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Identity, status and role in UK foreign policy: Brexit and beyond

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Brexit—the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union—is at the same time historic, controversial and of enduring significance. That description applies to both the UK’s domestic politics and (the focus here) its external relations. This article introduces the special issue ‘Adapting to Brexit: Identity, Status and Role in UK Foreign Policy’. It suggests that Brexit has had a dual character–being a source of both anxiety and opportunity for the UK—and, in consequence, can be usefully analysed through the concept of role adaptation. A focus on national ‘roles’ is a well-established way to think about what drives foreign policy. But role only makes sense when linked to the parallel concepts of status and identity. Insofar as Brexit has challenged (or, for some, has boosted), the status and identity of the UK, then so role adaptation becomes necessary. This piece outlines all three concepts—role, identity and status—placing them at the service of an analysis of Brexit’s effects on British foreign policy. That framing is then deployed in the thematic articles which follow.

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Introduction

Michael Clarke and Helen Ramscar ( 2020 : 1) have described Brexit as ‘the greatest strategic and economic change in the status of [the UK] for well over half a century’. Tellingly, this change was self-induced. Brexit cannot be regarded neatly as an ‘external shock’ acting upon the UK body politic, in reaction to which the British government undertook some sort of ‘structural adjustment’ to new realities. Footnote 1 Brexit was an act of will. It occurred as the result of a UK-wide referendum, itself the culmination of a decades’ long political controversy in British domestic politics. Because it had domestic origins, the response to Brexit has been seen by many as parochial, self-serving, even tragi-comic. Here, the grandiloquent emphasis on ‘Global Britain’ is mere words, ‘a glib post-imperial phrase’ that reflects a presumption of influence rather than a serious strategy for its exercise (Kettle 2021 ).

Undoubtedly, the UK has spun its foreign policy to avoid giving the impression the country is retreating from the world. The 2021 Integrated Review (HM Government 2021 ) provided the intellectual template for ‘Global Britain’; that document’s 2023 ‘refresh’ laid out the UK’s ambition to ‘shape the global environment’ (HM Government 2023 : 10). UK-hosted meetings of NATO leaders (in 2019), as well as the G7 and COP-26 (in 2021), the Commonwealth Games (in 2022) and the Global Investment Summit (2023) could be seen as evidence of that ambition in practice. But just how much of a shift is this exactly? A concern with status has, after all, been a fixed feature of UK foreign policy for decades. Further, while many warned of the deleterious effects of leaving the EU, this is not how Brexit was justified by its supporters. For them (a group which came to include the Conservative governments led by Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak), a decline in Britain’s status was not regarded as Brexit’s tolerable collateral damage. Brexit was, in fact, rationalised on precisely the opposite grounds, as an act that would unbind the UK from the shackles of EU membership and increase Britain’s freedom of manoeuvre in its foreign and security policy (Buckledee 2018 : chapter 6). Brexit has thus had a double and perhaps contradictory significance—raising immediate status concerns while simultaneously providing the UK with the opportunity to reassert its historic international influence. That convergence—of anxiety and opportunity—has found expression in forms of role adaptation (a term explained below) whereby the UK has sought to hedge against a Brexit-induced loss of status by elevating relationships outside of the EU.

Why does status matter in how we consider UK foreign policy? The straightforward explanation here would point to positional advantage, how material capabilities (military, economic, technological, scientific, and demographic) alongside soft power (culture and political values) confer upon a state ‘tangible benefits in security, wealth, and influence’ (Renshon 2017 : 3). Foreign policy follows the direction which possession of such resources makes possible, albeit in circumstances where the capabilities of others matter too. Relative power and the cooperative and competitive outcomes of state interaction that follow is the name of the game in international politics. But this is only part of the story. Even realism, the IR approach most preoccupied with capabilities, leaves room for non-material explanations of state behaviour. Whereas the neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer adopts an almost fatalistic system determinism on how states behave (cf. Freire 2019 ), neo-classical realism strikes a rather different note. As Gideon Rose ( 1998 : 146–147) has suggested, ‘there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour. Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being’. That emphasis on leadership (or agency) is, of course, a mainstay of non-structural approaches. Thus, for Frédéric Merand ( 2020 : 14), foreign policies cannot simply ‘be read off the international system or the international division of labour’—they ‘are enacted by people who have the ability to make […] decisions’. This is a valuable but hardly a new point. What makes it interesting is that it suggests leaders in making such decisions might be driven by grand objectives—not simply the everyday concerns of policy. Here, status is an end in itself; it is desired not because it is a proxy measure of material capabilities, but rather because it embodies the aspirations of national identity and self-image (Götz 2021 : 243).

The desire for status has, in fact, long been seen as a driver of state action—as relevant to ‘small’ states such as Norway, rising powers such as India and China, and ascendant states such as the USA (Renshon 2020 ). Status concerns are especially consequential for those moving up or down the international hierarchy. A rising power (China for instance) might err towards caution in its foreign policy, confident that its growing power will mean its status credentials are recognised. A declining power (Russia for example), by contrast, might feel an acute status dissatisfaction—a sense of injustice and discrimination because its presumed higher status is not being acknowledged by others. In the latter case, the difficulty of adjusting downward can result in the risky pursuit of ‘status-altering’ events (aggression against one’s neighbours in the Russian example) (Renshon 2017 : 24; Krickovic and Zhang 2020 ). But equally, it might entail a more measured and systematic foreign policy of status protection—efforts designed, in Jonathan Renshon’s ( 2017 : 4) words, ‘to preserve one’s current position or slow one’s decline’. That observation is particular apposite when it come to the UK. The history of post-War British foreign policy can be seen as one prolonged effort to sustain the UK’s position as a great power. Footnote 2

Status protection is, of course, conditioned by the external circumstances in which foreign policy decisions are made. For the UK, that context has been fundamentally altered by exit from the EU: in ways that are both constraining (the loss of ‘voice opportunities’ at the European level) and empowering (London is no longer bound by EU competencies on trade and environment policy). How might this altered context shape policy? Two broad considerations are relevant here. First are the views of the foreign policy decision makers themselves. As Hyam Gold ( 1978 : 569) noted many years ago, ‘environmental factors influence foreign policy decisions neither invariably nor directly, but only insofar as they affect or are mediated through the perceptions and attitudes of relevant decision makers’. To deploy a distinction of even longer standing, the ‘operational milieu’ of UK foreign policy has shifted with Brexit, but just as important is ‘how the policy maker imagines [that] milieu to be’ (Sprout and Sprout 1957 : 328). Second is the fact that foreign policy is played out by reference to others. In foreign policy, the ‘modes of enablement and constraint’ are not simply a consequence of structural circumstance; they also follow from ‘agential forces’—how, in other words, actors relate to one another in the same ‘interactive setting’ (Dessler 1989 : 444).

These considerations matter in how we consider status. Status follows from the capabilities a state possesses, but it is realised in how that state is regarded by others. Status is not, in other words, simply a matter of how, in relative terms, a state is ranked according to the possession of material attributes. As Marina Duque ( 2018 : 580) has noted, it is also ‘fundamentally social’; status is a matter of recognition in other words. That moves it pretty close to the related notion of reputation. But while these two concepts overlap they do not coincide. A state can, after all, have a high status but a bad reputation Footnote 3 (the converse is also true). ‘Reputation’ is a behavioural quality—‘beliefs’ held by others ‘about a trait or tendency of an actor, informed by observation of the actor’s past behaviour’ (Renshon et al. 2018 : 325). Status is something more. It is about the possibilities of action that follow from rank and standing (in both its material and social senses) and the deference shown by others as a consequence of that positioning (Kemper 2011 : 13–14). Deference may diminish if a state’s reputation is sullied and it may be the case that eventually reputational damage is so chronic and acute that the social element of status falls with it. A ‘good reputation’ Robert Keohane ( 2005 : 105–106) suggests, ‘makes it easier for a government to enter into advantageous international agreements; tarnishing that reputation imposes costs by making agreements more difficult to reach’. Over time, such costs will render a state less influential, less able to enact its foreign policy priorities and ergo undermining of its status. These processes do not necessarily run in parallel, and status is, arguably, more ‘sticky’ than reputation.However, the cumulative effects of reputational erosion are powerful. Thus, successive foreign policy blunders—the British role in the Suez crisis and the 2003 Iraq war, for instance—stand as way-stations in the long-term diminution of the UK’s international status (Cook 2004 ).

Role and identity

A quest for status might be regarded as an end in itself because it delivers ‘tangible benefits’, but beneath the surface of such instrumentalism lurks a powerful political and psychological need. A state which has experienced elevated status often remains committed to greatness (and with it, a rejection of decline and weakness) as an ongoing act of self-identification (Hagström 2021 ). And this, in turn, is underpinned by a conception of role —the notion held by ‘actors about who they are, what they would like to be with regard to others, and how they therefore should interact in (international) social relationships […]’ (Harnisch et al. 2011 : 1–2). ‘Role’, David Blagden ( 2019 : 471–472) has suggested, is ‘social, relational and performative—it is about deriving utility from being seen as the sort of actor that discharges certain rights and responsibilities’.

