth in the 1997 book by Lesley J Rogers, Minds of Their Own: Thinking and Awareness in Animals .

Given that many governments, including the UK, have laws to protect the welfare to some degree, it is safe to say that it has become accepted as fact that animals can suffer pain. Otherwise, why bother protecting them in law at all (albeit to a level which falls well short of what most vegans would hope for)? It is also telling that animals are used to assess the effectiveness of pain killers and other such medications, something else that would seemingly be pointless if they were unable to experience (and exhibit signs of experiencing) pain.

Are Animals Aware of Pain?

All animals are equal, but should some animals be more equal than others? There is disagreement amongst scientists about how many species of animals are capable of being consciously aware of pain when they experience it – indeed, whether or not they “experience” it at all. Clearly if a human stubs a toe, assuming they possess a fully working nervous system, they are going to know about it. But according to various research sources, there is a distinction between conscious pain and “pain” that is merely an unconscious detection of potentially damaging stimuli, known as nociception.

In a review of studies that claim to show that fish feel pain entitled Can fish really feel pain? (Rose et al, 2012), it is noted that cartilaginous fish (such as sharks and rays) do not possess the type of nociceptors (C fiber nociceptors or C type trauma receptors) found in humans and other mammals that are related to experiencing pain on a conscious level, and they also do not possess the cortical regions in the brain that are known to be related to feeling pain in humans.

While it is widely accepted that mammals are able to experience pain in a similar way to humans, there is a widely held belief that some animals, such as insects, nematodes, molluscs and other invertebrates, are incapable of feeling pain. With some exceptions, such as the fruit fly, most insects do not possess nociceptors at all, suggesting that they may well not possess the capacity to feel any pain, let alone be conscious of it.

It seems highly likely that different animals suffer pain to a greater or lesser degree; it would therefore follow that people might want to adjust their assessment of the necessary rights and protections of certain animals based on whether or not, and to what degree, they are able to experience pain. Which explains why “ostrovegans” exist – no, they don’t eat ostriches, they follow a mainly vegan diet but also consume bivalves, such as oysters and mussels on the basis that they believe they do not feel pain.

However, if humans accept that even most other animals are capable of suffering pain to some degree, many people would then conclude that wilfully causing such suffering is morally indefensible. When that suffering is instigated on a massive, industrialised scale, it is understandable when some vegans use terms such as “genocide” in relation to our treatment of animals.

Is An Animal a Person?

This might seem like a ludicrous question if you read the word “person” as “human”. But a person is not necessarily a human; and to many philosophers, a human is not necessarily a person. Confused yet? Australian moral philosopher, Peter Singer, has argued that in order to be classified as a person, an animal (and that includes human animals) must possess “rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness”. Many dog owners would certainly argue their prized pooch possesses those characteristics, and many scientists who have studied primates, dolphins and even livestock, contend that is the case in these animals too.

If an animal can feel physical pain and experience it in a similar way to humans (that is, pain really flipping hurts!), that is one thing. But if an animal is also capable of anticipating pain, of comprehending their own existence and of wanting to prolong their existence, then the moral case against hauling animals to a slaughterhouse is surely strengthened.

There is plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting animals (both farmed and pets) appear to “know” they are about to die. But without an effective means to communicate with animals, our grasp of their phenomenological experiences are limited at best. Still, given that this is even a possibility, vegans would argue it is better to play things safe rather than to expose animals to such psychological trauma.

Pleasure Versus Pain

It is extremely difficult to measure subjective experiences, such as pleasure and pain, especially in non-human animals who are unable to simply tell researches how much pain they are in. But, ethically speaking, the justification for eating an animal can be made if the pleasure gained by the eater outweighs the suffering caused to the eaten.

But there is another dimension to consider: the pleasure that would have been experienced by the animal in the remainder of its life had it not been slaughtered. Of course, if it was kept in cramped conditions that actually caused suffering, the animal might not have experienced much pleasure in the rest of its days.

But, what if a cow that was on the way to slaughter was instead taken to a sanctuary to live out its days in relative comfort and freedom? (As was the case when farmers in Derbyshire gave their herd of beef cows to an animal sanctuary instead of to slaughter, as detailed in the documentary, 73 Cows ). In this case, the animal would have a lot to lose by being slaughtered in its prime, thus tipping the balance further towards the side of the scale that points towards not eating the cow.

Also, when assessing the pleasure someone gains from eating meat, it should be compared to the pleasure gained from eating an available, non-meat alternative. So, does the extra pleasure gained from eating a burger made from beef compared to one made from beans, soya, mushrooms or any other non-meat product justify inflicting suffering on the cow? Vegans – and many others – would argue not, especially those people who have tried some of our top vegan burger recipes !

Ethical Arguments Against Veganism

Here we look as some of examples of ethical arguments that have been put forward against veganism.

Animals Are Slaughtered Quickly & Humanely

Humane slaughter is surely a contradiction in terms if by “humane” people mean “showing compassion” or similar, and by “slaughter” they mean “kills for food or other products”. Call us old-fashioned, but we like our compassion to come without the need to have our lives cut short, however quick the process is!

With the possibility that animals are able to understand they are going to be killed when rounded up, transported in cramped conditions in trucks and them potentially seeing and hearing their fellow animals being killed before them, the word “humane” is certainly not a great choice.

Animals Die When Crops Are Harvested

Another argument against veganism is that it would increase the amount of arable farming that would be required and that this would cause the death of animals (such as field mice) who might be nesting in the fields when they are harvested. The suggestion is that vegans can’t really care for animals if they are willing to let all these poor defenceless mice die or that it is unethical to cause these deaths!

This is a logical fallacy, of course. Taking account simply of the extra number of animals that would be likely to die as a result of an increase in arable farming; then comparing this to the number of animals lives that would be saved by reducing meat farming and it becomes clear that more lives would be saved than lost. Also the mice, or other animals, in question would have at least lived out their lives in the wild, free to roam where they chose, rather than being in captivity, which would, ethically speaking, appear likely to give them more pleasure.

What Would Happen to Farm Animals?

The question here, really, is what would we do with the farm animals if we didn’t kill them for food? If the whole world stopped eating meat on a given day, however unlikely that would be, there would be obvious implications for farmers and the animals that would therefore not need to be slaughtered. If this were ever the case, there is a strong moral case for subsidising farmers (or others) to care for the remaining animals for them rest of their natural days, and not encouraging any further breeding, thus eventually reducing the environmental effects.

It could be argued that restricting the breeding of former farm animals might be unethical on one level, but there could be a “greater good” argument (relating to the salvation of the planet!) that could counter this.

What Is Ethics?

Here, for those interested, we will give a brief explanation of the term ethics itself. Ethics is defined by Merriam-Webster as:

• “the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation”
• “a set of moral principles : a theory or system of moral values”
• “the principles of conduct governing an individual or a group”

These interrelated definitions all revolve around the concept of morality, essentially the distinction between things that can be classified as “right” or “wrong”. Without wanting to fall into a semantic or linguistic rabbit hole, on a general level, most people are familiar with this concept in everyday life, and while one person’s moral code or ethics can differ greatly from that of another person, the idea that people will often make a conscious decision about their personal ethics is well understood.

Three Branches of Ethics

In academic terms, the study of ethics can be split into three main branches:

• Meta-Ethics – Looking at the nature of ethical stances or propositions, for example, addressing such questions as, “What does it mean to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’?”
• Normative Ethics – Examines how to discern a course of action based on morals, for examples asking, “What should one do?” in a given situation based on ethical principles.
• Applied Ethics – Revolves around the practical application of ethics in the “real world”, for example, whether euthanasia or abortion should be permitted in a given society.

When examining the ethics of veganism, as we haven’t the time to work towards a doctorate in the subject any time this decade, we have avoided venturing into the head-spinning realm of meta-ethics. But both normative and applied ethics have a place at the table when it comes to forming an ethical argument for veganism.

Normative Ethics & Veganism

One branch of normative ethics is particularly pertinent, in our eyes: consequentialism; that is the consequences – or probable consequences – of one’s actions (or inactions). This contrasts with deontological ethics, which is related more with the intentions of the actor rather than the actual consequences.

The two are not mutually exclusive, of course, as good intentions can often result in “good” consequences, but this is not always the case. Sometimes, often even, the consequences could be both good and bad, depending on a person’s standpoint. For example, if a parent has the good intention of ensuring their child is well-nourished by feeding them beef for dinner, the good consequences for the child might be a satiated appetite, a boost in protein, iron and energy; the bad consequences for the cow in question are obvious.

Under the umbrella of consequentialism, reside a number of complementary or conflicting philosophies. For example, ethical egoism relates to the promotion of net pleasure (pleasure minus pain) for the individual; this is similar to but contrasts with utilitarianism, which Jeremy Bentham claimed should aim for the “greatest happiness for the greatest number”. To put it another way, to paraphrase Bentham, the aim of utilitarianism is to maximise the “utility” (worth or value) and minimise pain and suffering for the greatest number of people.

Utilitarianism & Veganism

Taking utilitarianism as our framework within which we can assess the arguments for veganism from an ethical point of view, whether the promotion of happiness relates to humans only or is expanded to non-human animals, there are ethical arguments to support veganism, as detailed above.

Even if people are not concerned with animal welfare per se, the environmental benefits to the planet and hence humanity as a whole are well documented. Even the ethical egoist has reasons to go vegan, depending on his/her calculation of the health benefits of a vegan diet when weighed against the pleasure gained from eating meat above that gained from eating non-meat alternatives.

In summary, despite there being plenty of sound ethical arguments in favour of veganism, people’s moral compasses vary enormously, and while some people are unaware of many of the facts about how meat is produced, and how animals are treated, others are well aware but choose to turn a blind eye.

This is something people do with many potentially troubling issues in the world, from the destruction of the environment to homeless people living on the streets in some of the richest cities in the world. For some people, it is just easier to live that way.

But as veganism grows in popularity around the world, there is the distinct possibility that the compassion vegan ethics promotes in relation to animals might produce benefits for humanity and the planet as a whole. We live in hope.

New Times, New Thinking.

Why are vegans so reviled?

Vegans makes meat-eaters aware of their hypocrisy, argues Ed Winters in This is Vegan Propaganda – and people hate them for it.

By Freddie Hayward

The problem with books on veganism is they’re all quite depressing. The death, the guts, the gas chambers, the end of the planet – reading about the torment of billions of animals can make one downcast. Pigs, for instance, are typically stunned with an electrical current before their throats are slit. Occasionally, however, the stunning doesn’t work and the creatures are still conscious when lowered into a “scalding tank” of hot water that loosens their skin. Then there are the dairy cows sent to slaughter while pregnant. When they’re gutted, sometimes a foetus will fall on to the excrement-covered floor of the slaughterhouse before being beaten to death.

It’s no surprise that many people prefer to think their food comes from farms where animals frolic on lush pastures. The reality challenges meat-eaters’ view of themselves as compassionate, or at least not wantonly cruel. People claim to love animals but are happy to pay for their slaughter and mistreatment.

In This is Vegan Propaganda , the popular vegan activist Ed Winters, known online as Earthling Ed, argues that this cognitive dissonance helps explain why vegans are so reviled. “Vegans make the status quo feel that bit more uncomfortable,” he writes. “Suddenly the consumption of meat comes with the label of being an ‘animal eater’ as opposed to just being ‘normal’.” Vegans make meat-eaters aware of their incompatible beliefs, Winters argues, and people hate them for it.

It’s a compelling point in this digressive but well-researched introduction to veganism. Winters recounts his journey from KFC addict to vegan educator before detailing the main arguments for veganism: it improves your health; it combats environmental destruction; and, most importantly for Winters, it stops the mistreatment of animals.

Winters is sharp when describing the conditions animals are forced to endure, but relies on platitudes to underline his point about them. (“I know which option I would choose – what about you?”)

[See also: The vegetarian in the abattoir ]

Elsewhere, he displays his ethical purity with pedantic anxiety – a trait he shares with sections of other social justice movements. After citing research that establishes animals’ intelligence, he is fretfully quick to reassure the reader that he does not condone such studies, “which were undertaken to satisfy human curiosity, not to help animals”. Although his earnestness is tempered by some laudable if only half-successful attempts at levity, a list of pointers for “more effective conversations about veganism” does not help to dispel the perception of vegans as solemn proselytisers.

But what is most stark is the way Winters places responsibility on the individual. “If we want to protect wildlife,” he writes, “the best way to do that is to change what’s on our plates,” adding: “Every time we eat, we have the power to radically transform the world we live in and simultaneously contribute to addressing many of the most pressing issues that our species currently faces.” While the growing availability of vegan products suggests that a consumer-based approach to promoting veganism has had success, Winters neglects the role that other actors (the state, business, or any institution at all) must play too.

This places a huge weight on the individual: veganism requires near-constant enaction in a world where consuming animal products is the norm. We eat, drink and make purchases every day. Vegans cannot escape these decisions or live up to their beliefs by attending a protest once a year. And if they err, they are complicit in what they deplore.

[See also: Peter Singer: Why the case for veganism is stronger than ever ]

This is not an argument against veganism. Doing the right thing is difficult. But the commitment veganism requires can damage personal relationships. When Winters became vegan, members of his family mocked his decision and his relations with them suffered. He chose not to join his grandparents’ 60th wedding anniversary meal because he felt that attending would implicitly condone animal exploitation. He writes that this was the hardest part of becoming vegan, and his is not an isolated case: the rise of veganism has been met with a barrage of opposition, with one study suggesting that only drug addicts face the same level of social stigma. While Winters grandly argues that vegans have the power to change the world, he rightly acknowledges that attempting to do so can exact a considerable toll. Still, at least vegans are not the ones being boiled alive.

This Is Vegan Propaganda (And Other Lies the Meat Industry Tells You) Ed Winters Vermilion, 320pp, £14.99

Purchasing a book may earn the NS a commission from Bookshop.org, who support independent bookshops

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• The Strongest Argument for Veganism

This collection of articles was first published on the website of Sentience Politics .

Strong arguments derive their (surprising, counter-intuitive and far-reaching) conclusions from modest premises that everybody accepts. Here’s one such premise:

(1) We shouldn’t be cruel to animals, i.e. we shouldn’t harm animals unnecessarily.

(2) The consumption of animal products harms animals.

This is quite obvious for meat, but it’s also true for milk and eggs . Animals often suffer terribly as a result of overbreeding, from dreadful conditions on farms, during transportation and in the slaughterhouse. Studies show that stunning fails regularly . The egg industry painfully gasses all male chicks right after they hatch. In short: The production of animal foods generally leads to lots of acts of violence against animals and large amounts of suffering. – Here’s a further premise:

(3) The consumption of animal products is unnecessary.

One might ask how this third premise could be uncontroversial, given that food production is a pretty necessary practice. The question, however, is not “Is food necessary?”, but “Is animal food necessary (here and now)?” – Or in other words: “Are there viable nutritional alternatives to animal products?” For one cannot plausibly argue that something is necessary in the presence of viable alternatives. So let’s take a look at the scientific facts: The Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics – the largest nutritional organisation in the world – has a position paper stating that “appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total vegetarian or vegan diets, are healthful, nutritionally adequate, and may provide health benefits in the prevention and treatment of certain diseases.” Official health bodies around the globe support this view . And the existence of millions of healthy vegans and a growing number of vegan top athletes bears it out. Also, “appropriate planning” is very easy in today’s world – healthy and tasty vegan (or at least vegetarian) food is available everywhere.

To sum it up: If our own health depended on eating animals, then there could be an argument for violence against animals (serving nutritional purposes) being necessary. But that’s not the case. We’re not inflicting horrible suffering on animals in order to preserve our own health and thus prevent our own suffering. We’re inflicting suffering on billions of animals in order to get a little more culinary pleasure at most. And very likely not even that: In an experiment at the University of Bochum , 90% of the students didn’t notice that their “beef goulash” was vegan. The availability of vegan gourmet food is increasing rapidly too. Last but not least, it’s largely a matter of culinary socialization anyway: Nobody craves exotic foods (such as dog, dolphin or chimp meat) that don’t exist and are taboo in our society. The same would be true in a vegan society (providing plenty tasty cruelty-free meats) with regard to all meat that requires violence against any sentient animal.

The (rather trivial) premises (1) – (3) logically imply that the consumption of animal products harms animals unnecessarily and satisfies the definition of “cruelty to animals”, which leads to the conclusion:

To recap the Strongest Argument for Veganism:

(1) We shouldn’t be cruel to animals, i.e. we shouldn’t harm animals unnecessarily. (2) The consumption of animal products harms animals. (3) The consumption of animal products is unnecessary. (4) Therefore, we shouldn’t consume animal products.

At which point could one plausibly block this line of reasoning?

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The Core Argument for Veganism

• Published: 04 April 2015
• Volume 43 , pages 271–290, ( 2015 )

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• Stijn Bruers 1  

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This article presents an argument for veganism, using a formal-axiomatic approach: a list of twenty axioms (basic definitions, normative assumptions and empirical facts) are explicitly stated. These axioms are all necessary conditions to derive the conclusion that veganism is a moral duty. The presented argument is a minimalist or core argument for veganism, because it is as parsimonious as possible, using the weakest conditions, the narrowest definitions, the most reliable empirical facts and the minimal assumptions necessary to reach the conclusion. If someone does not accept the conclusion, logical consistency requires that s/he should be able to point at axiom(s) on which s/he disagrees. The argument exposes hidden assumptions and provides a framework for an overview of the philosophical literature on animal rights and vegetarianism / veganism.

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Du Bois’ democratic defence of the value free ideal

How (not) to integrate scientific and moral realism.

John Rawls’ Theory of Justice as Fairness

Veganism is broadly defined as avoiding the consumption of bodily products from sentient beings. Of course the conclusion of the argument will point at a more specific meaning of veganism. Hence, the argument does not say anything about some animals (e.g., zooplankton or oysters) nor about some kind of uses of animal products (e.g., collecting feathers in the woods or eating road kill). The argument focuses on the most common cases of buying meat, fish, dairy and eggs.

Engel ( 2000 ) also presented a lengthy argument, but I will not discuss the strengths and weaknesses of is argument compared to mine.

Regan refers to a more general ‘use as merely a means’, Francione refers to ‘treatment as property’. These basic rights are Kantian in nature, because they refer to a means-ends relationship.

Explicitly referring to mentally disabled humans is of course the well-known argument from marginal cases (e.g., Dombrowski 1997 ).

Some argue that mentally disabled humans should get rights because we could become mentally disabled in the future and then we would want our rights to be respected (see e.g., Wreen 1984 ). However, we cannot become a mentally disabled human who was never mentally abled before.

This is an often heard argument to grant rights to non-moral agents such as children who have a potential to become moral agents in the future (e.g., Melden 1980 ). Still, some mentally disabled humans have as little potential as non-human animals.

See the genetic basis of moral agency (Liao 2010 ).

See Gunnarsson ( 2008 ).

Narveson ( 1987 ) used an argument that reflects this condition of kinship with other individuals.

According to Narveson ( 1977 ), one of the reasons why we give rights to mentally disabled humans is because of feelings of sympathy on the basis of superficial similarities. This sympathy is merely triggered by similarities, and should not be confused with empathy. Also Wreen ( 1984 ) uses the argument that we identify ourselves with human non-persons.

This refers to a possible reply to the super-chimp (Kumar 2008 ) or super-cat (Wreen 1984 ) examples: a highly intelligent mutant super-cat would not get rights if rights are based on species normality (what most members of the species have). This seems counter-intuitive because this unique cat is rational. So the reply goes that this super-cat must belong to another species than Felis domestica (even if it can still interbreed with other cats). But then a same reasoning allows to conclude that a mentally disabled human with an exceptional property is no longer a Homo sapiens .

This is the underlying rationale of the Logic of the Larder (see Scruton 2004 ; Matheny and Chan 2005 ).

This counters the argument of ‘moral sociability as a precondition to justice’ (Barilan 2005 ). A subject has no moral sociability if its right to life is incompatible with the right to life of someone else.

Scruton ( 2006 ) and MacLean ( 2010 ) emphasize symbolic meanings of eating animal meat as well as taboos about e.g., eating human corpses to justify a distinction between humans and animals.

This refers to the argument of indirect duties or duties towards oneself, used by e.g., Kant ( 1785 , part II, paras 16 and 17) and Carruthers ( 1992 ).

Narveson ( 1987 ) tried to avoid the conclusion that use of mentally disabled humans is permissible by claiming that their use would not be as beneficial for us after all.

This refers to a condition proposed by Barilan ( 2005 ) for non-human species, but hereby translated to mentally disabled humans.

This refers to the least harm argument against vegetarianism proposed by Davis ( 2003 ), but hereby applied to mentally disabled humans.

This refers to the argument against vegetarianism/veganism that livestock farming allows us to use resources such as grazing land that otherwise remain unavailable for direct consumption.

See e.g., Young ( 1984 ), for whom the morality of killing X depends on others who have an interest in X’s continued existence. But also Scruton ( 2006 ) refers to the sentiments of others about the way we are allowed to treat someone. The impermissibility of using mentally disabled humans merely due to us being disturbed by that idea is like the prohibition of eating e.g., human cultured meat, plants that have a symbolic (e.g., religious) meaning or alcoholic beverages that are considered taboo in some cultures. These prohibitions have nothing to do with rights violations.

E.g. Goldman ( 2001 ) referred to moral intuitions that excluded animals.

E.g. Levy ( 2004 ).

This refers to the normality argument: moral agency is normal for humans because most humans possess moral agency. E.g. Thomas ( 2010 ).

This refers to the predation argument: we are allowed to eat animals when some animals eat other animals for survival.

This refers to the slippery slope argument (e.g., Carruthers 1992 ): if we start using mentally disabled humans, we might end up using mentally abled humans, because there is a continuum from disability to ability. See also Bruers ( 2013 ).

This refers to the human prejudice argument (Williams 2006 ): in the absence of an impartial point of view, we could (as humans) be partial in favour of other humans, from our own particular (human) point of view.

Both Francione ( 2000 , 2008 ) and Regan ( 1983 ) argued for veganism based on a Kantian basic right, but Regan (in his earlier work) used ‘subject-of-a-life’ as morally relevant criterion whereas Francione explicitly rejects that and argues that sentience is sufficient for a being to hold the right not to be treated as a resource. Subject-of-a-life is a narrower criterion than sentience, as it requires not only sentience but also preference autonomy (an ability to initiate action to pursue goals) and temporal consciousness (memory and a sense of one’s own future). Hence, my argument can be considered as a polishing and structuring of Francione’s work.

Note that this use is not a use as merely a means if plants do not possess a will and cannot be used against their will. Hence, this right is broader than the basic right in definition 1.

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Bruers, S. The Core Argument for Veganism. Philosophia 43 , 271–290 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9595-5

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Received : 11 November 2014

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Accepted : 23 March 2015

Published : 04 April 2015

Issue Date : June 2015

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9595-5

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Vegetarianism Essay

This is a model  vegetarianism essay .

As I always stress, you should  read the question very carefully  before you answer it to make sure you are writing about the right thing.

Take a look at the question:

Every one of us should become a vegetarian because eating meat can cause serious health problems.

To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Staying on topic

If you rush to start writing and don't analyse the question and brainstorm some ideas you may include the wrong information.

There are religious or moral arguments for not eating meat, but if you discuss those you will be going off topic .

This question is specifically about the health problems connected to eating meat.

So you must discuss in your answer what some of these problems are and if you think there are real health risks or not.

Knowing about the topic

And don't get worried that you do not know much about diet and health.

As part of your IELTS study it will help if you know the basics of most topics such as some health vocabulary in this case, but you are not expected to be an expert on nutrition.

Remember, you are being judged on your English ability and your ability to construct an argument in a coherent way, not to be an expert in the subject matter. So relax and work with

Organisation

In this vegetarianism essay, the candidate disagrees with the statement, and is thus arguing that everyone does not need to be a vegetarian.

The essay has been organised in the following way:

Body 1: Health issues connected with eating meat (i.e. arguments in support of being a vegetarian Body 2: Advantages of eating meat

Now take a look at the model answer.

Model Essay

You should spend about 40 minutes on this task.

Write about the following topic:

Give reasons for your answer and include any relevant examples from your own experience or knowledge.

Write at least 250 words.

IELTS Vegetarianism Essay - Sample Answer

Vegetarianism is becoming more and more popular for many people, particularly because of the harm that some people believe meat can cause to the body. However, I strongly believe that it is not necessary for everybody to be a vegetarian.

Vegetarians believe that meat is unhealthy because of the diseases it has been connected with. There has been much research to suggest that red meat is particularly bad, for example, and that consumption should be limited to eating it just a few times a week to avoid such things as cancer. Meats can also be high in saturated fats so they have been linked to health problems such as cardiovascular disease and diabetes.

However, there are strong arguments for eating meat. The first reason is that as humans we are designed to eat meat, which suggests it is not unhealthy, and we have been eating meat for thousands of years. For example, cavemen made hunting implements so that they could kill animals and eat their meat. Secondly, meat is a rich source of protein which helps to build muscles and bones. Vegetarians often have to take supplements to get all the essential vitamins and minerals. Finally, it may be the case that too much meat is harmful, but we can easily limit the amount we have without having to cut it out of our diet completely.

To sum up, I do not agree that everyone should turn to a vegetarian diet. Although the overconsumption of meat could possibly be unhealthy, a balanced diet of meat and vegetables should result in a healthy body.

(264 words)

You should begin by intoducing the topi c. The introduction in this vegetarianism essay begins by mentioning vegetarians and the possible harm of eating meat .

It then goes on to the thesis statement , which makes it clear what the candidate's opinion is.

The first body paragraph has a topic sentence which makes it clear that the paragraph is going to address the possible health issues of eating meat.

Some reasons and examples are then given to support this.

The second body paragraph then has a topic sentence which makes it clear that the main idea is now about the arguments for eating meat .

The conclusion in this vegetarianism essay then repeats the opinion and gives the candidates final thoughts.

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Moral Vegetarianism

Billions of humans eat meat. To provide it, we raise animals. We control, hurt, and kill hundreds of millions of geese, nearly a billion cattle, billions of pigs and ducks, and tens of billions of chickens each year.

To feed these animals, we raise crops. To raise crops, we deforest and use huge quantities of water. To quench these animals, we use still more water.

In turn, these animals produce staggering amounts of waste, waste that poisons water sources and soil. They produce staggering amounts of greenhouse gasses.

To raise these animals and produce this meat, farmers and slaughterhouse workers labor in conditions from onerous to brutal.

If controlling, hurting, or killing animals is wrong or if the production of these environmental effects or effects on people is wrong or if consuming the meat produced is wrong, then a breathtaking level of wrong-doing goes on daily.

Many fewer than a billion humans are vegetarian, have diets excluding meat. They are vegetarian for various reasons: because it’s healthy, because their parents make them be vegetarian, because they don’t like meat. Some are vegetarian on moral grounds. Moral vegetarianism is the view that it is morally wrong—henceforth, “wrong”—to eat meat.

The topic of this entry is moral vegetarianism and the arguments for it. Strikingly, most contemporary arguments for moral vegetarianism start with premises about the wrongness of producing meat and move to conclusions about the wrongness of consuming it. They do not fasten on some intrinsic feature of meat and insist that consuming things with such a feature is wrong. They do not fasten on some effect of meat-eating on the eater and insist that producing such an effect is wrong. Rather, they assert that the production of meat is wrong and that consumption bears a certain relation to production and that bearing such a relation to wrongdoing is wrong. So this entry gives significant space to food production as well as the tricky business of connecting production to consumption.

§1 introduces relevant terminology and an overview of the main positions. §2 explains meat production, the main moral arguments against it, and some responses to those arguments. That section—like the rest of the entry—focuses on medium-sized land animals. Yet fish and insects are killed in a number that dwarfs the number of land animals killed. Some issues these killings raise are covered in §3.

None of the foregoing is about consuming animals. §4 covers moral arguments from premises about meat production to conclusions about meat consumption. §5 considers some extensions of the arguments in §2. It wonders about which arguments against meat production can, if sound, be extended to show that animal product production or even some plant production is morally wrong. This last idea is relatively new. §6 briefly summarizes some other new issues in the moral vegetarian literature.

1. Terminology and Overview of Positions

2.1 animal farming, 2.2.1 suffering, 2.2.2 killing, 2.2.3 harming the environment, 2.2.4 general moral theories, 3. fish and insects, 4.1 bridging the gap, 4.2 against bridging the gap, 5.1.2 dairy, 5.2.1 plants themselves, 5.2.2 plant production and animals, 5.2.3 plant production and the environment, 5.3 summary of animal product and plant subsections, 6. conclusion: where the debate about vegetarianism stands and is going, other internet resources, related entries.

Moral vegetarianism is opposed by moral omnivorism, the view according to which it is permissible to consume meat (and also animal products, fungi, plants, etc.).

Moral veganism accepts moral vegetarianism and adds to it that consuming animal products is wrong. Whereas in everyday life, “vegetarianism” and “veganism” include claims about what one may eat, in this entry, the claims are simply about what one may not eat. They agree that animals are among those things.

In this entry, “animals” is used to refer to non-human animals. For the most part, the animals discussed are the land animals farmed for food in the West, especially cattle, chicken, and pigs. There will be some discussion of insects and fish but none of dogs, dolphins, or whales.

Primarily, this entry concerns itself with whether moral vegetarians are correct that eating meat is wrong. Secondarily—but at greater length—it concerns itself with whether the production of meat is permissible.

Primarily, this entry concerns itself with eating in times of abundance and abundant choices. Moral vegans need not argue that it is wrong to eat an egg if that is the only way to save your life. Moral vegetarians need not argue it is wrong to eat seal meat if that is the only food for miles. Moral omnivores need not argue it is permissible to eat the family dog. These cases raise important issues, but the arguments in this entry are not about them.

Almost exclusively, the entry concerns itself with contemporary arguments. [ 1 ] Strikingly, many historical arguments and most contemporary arguments against the permissibility of eating meat start with premises about the wrongness of producing meat and move to conclusions about the wrongness of consuming it. That is, they argue that

It is wrong to eat meat

By first arguing that

It is wrong to produce meat.

The claim about production is the topic of §2.

2. Meat Production

The vast majority of animals humans eat come from industrial animal farms that are distinguished by their holding large numbers of animals at high stocking density. We raise birds and mammals this way. Increasingly, we raise fish this way, too.

Raising large numbers of animals enables farmers to take advantage of economies of scale but also produces huge quantities of waste, greenhouse gas, and, generally, environmental degradation (FAO 2006; Hamerschlag 2011; Budolfson 2016). There is no question of whether to put so many animals on pasture—there is not enough of it. Plus, raising animals indoors, or with limited access to the outdoors, lowers costs and provides animals with protection from weather and predators. Yet when large numbers of animals live indoors, they are invariably tightly packed, and raising them close together risks the development and quick spread of disease. To deal with this risk, farmers intensively use prophylactic antibiotics. Tight-packing also restricts species-typical behaviors, such as rooting (pigs) or dust-bathing (chickens), and makes it so that animals cannot escape each other, leading to stress and to antisocial behaviors like tail-biting in pigs or pecking in chickens. To deal with these, farmers typically dock tails and trim beaks, and typically (in the U.S., at least) do so without anesthetic. Animals are bred to grow fast on a restricted amount of antibiotics, food, and hormones, and the speed of growth saves farmers money, but this breeding causes health problems of its own. Chickens, for example, have been bred in such a way that their bodies become heavier than their bones can support. As a result, they “are in chronic pain for the last 20% of their lives” (John Webster, quoted in Erlichman 1991). Animals are killed young—they taste better that way—and are killed in large-scale slaughterhouses operating at speed. Animal farms have no use for, e.g., male chicks on egg-laying farms, are killed at birth or soon after. [ 2 ]

Raising animals in this way has produced low sticker prices (BLS 2017). It enables us to feed our appetite for meat (OECD 2017).

Raising animals in this way is also, in various ways, morally fraught.

It raises concerns about its effects on humans. Slaughterhouses, processing this huge number of animals at high speed, threaten injury and death to workers. Slaughterhouse work is exploitative. Its distribution is classist, racist, and sexist with certain jobs being segmented as paupers’ work or Latinx work or women’s (Pachirat 2011).

Industrial meat production poses a threat to public health through the creation and spread of pathogens resulting from the overcrowding of animals with weakened immune systems and the routine use of antibiotics and attendant creation of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Anomaly (2015) and Rossi & Garner (2014) argue that these risks are wrongful because unconsented to and because they are not justified by the benefits of assuming those risks.

Industrial meat production directly produces waste in the form of greenhouse gas emissions from animals and staggering amounts of waste, waste that, concentrated in those quantities, can contaminate water supplies. The Böll Foundation (2014) estimates that farm animals contribute between 6 and 32% of greenhouse gas emissions. The range is due partly to different ideas about what to count as being farm animals’ contributions: simply what comes out of their bodies? Or should we count, too, what comes from deforestation that’s done to grow crops to feed them and other indirect emissions?

Industrial animal farming raises two concerns about wastefulness. One is that it uses too many resources and produces too much waste for the amount of food it produces. The other is that feeding humans meat typically requires producing crops, feeding them to animals, and then eating the animals. So it typically requires more resources and makes for more emissions than simply growing and feeding ourselves crops ( PNAS 2013.

Industrial animal farming raises concerns about the treatment of animals. Among others, we raise cattle, chickens, and pigs. Evidence from their behavior, their brains, and their evolutionary origins, adduced in Allen 2004, Andrews 2016, and Tye 2016, supports the view that they have mental lives and, importantly, are sentient creatures with likes and dislikes. Even chickens and other “birdbrains” have interesting mental lives. The exhaustive Marino 2017 collects evidence that chickens can adopt others’ visual perspectives, communicate deceptively, engage in arithmetic and simple logical reasoning, and keep track of pecking orders and short increments of time. Their personalities vary with respect to boldness, self-control, and vigilance.

We farm billions of these animals industrially each year (Böll Foundation 2014: 15). We also raise a much smaller number on freerange farms. In this entry “freerange” is not used in its tightly-defined, misleading, legal sense according to which it applies only to poultry and simply requires “access” to the outdoors. Instead, in the entry, freerange farms are farms that that, ideally, let animals live natural lives while offering some protection from predators and the elements and some healthcare. These lives are in various ways more pleasant than lives on industrial farms but involve less protection while still involving control and early death. These farms are designed, in part, to make animal lives go better for them, and their design assumes that a natural life is better, other things equal, than a non-natural life. The animal welfare literature converges on this and also on other components of animal well-being. Summarizing some of that literature, David Fraser writes,

[A]s people formulated and debated various proposals about what constitutes a satisfactory life for animals in human care, three main concerns emerged: (1) that animals should feel well by being spared negative affect (pain, fear, hunger etc.) as much as possible, and by experiencing positive affect in the form of contentment and normal pleasures; (2) that animals should be able to lead reasonably natural lives by being able to perform important types of normal behavior and by having some natural elements in their environment such as fresh air and the ability to socialize with other animals in normal ways; and (3) that animals should function well in the sense of good health, normal growth and development, and normal functioning of the body. (Fraser 2008: 70–71)

In this light, it is clear why industrial farming seems to do less for animal welfare than freerange farming: The latter enables keeping animals healthy. It enables happy states (“positive affect”) and puts up some safeguards against the infliction of suffering. There is no need, for example, to dock freerange pigs’ tails or to debeak freerange chickens, if they have enough space to stay out of each other’s way. It enables animals to socialize and to otherwise lead reasonably natural lives. A freerange’s pig’s life is in those ways better than an industrially-farmed pig’s.

Yet because freerange farming involves being outdoors, it involves various risks: predator- and weather-related risks, for example. These go into the well-being calculus, too.

Animals in the wild are subjected to greater predator- and weather-related risks and have no health care. Yet they score very highly with regard to expressing natural behavior and are under no one’s control. How well they do with regard to positive and negative affect and normal growth varies from case to case. Some meat is produced by hunting such animals. In practice, hunting involves making animals suffer from the pain of errant shots or the terror of being chased or wounded, but, ideally, it involves neither pain nor confinement. Of course, either way, it involves death. [ 3 ]

2.2 The Schematic Case Against Meat Production

Moral vegetarian arguments about these practices follow a pattern. They claim that certain actions—killing animals for food we do not need, for example—are wrong and then add that some mode of meat production—recreational hunting, for example—does so. It follows that the mode of meat-production is wrong.

Schematically

X is wrong.

Y involves X . Hence,

Y is wrong.

Among the candidate values of X are:

• Causing animals pain for the purpose of producing food when there are readily available alternatives.
• Killing animals for the purpose of…
• Controlling animals…
• Treating animals as mere tools…
• Ontologizing animals as food…
• Harming humans….
• Harming the environment…

And among the candidate values of Y are:

• Industrial animal farming
• Freerange farming
• Recreational hunting

Space is limited and cranking through many instances of the schema would be tedious. This section focuses on causing animals pain, killing them, and harming the environment in raising them. On control, see Francione 2009, DeGrazia 2011, and Bok 2011. On treating animals as mere tools, see Kant’s Lectures on Ethics , Korsgaard 2011 and 2015, and Zamir 2007. On ontologizing, see Diamond 1978, Vialles 1987 [1994], and Gruen 2011, Chapter 3. On harming humans, see Pachirat 2011, Anomaly 2015, and Doggett & Holmes 2018.

Some moral vegetarians argue:

Causing animals pain while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives is wrong.

Industrial animal farming involves causing animals pain while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives. Hence,

Industrial animal farming is wrong.

The “while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives” is crucial. It is sometimes permissible to cause animals pain: You painfully give your cat a shot, inoculating her, or painfully tug your dog’s collar, stopping him from attacking a toddler. The first premise is asserting that causing pain is impermissible in certain other situations. The “when there are readily available alternatives” is getting at the point that there are substitutes available. We could let the chickens be and eat rice and kale. The first premise asserts it is wrong to cause animals pain while raising them for food when there are readily available substitutes.

It says nothing about why that is wrong. It could be that it is wrong because it would be wrong to make us suffer to raise us for food and there are no differences between us and animals that would justify making them suffer (Singer 1975 and the enormous literature it generated). It could, instead, be that it is wrong because impious (Scruton 2004) or cruel (Hursthouse 2011).

So long as we accept that animals feel—for an up-to-date philosophical defense of this, see Tye 2016—it is uncontroversial that industrial farms do make animals suffer. No one in the contemporary literature denies the second premise, and Norwood and Lusk go so far as to say that

it is impossible to raise animals for food without some form of temporary pain, and you must sometimes inflict this pain with your own hands. Animals need to be castrated, dehorned, branded, and have other minor surgeries. Such temporary pain is often required to produce longer term benefits…All of this must be done knowing that anesthetics would have lessened the pain but are too expensive. (2011: 113)

There is the physical suffering of tail-docking, de-beaking, de-horning, and castrating, all without anesthetic. Also, industrial farms make animals suffer psychologically by crowding them and by depriving them of interesting environments. Animals are bred to grow quickly on minimal food. Various poultry industry sources acknowledge that this selective breeding has led to a significant percentage of meat birds walking with painful impairments (see the extensive citations in HSUS 2009).

This—and much more like it that is documented in Singer & Mason 2006 and Stuart Rachels 2011—is the case for the second premise, namely, that industrial farming causes animals pain while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives.

The argument can be adapted to apply to freerange farming and hunting. Freerange farms ideally do not hurt, but, as the Norwood and Lusk quotation implies, they actually do: For one thing, animals typically go to the same slaughterhouses as industrially-produced animals do. Both slaughter and transport can be painful and stressful.

The same goes for hunting: In the ideal, there is no pain, but, really, hunters hit animals with non-lethal and painful shots. These animals are often—but not always—killed for pleasure or for food hunters do not need. [ 4 ]

Taken together the arguments allege that all manners of meat production in fact produce suffering for low-cost food and typically do so for food when we don’t need to do so and then allege that that justification for producing suffering is insufficient. Against the arguments, one might accept that farms hurt animals but deny that it is even pro tanto wrong to do so (Carruthers 1992 and 2011; Hsiao 2015a and 2015b) on the grounds that animals lack moral status and, because of this, it is not intrinsically wrong to hurt them (or kill or control them or treat them like mere tools). One challenge for such views is to explain what, if anything, is wrong with beating the life out of a pet. Like Kant, Carruthers and Hsiao accept that it might be wrong to hurt animals when and because doing so leads to hurting humans. This view is discussed in Regan 1983: Chapter 5. It faces two distinct challenges. One is that if the only reason it is wrong to hurt animals is because of its effects on humans, then the only reason it is wrong to hurt a pet is because of its effects on humans. So there is nothing wrong with beating pets when that will have no bad effects on humans. This is hard to believe. Another challenge for such views, addressed at some length in Carruthers 1992 and 2011, is to explain whether and why humans with mental lives like the lives of, say, pigs have moral status and whether and why it is wrong to make such humans suffer.

Consider a different argument:

Killing animals while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives is wrong.

Most forms of animal farming and all recreational hunting involve killing animals while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives. Hence,

Most forms of animal farming and all recreational hunting are wrong.

The second premise is straightforward and uncontroversial. All forms of meat farming and hunting require killing animals. There is no form of farming that involves widespread harvesting of old bodies, dead from natural causes. Except in rare farming and hunting cases, the meat produced in the industrialized world is meat for which there are ready alternatives.

The first premise is more controversial. Amongst those who endorse it, there is disagreement about why it is true. If it is true, it might be true because killing animals wrongfully violates their rights to life (Regan 1975). It might be true because killing animals deprives them of lives worth living (McPherson 2015). It might be true because it treats animals as mere tools (Korsgaard 2011).

There is disagreement about whether the first premise is true. The “readily available alternatives” condition matters: Everyone agrees that it is sometimes all things considered permissible to kill animals, e.g., if doing so is the only way to save your child’s life from a surprise attack by a grizzly bear or if doing so is the only way to prevent your pet cat from a life of unremitting agony. (Whether it is permissible to kill animals in order to cull them or to preserve biodiversity is a tricky issue that is set aside here. It—and its connection to the permissibility of hunting—is discussed in Scruton 2006b.) At any rate, animal farms are in the business of killing animals simply on the grounds that we want to eat them and are willing to pay for them even though we could, instead, eat plants.

The main objection to the first premise is that animals lack the mental lives to make killing them wrong. In the moral vegetarian literature, some argue that the wrongness of killing animals depends on what sort of mental life they have and that while animals have a mental life that suffices for hurting them being wrong, they lack a mental life that suffices for killing them being wrong (Belshaw 2015 endorses this; McMahan 2008 and Harman 2011 accept the first and reject the second; Velleman 1991 endorses that animal mental lives are such that killing them does not harm them). Animals could lack a mental life that makes killing them wrong because it is a necessary condition for killing a creature being wrong that that creature have long-term goals and animals don’t or that it is a necessary condition that that creature have the capacity to form such goals and animals don’t or that it is a necessary condition that the creature’s life have a narrative structure and animals’ lives don’t or… [ 5 ]

Instead, the first premise might be false and killing animals we raise for food might be permissible because

[t]he genesis of domestic animals is…a matter…of an implicit social contract—what Stephen Budiansky…calls ‘a covenant of the wild.’…Humans could protect such animals as the wild ancestors of domestic cattle and swine from predation, shelter them from the elements, and feed them when otherwise they might starve. The bargain from the animal’s point of view, would be a better life as the price of a shorter life… (Callicott 2015: 56–57)

The idea is that we have made a “bargain” with animals to raise them, to protect them from predators and the elements, and to tend to them, but then, in return, to kill them. Moreover, the “bargain” renders killing animals permissible (defended in Hurst 2009, Other Internet Resources, and described in Midgley 1983). Such an argument might render permissible hurting animals, too, or treating them merely as tools.

Relatedly, even conceding that it is pro tanto wrong to kill animals, it might be all things considered permissible to kill farm animals for food even when there are ready alternatives because and when their well-being is replaced by the well-being of a new batch of farmed animals (Tännsjö 2016). Farms kill one batch of chickens and then bring in a batch of chicks to raise (and then kill) next. The total amount of well-being is fixed though the identities of the receptacles of that well-being frequently changes.

Anyone who endorses the views in the two paragraphs above needs to explain whether and then why their reasoning applies to animals but not humans. It would not be morally permissible to create humans on organ farms and harvest those organs, justifying this with the claim that these humans wouldn’t exist if it weren’t for the plan to take their organs and so part of the “deal” is that those humans are killed for their organs. Neither would it be morally permissible to organ-farm humans, justifying it with the claim that they will be replaced by other happy humans. [ 6 ]

Finally, consider:

Harming the environment while producing food when there are readily available alternatives is wrong.

Industrial animal farming involves harming the environment while producing food when there are readily available alternatives. Hence,

A more plausible premise might be “egregiously harming the environment…” The harms, detailed in Budolfson 2018, Hamerschlag 2011, Rossi & Garner 2014, and Ranganathan et al. 2016, are egregious and include deforestation, greenhouse gas emission, soil degradation, water pollution, water and fossil fuel depletion.

The argument commits to it being wrong to harm the environment. Whether this is because those harms are instrumental in harming sentient creatures or whether it is intrinsically wrong to harm the environment or ecosystems or species or living creatures regardless of sentience is left open. [ 7 ]

The argument does not commit to whether these harms to the environment are necessary consequences of industrial animal farming. There are important debates, discussed in PNAS 2013, about whether, and how easily, these harms can be stripped off industrial animal production.

There is an additional important debate, discussed in Budolfson 2018, about whether something like this argument applies to freerange animal farming.

Finally, there is a powerful objection to the first premise from the claim that these harms are part of a package that leaves sentient creatures better off than they would’ve been under any other option.

Nothing has been said so far about general moral theories and meat production. There is considerable controversy about what those theories imply about meat production. So, for example, utilitarians agree that we are required to maximize happiness. They disagree about which agricultural practices do so. One possibility is that because it brings into existence many trillions of animals that, in the main, have lives worth living and otherwise would not exist, industrial farming maximizes happiness (Tännsjö 2016). Another is that freerange farming maximizes happiness (Hare 1999; Crisp 1988). Instead, it could be that no form of animal agriculture does (Singer 1975 though Singer 1999 seems to agree with Hare).

Kantians agree it is wrong to treat ends in themselves merely as means. They disagree about which agricultural practices do so. Kant ( Lectures on Ethics ) himself claims that no farming practice does—animals are mere means and so treating them as mere means is fine. Some Kantians, by contrast, claim that animals are ends in themselves and that typically animal farming treats them as mere means and, hence, is wrong (Korsgaard 2011 and 2015; Regan 1975 and 1983).

Contractualists agree that it is wrong to do anything that a certain group of people would reasonably reject. (They disagree about who is in the group.) They disagree, too, about which agricultural practice contractualism permits. Perhaps it permits any sort of animal farming (Carruthers 2011; Hsiao 2015a). Perhaps it permits none (Rowlands 2009). Intermediate positions are possible.

Virtue ethicists agree that it is wrong to do anything a virtuous person would not do or would not advise. Perhaps this forbids hurting and killing animals, so any sort of animal farming is impermissible and so is hunting (Clark 1984; Hursthouse 2011). Instead, perhaps it merely forbids hurting them, so freerange farming is permissible and so is expert, pain-free hunting (Scruton 2006b).

Divine command ethicists agree that it is wrong to do anything forbidden by God. Perhaps industrial farming, at least, would be (Halteman 2010; Scully 2002). Lipscomb (2015) seems to endorse that freerange farming would not be forbidden by God. A standard Christian view is that no form of farming would be forbidden, that because God gave humans dominion over animals, we may treat them in any old way. Islamic and Jewish arguments are stricter about what may be eaten and about how animals may be treated though neither rules out even industrial animal farming (Regenstein, et al. 2003).

Rossian pluralists agree it is prima facie wrong to harm. There is room for disagreement about which agricultural practices—controlling, hurting, killing—do harm and so room for disagreement about which farming practices are prima facie wrong. Curnutt (1997) argues that the prima facie wrongness of killing animals is not overridden by typical justifications for doing so.

In addition to pork and beef, there are salmon and crickets. In addition to lamb and chicken, there are mussels and shrimp. There is little in the philosophical literature about insects and sea creatures and their products, and this entry reflects that. [ 8 ] Yet the topics are important. The organization Fish Count estimates that at least a trillion sea creatures are wild-caught or farmed each year (Mood & Brooke 2010, 2012, in Other Internet Resources). Globally, humans consume more than 20 kg of fish per capita annually (FAO 2016). In the US, we consume 1.5 lbs of honey per capita annually (Bee Culture 2016). Estimates of insect consumption are less sure. The UN FAO estimates that insects are part of the traditional diets of two billion humans though whether they are eaten—whether those diets are adhered to—and in what quantity is unclear (FAO 2013).

Seafood is produced by farming and by fishing. Fishing techniques vary from a person using a line in a boat to large trawlers pulling nets across the ocean floor. The arguments for and against seafood production are much like the arguments for and against meat production: Some worry about the effects on humans of these practices. (Some workers, for example, are enslaved on shrimpers.) Some worry about the effects on the environment of these practices. (Some coral reefs, for example, are destroyed by trawlers.) Some worry about the permissibility of killing, hurting, or controlling sea creatures or treating them merely as tools. This last worry should not be undersold: Again, Mood and Brooke (2010, 2012, in Other Internet Resources) estimate that between 970 billion and 2.7 trillion fish are wild-caught yearly and between 37 and 120 billion farmed fish are killed. If killing, hurting, or controlling these creatures or treating them as mere tools is wrong, then the scale of our wrongdoing with regard to sea creatures beggars belief.