Role theory has acquired an important place in the study of foreign policy, particularly when explaining how states adjust to changing international circumstances. Philippe Le Prestre ( 1997 : 5) has noted that a state’s ‘role definition’ generates ‘an image of the world […] and influences the definition of the situation and […] the available options [before it]’. An idea of role allows a state to formulate foreign policy and thus to navigate turbulent external circumstance. Adjusting foreign policy in this way does not leave the underlying role untouched. As Kalevi Holsti’s ( 1970 : 294) foundational piece on role theory pointed out many years ago, flux in the international environment is given meaning by national roles, but these roles might themselves be adapted, even transformed, by the changes they seek to accommodate. Dirk Nabers ( 2011 : 84) has pointed out, similarly, that ‘roles can destabilize […] in times of social instability’. Yet we also know that roles can be stubbornly persistent, especially so when articulating a claim to a hierarchical position—‘how’ that is, according to Barry Buzan ( 2004 : 19), ‘states define their claims and roles in relation to each other’ whether as ‘superpower, great power, regional power or suchlike’. These two processes of change and persistence may well co-exist: a state may efface one role but at the same time affirm another. The USA, for instance, eschewed its anti-communist role as the Cold War wound down, but in the decade that followed it continued to emphasis its credentials as the leader of the liberal international community (McCrisken 2003 : 159–160). A similar manoeuvre had been performed by the UK some four decades earlier. Decolonisation after World War Two had rendered Britain’s imperial role untenable but the idea of an, admittedly ill-defined, world role took its place—justified, first, by the creation of the Commonwealth and, second, by an assumption that the exercise of international influence across two centuries simply accorded to the British an earned position of a global power (Northedge 1974 : 219–20).

Role is thus a nuanced way to understand a country’s external or foreign policy orientation. Does it help when looking at Brexit? At first sight, Brexit appears contradictory. Siren warnings that Brexit placed the UK’s good standing in jeopardy were made clear to London by its (then) fellow EU member states following the 2016 referendum (Harrois 2018 ). The search for a role post-Brexit has thus been about preserving a status for the UK that was, ironically, placed in jeopardy by the very act of leaving the EU in the first place (Hadfield 2020 : 183–186). This seemingly contradictory occurrence might simply be explained away by the turbulence of British domestic politics. An irrational foreign policy act was the outcome of domestic political division, ill-judged decision-making by flawed leaders and a form of perverse path dependence whereby a process was set in motion that proved impossible to reverse even when its negative consequences became clear (Macshane 2021 ). Having crossed the threshold and exited the EU, foreign policy then became geared towards limiting the damage of Brexit and urgently seeking out new international opportunities. The articulation of the UK’s post-Brexit role—whether as ‘global trading state, great power, faithful ally to the USA, regional partner to the EU and leader of the Commonwealth’—thus took on a decidedly instrumental nature (Oppermann et al. 2020 ).

Instrumentalism alone, however, cannot explain foreign policy. Identity also matters. As Hadfield-Amkhan ( 2010 ) has written, ‘national identity operates visibly to inform the national interest, and viably to constitute and motivate the foreign policy choices of states’. But how does this relate to role? Identity, can be seen as a composite of the various roles actors ascribe to themselves and which are then affirmed in their interactions with others (Ned Lebow 2016 : 79). Identity and roles, in other words, can be mutually constitutive (Nabers 2011 : 82). States (or, more accurately, their governing elites), ‘choose’, according to David McCourt ( 2011 : 1600) ‘to enact roles such as “leader” or “reliable ally” in particular situations in order to make their identity affirming behaviour in international politics meaningful’. To extend this argument, one might regard a state as having a master ‘role orientation’, one that, in effect, is short-hand for its identity claim. More ‘specific national role conceptions’ are the way by which that orientation is pursued (Gaskarth 2014 : 46).

What does this entail in the British case? Jamie Gaskarth ( 2013 ; 78; 2014: 47) has suggested that the UK’s dominant role orientation (or what he has also referred to as British ‘self-identity’) ‘is predicated on the idea that Britain is a leading global actor’. That role is accepted across the governing domestic political spectrum and forms an expectation among important international partners of how, when dealing with the British, the UK sees itself. British role conceptions—as a good ally, a diplomatic convening power, a soft power, a trading and finance state, a defender of the rule of law, follow logically from that point of reference.

Identity and role are bound up here with an elevated sense of status and that is, in some ways, the key to understanding Brexit. The UK’s exit from the EU appears to be much less of a conundrum if it is seen as the outcome of a particular interpretation of how British status was to be preserved. Brexit was premised on an assumption that continued EU membership had become inimical to British sovereignty and unnecessary for the articulation of the UK’s identity as a global actor. Brexit, by this view, was the bold step by which the restraints on the UK’s freedom of action would finally be resolved (Daddow 2019 ; Beasley et al. 2021 ; Tombs 2021 : 69). In this sense, refreshed role conceptions did not suddenly emerge into the light of day in response to Brexit—they were already there. The idea that the UK would be ‘one of the most influential countries in the world’, would consolidate the transatlantic relationship, and would be at the forefront of scientific, environmental and technological advances certainly gained currency as Brexit opened up a ‘new chapter’ for the UK (Johnson 2021 ). But these conceptions clearly played upon assumptions of national distinctiveness, even exceptionalism, already firmly embedded in UK foreign policy (Parnell 2022 : 392; Vucetic 2022 : 258–59). One might regard British foreign policy after 2016 as a series of actions aimed at ‘offsetting’ the damaging consequences of Brexit. But it is just as much a ‘reset’, an effort to preserve the sense of status that has been the central concern of British foreign policy before, during and after membership of the EU. Here, the underlying role orientation and role conceptions remain, but the ‘strategies and instruments [of] performing [that] role’ change (Harnisch 2011 : 10).

Figure  1 characterises that process as one of role adaptation. It assumes the UK’s role orientation as a leading international power is fixed. Brexit has challenged the idea that the UK is a global actor and so adaptation occurs in the conception and performance categories where this core claim has had to be constantly asserted. Global Britain, in this light, is not simply a slogan; it is an exercise of discursive shape-shifting meant to give meaning to the idea that the UK remains ‘a European country with global interests’ (HM Government 2021 : 60).

Adapted from Gaskarth ( 2014 : 47) and Harnisch ( 2011 : 8–9). See also House of Commons, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs ( 2020 : Chapter 2)

Role adaptation in UK foreign policy.

That said, Brexit has shattered elite consensus in British politics. Analytically, this is important because role analysis relies on the view that political elites hold a shared position on national role orientations. That view has always been something of a generalisation, ‘blackboxing’ elite debate and elbowing out evidence of intra-elite contestation (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012 ). Empirically tenuous, it can nonetheless be justified by assuming that intra-elite differences are matters of emphasis not substance and that the discourse and actions of foreign policy are rolled out once differences have been resolved. On this basis, we might accept that the headline of the UK’s role orientation—that the UK is or, at least, should be, a global actor—is a useful shortcut to understanding the direction of foreign policy. Even so, one major caveat remains. Role consensus is increasingly a thing of the English (or Westminster) governing elite. One outcome of Brexit has been to distance opinion in Scotland from the core claims of UK foreign policy, indeed, from the very notion that the UK has a foreign policy that represents Scottish interests at all (Hendry 2021 ). But foreign policy is made in Westminster, so even that caveat is not fatal to the premises of a role approach. It does, however, draw our attention to currents submerged beneath British national identity and role conception—that is, an unstated but essentially English outlook (Vucetic 2021 : 32–33, 73–4, 193).

Role adaptation requires achieving the best fit between an actor and its external environment. But despite the positive narrative the UK government has put on its foreign policy after Brexit, role adaptation has not gone down well among the UK’s major—now erstwhile—partners in the EU. Brexit has also complicated the relationship with the USA, the UK’s major ally. And hanging over all of this are material factors. These were qualified in our analysis above, but they remain significant. Whatever its level of ambition, material constraints still limit the UK’s options (inhibiting role performance, in other words). Overall, as Ryan Beasley et al. ( 2021 : 1) have noted, the UK has after Brexit experienced a profound challenge to reposition ‘itself into an international role that simultaneously meets its various domestic desires for greater control, its international foreign policy ambitions, is acceptable to international actors, and comports with prevailing sovereignty norms around anti-colonialism and the liberal international order’. Role adaptation is the response to these challenges, but it may ultimately be in vain. The development of the UK’s role in the world after Brexit could well be a story of unsuccessful decline management, one that demonstrates the mismatch between the British elite’s self-perception of status, and its social and material reality (Merand 2020 : 5).

Brexit is not the only recent development that affects Britain’s position in the world. The COVID-19 pandemic, accelerating climate change, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its associated economic consequences have all had negative and enduring effects on global markets and human security; all have worsened the ‘gridlock’ that blights global governance (Hale and Held 2017 ). These problems have all directly affected the UK’s domestic politics and socio-economic welfare and have challenged its claim to global influence. Sat above this tale of woe is the increasingly dysfunctional relationships between the USA and China on the one hand and the USA and Russia on the other. Such sharpening great power rivalries have forced other states (the UK included) and international organisations to take sides in an emerging global politics of strategic competition (Mazarr 2022 ).