Are these actions wrong? Complicating the question is that there is significantly more doubt about which sea creatures have mental lives at all and what those mental lives are like. And while whether shrimp are sentient is clearly irrelevant to the permissibility of enslaving workers who catch them, it does matter to the permissibility of killing shrimp. This doubt is greater still with regard to insect mental lives. In conversation, people sometimes say that bee mental life is such that nothing wrong is done to bees in raising them. Nothing wrong is done to bees in killing them. Because they are not sentient, there is no hurting them. Because of these facts about bee mental life, the argument goes, “taking” their honey need be no more morally problematic than “taking” apples from an apple tree. (There is little on the environmental impact of honey production or (human) workers and honey. So it is unclear how forceful environment- and human-based worries about honey are.)

This argument supporting honey production hinges on some empirical claims about bee mental life. For an up-to-date assessment of bee mental life, see Tye 2016, which argues that bees “have a rich perceptual consciousness” and “can feel some emotions” and that “the most plausible hypothesis overall…is that bees feel pain” (2016: 158–159) and see, too, Barron & Klein 2016, which argues that insects, generally, have a capacity for consciousness. The argument supporting honey production might be objected to on those empirical grounds. It might, instead, be objected to on the grounds that we are uncertain what the mental lives of bees are like. It could be that they are much richer than we realize. If so, killing them or taking excessive honey—and thereby causing them significant harms—might well be morally wrong. And, the objection continues, the costs of not doing so, of just letting bees be, would be small. If so, caution requires not taking any honey or killing bees or hurting them. Arguments like this are sometimes put applied to larger creatures. For discussion of such arguments, see Guerrero 2007.

4. From Production to Consumption

None of the foregoing is about consumption. The moral vegetarian arguments thus far have, at most, established that it is wrong to produce meat in various ways. Assuming that some such argument is sound, how to get from the wrongness of producing meat to the wrongness of consuming that meat?

This question is not always taken seriously. Classics of the moral vegetarian literature like Singer 1975, Regan 1975, Engel 2000, and DeGrazia 2009 do not give much space to it. (C. Adams 1990 is a rare canonical vegetarian text that devotes considerable space to consumption ethics.) James Rachels writes,

Sometimes philosophers explain that [my argument for vegetarianism] is unconvincing because it contains a logical gap. We are all opposed to cruelty, they say, but it does not follow that we must become vegetarians. It only follows that we should favor less cruel methods of meat production. This objection is so feeble it is hard to believe it explains resistance to the basic argument [for vegetarianism]. (2004: 74)

Yet if the objection is that it does not follow from the wrongness of producing meat that consuming meat is wrong, then the objection is not feeble and is clearly correct. In order to validly derive the vegetarian conclusion, additional premises are needed. Rachels, it turns out, has some, so perhaps it is best to interpret his complaint as that it is obvious what the premises are.

Maybe so. But there is quite a bit of disagreement about what those additional premises are and plausible candidates differ greatly from one another.

Consider a productivist idea about the connection between production and consumption according to which consumption of wrongfully-produced goods is wrong because it produces more wrongful production. The idea issues an argument that, in outline, is:

Consuming some product P produces production of Q .

Production of Q is wrong.

It is wrong to produce wrongdoing. Hence,

Consuming P is wrong.

Or never mind actual production. A productivist might argue:

Consuming some product P is reasonably expected to produce production of Q .

It is wrong to do something that is reasonably expected to produce wrongdoing. Hence,

Consuming P is wrong. (Singer 1975; Norcross 2004; Kagan 2011)

(The main ideas about connecting consumption and production that follow can—but won’t —be put in terms of expectation, too.)

The moral vegetarian might then argue that meat is among the values of both P and Q : consuming meat is reasonably expect to produce production of meat. Or the moral vegetarian might argue that consuming meat produces more normalization of bad attitudes towards animals and that is wrong. There are various possibilities.

Just consider the first, the one about meat consumption producing meat production. It is most plausible with regard to buying . It is buying the wrongfully-produced good that produces more of it. Eating meat produces more production, if it does, by producing more buying. When Grandma buys the wrongfully produced delicacy, the idea goes, she produces more wrongdoing. The company she buys from produces more goods whether you eat the delicacy or throw it out.

These arguments hinge on an empirical claim about production and a moral claim about the wrongfulness of producing wrongdoing. The moral claim has far-reaching implications (DeGrazia 2009 and Warfield 2015). Consider this rent case:

You pay rent to a landlord. You know that he takes your rent and uses the money to buy wrongfully-produced meat.

If buying wrongfully-produced meat is wrong because it produces more wrongfully-produced meat, is it wrong to pay rent in the rent case? Is it wrong to buy a vegetarian meal at a restaurant that then takes your money and uses it to buy wrongfully-produced steak? These are questions for productivists’ moral claim. There are further, familiar questions about whether it is wrong to produce wrongdoing when one neither intends to nor foresees it and whether it is wrong to produce wrongdoing when one does not intend it but does foresee it and then about whether what is wrong is producing wrongdoing or, rather, simply producing a bad effect (see entries on the doctrine of double effect and doing vs. allowing harm ).

An objection to productivist arguments denies the empirical claim and, instead, accepting that because the food system is so enormous, fed by so many consumers, and so stuffed with money, our eating or buying typically has no effect on production, neither directly nor even, through influencing others, indirectly (Budolfson 2015; Nefsky 2018). The idea is that buying a burger at, say, McDonald’s produces no new death nor any different treatment of live animals. McDonald’s will produce the same amount of meat—and raise its animals in exactly the same way—regardless of whether one buys a burger there. Moreover, the idea goes, one should reasonably expect this. Whether or not this is a good account of how food consumption typically works, it is an account of a possible system. Consider the Chef in Shackles case, a modification of a case in McPherson 2015:

Alma runs Chef in Shackles, a restaurant at which the chef is known to be held against his will. It’s a vanity project, and Alma will run the restaurant regardless of how many people come. In fact, Alma just burns the money that comes in. The enslaved chef is superb; the food is delicious.

The productivist idea does not imply it is wrong to buy food from or eat at Chef in Shackles. If that is wrong, a different idea needs to explain its wrongness.

So consider instead an extractivist idea according to which consumption of wrongful goods is wrong because it is a benefiting from wrongdoing (Barry & Wiens 2016). This idea can explain why it is wrong to eat at Chef in Shackles—when you enjoy a delicious meal there, you benefit from the wrongful captivity of the chef. In outline, the extractivist argument is:

Consuming some product P extracts benefit from the production of P .

Production of P is wrong.

It is wrong to extract benefit from wrongdoing. Hence,

Moral vegetarians would then urge that meat is among the values of P . Unlike the productivist argument, this one is more plausible with regard to eating than buying. It’s the eating, typically, that produces the benefit and not the buying. Unlike the productivist argument, it does not seem to have any trouble explaining what is wrong in the Chef in Shackles case. Unlike the productivist argument, it doesn’t seem to imply that paying a landlord who pays for wrongfully produced food is wrong—paying a landlord is not benefiting from wrongdoing.

Like the productivist argument, the extractivist argument hinges on an empirical claim about consumer benefits and a moral claim about the ethics of so benefiting.

The notion of benefiting, however, is obscure. Imagine you go to Chef in Shackles, have a truly repulsive meal, and become violently ill afterwards. Have you benefit ted from wrongdoing? If not, the extractivist idea cannot explain what is wrong with going to the restaurant.

Put so plainly, the extractivist’s moral claim is hard to believe. Consider the terror-love case, a modification of a case Barry & Wiens 2016 credits to Garrett Cullity:

A terrorist bomb grievously injures Bob and Cece. They attend a support group for victims, fall in love, and live happily ever after, leaving them significantly better off than they were before the attack.

Bob and Cece seem to benefit from wrongdoing but seem not to be doing anything wrong by being together. Whereas the productivist struggles to explain why it is wrong to patronize Chef in Shackles, the extractivist struggles to explain why it is permissible for Bob and Cece to benefit from wrongdoing.

A participatory idea has no trouble with the terror-love case. According to it, consuming wrongfully-produced goods is wrong because it cooperates with or participates in or, in Hursthouse’s phrase, is party to wrongdoing (2011). Bob and Cece do not participate in terror, so the idea does not imply they do wrong. The idea issues an argument that, in outline, goes:

Consuming some product P is participating in the production of P .

It is wrong to participate in the production of wrongful things. Hence,

Consuming P is wrong. (Kutz 2000; Lepora & Goodin 2013)

Moral vegetarians would then urge that meat is among the values of P . Unlike the productivist or extractivist ideas, the participatory idea seems to as easily cover buying and eating for each is plausibly a form of participating in wrongdoing. Unlike the productivist idea, it has no trouble explaining why it is wrong to patronize Chef in Shackles and does not imply it is wrong to pay rent to a landlord who buys wrongfully-produced meat. Unlike the extractivist idea, whether or not you get food poisoning at Chef in Shackles has no moral importance to it. Unlike the extractivist idea, the participatory idea does not falsely imply that the Bob and Cece do wrong in benefiting from wrongdoing—after all, their failing in love is not a way of participating in wrongdoing.

Yet it is not entirely clear what it is to participate in wrongdoing. Consider the Jains who commit themselves to lives without himsa (violence). Food production causes himsa. So Jains try to avoid eating many plants, uprooted to be eaten, and even drinking untreated water, filled with microorganisms, to minimize lives taken. Yet Jaina monastics are supported by Jaina laypersons. The monastic can’t boil his own water—that would be violent—but the water needs boiling so he depends on a layperson to boil. He kills no animals but receives alms, including meat, from a layperson. Is the monastic participating in violence? Is he participating because he is complicit in this violence (Kutz 2000; Lepora & Goodin 2013)? Is he part of a group that together does wrong (Parfit 1984: Chapter 3)? When Darryl refuses to buy wrongfully-produced meat but does no political work with regard to ending its production is he party to the wrongful production? Does he participate in it or cooperate with its production? Is he a member of a group that does wrong? If so, what are the principles of group selection?

As a matter of contingent fact, failing to politically protest meat exhibits no objectionable attitudes in contemporary US society. Yet it might be that consuming certain foods insults or otherwise disrespects creatures involved in that food’s production (R.M. Adams 2002; Hill 1979). Hurka (2003) argues that virtue requires exhibiting the right attitude towards good or evil, and so if consuming exhibits an attitude towards production, it is plausible that eating wrongfully produced foods exhibits the wrong attitude towards them. These are all attitudinal ideas about consumption. They might issue in an argument like this:

Consuming some product P exhibits a certain attitude towards production of P .

It is wrong to exhibit that attitude towards wrongdoing. Hence,

Moral vegetarians would then urge that meat is among the values of P . Like the participatory idea, the attitudinal idea explains the wrongness of eating and buying various goods—both are ways of exhibiting attitudes. Like the participatory idea, it has no trouble with Chef in Shackles, the rent case, the food poisoning case, or the terror-love case. It does hinge on an empirical claim about exhibition—consuming certain products exhibits a certain attitude—and then a moral claim about the impermissibility of that exhibition. One might well wonder about both. One might well wonder why buying meat exhibits support for that enterprise but paying rent to someone who will buy that meat does not. One might well wonder whether eating wrongfully-produced meat in secret exhibits support and whether such an exhibition is wrong. Also, there are attitudes other than attitudes towards production to consider. Failing to offer meat to a guest might exhibit a failure of reverence (Fan 2010). In contemporary India, in light of the “meat murders” committed by Hindus against Muslims nominally for the latter group’s consumption of beef, refusing to eat meat might exhibit support for religious discrimination (Doniger 2017).

The productivist, extractivist, participatory, and attitudinal ideas are not mutually exclusive. Someone might make use of a number of them. Driver, for example, writes,

[E]ating [wrongfully produced] meat is supporting the industry in a situation where there were plenty of other, better, options open…What makes [the eater] complicit is that she is a participant . What makes that participation morally problematic…is that the eating of meat displays a willingness to cooperate with the producers of a product that is produced via huge amounts of pain and suffering. (2015: 79; all italics mine)

This seems to at least incorporate participatory and attitudinal ideas. Lawford-Smith (2015) combines attitudinal and productivist ideas. McPherson (2015) combines extractivist and participatory ideas. James Rachels (2004) combines participatory and productivity ideas. And, of course, there are ideas not discussed here, e.g., that it is wrong to reward wrongdoers for wrongdoing and buying wrongfully produced meat does so. The explanation of why it is wrong to consume certain goods might be quite complex.

Driver, Lawford-Smith, McPherson, and James Rachels argue that it is wrong to consume wrongfully produced food and try to explain why this is. The productivist, extractivist, participatory, and attitudinal ideas, too, try to explain it. But it could be that there is nothing to explain.

It could be that certain modes of production are wrong yet consuming their products is permissible. We might assume that if consumption of certain goods is wrong, then that wrongness would have to be partly explained in terms of the wrongness of those goods’ production and then argue that there are no sound routes from a requirement not to produce a food to a requirement not to consume it (Frey 1983). This leaves open the possibility that consumers might be required to do something —for example, work for political changes that end the wrongful system—but permitted to eat wrongfully-produced food.

As §4.1 discusses, Warfield raises a problem for productivist accounts that they seem to falsely imply that morally permissible activities like paying rent to meat-eaters or buying salad at a restaurant serving meat are morally wrong (2015). Add the assumption that if consumption is wrong, it is wrong because some productivist view is true, and it follows that consumption of wrongful goods need not be wrongful. (Warfield does not assume this but instead says that “the best discussion” of the connection between production and consumption is “broadly consequentialist” (ibid., 154).)

Instead, we might assume that an extractivist or participatory or attitudinal view is correct if any is and then argue no such view is correct. We might, for example, argue that these anti-consumption views threaten to forbid too much. If the wrongness of producing and wrongness of consuming are connected, what else is connected? If buying meat is wrong because it exhibits the wrong attitude towards animals, is it permissible to be friends with people who buy that meat—or does this, too, evince the wrong attitudes towards animals? If killing animals for food is wrong, is it permissible merely to abstain from consuming them or must one do more work to stop their killing? The implications of various arguments against consuming animals and animal products might be far-reaching. Some will see this as an acknowledgment that something is wrong with moral vegetarian arguments. As Gruen and Jones (2015) note, the lifestyle some such arguments point to might not be enactable by creatures like us. Yet they see this not as grounds for rejection of the argument but, rather, as acknowledgment that the argument sets out an aspiration that we can orient ourselves towards (cf. §4 of Curtin 1991 on “contextual vegetarianism”).

A different sort of argument in favor of the all things considered permissibility of consuming meat comes from the idea that eating and buying animals actually makes for a great cultural good (Lomasky 2013). Even if we accept that the production of those animals is wrong, it could be that the great good of consuming justifies doing so. (Relatedly, it could be that the bad of refusing to consume justifies consumption as in a case in which a host has labored over barbequed chicken for hours and your refusing to eat it would devastate him.) Yet this seems to leave open the possibility that all sorts of awful practices might be permissible because they are essential parts of great cultural goods. It threatens to permit too much.

5. Extending Moral Vegetarian Arguments: Animal Products and Plants

Moral veganism accepts moral vegetarianism and adds to it that consuming animal products is wrong. Mere moral vegetarians deny this and add to moral vegetarianism that it is permissible to consume animal products. An additional issue that divides some moral vegans and moral vegetarians is whether animal product production is wrong. This raises a general question: If it is wrong to produce meat on the grounds adduced in §2 , what other foods are wrongfully produced? If it is wrong to hurt chickens for meat, isn’t it wrong to hurt them for eggs? If it is wrong to harm workers in the production of meat, isn’t it wrong to harm workers in the production of animal products? If it is wrong to produce huge quantities of methane for meat, isn’t it wrong to produce it for milk? These are challenges posed by moral veganism.

But various vegan diets raise moral questions. If it is wrong to hurt chickens for meat, is it wrong to hurt mice and moles while harvesting crops? If it is wrong to harm workers in the production of meat, isn’t it wrong to harm workers in the production of tomatoes? If it is wrong to use huge quantities of water for meat, isn’t it wrong to use huge quantities of water for almonds?

5.1 Animal Products

As it might be that meat farming wrong, it might be that animal product farming is wrong for similar reasons. These reasons stem from concerns about plants, animals, humans, and the environment. This entry will focus on the first, second, and fourth and will consider eggs and dairy.

Like meat birds, egg layers on industrial farms are tightly confined, given on average a letter-sized page of space. Their beaks are seared off. They are given a cocktail of antibiotics. Males, useless as layers, are killed right away: crushed, dehydrated, starved, suffocated. As they age and their laying-rate slows, females are starved so as to force them to shed feathers and induce more laying. They are killed within a couple years (HSUS 2009; cf. Norwood & Lusk 2011: 113–127, which rates layer hen lives as not worth living).

Freerange egg farming ideally avoids much of this. Yet it still involves killing off young but spent hens and also baby roosters. It often involves painful, stressful trips to industrial slaughterhouses. So, as it is plausible that industrially and freerange farming chickens for meat makes them suffer, so too is it plausible that industrially and freerange farming them for eggs does. The same goes for killing.

The threat to the environment, too, arises from industrial farming itself rather than whether it produces meat or eggs. Chickens produce greenhouse gas and waste regardless of whether they are farmed for meat or eggs. Land is deforested to grow food for them and resources are depleted to care for them regardless of whether they are farmed for meat or eggs.

In sum, arguments much like arguments against chicken production seem to apply as forcefully to egg production. Arguments from premises about killing, hurting, and harming the environment seem to apply to typical egg production as they do to typical chicken production.

Like beef cattle, dairy cows on industrial farms are tightly confined and bereft of much stimulation. As dairy cows, however, they are routinely impregnated and then constantly milked. Males, useless as milkers, are typically turned to veal within a matter of months. Females live for maybe five years. (HSUS 2009; cf. Norwood & Lusk 2011: 145–150).

Freerange milk production does not avoid very much of this. Ideally, it involves less pain and suffering but it typically involves forced impregnation, separation of mother and calf, and an early death, typically in an industrial slaughterhouse. So far as arguments against raising cows for meat on the basis that doing so kills them and makes them suffer are plausible, so are analogous arguments against raising cows for dairy.

The threat to the environment is also similar regardless of whether cattle are raised for meat or milk. So far as arguments against raising cows for meat on the basis that doing so harms the environment are plausible, so are analogous arguments against raising cows for milk. Raising cows for meat and for milk produces greenhouse gas and waste; it deforests and depletes resources. In fact, to take just one example, the greenhouse-gas-based case against dairy is stronger than the greenhouse-gas-based case against poultry and pork (Hamerschlag 2013).

In sum, arguments much like arguments against beef production seem to apply as forcefully to dairy production. Arguments from premises about killing, hurting, and harming the environment seem to apply to typical dairy production as they do to typical beef production.

As it might be that animal, dairy, and egg farming are wrong, it might be that plant farming is wrong for similar reasons. These reasons stem from concerns about plants, animals, humans, and the environment. This entry will focus on the first, second, and fourth.

Ed drenches Fatima’s prized cactus in pesticides without permission. This is uncontroversially wrongful but only uncontroversial because the cactus is Fatima’s. If a cactus grows in Ed’s yard and, purely for fun, she drenches it in pesticides, killing it, is that wrong? There is a family of unorthodox but increasingly common ideas about the treatment of plants according to which any killing of plants is at least pro tanto wrongful and that treating them as mere tools is too (Marder 2013; Stone 1972, Goodpaster 1978, and Varner 1998 are earlier discussions and Tinker 2015 discusses much earlier discussions). One natural way to develop this thought is that it is wrong to treat plants this way simply because of the effects on plants themselves. An alternative is wrong to treat the plants this way simply because of its effects on the biosphere. In both cases, we can do intrinsic wrong to non-sentient creatures.

The objection raises an important issue about interests. Singer, following Porphyry and Bentham, assumes that all and only sentient creatures have interests. The challenge that Marder, et al. raise is that plants at least seem to do better or worse, to flourish or founder, because they seem to have interests in a certain amount of light, nutrients, and water. One way to interpret the position of Porphyry, et al. is that things are not as they seem here and, in fact, plants, lacking sentience, have no interests. This invites the question of why sentience is necessary for interests (Frey 1980 and 1983). Another way to interpret the position of Porphyry, et al. is that plants do have interests but they have no moral import. This invites the questions of when and why is it permissible to deprive plants of what they have interests in. Marder’s view is that plants have interests and that these interests carry significantly more moral weight than one might think. So, for example, as killing a dog for fun is wrong, so, too, is killing a dandelion. If killing a chicken for food we don’t need is wrong, so, too, is killing some carrots.

If it is impermissible to kill plants to provide ourselves food we don’t need, how far does the restriction on killing extend: To bacteria? Pressed about this by Gary Francione, Marder is open-minded: “We should not reject the possibility of respecting communities of bacteria without analyzing the issue seriously” (2016: 179).

Marder’s view rests on a controversial interpretation of plant science and, in particular, on a controversial view that vegetal responses to stimuli—for example that “roots…are capable of altering their growth pattern in moving toward resource-rich soil or away from nearby roots of other members of the same species” (2016: 176)—suffice to show that plants have interests, are ends in themselves, and it is pro tanto wrong to kill them and treat them as tools.

Uncontroversially, much actual plant production does have various bad consequences for animals. Actual plant production in the US is largely large scale. Large-scale plant production involves—intentionally or otherwise—killing a great many sentient creatures. Animals are killed by tractors and pesticides. They are killed or left to die by loss of habitat (Davis 2003; Archer 2011). The scope of the killing is disputed in Lamey 2007 and Matheny 2003 but all agree it is vast (cf. Saja 2013 on the moral imperative to kill large animals).

The “intentionally or otherwise” is important to some. While these harms are foreseen consequences of farming, they are unintended. To some, that animals are harmed but not intentionally harmed in producing corn in Iowa helps to make those harms permissible (see entry on doctrine of double effect ). Pigs farmed in Iowa, by contrast, are intentionally killed. Chickens and cows, too. (Are any intentionally hurt? Not typically. Farming is not sadistic.)

The scale is important, too. Davis (2003) and Archer (2011) argue that some forms of meat production kill fewer animals than plant production and, because of that, are preferable to plant production.

The idea is that if animal farming is wrong because it kills animals simply in the process of producing food we don’t need, then some forms of plant farming are wrong for the same reason. More weakly, if animal farming is wrong because it kills very large numbers of animals in the process of producing food we don’t need, then some forms of plant farming are wrong for the same reason.

An outstanding issue is whether these harms are necessary components of plant production or contingent. A further issue is how easy it would be to strip these harms off of plant production while still producing foods humans want to eat at prices they are willing to pay.

A final objection to the permissibility of plant production: There are clearly environmental costs of plant production. Indeed, the environmental costs of plant farming are large: topsoil loss; erosion; deforestation; run-off; resource-depletion; greenhouse gas emissions. To take just the last two examples, Budolfson (2016: 169) estimates that broccoli produces more kilograms of CO 2 per thousand calories than pork and that almonds use two and a half times the water per thousand calories that chicken does.

If some forms of animal farming are wrong for those environmental reasons, then some forms of plant farming are wrong for those reasons (Budolfson 2018).

Again, an outstanding issue is whether these harms are necessary components of plant production or contingent. A further issue is how easy it would be to strip these harms off of plant production while still producing foods people want to eat at prices they are willing to pay.

Moral vegetarian arguments standardly oppose treating animals in various ways while raising them for food that we do not need to eat to survive. This standardly makes up part of the arguments that it is wrong to eat animals.

These arguments against meat production can be extended mutatis mutandis to animal product production. [ 9 ] They can be extended, too, to some forms of plant production. This suggests:

The arguments against industrial plant production and animal product production are as strong as the arguments against meat production.

The arguments against meat production show that meat production is wrong. Hence,

The arguments against industrial plant production and animal product production show that those practices are wrong.

One possibility is that the first premise is false and that some of the arguments are stronger than others.

Another possibility is that the first premise is true and all these arguments are equally strong. We would then have to choose between accepting the second premise—and thereby accepting the conclusion—or denying that meat production is wrong.

Another possibility is that the argument is sound but of limited scope, there being few if any alternatives in the industrialized West to industrialized plant, animal product, and meat production.

A final possibility is that the parity of these arguments and evident unsoundness of an argument against industrial plant production show that the ideas behind those arguments are being misexpressed. Properly understood, they issue not in a directive about the wrongness of this practice or that. Rather, properly understood, they just show that various practices are bad in various ways. If so, we can then ask: Which are worse? And in which ways? The literature typically ranks factory farming as worse for animals than industrial plant farming if only because the former requires the latter and produces various harms—the suffering of billions of chickens—that the latter does not. Or consider the debate in the literature about the relative harmfulness to animals of freerange farming and industrial plant farming. Which produces more animal death or more animal suffering? Ought we minimize that suffering? Or consider the relative harmfulness of freerange and industrial animal farming. Some argue that the former is worse for the environment but better for animals. If so, there is a not-easy question about which, if either, to go in for.

Given length requirements, this entry cannot convey the vastness of the moral vegetarian literature. There is some excellent work in the popular press. Between the Species , Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics , Journal of Animal Ethics , Environmental Ethics , and Journal of Food Ethics publish articles yearly. Dozens of good articles have been omitted from discussion.

This entry has omitted quite direct arguments against consuming meat, arguments that do not derive from premises about the wrongness of producing this or that. Judeo-Islamic prohibitions on pork, for example, derive from the uncleanliness of the product rather than the manner of its production. Rastafari prohibitions on eating meat, for another example, derive in part from the view that meat consumption is unnatural. Historically, such prohibitions and justifications for them have not been limited to prohibitions on consuming meat. The Laws of Manu ’s prohibition on onion-eating derives from what consuming onion will do to the consumer rather than the manner of onion-production (Doniger & Smith (trans.) 1991: 102). The Koran’s prohibition on alcohol-drinking derives from what consuming alcohol will do to the consumer rather than the manner of alcohol-production (5:90–91).

Arguments like this, arguments against consumption that start from premises about intrinsic features of the consumed or about the consumed’s effects on consumers, largely do not appear in the contemporary philosophical literature. What we have now are arguments according to which certain products are wrongfully produced and consumption of such products bears a certain relation to that wrongdoing and, ipso facto , is wrong. Moral vegetarians then argue that meat is such a product: It is typically wrongfully produced and consuming it typically bears a certain relation to that wrongdoing. This then leaves the moral vegetarian open to two sorts of objections: objections to the claims about production— is meat produced that way? Is such production wrongful?—and objections to the claims connecting consumption to production— is consuming meat related to wrongful production in the relevant way? Is being so related wrong? Explaining moral vegetarian answers to these questions was the work of §2 and §4 .

There are further questions. If moral vegetarian arguments against meat-consumption are sound, then are arguments against animal product consumption also sound? Might dairy, eggs, and honey be wrongfully produced as moral vegetarians argue meat is? Might consuming them wrongfully relate the consumer to that production? Explaining the case for “yes” was some of the work of §5 .

Relatedly, some plants, fruit, nuts, and other putatively vegetarian foods might be wrongfully produced. Some tomatoes are picked by workers working in conditions just short of slavery (Bowe 2007); industrial production of apples sucks up much water (Budolfson 2016); industrial production of corn crushes numerous small animals to death (Davis 2003). Are these food wrongfully produced? Might consuming them wrongfully relate the consumer to that production? Explaining the case for “yes” here, too, was some of the work of §5 .

Fischer (2018) suggests that the answers to some of the questions noted in the previous two paragraphs support a requirement to “eat unusually” and, one might add, to produce unusually. If meat, for example, is usually wrongfully produced, it must be produced unusually for that production to stand a chance of being permissible, perhaps as faultless roadkill (Koelle 2012; Bruckner 2015) or as the corpse of an animal dead from natural causes (Foer 2009) or as a test-tube creation (Milburn 2016; Pluhar 2010; see the essays in Donaldson & Carter (eds.) 2016 for discussion of plant-based “meat”).

If consuming meat is usually wrong because it usually bears a certain relation to production, it must be consumed unusually to stand a chance of being permissible. Some people eat only food they scavenge from dumpsters, food that would otherwise go to waste. Some people eat only food that is given to them without asking for any food in particular. If consuming is wrong only because it produces more production, neither of these modes of consumption would be wrongful.

As some unusual consumption might, by lights of the arguments considered in this entry, turn out to be morally unobjectionable, some perfectly usual practices having nothing to do with consumption might turn out, by those same lights, to be morally objectionable. Have you done all you are required to do by moral vegetarian lights if you stop eating, for example, factory-farmed animals? Clearly not. If it is wrong to eat a factory-farmed cow, it is for very similar reasons wrong to wear the skin of that cow. Does the wrongful road stop at consumption, broadly construed to include buying, eating, or otherwise using? Or need consumers do more than not consume wrongfully-produced goods? Need they be pickier in how they spend their money than simply not buying meat, e.g., not going to restaurants that serve any meat? Need they protest or lobby? Need they take more direct action against farms? Or more direct action against the government? Need they refuse to pay rent to landlords who buy wrongfully-produced meat? Is it permissible for moral vegetarians to befriend—or to stay friends with—meat-eaters? As there are questions about whether the moral road gets from production to consumption, there are questions about whether the road stops at consumption or gets much farther.

As discussed in §5 , the moral vegetarian case against killing, hurting, or raising animals for food might well be extended to killing, hurting, or raising animals in other circumstances. What, if anything, do those cases show about the ethical treatment of pets (Bok 2011; Overall (ed.) 2017; Palmer 2010 and 2011)? Of zoo creatures (DeGrazia 2011; Gruen 2011: Chapter 5; Gruen 2014)?

What, if anything, do they show about duties regarding wild animals? Palmer 2010 opens with two cases from 2007, one of which involved the accidental deaths of 10,000 wildebeest in Kenya, the other involving the mistreatment and death of 150 horses in England. As Palmer notes, it is plausible that we are required to care for and help domesticated animals—that’s why it is plausibly wrong to let horses under our care suffer—but permissible to let similar harms befall wild animals—that’s why it is plausibly permissible to let wildebeest suffer and die. And yet, Palmer continues, it is also plausible that animals with similar capacities—animals like horses and wildebeest—should be treated similarly. So is the toleration of 10,000 wildebeest deaths permissible? Or do we make a moral mistake in not intervening in such cases? Relatedly, moral vegetarians oppose chicken killing and consumption and yet some of them aid and abet domestic cats in the killings of billions of birds each year in the United States alone (Loss, et al. 2013; Pressler 2013). Is this permissible? If so, why (Cohen 2004; Milburn 2015; Sittler-Adamczewski 2016)? McMahan (2015) argues that standard moral vegetarian arguments against killing and suffering lead (eventually) to the conclusion that we ought to reduce predation in the wild.

What, if anything do moral vegetarian arguments show about duties regarding fetuses? There are forceful arguments that if abortion is wrong, then so is killing animals for food we don’t need (Scully 2013). The converse is more widely discussed but less plausible (Abbate 2014; Colb & Dorf 2016; Nobis 2016).

Finally, in the food ethics literature, questions of food justice are among the most common questions about food consumption. Sexism, racism, and classism, are unjust. Among the issues of food justice, then, are how, if at all, the practices of vegetarianism and omnivorism or encouragement of them are sexist (C. Adams 1990) or racist (Alkon & Agyeman (eds.) 2011) or classist (Guthman 2011). Industrial animal agriculture raises a pair of questions of justice: It degrades the environment—is this unjust to future generations who will inherit this degraded environment? Also, what makes it so environmentally harmful is the scale of it. That scale is driven, in part, by demand for meat among the increasingly affluent in developing countries (Herrero & Thornton 2013). Is refusing to meet that demand—after catering to wealthy Western palates for a long stretch—a form of classism or racism?

The animals we eat dominate the moral vegetarian literature and have dominated it ever since there has been a moral vegetarian literature. A way to think about these last few paragraphs is that questions about what we eat lead naturally to questions about other, quite different topics: the animals we eat but also the animals we don’t; eating those animals but also eating plants; refusing to eat those animals but also raising pets and refusing to intervene with predators and prey in the wild; refusing to eat but also failing to protest or rectify various injustices. Whereas the questions about animals—and the most popular arguments about them—are very old, these other questions are newer, and there is much progress to be made in answering them.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Adamson, P., 2012, “ King of Animals: Porphyry ”, podcast Episode 92 of History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps , LMU/Munich and Kings College London.
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animal: cognition | animal: consciousness | animals, moral status of | doing vs. allowing harm | double effect, doctrine of | ethics: in Indian Buddhism | moral status, grounds of

Acknowledgments

Surveys of the moral vegetarian literature are common. I have greatly benefited from reading, among others, Engel 2015, Fischer 2018, McPherson 2018, and Stuart Rachels 2011.

I have benefited, too, from helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions. For them, I thank Anne Barnhill, Selim Berker, Mark Budolfson, Terence Cuneo, Bob Fischer, Rachelle Gould, Matthew C. Halteman, Elizabeth Harman, Oscar Horta, James John, Robert C. Jones, Jeff McMahan, members of the Vermont Ethics Group, Kate Nolfi, Clare Palmer, L.A. Paul, Tina Rulli, Jeff Sebo, Peter Singer, Sarah Stroud, Mark Timmons, Amy Trubek, and Alisha Utter.

Some material in this entry started life in Barnhill & Doggett 2017a and 2017b.

Copyright © 2018 by Tyler Doggett < tyler . doggett @ uvm . edu >

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The 60 Most Common Arguments Against Veganism [Debunked]

Updated on November 8, 2023 Reviewed and fact-checked Found a mistake? Let us know!

As a vegan, you’ll be hit with various questions and criticisms from non-vegans in your life. Some of these questions will be asked sincerely. Other will be said defensively. Some may even be meant to attack your diet and lifestyle choices.

This post shares my personal answers to 60 common questions, objections, and critiques you’re likely to hear as a vegan. They’re not necessarily the “correct” answers. You may disagree with some of my responses. If you do, you may want to think about your own answers or even write them out.

Many of my answers make use of utilitarian ethics , which is explained more in Peter Singer’s book Animal Liberation . But I don’t consistently apply that ethical theory to the exclusion of others.

My view of ethics is also a bit more lax and relativistic compared to many ethical vegans. So I am less aggressive in some of my answers than others would be.

Adjust your answers to your own style, personal beliefs, and values. At the very least, you can use the list of questions and objections to brainstorm what your own answers might be!

Table of Contents

• “Where do you get your protein?”
• “Don’t you need fish for omega-3 fats?”
• “You can’t get vitamin B12 from plants.”
• “You can’t get enough iron from plants.”
• “You can’t get enough calcium without milk.”
• “Soy products aren’t healthy.”
• “Veganism relies on monoculture farming of grains—that’s not sustainable.”
• “Veganism requires supplements. That proves it’s not healthy.”
• “Vegans can’t gain weight/muscle to excel in sports like football.”
• “Vegan diets have too many carbs.”
• “Vegan diets have too many ‘anti-nutrients’ from grains and legumes.”
• “My body craves animal products because I need the nutrition in them.”
• “Veganism is a type of consumerism—it reinforces capitalism.”
• “Being vegan is impossible if you live in a food desert.”
• “You can’t be 100% vegan. All medications are tested on animals. Even roads contain animals.”
• “Humans are omnivores. Our bodies are made to eat meat. We have canine teeth.”
• “Eating meat is a personal choice.”
• “Eating meat is natural.”
• “Humans are at the top of the food chain.”
• “It’s the circle of life.”
• “Eating meat is what helped humans evolve to have such big brains.”
• “Plants feel pain, too.”
• “Even plant farming causes the deaths of field mice and insects.”
• “Farm animals only exist because we bred them for food—so they don’t have rights or lives without us.”
• “If everyone went vegan, what would happen to all the farm animals already alive?”
• “It hurts cows not to milk them. Cows like being milked.”
• “We are smarter and naturally superior to animals.”
• “Farm animals would never survive in the wild—so why should they have rights?”
• “If you eat every part of the animal, that is respectful and ethical.”
• “Animals would gladly eat you—so why not eat them?”
• “I only eat humanely slaughtered and humanely farmed animal products.”
• “Animals cannot enter into ethical or moral contracts with us.”
• “The animals are already dead. Why not eat the meat, so it doesn’t go to waste?”
• “We shouldn’t focus on animal rights until all human rights issues are handled.”
• “Medical conditions don’t allow everyone to be vegan.”
• “Only privileged people can afford vegan food. Veganism is expensive.”
• “The vegan community is just full of white people.”
• “The world will never be fully vegan.”
• “You buy other things that are made with unethical labor, like clothes from sweatshops.”
• “Veganism is boring—the food lacks taste and variety.”
• “There is no such thing as objective moral truth.”
• “Hitler was vegetarian.”
• “Sustainable vegan farming isn’t possible—animal manure is needed to fertilize plants.”
• “If everyone went vegan, so many people would lose their jobs.”
• “Vegans are preachy and pretentious.”
• “Meat tastes good.”
• “God put animals on earth to be food for us.”
• “If it’s wrong for humans to own and use animals, why do vegans have pets?”
• “So, do you force your cat or dog to be vegan, too?”
• “There has never been a vegan civilization in human history.”
• “Don’t force your beliefs on me.”
• “I don’t have enough time to be vegan.”
• “Meat and animal products are part of my culture.”
• “There’s no ethical consumption under capitalism.”
• “What if you were on a desert island or had to survive in the wild?”
• “What about mushrooms, yeast, and bacteria? They’re alive, too.”
• “Animals do not suffer when they’re slaughtered.”
• “Aren’t you projecting human desires and suffering onto other animals?”
• “I read a news story about a nutritionally deficient vegan baby…”
• “PETA is an offensive, racist, sexist organization.”

1. “Where do you get your protein?”

I get my protein from plants. Just like elephants and gorillas do. There are plenty of plant foods that have a good amount of protein: Beans, peas, lentils, peanut butter, quinoa, and many other veggies, nuts, seeds, and grains.

There are also plenty of meat substitutes and soy foods even higher in protein: Tofu, tempeh, textured vegetable protein (TVP), seitan, Beyond Meat, the Impossible Burger, Tofurkey, and all the other “mock meats.”

There are also vegan protein powders. Pea protein specifically is a complete protein with similar muscle-building effectiveness as whey. And there are many other vegan “protein blends” that are also complete proteins.

Most Americans eat far above the Recommended Daily Allowance (RDA) for protein, while a vegan diet naturally falls closer to the RDA.

And even if you want to eat a lot of protein as an athlete or bodybuilder, you can do it on a well-planned vegan diet using the high-protein foods above.

2. “Don’t you need fish for omega-3 fats?”

Fish are not the only source of omega-3s. There are also plant sources, such as flaxseed, chia seed, hemp seeds, and walnuts.

Even when looking at the specific kind of omega-3s found in fish—DHA and EPA—those can be obtained from a vegan source, too.

Many companies now make vegan omega-3 supplements that contain DHA and EPA sourced from algae (“algal oil”). This is the original source that fish get their omega-3s from.

So another benefit of choosing vegan omega-3s from algae is that you’re getting it straight from the original source (algae), without the mercury or PCBs often found in fish.

3. “You can’t get vitamin B12 from plants.”

That’s okay—vegans can easily, affordably, and safely get vitamin B12 from supplements. B12 supplements have been shown to be effective, and there’s no need to eat animal products for B12.

All vitamin B12 is actually made by bacteria , which is found in soil. In the past, humans were able to get more B12 from plants, but due to sanitation practices and modern industrial farming today, our plant foods don’t provide as much contact with this B12-producing bacteria anymore.

The way animals are raised on factory farms, they must be given B12 supplements, too. That’s because their plant-based feed doesn’t contain much B12 anymore, either.

So even when you eat animal products for B12 today, the original source of the B12 is typically a supplement given to the animals. It’s not actually “made” by the animals or anything.

Side Note: This is the best free video introduction I’ve found on adopting a plant-based diet— the right way . You’ll learn how to lower your risk of cancer, heart disease, type-2 diabetes, Alzheimer’s, and obesity—all with plants. Watch the free Masterclass here .

4. “You can’t get enough iron from plants.”

There are plenty of high-iron plant foods, from beans and lentils to pumpkin seeds, cashews, tofu, chia seeds, and quinoa.

In addition, if you eat those foods along with foods high in vitamin C, then the iron absorption is boosted even further. Getting enough iron is not a problem on a well-planned vegan diet.

Read more on vegans and iron here .

5. “You can’t get enough calcium without milk.”

Most plant-based milks like soy milk and almond milk are now fortified with the same amount of calcium as in cow’s milk. So if you just replace cow’s milk with plant milk, you’ll typically get the same amount of calcium.

It’s also possible to get enough calcium from low-oxalate dark leafy greens like kale, as well as other plant foods, fortified foods, or supplements. Milk is not necessary by any means.

Read more on vegans and calcium here .

6. “Soy products aren’t healthy.”

Most credible sources, including Healthline.com and the Harvard Health Letter , state that soy foods are either neutral or beneficial—especially when eaten in less-processed forms like tofu, tempeh, and unsweetened soy milk.

However, there are conflicting studies and theories about soy, for sure. Many sources argue that you should limit isolated soy protein , like what’s found in many soy-based mock meats.

Luckily, a vegan diet does not require soy—so you can avoid soy as a vegan if you choose.

There are plenty of vegan protein sources besides soy, including beans, peas, lentils, seitan (wheat meat), nutritional yeast, peanut butter, hemp seeds, and more.

You can also buy vegan protein powders or protein bars made from pea protein or others. Many of the most popular “mock meats” today, like Beyond Meat, are made with pea protein— not soy .

7. “Veganism relies on monoculture farming of grains—that’s not sustainable.”

First, there are many ways to eat vegan—and not all of them include grains or soy. There are ways to eat low-carb vegan, vegan keto , or other grain-free vegan diets if you wish.

Second, animal agriculture also typically relies on monoculture farming. Most animals are grain-fed, and it takes a whole lot of grain to raise a cow to the point of slaughter. The leading driver of deforestation in the Amazon Rainforest is the cattle industry. ( source )

So if you’re opposed to monoculture farming, you should also be opposed to eating the meat or other products of grain-fed livestock.

Third, there are forms of vegan farming out there that are more focused on sustainability. Look up “veganic” farming and “vegan permaculture” for two different approaches to sustainable food production without using animal products at any point in the process.

8. “Veganism requires supplements. That proves it’s not healthy.”

When it comes to vitamin B12—the most important supplement for vegans—there’s an interesting fact about that, which most people don’t know. First, vitamin B12 is actually made by bacteria—not plants or animals.

Humans used to get B12 from eating plants and drinking water from streams, because there was plenty of B12-producing bacteria in our soils.

But due to today’s industrial farming methods and sanitation practices, we no longer get much B12 through plants or water. So the main food source of B12 today is animal products.

However, what most people don’t know is that the B12 in most animal products actually got there because animals on farms are fed B12 supplements. That’s because the grains they’re fed don’t naturally contain much B12 anymore.

So even if you get your B12 from animal products, it’s most likely coming from a supplement originally anyway. And that’s necessary due to today’s farming and sanitation practices.

And it’s not totally unwarranted. Many physicians recommend that everyone take a vitamin D supplement, for example—because our modern lifestyles simply don’t include as much sunlight as our ancestors’.

Almost 20 million people in the U.S. take omega-3 supplements, too—because most of Western society has an imbalanced omega-3 to omega-6 ratio… not just vegans.

9. “Vegans can’t gain weight/muscle to excel in sports like football.”

Tell that to the “ 300-Pound Vegan ,” former NFL lineman David Carter.

Or tell it to a good bunch of the Tennessee Titans defensive line. As they explain in the documentary The Game Changers , something like a dozen players on the TItans went plant-based in 2018. They partially attributed their playoff run to the diet change.

Or tell it to vegan strongman Patrick Baboumian , who was declared “Strongest Man of Germany” in 2011.

There are plenty examples of people gaining muscle, size, and strength on a vegan diet. It takes some extra focus on protein and calories, but it can be done. And there are benefits as far as quicker athletic recovery, as well.

Even one of the strongest and most powerful animals in nature— the gorilla—eats a diet that is 97% plant-based or more (the exact percentage depends on the subspecies of gorilla).

10. “Vegan diets have too many carbs.”

There are a lot of misconceptions around “carbs.” They’re often associated with refined sugar and processed foods like bread, pasta, chips, pastries, and other low-nutrient foods. But carbs from whole foods like vegetables, fruit, whole grains, and beans are generally very healthy.

For most people today, their problem is not “too many carbs,” but too many processed foods of all kinds, in combination with too much saturated fat from animal foods.

That said, if you want to eat a low-carb diet for a specific reason, you can do that as a vegan. Simply focus on vegetables, nuts, seeds, avocados, oils, and mock meats as your major calorie sources. You can even be vegan keto if you choose.

11. “Vegan diets have too many ‘anti-nutrients’ from grains and legumes.”

This has become a more common argument against veganism in recent years. People warn of the lectins and other “anti-nutrients” in beans, grains, and other plant foods.

Based on the best science I’ve seen, these concerns are overblown. Lectins are mostly destroyed by soaking and cooking. Yes, if you eat raw, uncooked, dry beans, you would have an upset stomach and digestive problems to say the least.

But beans must be soaked and cooked for many hours. When you buy canned beans, they’re already cooked. Studies have shown that lectin activity is virtually non-existent after cooking. ( source )

Also, as it happens, these “high-lectin foods” are typically high in fiber, antioxidants, and other protective nutrients. So there seems to be very little actual cause for concern with lectins.

Population studies have also shown that people eating lots of whole grains and beans have better health and longevity. If the lectins in these foods were a serious health concern, we wouldn’t see this.

No major health organization promotes the dietary restriction of lectins. In fact, restricting lectin-containing foods goes against the advice of the American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, and American Diabetes Association. ( source )

12. “My body craves animal products because I need the nutrition in them.”

Cravings are rarely based on the nutrition you need to be healthy. Millions of people routinely crave cigarettes, drugs, ice cream, pizza, and chocolate cake.

So what explains cravings for animal foods? Our bodies evolved for survival in an environment where food was scarce. This has resulted in a human psychology that is very easy to tempt with high-calorie foods.

Meat and animal products are rich sources of calories and fat that would’ve been very beneficial to us in the evolutionary environments we evolved in.

But today, for the vast majority of us, we don’t need extra calories. What we actually need is more micronutrients—vitamins, minerals, antioxidants—and we need more water and fiber. That is, we actually need more colorful, healthy, whole plant foods. Not meat and cheese.

Luckily, if you stop eating animal products for a while, you will generally start to crave them less. Your taste buds will adapt and be able to appreciate vegetables, fruits, and other more subtle tastes again.

13. “Veganism is a type of consumerism—it reinforces capitalism.”

First, veganism isn’t just a consumer activity to the most committed, ethical vegans. It often involves other forms of action for animals and the earth, too—and many vegans are involved in other activist movements.

Second, consumer boycotts don’t inherently “reinforce capitalism.” Many people who oppose capitalism use boycotts as a tool to achieve their ends. Take the Palestinian movement for “Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions” (BDS) , which is supported by many socialists and anarchists.

Boycotts do not inherently “support” capitalism—they just use capitalism and market forces to achieve a specific effect in the world.

Third, even if veganism did “reinforce capitalism,” which is a stretch… once could argue that that’s okay, as it is supporting a more ethical form of capitalism. [Only add this point if you’re interested in trying to defend capitalism. Because it will probably lead to a broader debate about it!]

14. “Being vegan is impossible if you live in a food desert.”

Being vegan may be harder in a food desert, as any kind of specific diet might be. Saying it’s “impossible” is not precise, though, and it’s potentially condescending to people who live in food deserts and take great care to select the best food options from what they have access to.

Also, if it is harder to be vegan in a food desert, that’s not really a strike against veganism. That’s more of a strike against the food distribution systems in our society.

It may also be a strike against capitalism because it’s an example of free markets failing to meet the needs of people in those areas. But you can be vegan and also care about these other food justice issues.

There are vegan organizations like the Food Empowerment Project that are actively involved in food justice issues besides veganism itself, including programs to improve healthy food access in food deserts.

15. “You can’t be 100% vegan. All medications are tested on animals. Even roads contain animals.”

This statement assumes that “100% vegan” means “not ever consuming or using any animal by-products whatsoever .” But the most widely accepted definitions of “vegan” don’t suggest such perfection.

Here’s a quote from the Vegan Society’s definition of “vegan” :

“Veganism is a way of living which seeks to exclude, as far as is possible and practicable, all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose.”

This definition contains an acknowledgment that veganism is about doing what’s “possible and practicable.” For most vegans, yes, you’ll need to use some products that contain animal by-products or were tested on animals. That’s just a fact of the world we live in.

But it still makes a difference to mostly avoid animal products. It still makes a difference to seek out non-animal alternatives when possible.

Being vegan is not about being perfect—it’s about making the impact we can each make.

16. “Humans are omnivores. Our bodies are made to eat meat. We have canine teeth.”

Many of our anatomical features are actually closer to those of herbivores than omnivores:

• Our intestines are long like an herbivore’s.
• Our canine teeth are tiny compared to a true omnivore like a dog. (And there are other herbivores with much bigger canine teeth than ours—like gorillas and male musk deer.)
• We lack claws.
• We drink water like herbivores—sipping, not lapping.
• Uncooked meat is disgusting to us.
• Killing an animal is disturbing and uncomfortable for most of us.
• Our closest animal relatives are chimps and bonobos, both of which eat a diet of primarily fruit. Meat is less than 2% of the chimpanzee diet.
• Our color vision, sense of smell, and hands are perfect for finding and grabbing fruit.
• After years of eating meat and saturated fat, our bodies tend to develop atherosclerosis. That doesn’t happen to true omnivores like dogs—but it does happen to herbivores like rabbits that are fed meat.