These developments have had, and will continue to have, ripple effects on the UK for many years to come. But none of them was made in Britain. Brexit, by contrast, is a uniquely British occurrence. Its impact on British identity and status, and the UK’s role in the world is, therefore, likely to be substantial and long-lasting. In that light, what are the signposts that might mark the UK’s adaptation? Put another way, what past roles might serve as a model for the UK outside the EU (Hauser 2019 : 245)? Can the UK assert diplomatic, military or environmental leadership unencumbered by the constraints of EU membership? Or is its influence diminished by Brexit?

The articles in this special issue address such questions. They are based on the framework of analysis outlined in this short introduction which connects status, identity and role to the conduct of UK foreign policy. The special issue considers the historical context of the UK’s membership of the EU, examines how Brexit is viewed by the UK’s major partners and reflects upon the broad trajectory of UK foreign policy since the 2016 UK referendum. A number of articles apply the idea of role adaptation to case studies of post-Brexit foreign policy. These look at diplomacy (including cooperation with the UN, the Commonwealth and the EU), European defence (including NATO), defence industrial policy, nuclear weapons, environmental policy and trade. The case studies do not exhaust the range of activities where the UK’s claims to global status apply. One could have also looked at the life-sciences industry, cultural and soft power, cyber capabilities and even the UK constituent nations’ sporting prowess. All these add to the UK’s reputation, have a substantive basis in material achievement and have figured in the UK government’s post-Brexit narrative of national purpose. Those activities we have chosen to consider stand out because they meet some or all of the following criteria: they are subject to specific and important foreign actions, have a significance that pre-dates Brexit and have been expressly repurposed in the light of the Brexit watershed. Taken individually each has something important to say about Brexit’s impact; taken together, they are a measure of the turbulent journey the UK has taken since the EU membership referendum.

Finally, a word on timescale. Empirically, our analysis regards Brexit (a descriptor for the UK’s formal departure from the EU) as being triggered by the outcome of the UK-wide referendum held in June 2016. That vote saw a slim (but binding) majority opt in favour of leaving the EU, so terminating a membership status that goes back to British entry into the then European Economic Community in January 1973. Following the referendum, an interregnum followed during which the UK and the EU negotiated a new relationship. An EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement entered into force in February 2020 (that text also included a Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland) and an EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement was reached in December. The UK left the EU Single Market and Customs Union at the end of that month. Simultaneously, EU law including rulings of the European Court of Justice ceased to apply. Brexit as an event can be placed within these three and half years and even be extended back to the beginning of 2013 (the point at which Prime Minister David Cameron committed to a referendum). But Brexit has a spatial as well as temporal meaning. The latter has a reasonably narrow focus (the crucial years of 2013–2020) but what happened in that delimited period only makes sense when seen within a broader (spatial) context—that is, by reference to Brexit’s antecedents and later consequences. The articles in the special issue adopt this dual perspective. Brexit’s ‘eventfulness’ (Vucetic 2021 : 35) can be judged both as a moment in time (a historical watershed) and as the cause (or accelerant) of major processes of change, evident for our purposes in the UK’s role adaptation.

On ‘external shocks’ and ‘structural adjustment’ in foreign policy, see, respectively, Hermann ( 1990 ) and Levy ( 1994 ).

This theme is taken up in the article by Christopher Hill in this issue. See also McCourt ( 2014 ), Stephens ( 2021 ) and Vucetic ( 2021 ).

As was the case of the USA under the Trump administration. See also the commentary that attended the US withdrawal (by the Biden administration) from Afghanistan in August 2021 (Daily Telegraph 2021 ).

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Ned Lebow, R. 2016. Identity. In Concepts in World Politics , ed. F. Berenskoetter, 73–88. Los Angeles: Sage.

Northedge, F.S. 1974. Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy, 1945–1973 . London: George Allen and Unwin.

Oppermann, K., R. Beasley, and J. Kaarbo. 2020. British Foreign Policy after Brexit: Losing Europe and Finding a Role. International Relations 34(2): 133–156.

Parnell, T. 2022. Unravelling the Global Britain Vision? International Relationships and National Identity in UK Government Documents about Brexit, 2016–2019. Discourse and Society 33(3): 391–410.

Renshon, J. 2017. Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics . Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Renshon, J., A. Dafoe, and P. Huth. 2018. Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics. American Journal of Political Science 62(2): 325–339.

Renshon, J. 2020. Status in International Relations. Oxford Bibliographies Online , https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0254.xml . Accessed 20 September 2022.

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© BFPG 2021

16 Feb 2021 Annual Survey of UK Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and Global Britain

The British Foreign Policy Group’s (BFPG) major new report, the 2021 Annual Survey of UK Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and Global Britain , is the most comprehensive survey ever undertaken of UK public opinion on foreign policy. The survey finds that Britons’ foreign policy attitudes are evolving dynamically in the aftermath of Britain’s departure from the European Union and in the wake of the seismic global coronavirus pandemic. Ahead of the imminent publication of the Government’s Integrated Review of the UK’s Defence, Security, Development and Foreign Policy, the report maps a polarised nation, where international attitudes are increasingly cleaving onto domestic social and political identities.

About the Survey This survey was conducted with the BFPG’s research partners Opinium Research on 6-7 January 2021 (sample of 2,002 UK adults, weighted to be nationally representative). The BFPG-Opinium survey is an ongoing partnership, pioneering quantitative research on foreign policy in the United Kingdom.

FULL REPORT

Summary report.

The BFPG’s Director, and the lead author of the report, Sophia Gaston, says:

“If we seek to pinpoint the ‘heart of the nation’ on foreign policy, we would find it favours a relatively open and ambitious international agenda, working alongside a variety of friends and partners, forging areas of special global leadership, and striking a healthy balance between our strategic interests and the projection of our values. It is also true, however, that these areas of consensus mask significant tensions and disparities between different groups of citizens – many of which play out within the major political parties themselves. Engagement and education must, therefore, be a central pillar of the publication of the Integrated Review. Just as Levelling Up aims to give all citizens a stake in Britain’s economy, so too must Global Britain seek to afford all citizens a stake and a voice in Britain’s foreign policy.”

REPORT SNAPSHOT

• Many citizens remain uncertain about the Global Britain project, and hold competing visions about the UK’s foreign policy priorities. There is little appetite for the Indo-Pacific to be its central focus, and Britons remain hesitant towards military interventionism.
• On the other hand, there is a clear desire for multilateralism and leadership on climate change to be foundational pillars of the UK’s international agenda. International aid is also widely supported, although most Brits think foreign aid spending should be stopped or reduced during the pandemic.
• Britons are warming to Biden’s America, but the United States remains less trusted than other key security partners, such as Canada, Australia, Germany, and Japan, and is considered a less important relationship than our partnership with the European Union. 
• More Britons would prefer a closer UK-EU relationship than the deal secured in December, than the proportion who back the deal or favour a looser relationship.
• Russia and China are seen as distinctively hostile global actors, and concern about China is hardening, with only a fifth of Britons now supporting any form of UK-China economic relationship.
• The pandemic appears to have intensified pre-existing disadvantage and insecurity, rather than creating a more widespread sense of vulnerability amongst the population as a whole.
• The most alarming international threats to the British people are the risk of cyber-attacks from other nations, international terrorism, the rise of China, climate change and foreign interference. 
• Britons recognise that globalisation has benefited the UK – especially London. The question of whether its spoils have been shared around the nation or reached individual communities are more contested and cut to the heart of socio-economic, regional, age- and identity-based divides.
• Public opinion on immigration is softening a little, but remains deeply polarised. Britons believe the UK population is too high, and are anxious about pressure on the welfare system and job competition, but also recognise migrants’ positive economic and social contributions.
• International identities such as global citizenship, patriotism and being ‘European’ remain fiercely contested and closely correlated with domestic political identities. National identities within the UK (ie. British, English, Scottish) also carry their unique relationships to foreign policy attitudes.
• Trust in the UK Government to make foreign policy decisions in line with citizens’ interests slumped over the past year, as the ups and downs of the pandemic inject a huge degree of dynamism into public opinion.
• The Conservative Party is no longer the party of globalisation, with the new voters the party has gained since the Referendum shifting its centre of gravity towards a more isolationist, security-conscious foreign policy. While more internationalist overall, Labour’s coalition remains extremely divided on foreign policy issues, and its voters are anxious about the impacts of trade.

Sophia Gaston

Sophia is the Director of the British Foreign Policy Group.

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British Foreign Policy since 1945

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British Foreign Policy since 1945 brings a chronological approach to the study of British foreign policy since the Second World War in order to make the principal events and dynamics accessible within a broader historical and cultural context.

The key features included in this book:

• a detailed chronological survey of developments in post-war British politics;
• an integrated discussion of foreign and domestic policy developments indicating connections and interlocking themes;
• illustrations of British foreign policy drawn from popular culture;
• analysis of Britain’s role in the world, particularly in regards to the UK’s 'special relationship' with the US and its decision to leave the EU;
• a range of in-text features including essay questions and seminar/discussion topics.