So there’s a good deal of evidence that we’re closer to herbivores than actually being full-on omnivores. That said, even if you want to say we’re omnivores since we can eat meat… that doesn’t mean we should eat meat. It just means we can .

So eating meat is an option we have, physiologically. But we also have the option to be vegetarian or vegan. And this leaves us with a responsibility to choose our diet based on our values.

For more about the food that humans are meant to eat, refer to this post.

17. “Eating meat is a personal choice.”

You can call it a personal choice, but the fact is that it has an impact on other people and especially on other animals besides yourself.

If it’s a personal choice, then it is a personal choice that has the power to hurt or help thousands of animals over the course of your life, and to make life better or worse for future generations on this planet.

In my opinion, it is a choice worth making carefully, and in an informed, values-driven way.

18. “Eating meat is natural.”

This is the naturalistic fallacy . Just because something is natural, that doesn’t mean it is good. There are many aggressive, selfish things we may get impulses to do—but we understand they are harmful, so we don’t do them.

19. “Humans are at the top of the food chain.”

First, it’s actually debated whether humans are at the “top of the food chain.” Academics have debated whether humans count as “apex predators” or not, and it’s far from agreed upon.

Just think about it: There are many incidents where humans are prey for larger predators like bears or sharks. And we don’t routinely eat these big predators, either. We mostly kill animals from lower “trophic levels.” So it’s a stretch to say we’re at the “top.”

If you want to say humans are at the “top” because we could kill any animal… Remember we’re only capable of that because of tools like guns. And most humans are not capable of actually building a gun. Many of us don’t even understand how guns work.

So it’s only a small number of humans who have invented the tools that allow us to kill bigger animals… and it’s only a small number of humans who actually hunt or raise animals today.

Also—this is a bit of a circular argument. How do you know that human beings are at the “top” of the food chain? Because we can kill other animals? And you’re saying that’s also the reason we should kill other animals? Because we can?

Lastly, this is another example of the naturalistic fallacy. Just because something is natural doesn’t mean it is good.

20. “It’s the circle of life.”

Our modern industrial food system is very far from being a “circle of life.” Animals on factory farms typically only live a small fraction of their normal life span . They are typically kept indoors for their entire lives. They’re fed loads of antibiotics.

Their bodies are often mutilated with practiced like tail-docking (pigs), debeaking (chickens), and castration without pain killers. It’s the least natural, least “cyclical” thing you could imagine.

Instead of living naturally off the land and animals, what’s happening today is pure exploitation : Everything is optimized toward producing the most meat, dairy, and eggs at the lowest cost possible.

Also, a “circle” would suggest that our own dead bodies will become nutrition for the soil, plants, and other animals in turn. But animals in our industrial food system are fed grains like corn and soy, which are made using monoculture farming and typically many pesticides and even GMOs.

Meanwhile most of us dead humans will be planted in coffins, away in specific graveyards. To call this the “circle of life” just seems really naive.

21. “Eating meat is what helped humans evolve to have such big brains.”

Eating meat may have helped early humans survive and spread across the globe—as did the consumption of starches like hard tubers, which also increased with stone tool usage.

But that doesn’t mean we should keep eating meat.

The truth is that today, we have large brains because we now have those instructions in our DNA. And your brain does not shrink if you stop eating meat!

On the contrary, a diet full of fruits, vegetables, legumes, and whole grains can help optimize brain function and promote brain health, even reducing the risk of Alzheimer’s. ( source )

22. “Plants feel pain, too.”

I don’t actually buy that. There are ways to describe plant “behavior” that make it sound like plants experience pain… but plants do not have nerves or a central nervous system. So there is no known way they’d “feel” anything.

Also, most plants are sessile —rooted in one place. This suggests there would be no evolutionary purpose for sensations of pain. Pain in animals helps motivate us to run away from the painful stimuli. But plants can’t run away—so why would they feel pain?

The truth is that plants have entirely different ways of being than us.

There is no reason to believe that plants have consciousness, that they experience sensations of pain, or that such sensations are ethically relevant to which foods we eat.

Also, this is a completely separate point, but if you wanted to minimize the amount of plants you kill, a vegan diet would still be better than a diet including animal products.

This is because many more plants are killed in order to feed and sustain livestock on farms than are killed to actually feed humans directly. So if you want fewer plants to die, eating meat will not help!

Read more about how vegans justify killing plants here .

23. “Even plant farming causes the deaths of field mice and insects.”

This is similar to the argument that it’s impossible to be “100% vegan.” And my response, again, is that you don’t need to be perfect to have a massive positive impact.

Also—causing some unintentional deaths while doing what we need to do to survive (harvesting plants), is not the same as needlessly slaughtering animals.

We will probably always cause some harm to small creatures with our food production methods, even if we ate food solely from little gardens. But a vegan diet is comparatively less violent, less harmful, and more sustainable than other diets.

It’s most efficient for humans to eat plants directly, rather than feeding those plants to an animal and eating the animal. Less land, fuel, and water are needed when we eat plants directly.

24. “Farm animals only exist because we bred them for food—so they don’t have rights or lives without us.”

Regardless of how we’ve bred and raised farm animals, they fact now is that they exist and they suffer.

Imagine if we “bred” a new kind of human to become bigger and more docile, as we’ve done to farm animals. That wouldn’t give us the right to enslave or kill these new kinds of humans.

Animals are “subjects of a life.” They have preferences about what happens to them. They experience pain, and they’d prefer to avoid it. This means that how we treat them is ethically relevant.

It doesn’t matter that we gave them their life… Once they have that life and are capable of suffering, their suffering is ethically relevant.

25. “If everyone went vegan, what would happen to all the farm animals already alive?”

First, it’s not realistic that everyone will go vegan overnight. A much more likely scenario is that we would gradually become more and more plant-based, and meat could be phased out over time.

Second, if we ever decided to be vegan as a whole society, there would likely be support for allowing the remaining farm animals to live out their lives at animal sanctuaries.

These types of animal sanctuaries already exist, and they would find much more financial support in this hypothetical future where everyone is vegan.

26. “It hurts cows not to milk them. Cows like being milked.”

Yes, I’ve been told that cows seem to enjoy being milked when their udders are full of milk.

But that is different from a cow actually wanting to be confined indoors, artificially impregnated, separated from her calf, milked for 10 months, then artificially impregnated again, separated from her calf again, milked for 10 more months, then one more cycle of this—then killed around age 3 (even though their natural life span is 20 years).

So even if cows “like being milked,” that doesn’t mean they like being used as dairy cows overall.

The dairy industry is also intimately connected to the veal industry. The baby calves killed for veal are generally male calves from the dairy industry.

The dairy industry also emits a lot of methane, a greenhouse gas that contribute to climate change. Animal agriculture contributes 6-7% of the US’s total greenhouse gas emissions every year. 20% of that emission is methane from dairy cows (mainly from cow burps, actually).

So you have to look at the broader context of the cycle of impregnation and separation of mother and calf, as well as the broader impact of the dairy industry in the world.

If you do that, it’s easy to see why vegans don’t support dairy .

27. “We are smarter and naturally superior to animals.”

Animals don’t have to be smart for us to care about their pain, fear, and suffering. The fact that they can’t read books or do math, has nothing to do with the fact that they do suffer.

Most people would agree that it’d be wrong to hurt or kill unintelligent humans. We still care about the rights and welfare of people with lower IQs or mental disabilities. So how could you use a difference of intelligence to justify harming other animals

Arguably, being “higher animals” as humans is exactly what’s allowed us to develop ethics and morality that transcends our base instincts.

28. “Farm animals would never survive in the wild—so why should they have rights?”

Because they are conscious beings capable of suffering.

We don’t judge the moral standing of our fellow humans by whether they could survive in the wild, so why would this be relevant in our consider of other animals? (Many humans today wouldn’t survive in the wild, either!)

29. “If you eat every part of the animal, that is respectful and ethical.”

I would agree that seems more respectful than killing an animal for no reason. And I respect that some tribes or individuals may have ways of hunting or killing animals that feel much more wholesome compared to factory farms.

But here’s why I still don’t think it’s ethical:

Just imagine you’re a deer walking through the woods with your family. Then suddenly, someone shoots you or your family member. You’re terrified. You may be in horrible pain. Maybe you witness your family member die. And then maybe you’re alone after that—an orphan.

Now just imagine, after you experience this, the hunter explains to you: “Hey, sorry—but don’t worry about it—we’re going to eat your family member’s whole body, with the utmost respect.”

Would you be relieved? Does that make everything okay? Or would you still be terrified, alone, in pain, missing your family member, etc? Being hunted is bound to be terrifying for animals, even when it’s done “respectfully.”

And with the knowledge and technology we have today, it’s just not necessary. At least not in the developed world. So it’s a choice we make. And it’s a choice we make at the expense of those animals who have to feel that terror.

30. “Animals would gladly eat you—so why not eat them?”

First—most of the animals commonly eaten as meat are herbivores: Cows, pigs, chickens, turkeys, deer, etc. So in fact, those animals would not “gladly eat me.”

Second, that’s not really a sound ethical argument. We don’t hold animals to the same standards of morality and ethics that we hold our fellow humans to. Animals don’t have the same power of reason as we do.

But when it comes to how we should treat animals , Jeremy Bentham said it well: “The question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”

We seek to spare animals suffering because we, too, know what suffering is like. And we know we don’t like it. And we don’t want to inflict that on any other sentient being if we don’t have to.

31. “I only eat humanely slaughtered and humanely farmed animal products.”

I appreciate that you care about the humane treatment of animals, and you want to choose humane options. But many of these labels are very misleading.

First—most terms like “humanely raised” are not legally defined. So depending on the exact term, it could mean different things. Many such terms are empty—they’re more about marketing than actual animal welfare.

“Grass fed” cows can still be fed grass indoors, for example. “Cage free” chickens are often stuffed by the thousands into sheds. The actual farms don’t necessarily look like the commercial with happy cows in a meadow.

Second—even when you see the best animal welfare certifications on a product, like Animal Welfare Approved (AWA) or Certified Humane (CH), there are still some cruel practices allowed.

One example is castration without pain relief, which is allowed on both AWA and CH products. So even the best certifications do not guarantee a complete lack of cruelty.

Third—there is just inherent exploitation in animal agriculture. One example is the heart-breaking separation of mother and calf in the dairy industry—it can’t be avoided, even on the most “humane” farms.

Also, farming animals pretty much necessitates keeping them confined and then eventually killing them. Even when those actions are done in less-cruel ways, it’s still confinement and killing.

For all these reasons, I’m personally not satisfied with “humane meat,” and I think the term is a bit of an oxymoron.

32. “Animals cannot enter into ethical or moral contracts with us.”

There are plenty of ethical frameworks that don’t depend on any kind of moral contract or agreement to be established between both parties. The fact that animals are conscious and capable of suffering is enough reason for us to care about reducing their suffering.

33. “The animals are already dead. Why not eat the meat, so it doesn’t go to waste?”

There are actually some contexts in which some vegans actually do agree with this logic.

There are “freegans” who are fully vegan except that they’re okay with eating meat if it’s just being thrown away otherwise. Often, freegans participate in “dumpster diving” behind grocery stores to retrieve this discarded food and take it home before it goes to waste.

But in most contexts, it’s not so clear that meat is going to be thrown away if we don’t eat it.

Usually, when we eat meat, we increase the total demand for meat. Most often, we are paying for meat, which sends financial signals to companies that they should keep producing more.

Even when we aren’t paying for meat, eating it usually sends a signal of demand at some level.

If you eat meat at your family dinner, your parents will be more likely to keep buying enough meat to feed you on an ongoing basis, for example. This also applies at big parties and gatherings, although the signal may be less clear.

But there are other reasons not to eat meat in such contexts, too.

By refusing to eat meat, we’re often increasing demand for vegan alternatives. Then we’re sending signals to companies that more people want vegan options. When they get enough of these signals, they’ll be likely to offer more vegan options, which will make it easier for others to go vegan, too.

Another valid reason not to eat meat is that some people just feel that it’s gross or wrong… and it just doesn’t feel good to participate in it! And it’s as simple as that.

34. “We shouldn’t focus on animal rights until all human rights issues are handled.”

There will always be multiple issues that demand our attention.

Most of us, including vegans, do value human life more than animals. So on a gut level, we understand that impulse. But when animals are suffering so badly on factory farms, it just becomes hard to ignore.

In many cases, human rights violations today are at least restricted by laws—and people are at least sometimes prosecuted for breaking those laws.

In contrast, there is not even one federal law protecting animals that live on factory farms. Billions of animals are raised each year—in incredibly cruel conditions—specifically to be killed. And it’s all legally protected.

So, it’s not that vegans think animal rights are more important than human rights overall… it’s just that animal rights are being so brutally violated on such a mass scale.

Also: You can be vegan and still focus on human rights. Going vegan only really takes time during the initial learning period. Once you’re used to it, being vegan doesn’t really take up time or energy.

In fact, being vegan will likely give you more health and energy, which you can put toward fighting for human rights issues. Countless people who fight human oppression have also made a choice to eat a vegan diet—including famous feminist and anti-racist activist Angela Davis .

35. “Medical conditions don’t allow everyone to be vegan.”

I’ve actually researched this issue quite a bit . And while I respect that everyone’s body is different and you should listen to your doctor, I can tell you it’s very rare that a vegan diet would actually be impossible based on a medical condition.

That said, a vegan diet can certainly be much harder any time you have to “stack” multiple diet requirements on top of each other.

So yes, if you need to eat a very specific diet for a medical condition, it can get quite restrictive to stack veganism on top of that. And when a diet becomes very restrictive, there can be worries about getting all needed nutrients.

But it can pretty much always be done, if you really want to do it. You can be a gluten-free vegan, soy-free vegan, low-carb vegan, nut-free vegan, and so on.

One of the most difficult medical conditions to pair with veganism might be kidney failure. If you’re on dialysis, you typically need high protein while keeping potassium and phosphorous lower. That can be a challenge with vegan foods.

But even in those “tricky” cases, a good dietitian could usually figure out a vegan meal plan that is safe and hits the needed targets. So in most cases, it just comes down to how much you actually want to be vegan and how much you actually care about figuring it out.

For more on this topic, see “ Can Everyone Be Vegan? 13 Medical Conditions That May Prevent It .”

36. “Only privileged people can afford vegan food. Veganism is expensive.”

Having more money and better grocery store access can make veganism easier, as it can make any specific diet easier. But veganism is possible at pretty much any budget.

Many common vegan staple foods are cheap and widely available: Potatoes, rice, oats, pasta, corn, beans, peanut butter, bananas, apples, frozen vegetables, etc.

Heck, there are even some vegan ramen noodle brands. (Last I checked, the Oriental flavor by Top Ramen is vegan—and that’s just one example.)

You don’t need to buy vegan cheese, Beyond Burgers, or expensive non-dairy desserts to be vegan. In fact, you will be healthier if you don’t buy them.

If you’re on a budget, don’t go to places like Whole Foods Market or natural foods stores. There are plenty of vegan options at Wal-Mart and other big chains, or discount places like Aldi.

If you’re short on money and short on cooking time, it can be harder to find cheap vegan convenience foods… but they exist. Look into fat-free baked beans, pasta, bananas and apples, peanuts and peanut butter, cereal or oatmeal, and ramen noodles like I said above.

It’s potentially quite condescending when people say poor folks can’t be vegan. Yes, being poor could be an extra hurdle as a vegan—just like it’s an extra hurdle in many endeavors—but if you’re committed to being vegan, you can do it.

37. “The vegan community is just full of white people.”

This is one of the more harmful stereotypes of the vegan movement , because it could become self-perpetuating. And most of us agree that we want vegan spaces to be inclusive.

The truth about veganism and whiteness, as far as I can tell, is that the media simply chooses to promote white vegan speakers, authors, and figureheads more than vegans of color.

Black vegans exist. Latino vegans exist. Asian vegans exist. Native American vegans exist.

The idea of veganism as a white people’s movement is not true and never was true. There have been important vegans of color and a prominent tradition of “vegan soul food” all throughout the history of veganism.

Many of the most vegan-friendly cuisines are traditionally eaten by people of color around the world—Ethiopian food, Indian food, and various other Asian cuisines.

When people say veganism is a “white person thing,” that’s erasing the contributions of countless vegans of color. And this makes the vegan movement a less inclusive place for vegans of color going forward.

I’ve heard from many vegans of color who say it’s the most frustrating thing to hear people say veganism is “a white people thing.” They’re just like standing there like, “Hello?”

38. “The world will never be fully vegan.”

First off, the world could be fully vegan someday—it’s not impossible.

Moral judgments about others issues, like human slavery, have dramatically changed across the world in the last 500 years or so. There’s no reason that moral values around animals couldn’t change, too.

Second, the world doesn’t need to be fully vegan in order for vegans to have an impact. Every animal that’s saved from suffering matters—and over a lifetime, each vegan saves thousands of animals .

Every person who goes vegan also decreases their carbon footprint and environmental impact, which helps keep our planet habitable for future generations.

39. “You buy other things that are made with unethical labor, like clothes from sweatshops.”

I’d like to do a better job with my other purchases over time, too. It’s not easy to remove ourselves from every single unethical practice or industry in the world… but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try to do our best.

Going vegan is one of the most high-leverage, impactful changes we can all make. That’s because it not only helps the animals, but it also helps the environment and it’s good for our own health. So I started there.

But I don’t claim to be perfect or done with my journey to living a more compassionate life.

40. “Veganism is boring—the food lacks taste and variety.”

Maybe you’ve had a few bland vegan meals… but this certainly doesn’t apply across the whole spectrum of vegan options out there.

Some of the most vegan-friendly cuisines are Indian food, Thai food, Ethiopian food, and Mediterranean food. And from those four cuisines alone, you have such a wide variety of different flavors, spices, and types of food you can get vegan.

Then, add everything you can do with vegan Mexican food, vegan Chinese food, vegan pasta and pizza dishes, and so many more…

Most people find that going vegan pushes them to explore different cuisines and foods that they never tried before. Often, vegan foods like nutritional yeast , Soy Curls , and seitan become new favorites.

If vegan food seems boring, you probably just haven’t had that much yet.

41. “There is no such thing as objective moral truth.”

Depending on your view of things, this might be true. But even in that case, I’m sure we can agree: Personal values and following your own morality is an important part of being fulfilled and proud of who you are.

So I would just ask you to be honest with yourself: Do you actually feel that it’s okay to hurt animals, and like that’s something you want to contribute to?

Most people might say, “Yeah it’s okay, I don’t care about animal rights.” But if you really make yourself look at what’s happening… and if you see how it’s hurting these animals… you might start to feel some empathy for them.

I know that’s what changed it all for me. When I saw the videos of animals suffering in factory farms and slaughterhouses, I just had a feeling deep down that I didn’t want to support it anymore.

It wasn’t based on “objective morality,” logic, or what anyone else told me was wrong. It wasn’t based on a commandment or a specific moral theory. It was based on what I felt in my gut and in my heart about it.

42. “Hitler was vegetarian.”

It wasn’t Hitler’s vegetarianism that caused him to do any of the violent things he did. And that’s so obvious, I’m not even going to say anything else about it.

43. “Sustainable vegan farming isn’t possible—animal manure is needed to fertilize plants.”

Animal products like manure, bone meal, and blood meal are not needed to fertilize plants. There are nitrogen-fixing plants that can synthesize plenty of usable nitrogen through a symbiotic relationship with bacteria and fungi.

For examples of this, just look up “veganic” farming . (Vegan + organic = veganic.)

Veganic farmers plant nitrogen-fixing crops into their fields during the off-season (as a “cover crop”) or even at the same time as their main crop.

There is no magic ingredient in animal manure that you can’t get from nitrogen-fixing plants and fertilizers made from them.  The animals got their nitrogen from nitrogen-fixing plants in the first place.

Vegan permaculture also provides some interesting agricultural ideas for working with nature, harnessing natural biodiversity, and using predator-prey relationships to balance pests and control yields.

But vegan permaculture would also be a drastic departure from today’s monocrop farming. It may be unlikely for us to realistically see it widely applied in our lives.

Veganic farming overall, however, is not limited to personal gardens or community plots. One Degree is a profitable company whose cereals or breads you may have seen in grocery stores—especially if you ever shop at Whole Foods or health-food stores.

One Degree has a network of veganic farmers around the world who have successfully adopted the model. These include sizable farms (thousands of acres) that harvest their crop with combines and semi-trucks full of grains.

44. “If everyone went vegan, so many people would lose their jobs.”

First, everyone won’t realistically go vegan overnight. So if it ever happens, it’ll only happen gradually. That means the industry will have time to adapt. Very likely, some companies that currently make animal products would just switch to making plant-based versions.

Second— many of the jobs in animal agriculture are horrible . For example, workers at slaughterhouses often experience physical injuries, along with PTSD and other emotional, psychological issues from killing animals all day, every day. ( source )

Also, I personally believe the intense, life-long suffering of animals on factory farms is worse than the temporary issue of people losing their jobs. Most people who lose their jobs would find new ones just fine.

Many developments in human history have made old jobs obsolete. It happens all the time due to technology. But does that mean we should stifle our technology and stay in the past, just to allow people to keep their jobs?

People will adapt. People have to adapt. That’s just a fact of life, and specifically, it’s a fact of capitalism. You’re not entitled to a job if it’s no longer contributing value that is in demand.

45. “Vegans are preachy and pretentious.”

Honestly, I’d agree that some vegans can be preachy… But most of us are just passionate. We feel strongly that animals are suffering, and we really want to help. In order to do that, we have to convince others to go vegan, too. So we try to spread the message.

But don’t let a few preachy people ruin veganism for you. Going vegan doesn’t mean you have to love and agree with all other vegans. Honestly, I find some vegans obnoxious—but that’s okay.

I’m vegan for the animals and for myself. So it doesn’t really matter what the rest of the vegan movement is like. If some of them are obnoxious, that’s their own problem.

What I care about is eating and living in a way that feels good and right to me . I like how I feel eating plants and being vegan. I feel good about the impact I’m having, and it makes me healthier.

If you really dislike vegans and the vegan movement, you can always just call yourself “plant-based.” That’s a more neutral term with fewer associations.

46. “Meat tastes good.”

Yes, meat does taste good. And human meat would also taste good, I’m guessing. But that doesn’t mean it’s okay to kill humans to eat them.

And I’m saying the same about cow meat or chicken meat. Whether it tastes good is irrelevant to the question of whether it’s morally okay to kill an animal for it.

There are many things that would be pleasurable to do, but we don’t do them because it would cause suffering and harm to others. I’m saying that cow suffering also matters.

Plus, if you think about it, it’s not actually the meat itself that really tastes so good. Have you noticed that pretty much every meat is seasoned with salt (a mineral) and plant ingredients like tomato-based ketchup and BBQ sauce, mustard, herbs, olive oil, and so on?

47. “God put animals on earth to be food for us.”

I know many Christian vegans who would dispute that! For every passage in the Bible that seems to label animals as food, there are other passages that contradict it.

Many Christians would agree that God wants humans to be “stewards” of animals. But stewardship is not domination. Being a steward of animals means looking after them and taking care of them. Not building factories to exploit and kill them.

Many Christians believe that it was in God’s plan for us to out-grow the killing of other animals for food, and that veganism is perfectly in line with the values of mercy, compassion, and caring for God’s creation.

At the least, the Bible seems to be neutral on whether humans eat animals. It certainly doesn’t dictate that we should eat animals.

48. “If it’s wrong for humans to own and use animals, why do vegans have pets?”

This is actually an issue that’s debated among vegans. Some vegans do see an inherent ethical problem with pet ownership and the status of animals as property.

That said, most of us are practical enough to see a difference between providing a loving home to a rescued dog vs raising animals specifically to kill and eat them. So most vegans are okay with having pets.

Still, there are issues of exploitation and cruelty in the pet industry. Puppy mills churn out dogs to sell, while unwanted strays are put down at shelters. Many pets are neglected, mistreated, and generally lack freedom.

Most vegans just try to be conscious of these issues, and they do the best for their pets that they can.

49. “So, do you force your cat or dog to be vegan, too?”

Cats are obligate carnivores, meaning they cannot survive on a fully plant-based diet. Some vegans may try to get around this with supplements, but most vegans respect that their cat needs to eat meat.

On the other hand, dogs are actually omnivores—not carnivores. Since evolving from wolves, dogs have become more capable of digesting starches and carbohydrates, and getting vitamin A from plants like humans can, too.

All this means that dogs can be healthy on a well-planned vegan diet. In fact, there are several dog food brands and supplements specifically made for vegan dogs.