This timely book will be essential reading for anyone interested in British politics, foreign policy analysis and British history.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter | 6  pages, introduction, chapter 1 | 21  pages, foreign policy and international-relations theory, chapter 2 | 31  pages, the shaping and making of british foreign policy, chapter 3 | 35  pages, the road to 1945, chapter 4 | 35  pages, the limping lion, 1945–55, chapter 5 | 25  pages, suez and ‘supermac’, 1955–63, chapter 6 | 19  pages, symbols and substance, 1963–70, chapter 7 | 29  pages, awkward partnerships and special relationships, 1970–83, chapter 8 | 35  pages, from falklands fanfare to maastricht misery, 1983–92, chapter 9 | 29  pages, ethics and interventions, 1992–2001, chapter 10 | 28  pages, ‘not in my name’, 2001–7, chapter 11 | 29  pages, heirs to blair and ‘brexiteers’, 2007–17, chapter 12 | 16  pages, summary, guide to further reading and topics for discussion.

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UK position on foreign affairs

• Foreign Policy
• Thomas Brown

In 2021 the government published an integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy. It published a refreshed review in March 2023 to take account of developments in foreign affairs over the preceding two years. The government has since published a number of policy papers and strategies to complement the refreshed review. In addition, Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton was appointed as foreign secretary in November 2023.

Table of contents

The House of Lords is scheduled to debate the UK’s position on foreign affairs on 5 March 2024. The debate will take place on a government-sponsored motion.

The first section below provides a short summary of key overarching policy documents relating to security, defence, development and foreign policy. The second section provides links to recommended reading material for further information on the government’s foreign policy position in connection with specific issues or regions. This includes through statements and responses to parliamentary questions and debates, as well as briefings on particular foreign policy areas.

1. Overview of UK foreign policy approach

The government published an initial integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy in March 2021. [1] The document, entitled ‘ Global Britain in a competitive age ’, described the government’s vision for the UK’s role in the world. In particular it set out the UK’s foreign policy focus as follows:

In keeping with our history, the UK will continue to play a leading international role in collective security, multilateral governance, tackling climate change and health risks, conflict resolution and poverty reduction . We accept the risk that comes with our commitment to global peace and stability, from our tripwire NATO presence in Estonia and Poland to on-the-ground support for UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. Our commitment to European security is unequivocal , through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force and strong bilateral relations. There are few more reliable and credible allies around the world than the UK, with the willingness to confront serious challenges and the ability to turn the dial on international issues of consequence. [2]

The review identified four overarching trends facing the UK in the period up to 2030:

• Geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts : such as China’s increasing power and assertiveness internationally, the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific to global prosperity and security, and the emergence of new markets and growth of the global middle class.
• Systemic competition : the intensification of competition between states and with non-state actors […]
• Rapid technological change : technological developments and digitisation will reshape our societies and economies, and change relationships—both between states, and between the citizen, the private sector and the state. Science and technology will bring enormous benefits but will also be an arena of intensifying systemic competition.
• Transnational challenges : such as climate change, global health risks, illicit finance, serious and organised crime, and terrorism. [3]

In response to these trends, the review set out a strategic framework comprising four overarching and mutually supporting national security and international policy objectives for the period to 2025: [4]

• sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology
• shaping the open international order of the future
• strengthening security and defence at home and overseas
• building resilience at home and overseas

In March 2023 the government updated the integrated review in response to a “more contested and volatile world”. [5] In a foreword to the refreshed policy document, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said the 2021 review had “anticipated some but not all of the global turbulence of the last two years”. He continued:

Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, weaponisation of energy and food supplies and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, combined with China’s more aggressive stance in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, are threatening to create a world defined by danger, disorder and division—and an international order more favourable to authoritarianism. Long-standing threats from terrorism and serious and organised crime are enduring and evolving, and may find new opportunities in events like the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Other transnational challenges such as large-scale migration, smuggling of people, narcotics and weapons, and illicit finance have become more acute, with grave human costs and strain on our national resources. [6]

The document said the government’s assessment was that the “broad direction” set by the initial integrated review “was right, but that further investment and a greater proportion of national resource will be needed in defence and national security—now and in the future—to deliver its objectives”. [7] It added that a revised strategic framework comprising four pillars would underpin how the government would now seek to meet its strategic objectives, including addressing the threat posed by Russia to European security and responding to the “evolving and epoch-defining challenge” posed by China. The document listed these as follows:

• Shape the international environment : this pillar commits the UK to shaping, balancing, competing and cooperating across the main arenas of systemic competition, working with all who support an open and stable international order and the protection of global public goods.
• Deter, defend and compete across all domains : this pillar reinforces the ongoing shift to an integrated approach to deterrence and defence, to counter both state threats and transnational security challenges. It reaffirms that NATO is at the core of this effort, but is clear that—given the changing threat picture—effective deterrence will mean working through other groupings and beyond the Euro-Atlantic theatre. It also introduces a renewed emphasis on the concept of strategic stability—establishing new frameworks and building a new international security architecture to manage systemic competition and escalation in a multipolar environment.
• Address vulnerabilities through resilience : this pillar develops the UK’s approach to resilience, shifting to a long-term campaign to address the vulnerabilities that leave the UK exposed to crises and hostile actors. This will strengthen the UK’s deterrence by denial, and ensure that operational activity under pillar two can be focused where it has the greatest impact.
• Generate strategic advantage : this pillar reinforces and extends IR2021’s focus on strategic advantage—the UK’s relative ability to achieve our objectives compared to our competitors. In a more contested environment, this is indispensable to maintaining the UK’s freedom of action, freedom from coercion and our ability to cooperate with others, and is the underpinning for the other pillars of the strategic framework. [8]

The integrated review refresh was followed by an updated defence command paper, entitled ‘ Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world ’, published in July 2023, and an international development white paper, entitled ‘ International development in a contested world: Ending extreme poverty and tackling climate change ’, published in November 2023. [9] In February 2024 the government published a sanctions strategy entitled ‘ Deter, disrupt and demonstrate: UK sanctions in a contested world ’, which explained how the government intended to use sanctions as a foreign and security policy tool and the investments, partnerships and structures that would support sanctions work. [10]

Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton was appointed as foreign secretary a week before the international development white paper’s publication in November 2023. [11] Lord Cameron recently marked 100 days in office.

2. Read more

The following selection of material provides further information on the UK’s position on foreign affairs.

2.1 Government material

• HM Government, ‘ Integrated review refresh 2023 ’, 13 March 2023, CP 811
• Ministry of Defence, ‘ Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world ’, 18 July 2023, CP 901
• Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘ International development in a contested world: Ending extreme poverty and tackling climate change ’, 20 November 2023, CP 975
• Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘ Deter, disrupt and demonstrate: UK sanctions in a contested world ’, 22 February 2024
• Prime Minister’s Office, ‘ The Windsor Framework ’, accessed 26 February 2024; and ‘ The Windsor Framework: A new way forward ’, 27 February 2023, CP 806
• Prime Minister’s Office, ‘ Atlantic Declaration: A framework for a twenty-first century US-UK economic partnership ’, 8 June 2023

Further information on the government’s position on particular issues can be found via the ‘ Policy papers and consultations ’ and ‘ News and communications ’ sections of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office website.

2.2 Parliamentary questions, statements and debates

2.2.1 questions.

• Oral questions to the foreign secretary, HL Hansard, 13 February 2024, cols 135–49 (see also: House of Lords Library, ‘ Questions to the foreign secretary: 13 February 2024 ’, 9 February 2024. Topics covered: debt reduction in the developing world; children in Gaza; AUKUS security partnership; UK position on recognising a Palestinian state)
• Oral questions to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, HC Hansard, 30 January 2024, cols 701–22 (topics covered: Gaza; West Philippine Sea; UK recognition of a Palestinian state; climate change adaptation; debt reduction in the developing world; preventing conflict in the Middle East; Ukraine; Iran and Pakistan; human rights in Eritrea; the Hazara community in Afghanistan; and the UK’s diplomatic relationship with China)
• Oral questions to the foreign secretary, HL Hansard, 16 January 2024, cols 306–19 (see also: House of Lords Library, ‘ Questions to the foreign secretary: 16 January 2024 ’, 12 January 2024. Topics covered: Rohingya refugees; ceasefire in Gaza; sustainable development goals; and rules-based international order)
• Oral questions to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, HC Hansard, 12 December 2023, cols 723–44 (topics covered: violence in the West Bank; international development white paper; the British Indian Ocean Territory; civilian deaths and humanitarian situation in Gaza; climate change adaptation in the British Overseas Territories; Pakistan; Israel and international law; Iran; Sri Lanka; Israel and Palestine; the Philippines; Zimbabwe; release of hostages held by Hamas; and NATO support for Ukraine)
• Oral questions to the foreign secretary, HL Hansard, 5 December 2023, cols 1373–87 (topics covered: humanitarian and economic support for Ukraine; restoring democracy in Belarus; relations with the Taliban and Afghan refugees in Pakistan; and the UK-EU relationship)

Written questions answered since the beginning of the 2023–24 session by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office are available on the UK Parliament website.