One of the oldest dogs ever on record was actually a blue merle Collie in the UK named Bramble. Bramble lived to age 27 in good health, eating a mostly vegan diet of rice, lentils, and vegetables.

In practice, some vegans feed their dogs a vegan diet, but others don’t because it’s more expensive or they’re not confident about how to make sure it’s healthy.

For more on whether cats and dogs can be vegan, refer to this post .

50. “There has never been a vegan civilization in human history.”

That doesn’t mean there couldn’t be one today or in the future. And it doesn’t mean a vegan diet is unhealthy or unsustainable.

We’ve only really started to deeply understand the science of human nutrition in the past 100 years or so. The word “vitamin” didn’t even exist until 1913.

So it makes sense that we’re better positioned to safely eat a fully vegan diet today than in the past. That said, there has been a rich history of people experimenting with vegetarianism throughout history.

Did you know that Pythagoras started a vegetarian movement back in ancient Greece? (Yes, the guy from the theorem!) Followers of Jainism have a principle of “ahimsa” that calls for non-violence towards all living beings . So most Jains have always been vegetarian.

Buddhism also has ties to vegetarianism. Some scholars argue that the Budhha was a strict vegetarian, while others say he only ate meat when it was offered by a host. Meat-eating was also even banned in Japan for a period of ~1,200 years, from 675 A.D. to 1872.

The word “vegan” was only coined in 1944. But modern science is discovering that there are many benefits to a plant-based diet. And our modern technology makes it safer and easier than ever to be fully vegan.

For more on this kind of vegan history, refer to this post .

51. “Don’t force your beliefs on me.”

I’m not trying to forcing my beliefs on anyone. I’m just asking you to question your own beliefs.

Most of us grew up eating animals, and we never really questioned it. Since meat-eating is the norm in society, most of us just keep doing it without really looking into the facts.

But when you take the time to look at the impact on your health, on the animals, and on the planet… many people decide it’s more in line with their goals and values to eat plant-based.

All I’m trying to do is prompt you to ask these questions, and consider for yourself, what you really want to be doing with your diet—instead of just falling into the norm.

52. “I don’t have enough time to be vegan.”

It can take a little time to figure out veganism at first. But I’ve found that once you’re accustomed to it, veganism doesn’t take extra time at all.

There are so many quick vegan meals and snacks. Fresh fruit and nuts are some of the fastest foods of all. Many packaged snack foods like chips and cookies are “accidentally vegan”—you just need to learn which ones.

It’s also simple to carry trail mix with you, or quickly pack a vegan sandwich and carrots or fruit for lunch.

Chipotle is quick and easy to make vegan. Falafel places are great for a quick vegan lunch. There’s even a growing list of fast-food restaurants that offer the Beyond Burger. (See my full selection of vegan restaurant guides .)

If you want to be vegan, you can find the time to figure this stuff out.

53. “Meat and animal products are part of my culture.”

Increasingly, veganism is a global movement. More and more people of all cultures and cuisines are coming up with vegan versions of their diets.

Yes, cultural ideas about meat may vary—but there’s also a biological component to having compassion toward innocent creatures, and caring about our health and the Earth.

Food is emotional and social, so going vegan may seem very “against the grain” in some cultures and families. But all traditions and foods can be reimagined in a plant-based version.

As a vegan in a traditionally non-vegan culture, you can even be a part of building bridges between your culture and a vegan future. Create the vegan recipes in your cuisine if you can’t find them.

This can potentially make your culture that much more relevant to an up-and-coming generation that cares about food justice, health, and animal welfare.

If you’re confused or feeling lonely about going vegan in your culture, search and find others who have already done it. You should be able to find them online. Hear their perspective and the challenges they overcame, and know you’re not alone.

54. “There’s no ethical consumption under capitalism.”

Depending on your view of capitalism, this may be valid to an extent. There’s certainly a level of exploitation in most major industries, including “vegan” industries like the farming of grains and fresh produce.

That said, most of us would agree that it’s still good to boycott the worst industries and brands—even if the other ones aren’t perfect, either.

And animal agriculture has to be near the top of the list of “worst industries.” Not just for animal abuse, but for the abuse of human workers , too.

Workers at slaughterhouses commonly experience trauma and PTSD, becoming desensitized from killing so many animals and witnessing so much suffering. Workers are also frequently cut and injured themselves from the line moving so quickly.

As depicted in the movie Fast Food Nation , many workers in these facilities are also undocumented immigrants. As these immigrants often have no legal recourse to report unsafe working conditions, they may be regularly mistreated and hyper-exploited.

Angela Davis is just one of the many anti-capitalist figures who promote a vegan diet as a sensible, compassionate choice—even if it doesn’t solve every ethical problem in our economy today.

55. “What if you were on a desert island or had to survive in the wild?”

Well, I’m not on a desert island. And neither are you. We’re in modern human civilization.

Maybe meat was helpful in our species history. Maybe it was necessary back when we didn’t know much about nutrition and we had fewer food options. But it’s not necessary now.

Ethics is contextual. For example, most people agree that some violence is okay in the context of self-defense. But that’s different from initiating violence for no good reason.

So, asking if I’d still be vegan in a very different context (a desert island)… It’s just not the same question at all as whether I should be vegan in modern human civilization.

56. “What about mushrooms, yeast, and bacteria? They’re alive, too.”

Vegans aren’t against killing things that are “alive.” We’re against killing individuals who suffer, have preferences, and are subjects of a life.

Bacteria and fungi are “alive,” and so are plants—but we have no reason to believe that they suffer. Mushrooms and yeast do not have central nervous systems.

Some of these organisms may react to stimuli… but that’s different from feeling pain. There’s no reason for us to believe that these organisms have consciousness or a capacity to actually feel suffering.

Even when it comes to oyster and bivalves, which are animals, some vegans are okay with eating them because they don’t have central nervous systems. That’s a separate debate, though. Read this post on “ostrovegans” for more on that.

57. “Animals do not suffer when they’re slaughtered.”

There has been plenty of documentation of cases where animals visibly suffer in the process of slaughter.

Some animals are fully conscious when their throats are cut. This is still practiced in some parts of the world according to Jewish and Muslim rules of slaughter. It’s debated whether it is actually painful to the animals, but I imagine it is at least quite scary…

Most places in the world, animals are knocked unconscious before slaughter, using tools like a “captive bolt gun.” But these stunning practices don’t always go properly.

In 2019, the US Department of Agriculture deregulated pig slaughter. This has resulted in faster line speeds, less oversight, and more pigs that are still conscious as their throats are slit.

One USDA inspector found that, after deregulation, more pig carcasses were found with water in their lungs—a sign that these pigs were still breathing when dropped into scalding hot water tanks (that comes after having their throats cut). ( source )

Even in the majority of cases when animals are knocked out properly, videos show the animals expressing clear fear and stress as they’re transported, corralled, and then sequentially knocked out.

And even if slaughter were somehow totally painless… there is typically suffering inflicted at many other points in the animals’ lives.

Many animals undergo procedures like tail docking and castration without pain relief. And they’re often held in tiny indoor cages for their whole lives, living in filth and their own waste.

Some animal products are produced more humanely than others—but even the strictest animal welfare certifications are still considered inadequate by many advocates.

58. “Aren’t you projecting human desires and suffering onto other animals?”

This is a fair question to be asking. Certainly, animals don’t have all the same awareness as we have… so we could expect their fears and concerns to be different. There are likely situations that would be distressing to a human but not to another creature.

That said, there is quite a bit we can gather about animal experience by observing how they react to things. Many of us know from having pets, just how deeply animals can bond and feel. (I’d personally guess that my dog is more needy and emotional than most humans!)

We also have a scientific understanding of which animals have a central nervous system, and a fair bit of understanding about that stuff.

Also, the kinds of abuse that animals experience on factory farms is pretty blatant . It’s not just a little boredom or lack of freedom. It’s being castrated without pain relief, being separated from your mother at birth, and not even having space in your cage to turn around—things like that.

There are some animal rights conversations that could get a little more complicated… but when it comes to factory farms and slaughterhouses, we know that animals don’t want to be there.

59. “I read a news story about a nutritionally deficient vegan baby…”

Yes, it’s possible for vegan babies to become nutritionally deficient—just like this is possible for non-vegan babies. News outlets often latch onto vegan malnutrition stories, as the anti-vegan crowd is guaranteed to share the article far and wide.

But experts agree that babies and children of all ages can be healthy vegans. This has been stated by the American Academy of Pediatrics, the British Dietetic Association, and the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics. It just requires proper planning.

So if you’re planning to be pregnant or have a child, look up resources on those topics—such as the relevant chapters in Brenda Davis’s book Becoming Vegan . Perhaps seek out a registered dietitian to help plan the diet.

But a few cases of poorly planned vegan diets doesn’t mean the lifestyle isn’t sound when it’s done right.

60. “PETA is an offensive, racist, sexist organization.”

PETA does not speak for all vegans, and not all vegans support PETA. Some vegans are very against PETA , in fact.

PETA tends to use controversial campaigns to drive publicity. Some make comparisons between animal oppression and the oppression of women or people of color. Or they compare factory farming to the Holocaust.

Various PETA campaigns have been referred to as racist, sexist, homophobic, transphobic, fat-phobic, and more by critics. Many compassionate people have likely been turned off from veganism by these campaigns.

But again: Being vegan doesn’t mean you support PETA. As a vegan, you can be supportive, neutral, or opposed to PETA.

More on Vegan Ethics

For more discussion of vegan ethical arguments, check out my big post on vegan ethics here .

Two More Recommendations for Your Plant-Based Journey

1. This is the best free video training I’ve found on plant-based nutrition. You’ll learn how to reduce your risk of cancer, heart disease, type 2 diabetes, Alzheimer’s, and obesity—all with plant-based food. Watch the free “Food for Health Masterclass” here .

2. This is the  best vegan multivitamin I’ve found  in my 14 years of being vegan.  It has vitamin B12, vitamin D, omega-3—and nothing else. Translation: It only has the nutrients vegans are  actually low in . Read my  full review of Future Kind’s multivitamin here  (with 10% discount).

I’m Tyler McFarland, the editor and main author here. When I first went vegan 13 years ago, convenience products like veggie burgers and soy milk were a lot harder to find. Now they’re everywhere!

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This blog is reader supported. If you click a link on this page and buy something, I may receive an affiliate commission at no extra cost to you. Learn more here . As an Amazon Associate, I earn from qualifying purchases.

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Against Veganism

Chris belshaw makes the case for rearing animals for their meat and produce..

Vegans want us to think carefully about what we eat. Certainly the bad practices rife in intensive farming generate powerful arguments against meat, dairy, eggs. But it may be harder to build a case against what might be called ‘humane’ farming (though some think there is no such thing). Pain can be reduced or eliminated in the better farming practices. So then the emphasis concerns killing. But is it really clear that we absolutely ought not to kill and then eat animals? There are three main arguments against this: we’re told that the production and consumption of meat is bad for us, bad for the environment, and bad for the animals who get eaten. Here I’ll be interested in the third claim.

Before getting into the argument, there’s some shorthand that needs explaining. I’m going to say that death isn’t bad for animals. Yet this needs clarifying. It certainly is bad for cows to be made into burgers, just as it’s bad for trees to be turned into pencils. But our concern will be with things that are bad in a way that matters , or which give us reasons against that thing. I’m also going to discuss what is permitted, required, or forbidden. Again, this is shorthand. There will usually be some special circumstances in which there might be good reason to do what is in general forbidden; or reasons not to do what is in general permitted, or even required. Even most vegans will allow meat-eating if that is the only way a person can keep themselves, or their family, alive. My concern will be with what is forbidden in general , or forbidden, other things being equal .

Arguments Permitting Animal Killing

Here are three arguments that killing and eating animals is permissible. The first has affinities with anti-natalism , some versions of which say how we shouldn’t start lives that will involve suffering. Even the best lives are temporary and involve pain and grief, so the anti-natalist says that we shouldn’t even have babies. Apply this logic to animals and we shouldn’t breed them. Can we extend that argument to say that we should end the lives of animals already living, on farms or in the wild? There might be good reason to do so, since pain is certainly bad for them, and in their case pain is uncompensated by pleasure, even when it is outweighed by it. For no animal thinks, as we might think, that the present pain – it’s hungry, or caught in a trap, or distressed at losing its young – will soon be over. So, the argument goes, given the inevitability of pain, it’s better for animals overall if their lives are ended. But if we’ve decided now to kill them, it seems there’s no reason then not to eat them, especially if that might alleviate hunger in our own lives.

Not many people will be impressed with this argument. They may prefer, as do I, a second argument, surely less counter-intuitive, which says that even if animals can have overall good lives, such that the pleasure outweighs and compensates for the pain, it is nevertheless not bad for them painlessly to die. Give them a good life; end it with a good, clean death; and then feel free to eat them. But how can I claim that their death isn’t bad? Because, unlike us, animals lack a consciously-formulated desire for survival. In this sense, they don’t want to live on. So it’s not bad that they die prematurely. Maybe we should concede that self-conscious animals such as whales, elephants, chimps, even dogs, are different here. But these are not the animals we eat.

Perhaps, other things equal, we should ensure that animal don’t die prematurely, but rather live on and die of old age. Yet a third argument insists that other things aren’t equal, and so eating meat is permitted. Consider just humane farming, and the animals alive right now. Our options are: continue with business as usual; kill them all now; care for them into their old age and death by natural causes; or finally, set them all free. Given that these animals don’t have a bad life, there is no reason to kill them now. What about the third option, caring for the animals until their natural deaths in old age? It may be easy enough for animal rights activists to steal a new-born lamb and give it a life of bliss in someone’s garden, but it’s less easy to apply this ideal on a global, industrial scale. We can’t choose to breed tens of billions of animals, then give all of them life-time care. So even if we might occasionally act to keep a farm animal from death, we can’t make this into a rule. What then about just setting them free? This last would be the worst option for most farm animals. Domesticated animals generally can’t look after themselves in the wild – especially when the wild is littered with towns and motorways. If this is what animal liberation is about, so much the pity.

What we should think about well-tended farm animals, then, is that even if their lives aren’t the best possible, they are nevertheless worth living, and generally the best lives available for them. A short, good life with a pain-free death; or no life at all. Which would you prefer?

In Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2005 novel Never Let Me Go there are two kinds of people. Most have lives more or less like ours, but some are clones, created and raised as a source of replacement organs. The clones could live into their eighties or nineties or beyond, as do the others, but instead they are pressured to ‘donate’ organs in early adulthood, and are ‘completed’ at the latest by their early thirties. Horrible? It seems so. But although a melancholy air hangs over their lives, there’s no suggestion that they think it would have been better if they’d never been born. And at the end of the novel, the main character suggests that on reflection their lives are not very different from those of other people. Shorter, yes; but death is pretty much the same for all of us – it’s usually bad that it happens, and it usually happens too soon.

I can’t decide whether we’re supposed to think there’s self-deception here, and that these lives, even if worth living, are in fact much worse than ours. For the clones are aware that death is coming sooner for them than it will for most of the people they see around them. They can think about, imagine, regret the longer life they’ll never have. Melancholy is the least we might expect.

But it’s not at all like this for animals. The sheep on the farms around here appear completely unaware that other animals – the dogs and cats, perhaps the horses – have long and cossetted lives. That they fare less well is no concern to them. So far as we can tell, they don’t think about it at all.

Arguments Requiring Animal Rearing

If killing and eating animals is in some circumstances permissible , and you want to eat meat, then go ahead. But three more ambitious arguments have it that this killing and eating of animals is morally required . The first of these is in certain respects a bad argument. The two that follow are better.

According to the so-called ‘Logic of the Larder’, we actually benefit animals – do them a favour – by bringing them into existence, even if for a short life. As Leslie Stephen put it, no one has more interest in bacon than the pigs who provide it ( Social Rights and Duties , 1896).

Sophistry? Well, there are things wrong here, but not as much as may seem. Any actual pig, it will be said, is harmed rather than benefited by being killed, brined, and sliced. But if it’s good for non-actual pigs to be made actual – to be brought into existence – and this happens only if we’re going eventually to eat them, then indeed our appetites are also working in their favour.

On this view, a short life really is better than no life at all. Yet even if we allow that good lives should be continued, we can still deny that such lives should be started. There’s nothing speciesist about this. Many of us feel more secure with the claim that we should make existing people happy, than that we should bring new people – similarly happy – into existence.

Yet it still might be good – but this time good for us – if certain animals are deliberately brought into existence, quite apart from whether we plan to eat them or not. We regret the threat of extinction that hangs over many rare breeds – Saddleback pigs, Ryeland sheep, Chillingham cattle, to name only three – and would prefer to keep them in existence. We acknowledge our connectedness to the past this way, and preserving these breeds through humane farming allows this connectedness to continue into the future.

A third argument, somewhat similar, focuses on landscape and environment. It reflects a simple but important aesthetic concern. The countryside we like, feel at home in, and want to explore, is very much shaped by farmers and their animals, and has been so for centuries. Remove the animals, and much of what we value in the countryside disappears. There is also a future-facing practical concern to take into account. It’s been recently rediscovered that in various ways the animals we rear can stimulate the regrowth of ancient woodland, increase biodiversity, help mend broken habitats. So these animals also have a more straightforward instrumental value.

This is all presently achieved by farm-rearing animals for meat and produce. Are there vegan-friendly routes to the same ends? We could keep a few examples of rare breeds in animal sanctuaries, charging for admission; and we could, at some cost, manage the landscape so as to preserve its traditional appearance, even without the help of animals. But those objections often raised against zoos and theme parks also apply here. Divorced from their long-standing rationale – and that involves, of course, most aspects of farming – these animals, and these environs, lose in meaning and value.

The Vegan Counter-Attack

Finally, I’ll consider three counter-arguments to the effect that we should believe that eating animals is wrong. There’s no spoiler in my saying now that these arguments fail.

I’ve focused on the alleged badness of death, and assumed that we can eliminate the anxiety, distress, and pain in killing animals. But, it is objected, this is wishful thinking. It’s inevitable that animals will in some ways suffer as they die.

Suppose I concede this. What follows? Is this intended as an across the board reason to keep animals out of existence? Then we’re back to the anti-natalist argument I mentioned earlier, and whose conclusion I said most people will surely view as extreme – that it is better for many farm animals to never have lived. It’s also hard to see how the argument can target just farm animals, as their lives in general, and their deaths in particular, are usually less painful than those of equivalent animals living in the wild.

There are also concerns about a slippery slope. People may say, give the all-clear to free-range chickens, and it’s just a small step to factory-farmed birds, lark pie, and roast albatross. A similar argument suggests that if voluntary euthanasia is permitted, we’ll soon be back with death camps. It’s hard to believe these arguments are ever made sincerely, and are not just rhetorical devices wheeled out to support foregone conclusions. But since they are so hopelessly pessimistic about human nature, such arguments are never made well.

Closely connected is what I’ll call the ‘splitting hairs’ argument. Even allowing that we won’t descend into murder and mayhem, still, ethical meat-eating demands that we busy ourselves with some rather fine distinctions. Mightn’t we instead agree with Peter Singer when he says, “Going vegan is a simpler choice that sets a clearcut example for others to follow”? However there are also suspects practices in tea and coffee production; similarly with avocado and soy; and notoriously so in clothing manufacture. No one suggests that we should therefore go about thirsty, hungry, and naked. My point though is that the requisite responses are not ones we all need to make personally. Surely governments and regulatory authorities can and should do much of the spade work here, as they ought to do with the other industries, determining which animal husbandry procedures should be permitted, which proscribed, and enforcing these decisions by demanding frequent and effective inspections, insisting on clear and useful labelling, and so on. Then, as individuals, we can more easily avoid getting things hopelessly wrong, while still having some choice about what to eat.

Some will say we shouldn’t eat meat whatever the cause of the animal’s death, because in doing so we show a lack of respect. But how is this disrespectful? More detail is needed here. If the suggestion is that there’s fault in eating something just because it was once alive, then it seems we should give up our fruit and vegetables also. Perhaps then synthetic food is the future?

Conclusions

I’ve said there’s no reason, for their sake, to bring animals or indeed people into existence. Nor is there good reason to keep animals (though often there is reason to keep people) in existence. But if we do bring animals into existence, there are good reasons to give them a good life.

The second of these claims is the most controversial. So suppose it’s false, and that there are reasons to keep animals in existence. Farming, I say, is still permitted. It’s not ideal for the animals, but it’s not bad for them either; as indeed it’s not bad for people to have a good but short life.

So I’m against veganism as an absolute principle. But is there nothing, other than the concessions I made at the beginning, to be said for it?

Think about pacifism. We might agree that total and implacable opposition to war in all its forms offered an important and necessary corrective to attitudes prevailing almost everywhere right up to the twentieth century, even while thinking that the complexity of our imperfect world calls for a more nuanced position. It’s the same with veganism. There’s much that needed to be, and has been, learned. All of us who care about animals are indebted to the vegan flag-flyers, even if we disagree with them.

Those who care about food are also indebted to them, for another benefit of veganism is its encouraging the development of good alternatives to a meat-based diet. No longer are the options simply the pretentious but dreary omelette aux fines herbes , or the less pretentious but equally dreary nut roast.

© Dr Chris Belshaw 2021

Chris Belshaw is an honorary Fellow in Philosophy at both the Open University and the University of York.

Question of the Month

Do you think you can do better than these arguments, or counter them? You still may have time to submit an answer to ‘Question of the Month’ for Issue 147. The question is: Can Eating Meat Be Justified? Please justify it, or reveal it as unjustified, in less than 400 words. The prize is a semi-random book from our book mountain. Subject lines should be marked ‘Question of the Month’, and must be received by 18th October 2021. If you want a chance of getting a book, please include your physical address.

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Veganism, Moral Motivation and False Consciousness

Susana pickett.

School of History, Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK

Despite the strength of arguments for veganism in the animal rights literature, alongside environmental and other anthropocentric concerns posed by industrialised animal agriculture, veganism remains only a minority standpoint. In this paper, I explore the moral motivational problem of veganism from the perspectives of moral psychology and political false consciousness. I argue that a novel interpretation of the post-Marxist notion of political false consciousness may help to make sense of the widespread refusal to shift towards veganism. Specifically, the notion of false consciousness fills some explanatory gaps left by the moral psychological notion of akrasia , often understood to refer to a weakness of will. Central to my approach is the idea that animal exploitation is largely systemic and the assumption that moral motivation is inseparable from moral thinking. In this light, the primary obstacle to the adoption of veganism arises not so much from a failure to put genuine beliefs into action, but rather in a shared, distorted way of thinking about animals. Thus, common unreflective objections to veganism may be said to be manifestations of false consciousness.

Introduction

Why does the case for veganism often fail to convince? Insofar as it does sway opinion, why then does it fail to motivate large-scale social change? Whilst moral disagreements are inevitable, the core case for veganism from the animal rights perspective – complemented as it is by environmental, social justice, and global health considerations – is robust. 1 Considering this jointly with commonly held moral principles, one might reasonably expect the percentage of vegans to be much higher, at least in economically developed societies. On the other hand, apathy towards veganism prevails, and common objections to veganism often rest on rationalisations (Piazza 2015 , p. 114). In this paper, I suggest that a failure to accept the moral status of animals as required by veganism may itself constitute a failure of moral motivation (hereinafter referred to as motivation). Central to this position is the premise that moral thinking and motivation are inseparable, and thus thinking does not necessarily precede motivation. If this is the case, then common excuses presented against veganism express failures of motivation rather than intent, by which I mean the motivation to think of animals as being recipients of moral consideration in a manner that conflicts with our social habits and received opinion.

To narrow the scope of my opening questions, I examine the motivational problem from two radically opposing perspectives; namely akrasia and false consciousness. Akrasia – often known as ‘weakness of the will’ – is a failure of practical reasoning whereby individuals act knowingly and willingly against their better judgement. This idea has already been developed by Aaltola ( 2016 ) to explain the widespread reluctance to adopt veganism. Marxian false consciousness, by contrast, is traditionally understood as the social consciousness of an exploited class. It leads individuals to act – not fully knowingly or willingly, and thus not akratically – under a dominant ideology. This ideology may run contrary to one’s best interests, but I argue that it can also taint one’s conception of the ‘greater’ good. I understand false as applying to groups of individuals beyond social class, and argue that it is false consciousness, rather than akrasia, that is more likely to be a persistent condition that dampens motivation. As such, false consciousness may have greater explanatory power than akrasia for the widespread refusal to shift towards veganism.

This paper is divided into three sections. First, I offer a brief overview of the motivational difficulties associated with veganism, specifically the role of willpower and typically presented rationalisations. Second, I give an overview of akrasia and the structure of akratic action. Furthermore, I consider social factors which impact upon our moral thinking, serving to highlight that moral thinking is not reducible to syllogistic-style reasoning. Shortcomings of the application of akrasia lead on to the final section on false consciousness, wherein I explore the persistency of dominant ideologies and their impact upon moral thinking and motivation.