2.2.2 Statements and debates

• House of Lords, ‘ Written statement: UK integrated security fund 2024/25 (HLWS286) ’, 26 February 2024
• House of Commons, ‘ Written statement: Publication of the ‘Critical imports and supply chains strategy’ (HCWS191) ’, 17 January 2024
• House of Commons, ‘ Written statement: Trade sanctions implementation update (HCWS110) ’, 11 December 2023
• House of Commons, ‘ Written statement: ‘International development white paper’ (HCWS47) ’, 20 November 2023; Commons statement on ‘International development white paper’ , HC Hansard, 21 November 2023, cols 195–213; and Lords statement on ‘International development white paper’ , HL Hansard, 23 November 2023, cols 875–87
• Debate on the ‘King’s Speech: Foreign affairs and defence’ , HL Hansard, 15 November 2023, cols 491–592
• Commons statement on ‘Defence command paper refresh’ , HC Hansard, 18 July 2023, cols 785–804; and Lords statement on ‘Defence command paper refresh’ , HL Hansard, 19 July 2023, cols 2427–42
• House of Commons, ‘ Written statement: Publication of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on China (HCWS938) ’, 13 July 2023; and ‘ Written statement: Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s China report (HCWS1026) ’, 14 September 2023
• Debate on ‘Foreign policy’ , HL Hansard, 3 May 2023, cols 585–626GC
• Commons statement on ‘Integrated review refresh’ , HC Hansard, 13 March 2023, cols 539–59; and Lords statement on ‘Integrated review refresh’ , HL Hansard, 14 March 2023, cols 1259–72

2.2.3 Committee activity

• House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘ IRDC homepage ’, accessed 26 February 2024
• House of Lords International Agreements Committee, ‘ IAC homepage ’, accessed 26 February 2024
• House of Lords European Affairs Committee, ‘ EAC homepage ’, accessed 26 February 2024; and ‘ Oral evidence: Foreign secretary (non-inquiry session) ’, 14 December 2023
• Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ‘ ISC publications ’, accessed 26 February 2024
• House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘ FAC homepage ’, accessed 26 February 2024; and ‘ Oral evidence: Work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office ’, 9 January 2024, HC 325 of session 2023–24, Q582–725
• House of Commons International Development Committee, ‘ IDC homepage ’, accessed 26 February 2024
• House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘ Defence Committee homepage ’, accessed 26 February 2024

2.3 Briefings

2.3.1 house of lords library.

• ‘ Humanitarian situation in Gaza ’, 5 February 2024
• ‘ Ukraine update: January 2024 ’, 18 January 2024
• ‘ King’s Speech 2023: Foreign affairs and defence ’, 27 October 2023
• ‘ UK: Long-term strategic challenges posed by China ’, 3 October 2023
• ‘ The future UK-EU relationship: Report by the House of Lords European Affairs Committee ’, 8 September 2023
• ‘ UK’s role in the world: Implications for foreign policy ’, 27 April 2023

Further House of Lords Library briefings on world affairs are available.

2.3.2 House of Commons Library

• ‘ Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion ’, 22 February 2024
• ‘ 2023/24 Israel-Hamas conflict: UK and international response ’, 20 February 2024
• ‘ Defence and international affairs ’, 19 January 2024
• ‘ International affairs and defence: Parliamentary debates and statements in the 2022–23 session ’, 17 January 2024
• ‘ The 0.7% aid target ’, 4 December 2023
• ‘ General debate on international trade and geopolitics ’, 19 April 2023
• ‘ Integrated review refresh 2023: What has changed since 2021? ’, 15 March 2023

Further House of Commons Library briefings on world affairs are available.

2.4 Articles and opinion

• Eleni Courea, ‘ ‘He’s getting a lot done’: Cameron’s first 100 days as foreign secretary impress ’, Guardian, 26 February 2024
• Lord Ricketts, ‘ The Cameron effect ’, New Statesman, 22 February 2024
• Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, ‘ David Cameron: Pass Ukraine funding for the sake of global security ’, The Hill, 14 February 2024
• Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, ‘ Israel must act now to let aid through and save lives in Gaza. Britain has a plan to help that happen ’, Guardian, 11 January 2024

Cover image by Kyle Glenn on Unsplash .

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• HM Government, ‘ Global Britain in a competitive age ’, 16 March 2021, CP 403. This replaced an earlier ‘ National security strategy and strategic defence and security review ’, published in 2015. Return to text
• As above, p 11. Bold in original. Return to text
• As above, p 24. Bold in original. Return to text
• As above, p 18. Return to text
• HM Government, ‘ Integrated review refresh 2023 ’, 13 March 2023, CP 811. Return to text
• As above, p 2. Return to text
• As above, p 11. Return to text
• As above, p 16. Return to text
• Ministry of Defence, ‘ Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world ’, 18 July 2023, CP 901; and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘ International development in a contested world: Ending extreme poverty and tackling climate change ’, 20 November 2023, CP 975. Return to text
• Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘ Deter, disrupt and demonstrate: UK sanctions in a contested world ’, 22 February 2024. Return to text
• Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘ Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton ’, accessed 26 February 2024. Return to text

1st Edition

British Foreign Policy since 1945

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Description

British Foreign Policy since 1945 brings a chronological approach to the study of British foreign policy since the Second World War in order to make the principal events and dynamics accessible within a broader historical and cultural context. The key features included in this book: a detailed chronological survey of developments in post-war British politics; an integrated discussion of foreign and domestic policy developments indicating connections and interlocking themes; illustrations of British foreign policy drawn from popular culture; analysis of Britain’s role in the world, particularly in regards to the UK’s 'special relationship' with the US and its decision to leave the EU; a range of in-text features including essay questions and seminar/discussion topics. This timely book will be essential reading for anyone interested in British politics, foreign policy analysis and British history.

Table of Contents

Mark Garnett is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, UK. Among many books and articles on UK Politics, he is co-author of Exploring British Politics, 4th edition (2016), and British General Elections since 1964 (2014). Simon Mabon is Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Richardson Institute at Lancaster University, UK. He is also a Research Associate with the London-based think tank the Foreign Policy Centre, and is the author of Saudi Arabia and Iran (2013) and the co-author of The Origins of Isis (2017), among other publications. Robert Smith is a Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University, UK. He has previously taught at Lancaster University, UK, and was a Senior Lecturer in British defence and foreign policy at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and worked for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Iraq advising on the development of Human Rights policies in the immediate aftermath of the 2003 invasion. He has also written on the development of policies of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era.

Critics' Reviews

"Combining theoretical, historical and political science approaches and exploring both international and domestic contexts, this volume breaks new ground in explaining how and why the belief in Britain’s continuing ‘greatness’ has persisted so long and stymied attempts to shape a more realistic appreciation of Britain’s foreign policy options. As Britain prepares to forge a new international role outside the European Union, this book will serve as both the best single-volume introduction to recent British foreign policy and a valuable warning of the limitations of a foreign policy based on bluster and wishful thinking." – Alex May, University of Oxford, UK. " British Foreign Policy Since 1945 provides an authoritative and comprehensive evaluation of the critical developments in British foreign policy in the post-war era. Tailored to the needs of lecturers, teachers and students of British politics, the book will facilitate a thorough understanding of the principal themes of British foreign policy - the main factors, events and issues by which foreign policy has been shaped. Garnett, Mabon and Smith provide a fascinating examination of the changes and continuities of British foreign policy." – Samantha Wolstencroft, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK " British Foreign Policy since 1945 provides a rich and timely introduction to the past and present of UK foreign policy. It provides a detailed and carefully researched exploration of change and continuity in Britain’s approach to world politics from the early part of the 20th Century to the EU referendum of 2016. Accessibly written and with insights into theory and institutional structures, the book provides a very useful guide to understanding Britain’s efforts to define its role in the post-War world. Its chronological organisation allows readers to appreciate the connections between different phases of UK foreign policy, Britain’s shifting priorities and position in the world, and its path in an increasingly uncertain 21st Century global politics. The coverage of Brexit provides a pertinent analysis of what is likely to be a turning point for the UK. British Foreign Policy since 1945 is an authoritative work and key reading for students of British foreign policy." – Jonathan Gilmore, Kingston University, UK.

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Partnerships for the future of UK Foreign Policy

After a prolonged period of introspection and tensions with longstanding partners, this new publication sets out the many different ways in which a ‘Global Britain’ can reinvigorate its relationships with allies, alliances and institutions.

This essay collection has been edited by Foreign Policy Centre Director Adam Hug. It contains essay contributions from: Rosa Balfour (Director of Carnegie Europe); Professor Jamie Shea (Visiting Professor at the University of Exeter); Dr Alice Donald (Senior Lecturer at Middlesex University) and Professor Philip Leach (Professor at Middlesex University); Anna Chernova (FPC Research Fellow); Sanjoy Hazarika (International Director of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative [CHRI]) and Sneh Aurora (Director of CHRI UK); Richard Gowan (UN Director for the International Crisis Group); Enyseh Teimory (Communications Officer at the UNA-UK); Thorsten Benner (Director of the Global Public Policy Institute); Aaron Shull (Managing Director for the Centre for International Governance Innovation [CIGI]) and Wesley Wark (Senior Fellow at CIGI); and Thomas E. Garrett (Secretary General of the Community of Democracies).

The UK can show that it is willing to do the hard work to retain and build alliances with like-minded countries to make regional and global systems work in both the national and international interest. In order to build trust the UK should demonstrate that it still believes in the intrinsic value of international cooperation as more than simply an instrumental tool in its foreign policy kit because as an internationally focused middle power the UK benefits enormously from promoting wider global acceptance of international institutions and established norms.

Irrespective of the UK’s Asia-Pacific aspirations, the UK’s security priorities are still overwhelmingly focused on Europe and so the UK needs to find a new way of working with the EU once the current sound and fury has subsided. This can start at an operational level where UK Embassies and EU Delegations can re-establish cooperation and information sharing on the ground in third countries and international institutions. In the future it may be possible to revisit issues such as formal foreign policy and security cooperation, as part of a future EU-UK Partnership and Cooperation Agreement or Strategic Partnership. Irrespective of the state of UK-EU relations Britain will need to redouble its efforts in the other European focused forums such as NATO, the OSCE and Council of Europe, with an emphasis on supporting the work these institutions do to promote democratic values.

Globally the UK must build on its strong position at the UN and take full advantage of its leadership of both the COP and G7 in 2021 to set out an ambitious agenda for the UK’s future foreign policy. It should seek to build on ideas around a ‘Democracies-10’ (D10), by promoting expanded G7 membership to include South Korea and Australia. It should find new ways to promote engagement with the democracies of the global south and support UK NGOs and institutions such as the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to play a bigger role in democracy promotion. The UK will need to work flexibly and creatively with longstanding partners in new formats such as the Alliance for Multilateralism, the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) coalition, as well continuing current efforts to build greater collaboration between the ‘CANZUK’ countries, though recognising the geographic and economic limitations to the scale of such ambitions.

Partnerships for the future of UK Foreign Policy: Executive Summary

After a prolonged period of introspection and tensions with longstanding partners, this publication shows the many different ways in which a Global Britain can reinvigorate its relationships with allies, alliances…

Partnerships for the future of UK Foreign Policy: Introduction

Alliances and partnerships have been at the heart of the UK’s foreign policy throughout its history and they will be central its future. While at different points in history the…

After Brexit: Recasting a UK-EU dialogue on foreign policy

2020 will be remembered for the Coronavirus pandemic, the end of Donald Trump’s US Presidency, and the year in which Britain finally left the EU. It was also the year…

The UK and European defence: Will NATO be enough?

During her time as British Prime Minister handling Brexit, Theresa May was fond of pointing out that “the UK is leaving the European Union but it is not leaving Europe”.[1]…

Engaging with Europe after Brexit: Time to reset the UK’s relationship with the Council of Europe

The UK’s relationship with the Council of Europe presents a paradox. In many ways, the UK is an exemplar within this organisation of 47 states. The UK was a founding…

Global Britain in 2030: Multilateralism and the importance of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The UK plays a leading role in responding to global challenges and has traditionally excelled at maximising foreign policy opportunities for national security and development.[1] However, within a shifting geo-political,…

The UK and the Commonwealth: Leading the rights path

With the COVID-19 pandemic battering the world socially and economically, both the Director General of the World Health Organization, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, and the Secretary General of the United…

Brexit Britain at the United Nations

Following the 2016 Brexit referendum, successive governments have been keen to emphasise that Britain’s withdrawal from the EU is not a rejection of international institutions and cooperation more broadly. Advocates…

Recommitting the UK to multilateralism through the United Nations

The global order is changing: traditional champions of international cooperation work to undermine the system of rules they helped build and multilateral organisations face a crisis of legitimacy at the…

Kindred spirits: How a post-Brexit Britain and the EU can work together to strengthen multilateralism

In December 2016, in a speech at Chatham House, then UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson talked about the promise of a post-Brexit UK “to be more outward-looking and more engaged…

The UK and Canada: National Security and collaboration in uncertain times

The contemporary world of international relations is marked by two major countervailing trends. First, is a number of complicated existential threats, like climate change and pandemics, which require earnest international…

Another look at values-based multilateralism

Every few years, Western leaders raise the idea of democracies working in 'alliance' or 'concert' on global challenges. The late US Senator John McCain, an esteemed supporter of transatlantic cooperation,…

Partnerships for the future of UK Foreign Policy: Conclusions and Recommendations

The contributions to this essay collection highlight the range of different opportunities that a truly engaged Global Britain can take advantage of on the world stage as it seeks to…

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• International
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Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world

The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 updates the government’s security, defence, development and foreign policy priorities to reflect changes in the global context since Integrated Review 2021.

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Adolygiad Integredig Diweddaraf 2023: Ymateb i fyd mwy cystadleuol a helbulus (HTML)

The 2021 Integrated Review (IR2021) provided a comprehensive articulation of the UK’s national security and international policy in the context of a world moving towards greater competition and multipolarity. In the two years since its publication, that transition has happened more quickly and definitively than anticipated. The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IR2023) responds to a more contested and volatile world.

The broad direction set by IR2021 remains right, and IR2023 maintains significant continuity across most policy. But in a few areas, the UK’s policy has evolved in the last two years, or needs to be updated to reflect key changes in the global context, including but not limited to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In this context, IR2023 sets out the four ways in which the UK will protect its core national interests – the sovereignty, security and prosperity of the British people – as well as its higher interest in an open and stable international order of enhanced cooperation and well-managed competition based on respect for the UN Charter and international law:

• Shape the international environment. The UK will actively shape, balance, cooperate and compete to create the conditions, structures and incentives necessary for an open and stable international order and to protect global public goods.
• Deter, defend and compete across all domains. We will strengthen our integrated approach to deterrence and defence, to counter both state threats and transnational security challenges. We will also work to uphold strategic stability, establishing new frameworks and building a new international security architecture to manage systemic competition and escalation in a multipolar environment.
• Address vulnerabilities through resilience. We will develop the UK’s approach to resilience, addressing the economic, societal, technological, environmental and infrastructural factors that leave the UK exposed to crises and hostile actors.
• Generate strategic advantage. We will reinforce and extend IR2021’s focus on strategic advantage – the UK’s relative ability to achieve our objectives compared to our competitors. We will cultivate our national strengths and update our tools of statecraft to maintain the UK’s freedom of action, freedom from coercion and our ability to cooperate with others.

IR2023 will guide the allocation of resources across national security and foreign policy for the remainder of the Parliament. We will ensure all government’s instruments work together, coordinated at the centre, to achieve our objectives.

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The EU’s approach to Britain and Brexit needs fixing

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Windsor Framework

The windsor framework.

24 March 2023: The EU-UK Joint Committee adopted a decision laying down the arrangements relating to the Windsor Framework. More details:

• Press release
• Legal documents

27 February 2023: A political agreement in principle by the Commission and UK government on a new way forward on the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland

Today, the European Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom reached a political agreement in principle on the Windsor Framework. This constitutes a comprehensive set of joint solutions aimed at addressing, in a definitive way, the practical challenges faced by citizens and businesses in Northern Ireland, thereby providing them with lasting certainty and predictability.

The joint solutions cover, amongst other things new arrangements on customs, agri-food, medicines, VAT and excise, as well as specific instruments designed to ensure that the voices of the people of Northern Ireland are better heard on specific issues particularly relevant to the communities there. These new arrangements are underpinned by robust safeguards to ensure the integrity of the EU’s Single Market, to which Northern Ireland has a unique access.   

For more information:

• Statement by President von der Leyen
• Memo (Q&A)

Legal and other texts:

• 18 July 2024: Commission adopted a Notice on the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1849 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/852 on mercury as regards dental amalgam and other mercury-added products subject to export, import and manufacturing restrictions to and in the United Kingdom in respect of Northern Ireland  
• 30 January 2024: Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Decision on a new EU-UK joint solution under the Windsor Framework on tariff-rate quotas for certain agri-food products, to benefit Northern Ireland businesses
• 9 June 2023: Commission adopted a revised Notice to stakeholders on the application of EU State aid rules following the withdrawal of the UK from the EU
• 9 June 2023: Commission published a Delegated Act for simplified customs formalities for trusted traders and for sending parcels into Northern Ireland from another part of the United Kingdom
• General publications
• 27 February 2023
• Secretariat-General

Windsor Political Declaration by the European Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom

Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the EU in the Joint Committee established by the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement

• Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the EU in the Joint Consultative Working Group

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council – Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council - Medicinal products for human use

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) – High-risk plants (Ligustrum delavayanum and Ligustrum japonicum) originating in the UK

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council – Tariff Rate Quotas

Position paper on agri-food, plants and pet animals

Position paper on simplifications in the area of customs

Commission statement on Enhanced engagement with Northern Ireland stakeholders

Stakeholder engagement

The voices of Northern Ireland stakeholders are heard through regular engagement at each level of the Withdrawal Agreement structures, also following the Windsor Political Declaration by the European Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom   of 27 February 2023.