The Vegan Motivational Problem

Moral motivation is typically conceived as the phenomenon of being motivated to do what one judges to be the right thing to do. Naturally, moral reasons can conflict with one’s self-interest and other reasons. In the animal ethics literature, care ethicists, including Luke ( 1992 ), are critical of the mainstream, rationalist approach exemplified by Singer ( 2015 ) and Regan ( 2004 ). The rationalist approach tends to put forward arguments for veganism and vegetarianism without tackling the motivational question of why some people may be convinced by their arguments but fail to put their beliefs into action. By contrast, care ethicists consider humans to have an innate sense of empathy towards animals, which is the basis of moral motivation, but such empathy needs to be cultivated. A problem with this approach is that most people carry on eating animals despite being empathetic to their suffering. Indeed, it is not unusual for carnivores to feel guilt and avoid imagining a slaughtered cow when eating a hamburger (Greenebaum 2012 , p. 316). Hence, it is pertinent to ask why veganism poses such motivational difficulties, considering that the public possesses some moral regard for animals as well as varying degrees of empathy for animals.

Bona Fide Challenges

While some aspects of veganism, such as health and environmental considerations, may be motivated by human self-interest, other dimensions conflict not only with narrow self-interest but also with prudential self-interest. As such, they constitute bona fide reasons to act or side against veganism. ‘Go vegan’ approaches present veganism as being easy, yet some challenges merit attention. These include financial sacrifice, social alienation, and conflict. However, I argue that taste (flavour) is not a bona fide reason.

First, veganism may sometimes involve financial sacrifice. This is because vegan substitutes often cost more (Mills 2019 , p. 17). However, this does not apply to a large part of the population who has access to and can afford plant-based foods. Second, veganism involves alienation. Food is communal in family and social situations, and a vegan at the table can be seen as a threat (Twine 2014 , p. 632). Worse still, vegans often experience exclusion and disapproval (Bresnahan et al. 2016 , p. 13) and such forms of discrimination as ‘vegaphobia’ can arise (Horta 2018 , p. 359). Third, veganism involves moral conflict, not only because of how vegans are perceived but also because of how they perceive others. Raimond Gaita states that vegans who provocatively shout, ‘meat is murder’ exhibit a pathological gap between what they profess and how they act, in that ‘they don’t act as though they live among murderers’ (Gaita 2016 , pp. 22–23). This insight is powerful, even when applied to less polarising claims such as ‘meat involves unnecessary suffering’. From the perspective of some vegans, it can be soul-draining to inhabit a world that celebrates animal consumption and forces ‘question upon question from non-vegan interlocutors’ (Reid 2017 , p. 39), and vegans are often asked to justify their standpoint and then subsequently criticised for being ‘preachy’ (Cole and Morgan 2011 , p. 149). Fourth, radical factions can create tension with other individuals who do not live up to the expectations of the ‘hegemonic vegan frame’, a phrase coined by Wrenn ( 2019 ) to describe highly bureaucratised veganism (often referred to as the ‘vegan police’). There are indeed many ‘veganisms’ (Jones 2016 , p. 24). Hence, vegans may face opposition, not only from non-vegans but also from other vegans.

Finally, Kazez ( 2018 ) argues that food taste is not necessarily trivial. For example, persistently unpalatable food could affect one’s wellbeing. However, I disagree that this constitutes a bona fide argument against veganism, because it is based on a hypothetical consideration that assumes too much since not all vegan food tastes disgusting to most people. As Singer notes, it is not as if animal flesh is uniformly delicious and vegetarian food is uniformly awful (Singer 1980 , p. 333). Given this logic, one can reasonably object on the basis that taste is typically trivial when compared with what Rowlands ( 2013 , p. 6) refers to as an animal’s ‘vital interests’. What is one to make, then, of those seemingly incapable of going vegan owing to their craving for meat? For instance, Eugene Mills recounts how he gave up after trying to be vegan for three days. His cravings for hamburgers became so powerful that he became distracted from the pursuit of important projects (Mills 2019 , p. 19). It is not clear, though, that he deemed veganism to be an important long-term project.

Excepting taste, the aforementioned challenges can constitute bona fide, prima facie reasons for not embracing veganism. When coupled with the realisation that one’s lifestyle choices may have little positive impact globally (this is the phenomenon of ‘causal inefficacy’ which I discuss in more detail later), and after considering the disconnect between consumption, production, and killing, these reasons can become powerful. As a result, it may require substantial willpower to become a vegan against one’s cultural traditions. There are cases, however, where veganism does not require willpower. For example, where veganism is second nature (Lumsden 2017 , p. 221); or one finds joy rather than sacrifice in veganism (Aaltola 2015 , p. 42). In general, though, the act of becoming a vegan does require some degree of willpower.

Willpower in Deliberation

One may object on the grounds that, if animals have no moral status, as Hsiao ( 2015 , p. 284) proposes, then the moral motivational question of veganism does not arise. However, I disagree that this is necessarily the case. It appears to me that moral thinking and motivation are inseparable in the same way that reason and feeling cannot be fully separated, any more than form and content can. Indeed, without motivation, moral thinking would not be possible, for what else would motivate the thinking insofar as moral thinking is not purely theoretical? Hence, when I speak about moral motivation, albeit broadly conceived, I also include the motivation to deliberate about moral matters, including those concerning animals. According to this view, which I refer to as the ‘motivational unity thesis’, motivation is not always something that takes place at the end of a practical deliberation as to whether it is right or wrong to act (this is the narrow conception of motivation). Motivation is also needed to see certain others as worthy of moral deliberation in the first place.

The idea that animals have no moral worth is not commonplace, but the notion that animals are of lesser worth is central to the orthodoxy of animal welfare, a commonly held view which justifies animal suffering according to their utility to humans. This view has been said to explain ‘some of the apparently schizophrenic attitudes to animals that occur in Britain and elsewhere’ (Garner 2013 , p. 80). Regardless of whether one believes that animals are of lesser, or indeed no moral worth (or whether one has ever considered any of this in terms of moral worth), the motivation to think things through with moral seriousness fails when we conclude that we have a right to eat or kill an animal merely because, for example, it is traditional, natural, or simply because the animal was raised on a local farm or one with higher welfare standards than some other farms.

More elaborate justifications against veganism can be provided, but we fail to do justice to animals as the objects of our deliberation if we conclude that safeguarding our lifestyle habits is generally a good enough reason to justify animal exploitation. This constitutes a broad motivational failure insofar as we fail to view animals as individuals who are ‘equally real’, to borrow Thomas Nagel’s phrase (Nagel 1970 , p. 14). Still, one might lodge at least two objections. First, there is no motivational failure if it is not deemed morally objectionable to use animals as commodities in industrialised societies. Second, one might concede that a motivational failure only exists if one holds the conviction that veganism is morally obligatory, yet otherwise fails (akratically) to act accordingly.

Since this paper is not an argument for veganism, I cannot respond to the first objection directly but can link it to the second objection. To clarify, I can invoke the motivational unity thesis to argue that motivational failures can take place at the level of thinking alone (including what kind of beings to include in these considerations), and not merely when it comes to putting beliefs into action. Based on this premise, the exclusion of animals from serious moral consideration is tantamount to moral nihilism and leads only to further rationalisations when probed. Therefore, in addition to the prudential ( bona fide ) reasons against veganism discussed earlier, I now turn my attention to some common rationalisations.

Two Rationalisations

Rationalisations against veganism readily occur when the issue is not thought through. Indeed, we are prone to motivated ignorance (Tam 2019 , p. 6). The objection that animals only exist to be eaten and various other defensive tactics, exhibit apathy in the face of superior evidence to the contrary. Poor argumentation is relevant to motivation because thinking requires effort, while social habits and contempt inhibit it. Many rationalisations against veganism are merely strawmen, yet more sophisticated objections permeate the animal ethics literature, namely the causal inefficacy objection and the principle of unnecessary harm. On the one hand, causal inefficacy is the idea that an individual’s veganism has no impact on the market, specifically that one’s veganism will not make a difference to overall meat consumption. On the other hand, unnecessary harm is the principle (in the current context) by which it is unjustifiable to harm animals when vegan alternatives are available—a principle that is subject to distortion. Both principles are nonetheless interesting as they serve as a double-edged sword, both for and against veganism.

The causal inefficacy objection to veganism has accrued a vast literature which has been recently summarised by Fischer ( 2020 ). It is related to the ‘free-rider’ problem of rational choice theory, although my concern here is with the role of motivation in our thinking about causal inefficacy serving effectively as a proverbial ‘get out of jail free card’. There is a parallel with global warming, whereby people manage feelings of hopelessness with expressions such as ‘what can one person do?’, often to avoid thinking about a challenging issue (Cole & Morgan 2011 , p. 156). In fact, from the existence of a global problem alone, nothing clearly and directly follows with regards to individual responsibility.

In this context, group identity can be powerful, since a group can be more impactful and offer moral support: ‘within the safe bubble of the vegan community, its practitioners are noticeably joyous’ (Twine 2014 , p. 637). Relatedly, hope plays an important role in moral thinking. Moody-Adams ( 2017 , p. 155–6) discusses the motivating power of hope, specifically how those social movements which deepened our understanding of justice and compassion were driven by those who were confident in acting on their moral convictions and hopeful of moral change. Similarly, Agnes Tam emphasises the power of “We-reasoning” as a distinctive form of communitarian rationality (Tam 2019 , p. 3). Naturally, this does not mean that one abandons self-critical thinking, but it is a potential pitfall of identity groups (Fukuyama 2018 , p. 115).

As Garner points out, the phrase ‘unnecessary harm’ is somewhat vague, a catch-all that can have political advantages in supporting a spectrum of speciesist positions depending on geographical and historical factors (Garner 2013 , p. 81). For example, animal harm is viewed as a necessary evil in support of traditional forms of hospitality and economic interests. Central to the manipulation of these principles is the conflation of difficult, often potentially intractable empirical and analytic problems with practical moral matters about how one should live. In this vein, Reid has pointed out that simply not having a fully worked out theory of veganism is not sufficient reason, in of itself, for not becoming a vegan, in the same way as not having a fully worked out theory of knowledge is not a justification for epistemic scepticism (Reid 2017 , p. 38). Indeed, veganism can be seen as a practical stance in response to animal exploitation, even though it can only ever be aspirational, for it is not possible to avoid causing harm altogether (Gruen and Jones 2016 , p. 157–158). In order to reach the vegan practical conclusion, one need not have to resolve intractable problems of causation, collective responsibility, or necessity.

I have argued, because moral thinking and motivation are not entirely separable, that distorted thinking can dampen motivation, while motivational failures may also result in morally distorted thinking. Take, for instance, the conflation of difficult empirical and philosophical matters with practical moral considerations. Next, I consider how philosophers have traditionally accounted for the breakdown of moral motivation in practical deliberation, and how this can be applied to the vegan motivational problem.

Omnivore’s Akrasia

Akrasia , sometimes referred to as a weakness of will or incontinence, is often understood to mean an intentional action contrary to one’s better judgement. It is, by definition, rather a failure of practical rationality in the shape of a motivational failure. The literature on akrasia dates back to ancient Greek philosophy and the contemporary literature in moral psychology is often technical. To be concise, I assume that akrasia is possible and follow Davidson’s ( 1980 ) definition of akrasia as an action that is free, intentional, and contrary to a full-blown practical judgement.

In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: (a) the agent does x intentionally; (b) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and (c) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x . (Davidson 1980 , p. 22)

Practical reasoning often starts with prima facie judgements, whereupon various reasons are weighted against each other until an evaluative conclusion is derived. When deliberating whether one ought to become a vegan, prima facie reasons might include animal welfare, health, or environmental concerns (notwithstanding myriad other reasons for and against veganism, including one’s psychological and social wellbeing, or how one’s actions will be perceived by others). An individual may accept good overall reasons for adopting veganism, yet fail to embrace it in practice. Indeed, this seems quite plausible. Elisa Aaltola ( 2015 ) coined the term ‘omnivore’s akrasia ’ to refer to the state arising in those who voluntarily consume animal products despite believing that they have been produced by immoral means. Could widespread akrasia , then, play a major role in preventing a significant proportion of the public from adopting veganism? I argue that, despite its explanatory power, the traditional approach is subject to two limitations.

The Limits of Traditional Akrasia

A limitation of akrasia is that moral decisions, such as the decision to go vegan, may not necessarily be the outcome of practical deliberation. On the flip side, one’s better judgement may be faulty. In explanation, ‘all things considered’, or prima facie judgements may not necessarily yield a correct moral answer, not least because we are limited as epistemic and moral beings. Some philosophers (Arpaly 2000 ; Audi 1990 ; McIntyre 2006 ) have even questioned whether akrasia is necessarily irrational. What if the better judgement itself is faulty, or if the desires which ground the ‘better judgement’ fail to represent the agent’s overall desires and interests?

I shall illustrate this with a powerful example from Bennett's reflections on Huckleberry Finn (Bennett 1974 ), so that I can then explore how this applies to veganism. In Mark Twain’s famous novel, Huck believes that, all things considered, the right thing to do is to turn his slave friend Jim in to the authorities, but he fails to do so. ‘Huck hasn’t the strength of will to do what he sincerely thinks he ought to do’ (Bennett 1974 , p. 126). He acts simply out of sympathy for Jim. This turns akrasia on its head, for Huck acts out of moral necessity (he cannot do otherwise), yet he acts against his better judgement.

Similarly, veganism may not necessarily be the direct outcome of practical deliberation. For some, the commitment to veganism may happen over and above any prima facie considerations. It may be the case that one already has an inner necessity. For example, one is moved by the visceral repugnance of the slaughter and ingestion of animals or a deep sense of compassion.

Thus, one could argue that the akrasia explanation of non-veganism involves an overly simplistic, syllogistic account of moral thinking, largely ignoring the social context. Individuals are not disembodied moral agents capable of making rational decisions independently of the social contex—there is much more at stake than merely prima facie reasons in terms of practical deliberations about what one morally ought to do. Could a more nuanced, socially informed notion of akrasia serve to overcome this limitation?

Sociopolitical Akrasia

Aaltola ( 2015 , 2016 ) takes a nuanced sociopolitical approach to omnivore’s akrasia . Like Amelie Rorty ( 1997 ), she views akrasia as a social problem, in that social forces prevent veganism by placing individuals within a continual state of akrasia wherein conscious deliberation and self-control are futile. These forces include ambiguity or conflict at the root of our institutions, habit, consumerism, and the culture of immediate reward or sensory hedonism. Significantly, the meat-eaters’ paradox, in which a societal love for certain animals such as dogs and cats is cultivated, while cows, pigs, and other animals, which are equally sentient, are mistreated and slaughtered, is entrenched within our institutions (Aaltola 2016 , p. 118).

Despite these conflictual beliefs, 2 most individuals believe that food choices are rational but overlook how these choices are grounded via emotive, cultural, or otherwise more ambiguous justifications (Aaltola 2016 , p. 117). Habit perpetuates the meat-eaters’ paradox for, although the original reason for eating meat was survival, it is no longer essential for a large part of the world’s population, so it is in some ways a mindless habit and one that is exacerbated by consumerism. Given this, asking individuals to exercise self-control is insufficient (Aaltola 2016 , p. 124). Indeed, ‘our akratic choices may take place beyond the possibility of conscious deliberation, and thereby beyond the possibility of conscious hedonism or egoism’ (Aaltola 2016 , p. 131). This results in a vicious circle wherein contempt may feed moral apathy and we may thus become apathetic to act altruistically. Therefore, Aaltola ( 2016 , p. 135) concludes that we are in a state of continual akrasia .

Whilst such application of akrasia is insightful, akrasia may not be the best explanation for the phenomenon of widespread omnivorism. Crucially, the possibility of perpetual akrasia seems absurd, especially given that akrasia is, by definition, free intentional action contrary to one’s better judgement. In the context of permanent akrasia , as described by Aaltola, individuals are not acting freely or intentionally, and their better judgement is not to become vegans. As such, they are not akratically failing to become vegans: they never set out to do so in the first place, so there is no motivational failure as the rational outcome of practical deliberation.

Similarly, akrasia may not be the best notion to incorporate mindlessness, self-deception or voluntary ignorance. The notion of akrasia struggles to accommodate the fact that not all our thinking is transparent, bona fide , or easily moulded into practical syllogisms. For instance, it has been said that, once we are accustomed to behaving in ways that have implicit normative content, we struggle to contemplate the possibility of change and may thus engage in self-deception to justify wrongful actions (Cooke 2017 , p. 9). John Searle exemplified one such deception: ‘I try not to think about animal rights because I fear I’d have to become a vegetarian if I worked it out consistently.’ (Cooke 2017 , p. 10).

Indeed, such deception is more likely to be widely shared, given that most people give similar excuses against veganism, commonly referred to as the 4Ns (the belief that eating meat is natural, normal, necessary, and nice; Piazza et al. 2015 ). For Luke ( 1992 , p. 106), such rationalisations consume abundant social energy. However, one can object that very little thinking power is normally used, even though the passions may be inflamed. Given these limitations, one must ask whether the notion of false consciousness would fare any better in accounting for such persistent motivational gaps and largely unreflective responses to veganism or be more cohesive with the idea that animal exploitation is largely systemic.

Omnivore’s False Consciousness

False consciousness is a post-Marxian notion. Although Marx did not use the phrase ‘fase consciousness’, the notion is embedded in much of his thinking. Thus, Miller ( 1972 , p. 433) argues that a broad interpretation of the related concept of ideology, understood as applying to theories, belief-systems and practices involving the use of ideas, has great explanatory power concerning the persistency and influence of ideologies over the actions of the groups who adopt such ideologies. Crucially, if such a group is confronted by others holding incompatible ideas, ‘it has no resources to fall back upon, it can only reaffirm its original faith’ (Miller 1972 , p. 433). Alternatively, if the ideology is seen primarily as an explanatory framework, then ‘the ideology is given repeated empirical confirmation, through the selection of what is perceived’ (Miller 1972 , p. 433). When ideologies function in these ways, they can be said to involve false consciousness. If Miller is correct, and omnivorism can be shown to depend on an ideology that necessarily involves false consciousness, then this may account for the persistency of omnivorism over reasoned arguments, thus filling the gaps left by omnivore’s akrasia .

In Marxist theory, false consciousness is essentially deemed to be political in nature and refers to the social consciousness of the proletariat as an exploited class under capitalism. It is thereby related to the concept of ideological power and forms the basis of Luke’s third dimension of power, wherein the illegitimate use of power by one group over another confers the power to mislead (Lukes 2005 , p. 149). To put it simply, it is the power to control what groups think as being right, resulting in biased acceptance without question. Marx and Engels used the concept of ideology to refer to ‘the distorted beliefs intellectuals [hold] about society and the power of their own ideas. Those who produced ideologies suffered from false consciousness: they were deluded about their own beliefs.’ (Eyerman 1981 , p. 43). Given this tenet, one may be puzzled by my use of false consciousness, as it seems to shift the construct of veganism to being about people rather than about animals. How, then, is false consciousness relevant to the problem of motivation in veganism, given that animals are the exploited group in question, even to the extent that some theorists, such as Perlo ( 2002 , p.306), have likened animals to the proletariat?

The notion of false consciousness has evolved since its origins, and my intention here is to expand its application further. Marx’s concept was further developed by Gramsci, Lukacs and the early Frankfurt School, and later expanded to apply to any social class with a ‘limited form of experience in society’ (Eyerman 1981 , p. 43–44). Thus, it is not limited to Marxian class and has been more applied broadly to groups both before and after the rise of capitalism. For example, Michael Rosen ( 2016 , p. 10) sees Marxian false consciousness as a critique and the development of rationalistic understandings of a previously unformulated notion of false consciousness, beginning with Plato, for whom irrationality of the soul led to the injustices of the state; and Aristotle, for whom false consciousness is necessarily akratic . Omnivore’s false consciousness may thus be viewed as a novel development and a particular application of false consciousness 3 to a broad majority of humans who practise omnivorism in economically developed societies.

Narrow and Broad False Consciousness

So, what then is false about false consciousness? False consciousness is often portrayed in terms of one being misled about one’s true interests. However, there is a distinction arising between being blinded by one’s interests (i.e., being impetuous) and being blind to them, where false consciousness is often associated with the latter (Runciman 1969 , p. 303). The self-interest interpretation, however, omits the altruistic and moral dimensions of human thinking, whereby one may also be blind not only to others’ interests but also to their moral dimension. Traditionally, false consciousness is about group interest and social ontology, but I shall argue that it can also distort moral thinking in much the same way as it distorts non-moral thinking. The notion that Marxism is not totally abstracted from morality is not novel (e.g., Lukes 1985 ), so I will instead set the context before I explain how it bears on veganism.

Marx avoided talk about morality, not only because he hated preaching and was distrustful of the moralist per se (Popper 1995 , p. 220), but because he saw contemporary morality as being part of the bourgeois superstructure, in which class morality added an extra layer of false consciousness. The worker believes, according to Singer, that capitalist has a moral right to the profits 4 (Singer 2018 , p. 83). Although Lenin and others claimed that Marx’s theory was purely scientific, it has since been argued that Marx held a normative position, not least because of his desire to end capitalism (Cochrane 2010 , p. 95; Singer 2018 , p. 82), his hatred of servility, and his ‘desire for a better world that it is hard not to see as moral’ (Lukes 1985 , p. 3).

Central to the Marxian notion of false consciousness is the tenet that both the capitalist and proletariat are afflicted by it and, thus, that the proletariat believed, whether implicitly or explicitly, that the capitalist had a moral or legitimate right to profit. If proletarian Jim held such a belief about himself, he would also believe that the capitalist had a right to the labour of his fellow proletarians. In this world view, the proletariat is both wronged by the capitalist and unaware that they have been wronged. Similarly, capitalists had so distorted or delimited moral ideas insofar as they too failed to acknowledge the true interests of the exploited group and were unaware of their wrongdoing. In the case of animals, the public largely carries on supporting systemic practices of animal-exploitation without acknowledging the wrongs inflicted on animals in its name.

Hence, false consciousness may be understood narrowly as relating to either self or group interest or, more broadly, as including an altruistic moral dimension in the sense of limiting such a dimension. Indeed, if I am blind to my own true interests, then I may not necessarily be receptive to those of other people or those of animals. My claim is not that there is a causal link between blindness to one’s own interests and blindness to the interests of others, but rather that it is absurd to contend that false consciousness impacts only one’s self-interested thinking. Crucially, false consciousness may so taint one’s conception of the good and limit the moral self, that it has the effect of occluding the motivational difficulties of veganism. Hence, the akratic break (motivational failure) does not actually take place, at least not explicitly.

This broad interpretation of false consciousness presupposes a close link between alienation and false consciousness. As Rosen states in his discussion of Marx’s early writings on alienation as a form of life, ‘the alienated worker’s failure to recognize himself in the product of his labour and the failure of isolated individuals to recognize each other fully as fellow human beings are expressions of false consciousness that are lived and experienced before they are theorized about or reflected upon.’ (Rosen 2016 , p. 35). In this sense, the moral self is not impervious to false consciousness. This is interesting within the context of the vegan debate, as the cumulative case for veganism (i.e., the case from a wide range of perspectives) encompasses both moral and enlightened self-interested strands. If we deem both the narrow and broad sense of false consciousness to be appropriate, then this may help to explain how a substantial proportion of the general public may be somewhat blinded by the dominant animal-exploiting ideology in contrasting, yet complementary ways, so as to render the ideology quite impenetrable.

This narrow sense of false consciousness applies to the case for veganism from either anthropocentric or enlightened self-interest perspectives. Strictly, these perspectives support plant-based living as opposed to fully blown ethical veganism but are largely consistent with it. Overall, exploitative animal practices are agreed to have a detrimental impact on the environment, sustainability, and climate change (Rosi 2017 ; Sabaté & Soret 2014 ), as well as global human health (Tuso 2013 ) and that of future generations (Deckers 2011 ). Zoonotic diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and coronavirus disease (COVID-19) have also been traced to wet markets where animals are confined within unnatural and unsanitary conditions (Singer 2020 , pp. 82–83). Despite these, and other harms to humans, the animal agricultural complex has a vested interest in continued animal exploitation. Moreover, the advertising industry and media can exercise tremendous power in perpetuating the desire to consume animal products.

There are at least two difficulties with the attribution of narrow false consciousness in these scenarios. First, the oppressor and oppressed (or exploiter and exploited) groups are not distinct, for at least some humans count as the exploited, even though they too contribute to animal exploitation through their consumption and labour. Although this complicates matters, it does not in of itself make the premise of false consciousness impossible, for (unlike Marxian social class) an individual can belong to more than one group at any one time. In this respect, animals are posited as the oppressed, yet humans are both oppressor and oppressed. In fact, the presumption of such a stark dichotomy of classes would have very little application in terms of the animal agricultural complex which lacks any clearly defined boundaries.