In addition, the European Commission has introduced enhanced measures to deepen engagement with people and businesses with respect to the limited set of Union law that applies in Northern Ireland. COM statement of 27.2.2023

To facilitate the participation of Northern Ireland stakeholders in consultation processes relating to upcoming policy or legislative initiatives, a list of relevant upcoming initiatives will be made available here.

Upcoming EU Policy initiatives with relevance for Northern Ireland:

The information included under this section is intended for informational purposes only. Its content is regularly updated as appropriate, and it should be read in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Windsor Framework and its annexes, in particular the notes/comments that define the application of certain legal acts for the purposes of the Windsor Framework.

Have your say

EU Impact Assessments

EU-UK relations: The Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee met on 21 February.

An update regarding the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (‘the Protocol’) was on the meeting agenda. A series of factsheets on the Protocol in the areas of::

A series of factsheets on the Protocol on Northern Ireland/Ireland in the areas of:

• supply of medicines
• sanitary and phytosantiary goods (SPS); and
• stakeholder engagement

are available here

More information:

• Joint Statement
• Press remarks by Vice-President Šefčovič

EU-UK relations: Commission delivers on promise to ensure continued supply of medicines to Northern Ireland, as well as Cyprus, Ireland and Malta

On 17 December 2020, the Commission has put forward proposals to ensure the continued long-term supply of medicines from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and to address outstanding supply concerns in Cyprus, Ireland and Malta. This means that the same medicines will continue to be available in Northern Ireland at the same time as in the rest of the United Kingdom, while specific conditions ensure that UK-authorised medicines do not enter the Single Market. The proposed bespoke solution reflects the outcome of extensive discussions between Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič, and the UK Cabinet Office Minister, David Frost, and takes into account the concerns raised by stakeholders.  With this solution, the Commission is delivering on its intention to facilitate the implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland on the ground, in line with the package of far-reaching solutions for Northern Ireland tabled on 13 October 2021.

• Statement by Vice-President Šefčovič

Main elements of the Protocol

• Alignment with EU rules : as of the end of the transition period, Northern Ireland is subject to a limited set of EU rules related to the Single Market for goods and the Customs Union. The Union's Customs Code, for example, applies to all goods entering or exiting Northern Ireland.
• Necessary checks and controls must take place at Points of Entry on goods entering Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom or any other third country. This also means that the UK, acting in respect of Northern Ireland for the implementation of the Protocol, must ensure that, amongst other things, the relevant sanitary and phyto-sanitary (“SPS”) controls are carried out.
• EU customs duties apply to goods entering Northern Ireland from any other part of the United Kingdom or any other third country unless those goods are not at risk of moving on to the EU.  The Protocol contains a presumption that all goods entering Northern Ireland from a third country (i.e. from any other part of the United Kingdom or from other third countries) are at risk of moving on to the Union. Such goods may only exceptionally be considered “not at risk” of moving on to the Union, if the goods concerned are (i) not subject to commercial processing in Northern Ireland and (ii) fulfil additional conditions for being considered “not at risk” set out in the Joint Committee Decision on “goods not at risk”. Where it is established, based on these conditions, that goods from any other part of the United Kingdom than Northern Ireland may be considered “not at risk”, no customs duties are applicable; and where it is established, based on these conditions, that goods from any other third country may be considered “not at risk”, the UK’s customs duties are applicable.
• The application and implementation of the Protocol is the sole responsibility of UK authorities acting in respect of Northern Ireland (Article 12 (1)).
• In order to live up to their responsibilities pursuant to Article 12 of the Protocol, EU institutions and bodies must be able to monitor the implementation of the Protocol by UK authorities. Article 12 (2) therefore provides for a ‘Union presence’ during any implementation activities by the UK authorities.
• The Joint Committee Decision 6/2020 sets out practical working arrangements aimed at ensuring an effective exercise of the ‘Union presence’ established by Article 12 of the Protocol.

October 2021 package

On 13 October 2021, the European Commission proposed bespoke arrangements to respond to the difficulties that people in Northern Ireland have been experiencing because of Brexit.

This package of measures proposes further flexibilities in the area of food, plant and animal health, customs, medicines and engagement with Northern Irish stakeholders.

It proposes a different model for the implementation of the Protocol, facilitating the movement of goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland, while protecting the Single Market through specific conditions and safeguards, such as robust monitoring, increased market surveillance and enforcement mechanisms.

• Engagement with Northern Ireland Stakeholders and Authorities
• Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) issues
• Concrete examples of today’s package
• Benefits of the Protocol
• Examples of flexibilities already identified

What is the consent mechanism?

The Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland provides for a new mechanism on “consent”, which gives the Northern Ireland Assembly a decisive voice on the long-term application of relevant EU law made applicable by the Protocol in respect of Northern Ireland. This consent mechanism concerns the application of EU law on goods and customs, the Single Electricity Market, VAT and State aid, as currently foreseen by the Protocol.

In practice, this means that four years after the start of application of the Protocol on 1 January 2021, the Assembly can, by simple majority, give consent to the continued application of relevant Union law, or vote to discontinue its application. In the latter case, the Protocol would cease to apply two years later.

Every four years thereafter, the Assembly can vote on the continued application of relevant Union law. In case a vote of the Assembly gathers cross-community support for the continued application of relevant Union law, the next vote can only take place eight years thereafter. 

More information

• European Commission Q&A: Brexit: What did you agree with the UK today?  [17 October 2019]
• European Commission Representation in Ireland: Brexit and Ireland
• 19 December 2022

Commission notice

• 15 June 2022

Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland - Position paper on possible solutions - Customs

Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland - Position paper on possible solutions - Sanitary and Phytosanitary

• 12 April 2022
• 21 February 2022

Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: movement of animals and animal products into Northern Ireland

• 22 December 2021

Commission Notice

• 17 December 2021

Communication to the Commission and Annex

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

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Essay: M. Night Shyamalan Pulls Off the Ultimate Twist

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M. Night Shyamalan Pulls Off the Ultimate Twist

For 25 years, the director has been doing something few else would dare try in wide-release, thrill-ride cinema..

There are only a few film directors working in Hollywood whose names can be used as shorthand. You say Michael Bay and you know you’re getting chaotic explosions. Christopher Nolan delights in mind-scrambling manipulations of time. And M. Night Shyamalan, perhaps most famously of all, will forever be known as the guy with the twist endings. And while a revelatory “aha!” in the final scene is something that happens in most (but not all) of Shyamalan’s movies, that carny-style move isn’t his only authorial stamp. For 25 years, Shyamalan has been doing something hardly few would dare to try in wide-release, thrill-ride cinema. He’s maintained a philosophy of heart-on-sleeve earnestness, a sincerity surrounding existential issues rarely seen outside a hospital or house of worship. You buy a ticket to a horror movie, you get theology. How’s that for a twist?

To understand Shyamalan—still best known for his three-in-a-row run of The Sixth Sense (1999), Unbreakable (2000), and Signs (2002), and in theaters now with the extremely entertaining Trap —it’s good to know his origins, as well as some details about his seldom-seen early work.

The writer-director-producer was born Manoj (that’s what the “M.” stands for) Shyamalan in Pondicherry, India, in 1970. Both parents were physicians, and the family, including an older sister, settled in the Philadelphia suburbs when Manoj was still an infant. He was raised Hindu but attended Catholic school, an outsider’s position that fueled his investigative, questioning nature. As a child he became enamored of Native American history, and, when studying the Lakota language, was drawn to a word that translated to “night”; he added that name to his own. Seeing Star Wars at the age of 7 led to a love of shooting home movies, and eventually attending New York University’s film school—not studying medicine as his father wished.

While a student he completed the feature-length film Praying with Anger , in which the young Shyamalan himself stars as an Indian-American exchange student in the land of his roots, trying to navigate a sense of identity. For a student film, it is impressive, but it’s hard to recommend for reasons other than searching for seeds of the director’s later work. Early on, his character tells a friend that he rejected religion once he realized that no matter how hard he prayed, it wouldn’t affect the scores of his favorite football team. Repeated culture clashes cast something of a jaundiced view on India, but this is balanced by moments of awe during visits to Hindu temples. At the climax, the student summons a strength he didn’t know he had to halt a mob from killing a Muslim.

Not long after Praying with Anger , Shyamalan completed the religious comedy Wide Awake , another semi-autobiographical small film. In it, a wide-eyed, philosophical boy (Joseph Cross) with physician parents and an older sister living in the Philadelphia suburbs attends a Catholic school and can’t stop causing lighthearted grief for the nuns (Rosie O’Donnell and Camryn Manheim!) with his constant questions. Early on, he is thunderstruck to learn that anyone who isn’t baptized will be sent to hell, a moment Shyamalan still recalls from his youth.