Second, false consciousness is supposed to affect both the exploiter and exploited alike, but it is not altogether clear why it would not be in the interest of the exploiter to exploit, particularly in terms of material self-interest. It may well be that the exploiting group is subject to false consciousness but is not necessarily deceived about its own material self-interest. After all, many people’s livelihoods depend on animal agriculture, which does not go against their immediate, material self-interest. However, the exploiter might be in denial about the consequences of their own exploitation. In Hegel’s dialectic, which influenced Marx’s thinking, the master (to his own detriment) becomes too dependent on the slave. When translated in terms of the current exploitation of animals and nature, exploiters act in such a way as though they are blind to the ultimate consequences of their actions, yet the crucial difference here lies between enlightened self-interest in the medium term and the long run, for it is the latter that false consciousness is supposed to affect.

On the other hand, in a somewhat broader sense, false consciousness acts against the case for veganism from the point of view of ethical and political perspectives such as animal rights and care ethics. These are deemed to be ‘veganism for the animals’ perspectives that constitute the core of ethical veganism, which are not defensible from the standpoint of self-interest. In this context, false consciousness might serve as a good explanatory match for two phenomena; namely the absence of moral reflection on whether one ought to become a vegan (in light of the meat-eater's paradox), and second, the poverty of thinking exemplified by the public’s common rebuttals in response to arguments for veganism.

Although not all objections or negative responses to veganism are crude, there is a widespread social malaise in the form of a prevalent moral apathy towards the exploitation of animals. This matter is political, not only from the perspective that humans exercise illegitimate power over animals but also that animals are worthy of political justice as argued, for example, in The Political Turn in Animal Ethics (Garner and O'Sullivan 2016 ). Further, it could be construed that the public’s commonplace objections to veganism are socially determined and thus often devoid of individual self-expression. The issue is also a very personal one, in the sense that moral thinking is inextricably personal, yet such thinking may at times be thwarted by sociopolitical imperatives. When deliberating on whether one ought to become a vegan, insofar as one engages in moral discourse at all, the moral problem is, and ought to be, inescapably one’s own in the sense that one cannot pass it on to someone else to resolve on one’s behalf (on this topic see Gaita 1989 , p. 128), let alone rely on the unexamined opinions of the majority. However, this is precisely what tends to happen when people confront veganism. The next step, then, is to relate common, unreflective objections to veganism to aspects of political false consciousness.

Four Features of False Consciousness

To deconstruct how thinking can be systematically distorted, I build on Miller’s account of the four dimensions of false consciousness (Miller 1972 , p. 443–444), sketching how these features may be manifested in omnivore’s false consciousness. The four interrelated features are conceptual inadequacy, isolation of phenomena, eternalisation, and reification.

First, false consciousness involves a degree of conceptual inadequacy in that it leads to fallacious reasoning . For example, generalisations based on superficial similarity, whereupon subsequent analysis can reveal them to be disparate. Conceptual inadequacy includes such common injunctions against veganism as animals being unintelligent, carnivorism natural, and vegans self-righteous. These claims expose distortion as empirical analysis – and frequently linguistic or logical analysis alone – can prove them to be fallacious.

For instance, does it follow from the premise that animals are less intelligent that we have a moral right to eat them? Does the fact that something is natural necessarily make an action or attitude morally justifiable? Are all vegans self-righteous? Even if they all are, this latter argument is effectively ad hominem and therefore invalid. Similarly, the idea that veganism is impossible because nobody can ever avoid partaking in harming animals is to misunderstand the very concept of veganism. It exhibits fallacious reasoning by misusing the concept of vagueness. Just because there are borderline cases between a child and an adult, or shades of grey, it does not necessarily follow that nobody can ever be an adult, or that nothing can be truly black. The same holds true for veganism. While nobody would seriously deny that adulthood or true blackness are possible, many are prepared to subject veganism to a reductio ad absurdum . These common examples of conceptual inadequacy are not isolated mistakes, or merely manifestations of the ignorance of specific information, but rather are fundamental ways in which thought fails. They are manifestations of how the acceptance of the moral and political legitimacy (or neutrality) of animal exploitation is deeply rooted within the collective consciousness and embedded within our social institutions.

Second, the process involves the isolation of phenomena, notably a refusal to see an instance of individual behaviour as being part of a wider social system. For example, the belief that one exercises free will in consumer choices 5 and, therefore, that one’s decision to eat animals is autonomous when one is, in actuality, making socially conditioned decisions which are influenced by the meat industry. Hence, Nibert talks of a socially engineered public consciousness, highlighting how organisations such as the ‘Center for Consumer Freedom’ exploit both the concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘consumer choice’ (Nibert 2013 , p. 266). Since others are doing the same, these attitudes are considered to be justificatory of the wider system.

Third, it involves eternalisation, whereby conventional relationships or characteristics are regarded as being permanently fixed within the nature of things. For example, in medieval Europe, society was ranked hierarchically from God down to inanimate objects. Similarly, the hierarchical belief in speciesism is effectively an extension of the belief that ‘might is right’, wherein biological omnivorism is extrapolated to entail a right to exploit animals. For Cooke, the view of the innate inferiority of animals is embedded within our social consciousness, and the moral imagination must be cultivated to break out of such self-deception (Cooke 2017 , p. 14–15). This feature of false consciousness serves as the key to perpetuating certain practices.

Let us consider an example of eternalisation, such as the common belief (in some countries) that a turkey must be the centrepiece of the Christmas dinner table, as tradition dictates, in such a way that a vegan alternative is deemed to be out of the question. In what way is this thinking distorted? How does it manifest as a form of false consciousness? One of the distortions revolves around the false belief that tradition is alone sufficient justification for engaging in a specific practice. Some traditions, such as forced marriages, are morally wrong and so tradition alone does not morally justify a practice. It constitutes a distorted form of thinking rather than a question of holding a false belief, as most individuals living in liberal societies do accept that tradition alone does not morally justify a practice. It manifests as a form of false consciousness insofar as the distortion is not politically neutral.

Like most animal agriculture, the mass confinement, fattening and slaughter of hundreds of millions of turkeys aged between 14 and 24 weeks for Christmas involves the illegitimate use of power of humans over animals. Yet, such traditions continue, not only because people enjoy certain flavours and family traditions, but also because a powerful industry lobby has a vested interest in perpetuating and normalising this form of animal exploitation. For example, in December 2019, the UK’s National Farmers Union (NFU) took issue with a BBC commercial in which a cartoon turkey wearing an ‘I Love Vegans’ sweater announced ‘less of us have been gobbled this year’ (The Telegraph 2019 ). The NFU feared that the BBC was promoting a political view. What was not questioned, however, was that the farming and killing of animals may not be a politically neutral standpoint.

Finally, it involves reification. It reduces individuals to the status of mere objects of fixed properties, their individuality denied, similar to the archetypal Nazi depiction of the Jew (Miller 1972 , p. 444). Animals, too, are objectified when reduced to the status of commodities such as forms of food or modes of transportation, or even being owned as pets. As expressed by Cole and Morgan ( 2011 , p. 149), ‘ethics are simply ruled out of order by the prior to objectification and invisibilisation of nonhuman animals that speciesist material and cultural practices instantiate’. This takes place on a large scale, even when people are generally aware that animals such as the Christmas turkey are (or rather were) individuals, not mere things. Still, animals are essentially commodified, an idea that also links into Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism.

Miller’s analysis provides a framework for dissecting how common objections to veganism, and the belief systems that ground them, are distorted and thereby largely unmovable. It gives weight to the idea that these objections manifest false consciousness. As a form of political false consciousness, omnivore’s false consciousness involves distorted and limited forms of thinking that are not often scrutinised. I have only touched on a small number of common objections to veganism, although there are many others, such as those exemplified in a defensive omnivore board. 6 When one of these notions is challenged, many more excuses are proffered.

What these distorted forms of thinking lack in terms of sobriety they make up for in intuitive persuasiveness by conforming to a widely accepted worldview or way of life. According to this worldview, nonhuman animals are inferior to human animals in politically significant ways that accord the latter the moral entitlement to exploit the former. As Miller recognises, one cannot easily fight instances of false consciousness by pointing out isolated errors. Thus a broader stance is needed, yet it may not be possible to avoid false consciousness altogether (Miller 1972 , p. 444). Therefore, one might ask what makes false consciousness not only possible but also so persistent and prevalent?

The Persistency of Ideologies

The link between false consciousness and ideology is key to its persistency. Gauthier ( 1997 , p.27–28) points out that the notion of an ‘ideology’ is employed inconsistently, yet is generally regarded as a pejorative aspect of our consciousness. He sees ideology as a theoretical construct, part of the ‘deep structure of self-consciousness’, that is, the capacity to conceive oneself relative to others and therefore to act in light of this conception of oneself as a member of the human species. Although it can be the subject of reflection, it is necessarily pre-reflective. This sounds puzzling, but Gauthier sees a similarity between ideology and language in that ‘both conceal a deep structure which unconsciously affects conscious activity’ (Gauthier 1997 , p. 28). Even if one cannot think outside the boundaries of a specific language or ideology, reflection and critique are still possible, thereby enabling moral progress.

Like languages, ideologies also promote social commonality. One of the main functions of social institutions is to maintain and transmit a common ideology (Gauthier 1997 , p. 28). Hence, individuals with very different ideologies, such as vegans and non-vegans, may find communication difficult. Moreover, for Marx, an ideology was not merely false but served an intentional role both in upholding the extant social order (Rawls 2008 , p. 361) and continuing the status quo in terms of the exploitation of the proletariat. For example, hiding the act of robbery within the construct of capitalism is essential. Similarly, exploiters of animals do not want to be perceived to be exploitative, whether these agents be the state or the lawmakers protecting animal-exploiting institutions. Farmers’ associations have privileged access in terms of shaping the viewpoint of the media and in influencing agricultural policy and legislation (Benton 1993 , p. 160). For example, both the US and Australia have introduced ‘ag-gag’ laws that essentially criminalise the dissemination of information about the treatment of animals (O'Sullivan 2016 , p. 53). Moreover, the institutionalised praise of exploiters and punishment of animal liberationists is not a morally neutral position with regard to conceptions of the good that liberal states purport to do. As Schmitz says, ‘the animal question debunks the appearance of neutrality’ (Schmitz 2016 , p. 42).

If we interpret ideologies as being pre-reflective, this aids in explaining their persistency and evasiveness from rational argumentation. As Miller suggests, repeated selective perception confirms the ideology (Miller 1972 , p. 433), yet it is difficult to construct a simple verification or falsification test, as ideologies are false at the level of the whole (Miller 1972 , p. 435). As such, they are not a mere set of commonly held ideas, but rather embody attitudes, common behaviours, and practices. Thus, the ideology that dominates our relationship with animals in developed societies gives rise to a level of false consciousness. It is pre-reflective in that societies embrace omnivorism without perceiving the moral need to justify it, although it is possible to reflect on it. When the dominant ideology is challenged, rationalisations can ensue. Since an ideology is not a specific set of beliefs that can be proven to be true or false in isolation, it is very difficult to ‘prove’ that omnivorism is morally wrong, or that veganism is right in such a way that any rational moral agent could be convinced.

One might object to the premise that attributing false consciousness is arrogant, for it requires a privileged perspective in terms of intellect and education. As Polsby states, ‘the presumption that the “real” interests of a class can be assigned to them by an analyst allows the analyst to charge “false consciousness” when the class in question disagrees with the analyst’ (Polsby 1963 , p. 22–3). However, is the attribution of false consciousness necessarily arrogant? Lukes ( 2005 , p. 149–150) argues that recognising the possibility of false consciousness is neither condescending, nor inherently illiberal, or even paternalistic. He considers, for example, J.S. Mill’s analysis of the subjection of Victorian women to the rule of men (in Mill 2009 [1869], p. 25) which can be interpreted as showing how most women were subject to false consciousness in the form of voluntary servitude, as opposed to coercive power. In light of such historic examples, and the fact that gender equality is now largely undisputed, the objection from arrogance is begs a question in that it denies the possibility that anyone might ever be politically deceived. It is ad hominem insofar as it attacks the character of the analyst, not the soundness of their views. Similarly, if future generations were to embrace the cause of animal rights and veganism, the attribution of an omnivore’s false consciousness to previous generations may then not seem too paternalistic.

Some Marxists could argue that the notion of false consciousness simply does not apply here. That may well be the case if indeed false consciousness is taken literally in a Marxist context. Instead, I have argued that there is a broad reading of false consciousness according to which it can narrow the moral self precisely because the interests of animals are not perceived in such a way as to trigger the moral motivation to practice veganism. In fact, I have attempted to detach the concept from Marxist theory as far as possible, so that one does not have to embrace Marxism in order to be able to accept how such a concept (and related concepts) may command useful explanatory power where the notion of akrasia falls short. 1

If there is such a thing as omnivore’s false consciousness, it would seem to follow that animal liberation (from human oppression) requires human liberation from omnivore’s false consciousness. Broad false consciousness may need to be confronted head-on through practices that promote more reflective and altruistic thinking (Cooke 2017 ). Narrow false consciousness, on the other hand, may be tackled directly by promoting some of the benefits of plant-based living (Fetissenko 2011 ), or indirectly by creating the conditions that normalise such a lifestyle (Lumsden 2017 ), for example, by making the shift from animal to plant agriculture easier and more desirable for farmers, or through the technological development of realistic alternatives to culling animals (e.g. in vitro meat; see Milburn 2016 ). A drawback of the self-interest approach, however, is that it only favours animals contingently in those instances where enlightened human self-interest happens to be convergent with those of animals. These challenges make a global shift to veganism not only fraught but also currently inaccessible to those on the opposite side of the debate. Considering how humans have habitually exploited animals, the future for most animals looks grim. On the other hand, social movements depend on hope and persist in the belief in moral progress has been said to be a regulative concept (Moody-Adams 2017 , p. 154).

Concluding Remarks

Starting from the assumption that there is a strong case for veganism in the literature, and the hypothesis that moral thinking and motivation are inseparable, I have considered how akrasia and false consciousness are ‘conceptual pathways’ through which our practical thinking about animals is distorted. Omnivore’s akrasia leaves some important gaps, for it is delimited to free and voluntary action against one’s better judgement. As such, the phenomenon of widespread omnivorism in developed societies may be better explained in terms of omnivore’s false consciousness (but I am not thereby suggesting that animal liberationists should embrace Marxism). Where omnivore’s false consciousness arises, there is no clear or explicit motivational failure to become a vegan, precisely because there is insufficient reflection for an akratic break to take occur. Further work in the field of moral psychology is evidently needed to unravel the motivational unity thesis, a theorem upon which this paper leans heavily.

Insofar as veganism expresses an ideology, it cannot be proven either to be true or morally right through arguments alone in such a way as to persuade any rational being or otherwise fully-fledged moral agent. Veganism is, as such, not an analytic truth to be derived from abstract moral principles but rather a moral way of life. Arguably, it is also a moral requirement. Principles such as causal inefficacy and unnecessary harm can be turned against veganism via analytic rationalisations which exploit scepticism and err on the side of narrow human self-interest, rather than an altruistic stance towards animals. Despite difficult technical and analytic considerations, one can experience veganism as an inescapable imperative; as a spiritual necessity; or as a powerful political identity against the oppression of animals. As such, some animal advocates may feel utter despair and therefore struggle to comprehend how others are not similarly moved. They may experience helplessness as to why common reasons against veganism are so weak. This paper is but one expression of such puzzlement, and a first attempt to make sense through the hitherto underexplored notion of false consciousness within the field of animal ethics.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the MANCEPT ‘Just Animals? The Future of the Political Turn in Animal Ethics’ workshop in September 2019. I am especially grateful to Robert Garner, Steve Cooke, Josh Milburn and Eva Meijer for their comments and support. I am also greatly indebted to the anonymous reviewers of this journal.

Self-funded.

Declaration

The authors declares that they have no conflict of interest.

1 For a concise exposition of the cumulative case for veganism see Stephens ( 1994 ). For more recent arguments see Francione ( 2008 ), Huemer ( 2019 ) and Singer ( 2020 ).

2 There is no conflict if animals are viewed and treated only according to their purpose to humans, but it can be argued that this is how things are (the animal welfare orthodoxy), not how they ought to be.

3 False consciousness is often assumed without explanation in the Critical Animal Studies (CAS) literature (e.g., Nibert 2002 , p. 247).

4 Marx may not have thought that the proletariat held such explicit beliefs given that they had no access to the superstructure, but the relevant idea is that the proletariat was blind to their interests.

5 Vegans too can be consumerist.

6 A compilation of poor excuses against veganism such as ‘we have carnivore teeth’. For an example see https://vegansaurus.com/post/254784826/defensive-omnivore-bingo .

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Vegan Speak

Vegan Speak is an ever growing resource addressing common misconceptions and arguments against veganism. Whether you’re a seasoned vegan or exploring the philosophy, Vegan Speak offers a wealth of information and resources to help you engage in meaningful conversations and make informed choices.

• Meat and dairy tastes good
• ★ Crop harvesting kills animals
• Animals don’t understand morality
• Animals eat other animals
• Animals would eat you if they could
• B12 is only found in meat
• Eating animals is natural
• Eating animals is necessary
• Eating meat helped us evolve
• Eating meat is healthy
• Farm animals would go extinct
• Farmed animals are bred to be killed
• Farmed animals would be killed in the wild
• Farmed animals would overpopulate
• Farmers treat their animals like family
• God put animals here to eat
• Going vegan doesn’t make a difference
• Hitler was vegetarian
• ★ Animals are humanely slaughtered
• Humans are omnivores
• Humans are superior to animals
• I eat every part of the animal so they don’t go to waste
• I need to eat fish for Omega-3
• I only buy locally grown, free-range, organic meat
• It’s legal to eat animal products, there are laws to protect animals
• You take medication that has been tested on animals
• Morality is subjective
• Human rights are more important
• Most people eat meat
• Not everyone can be vegan
• ★ Our ancestors ate meat
• People would lose their jobs if the world went vegan
• It’s my personal choice
• Plants feel pain
• The animals are already dead
• The dairy industry doesn’t harm animals
• The egg industry doesn’t harm animals
• The whole world will never go vegan
• ★ We’re top of the food chain (circle of life)
• Vegan diet lacks iron
• Vegan food is tasteless
• Veganism is expensive
• Veganism is unsustainable
• Vegans are judgmental
• Vegans don't get enough protein
• Vegans lack calcium
• Vegans lack vitamin D
• You buy products from sweatshops
• ★ You can't be 100% vegan

This is an open source work in progress and we welcome your contributions or improvements .

What’s the difference between vegan and vegetarian?

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Katherine Livingstone receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council (APP117380) and the National Heart Foundation (ID106800).

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What’s the difference? is a new editorial product that explains the similarities and differences between commonly confused health and medical terms, and why they matter.

Vegan and vegetarian diets are plant-based diets . Both include plant foods, such as fruits, vegetables, legumes and whole grains.

But there are important differences, and knowing what you can and can’t eat when it comes to a vegan and vegetarian diet can be confusing.

So, what’s the main difference?

What’s a vegan diet?

A vegan diet is an entirely plant-based diet. It doesn’t include any meat and animal products. So, no meat, poultry, fish, seafood, eggs, dairy or honey.

What’s a vegetarian diet?

A vegetarian diet is a plant-based diet that generally excludes meat, poultry, fish and seafood, but can include animal products. So, unlike a vegan diet, a vegetarian diet can include eggs, dairy and honey.

But you may be wondering why you’ve heard of vegetarians who eat fish, vegetarians who don’t eat eggs, vegetarians who don’t eat dairy, and even vegetarians who eat some meat. Well, it’s because there are variations on a vegetarian diet:

a lacto-ovo vegetarian diet excludes meat, poultry, fish and seafood, but includes eggs, dairy and honey

an ovo-vegetarian diet excludes meat, poultry, fish, seafood and dairy, but includes eggs and honey

a lacto-vegetarian diet excludes meat, poultry, fish, seafood and eggs, but includes dairy and honey

a pescatarian diet excludes meat and poultry, but includes eggs, dairy, honey, fish and seafood

a flexitarian , or semi-vegetarian diet, includes eggs, dairy and honey and may include small amounts of meat, poultry, fish and seafood.

Are these diets healthy?

A 2023 review looked at the health effects of vegetarian and vegan diets from two types of study.

Observational studies followed people over the years to see how their diets were linked to their health. In these studies, eating a vegetarian diet was associated with a lower risk of developing cardiovascular disease (such as heart disease or a stroke), diabetes, hypertension (high blood pressure), dementia and cancer.

For example, in a study of 44,561 participants, the risk of heart disease was 32% lower in vegetarians than non-vegetarians after an average follow-up of nearly 12 years.

Further evidence came from randomised controlled trials. These instruct study participants to eat a specific diet for a specific period of time and monitor their health throughout. These studies showed eating a vegetarian or vegan diet led to reductions in weight, blood pressure, and levels of unhealthy cholesterol.

For example, one analysis combined data from seven randomised controlled trials. This so-called meta-analysis included data from 311 participants. It showed eating a vegetarian diet was associated with a systolic blood pressure (the first number in your blood pressure reading) an average 5 mmHg lower compared with non-vegetarian diets.

It seems vegetarian diets are more likely to be healthier, across a number of measures.

For example, a 2022 meta-analysis combined the results of several observational studies. It concluded a vegetarian diet, rather than vegan diet, was recommended to prevent heart disease.

There is also evidence vegans are more likely to have bone fractures than vegetarians. This could be partly due to a lower body-mass index and a lower intake of nutrients such as calcium, vitamin D and protein.

But it can be about more than just food

Many vegans, where possible, do not use products that directly or indirectly involve using animals.

So vegans would not wear leather, wool or silk clothing, for example. And they would not use soaps or candles made from beeswax, or use products tested on animals.

The motivation for following a vegan or vegetarian diet can vary from person to person. Common motivations include health, environmental, ethical, religious or economic reasons.

And for many people who follow a vegan or vegetarian diet, this forms a central part of their identity .

So, should I adopt a vegan or vegetarian diet?

If you are thinking about a vegan or vegetarian diet, here are some things to consider:

eating more plant foods does not automatically mean you are eating a healthier diet. Hot chips, biscuits and soft drinks can all be vegan or vegetarian foods. And many plant-based alternatives , such as plant-based sausages, can be high in added salt

meeting the nutrient intake targets for vitamin B12, iron, calcium, and iodine requires more careful planning while on a vegan or vegetarian diet. This is because meat, seafood and animal products are good sources of these vitamins and minerals

eating a plant-based diet doesn’t necessarily mean excluding all meat and animal products. A healthy flexitarian diet prioritises eating more whole plant-foods, such as vegetables and beans, and less processed meat, such as bacon and sausages

the Australian Dietary Guidelines recommend eating a wide variety of foods from the five food groups (fruit, vegetables, cereals, lean meat and/or their alternatives and reduced-fat dairy products and/or their alternatives). So if you are eating animal products, choose lean, reduced-fat meats and dairy products and limit processed meats.

• Consumer health
• Plant-based diet
• Vegetarian diet
• What's the difference?

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A Defense of Veganism

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• 1. Multiple Choice Edit 30 seconds 1 pt What is the main argument this essay makes? A. People should stop eating meat and become vegans. B. Vegans are unhealthy and don't eat a balanced diet.  C. Certain claims made against veganism are untrue. D. Veganism is the only environmentally correct solution.
• 2. Multiple Choice Edit 30 seconds 1 pt How do people who eat meat feel about vegans, according to the essay? A. They believe that vegans are "garden-variety" eaters. B. The feel that vegans show "balance and maturity." C. They believe that vegans are "horrific" and "immoral." D. They think that vegans are primarily working class.
• 3. Multiple Choice Edit 30 seconds 1 pt What information does the author use to respond to the counterclaim that animals don't really have rights? A. Facts about the damage meat production causes. B. Evidence showing that a vegan diet costs less. C. Interviews with noted anti-vegan activists. D. Information from a professor at Princeton.
• 4. Multiple Choice Edit 30 seconds 1 pt Which passage from the essay helps to respond to the counterclaim that the vegan diet is unhealthy? A. "Meat eating is actually the unhealthy diet because a high level of cholesterol causes many ailments..." B. At $11.15, the vegan's grocery bill came in at $3.50 less than that of a person eating chicken, eggs, and bacon." B. "Tofu, hummus, and vegetables can be readily found in most grocery stores today." D. "According to these guidelines, an adult males needs 56 grams, and an adult woman needs 46 grams of protein."
• 5. Multiple Choice Edit 30 seconds 1 pt What evidence does the author use to respond to the counterclaim that veganism does not protect the environment? A. The average cost that a vegan spends on food each day. B. The damage meat production does to the environment. C. The harm done to the body when one eats too much red meat. D. The amount of time it takes to slaughter an animal.

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