Grieving the death of his grandfather, our young protagonist sets out on a mission to somehow meet God and lob him a few basic questions. At only 88 minutes, Wide Awake tries to walk a line between Thomas Mann and Home Alone and is far too corny to really work. At the very end, however, there is a little twist (God was with us all along, you’ll be happy to know), which unlocked the door for Shyamalan’s future success. A dash of fantasy (or the supernatural) will be a hallmark going forward and lead to one of the most impressive careers in Hollywood.

Shyamalan on the set of his 1999 film The Sixth Sense . Buena Vista Entertainment

A year after Wide Awake ’s release (though the movie had been completed for some time), summer audiences sank their teeth into The Sixth Sense , a money-making juggernaut that dominated the cultural conversation and was nominated for six Academy Awards. It, too, is about a young boy in Philadelphia attending Catholic school and working through enormous issues. His is less a case of premature weltschmerz and instead is about the trouble that comes from being able to communicate with the dead. (Specifically, dead people who were killed in rotten ways and are still milling about the Delaware Valley with some sort of task that needs doing.) This would be a problem for anyone, but especially a sensitive young lad who just wants someone, mostly his mother, to believe him.

As you likely know, the child psychologist dispatched to help him (Bruce Willis) turns out to be a ghost himself, which he (and we in the audience) do not realize until the conclusion—which sent many to tell friends “you need to see this movie; you won’t believe how it ends” and also back to the ticket booth for a second viewing, to make sure it all added up. Watching it years later, already aware of the big finish, I was much more taken with the penultimate scene. Before Willis has his final reveal, the young boy (Haley Joel Osment) finally opens up to his mother (Toni Collette) and offers just enough “proof” that he maybe isn’t a head case after all. If you come to this emotional scene in the car with your guard down, you’ll find the exchange to be incredibly powerful. Putting aside plot specifics, it’s a moment in which two people who are terrified of the enormity of existence accept that the only weapon they have against fear is love.

It’s a raw kind of emotion—one reserved for a person’s most private encounters, not the middle of a mainstream suspense thriller—and Shyamalan effectively duplicated it in his alien invasion thriller, Signs .

In Signs , Mel Gibson plays a farmer and former preacher grieving the sudden (and gruesome) death of his wife. When it looks like the world is about to be conquered by asparagus-looking visitors from outer space, Gibson confesses to his younger brother (Joaquin Phoenix) that every drop of his faith has been dried up. The night before he and his family, including Rory Culkin and Abigail Breslin, expect to die, he fails as a father when he is unable to offer even a shred of hope. Faced with this ultimate absence, he reaches out for a group embrace, and everyone sobs.

Here’s where I’ll mention that Signs is actually rousing and action-packed and has a great many funny scenes, as well as suspenseful sequences that would make Alfred Hitchcock tense. But its foundation is this: When the time comes, can any of us make sense of the enormity of existence, not just to their family, but to ourselves? People forget that Signs , too, has a twist ending. The final frame shows Gibson putting his collar back on. At the end of the ordeal, he has returned to God.

Between The Sixth Sense and Signs came another big hit, Unbreakable , a movie that foresaw comic-book-movie mania in its content but not in form. Its twist (apart from an actual character switcheroo at the end) was that it wasn’t a supernatural movie like The Sixth Sense , but a superhero origin story. It stars Bruce Willis as a working-class security guard who is the sole survivor of a deadly train derailment. Turns out he is invincible, but other than that (and a few other subtle tweaks of reality), everything about the world of Unbreakable is as realistic as ours.

Taking that approach—and limiting itself to just one or two pleasurable sequences of vigilante justice—the movie offers itself plenty of time for Willis (and, wouldn’t you know, his young and highly sensitive son) to ask big questions like “why me?” The lasting image of the film is a melancholy Willis finally accepting his unbelievable fate.

At the kitchen table, father and son make tearful eye contact and agree to keep the mixed blessing between them. Yes, yes, in superhero terms this is “maintaining a secret identity,” but within the film it plays out like an open wound. Even though Willis is admitting to great strength, his acceptance, after long wishing it were not true, is more of a weakness. It rattles him and makes for a surprisingly emotional moment—in a movie where Samuel L. Jackson plays a comic book supervillain.

Bryce Dallas Howard in Shyamalan’s 2006 film, Lady in the Water . Warner Bros. Entertainment

With these three hits under Shyamalan’s belt, surely, he, too, felt invincible. Newsweek magazine called him “ The Next Spielberg ” when he was only 31. His next picture, The Village , was promoted with a television “ documentary ” that suggested that Shyamalan himself may be some sort of cursed revenant with extrasensory gifts. The program was a put-on (and the scenes where he takes the crew to Jim’s Steaks in Philly are a blast), but the public was starting to get sick of this guy. The Village , ostensibly set in the 1800s, but actually not, had a zany twist that many felt went beyond believability—though I personally find it no less daffy than Willis discovering he’s akin to Superman. While far from a box office bomb, Shyamalan started to get some negative reviews.

This sent him into a bit of a tailspin. His next picture, The Lady in the Water , ostensibly a family-friendly fantasy, is one of Hollywood’s great boondoggles, and is particularly funny because it features a twerpy film critic (Bob Balaban) getting mauled by a demon as an angelic beauty (Bryce Dallas Howard) tells a misunderstood genius (Shyamalan casting himself) that he will one day write a book so brilliant it will inspire political leaders to change their ways and all of Earth’s problems will be solved. It’s the type of delusionary dream one might play out for oneself while drifting to sleep, but perhaps best not to release into movie theaters.

The Lady in the Water was destroyed by critics and audiences alike, and the sudden shift from hero to zero made Shyamalan something of a punchline to moviegoers. Don’t worry, there’s a twist to all this with his current string of films, but every good third act deserves a difficult second.

Shyamalan’s next outing, The Happening , is one that only a select few will defend—and I guess you can count me among them. Whereas Hitchcock’s The Birds details what would happen if our skyward cohabitants decided one day to kill us, The Happening shows an alliance between trees, grass, and shrubs that want to do damage to those who do damage to them. In this vaguely environmental tale, Mark Wahlberg and others find themselves running from danger before they can even identify where it is coming from.

When the wind blows, you see, anyone caught in its path freezes, then suddenly finds a way to kill themself. Easy when you are a gun-toting cop (or a construction worker atop a building), but more of a conundrum out in the sticks. This leads to the bizarre image of a man turning on an enormous lawn mower, then laying down in front of it to get all chomped up. It’s very silly to watch but … also terrifying?

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The Paranoid Movies That Captured Post-Watergate America

The proverbial tinfoil hat was once the purview of counterculture hippies.

Released in 2008, The Happening grappled directly with the powerlessness many felt after the 9/11 terrorism attacks and, eerily, predicted some of the first wave of COVID’s dark vibes. What I love about the movie is that the avenging plants release a toxin that, according to a scientist we see on television for 10 seconds, tamps down whatever enzyme is in our system that promotes self-preservation. The idea, I suppose, is that by removing this one simple domino, every human being defaults to an immediate and irrevocable proclivity toward suicide. Pretty dark!

No one else interprets the movie this way (most just laugh the picture off), but given Shyamalan’s love of asking big fat “why?” questions in all his work, I feel like he’d be fine with this particular take. As with Signs , though, I must reiterate that there are a lot of very funny moments in the movie, too—there’s a whole bit about hot dogs at the end of the world that’s a scream. The movie doesn’t have a twist, however, unless you consider Wahlberg and his wife (Zooey Deschanel) deciding to communicate more in their marriage a big revelation. Not everything is gold here.

After the box office failure of The Happening , Shyamalan hit a true rough patch. He did two “work for hire” gigs. The first was adapting Nickelodeon’s beloved animated series Avatar: The Last Airbender to live action, in the hopes of sparking a trilogy. The result was atrocious, but part of Shyamalan’s decision to take the gig, as he explained in a video interview with me for UGO.com that is no longer online, was that his kids loved the show, and his mother, who watched along with the family, was excited that there was a popular cartoon that had some Hindu themes. (The original series indeed features a mélange of Asian storytelling origins; alas, the Hollywood version swapped in mostly white kids for the leads.)

The dud that was The Last Airbender led to something even further removed from Shyamalan’s usual playbook: a space opera, also intended to kick-start a franchise, based on a story concept by Will Smith. The result, After Earth , which many interpreted as thinly veiled Scientology propaganda, was a disaster for Smith and Shyamalan alike.

Shyamalan, center, and Dave Bautista on set of the 2023 film Knock at the Cabin . Universal Pictures

The two big-budget assignments broke Shyamalan’s mojo not just because they lacked classic twist endings, but because they didn’t come from the man’s soul. Sincerity is what counts with Shyamalan, so in an all-or-nothing move he put his home up as collateral and self-financed his comeback—the gory, tense, and very funny suspense film The Visit . In it, a young brother and sister go to stay with their estranged grandparents on a farm and slowly realize they are serial killers. The twist at the end happened both on screen (they aren’t really the grandparents!) and off. A movie that cost $5 million made close to $100 million.

And this is the formula that’s stuck: smaller-budget projects set at one location. After The Visit came Split , in which Anya Taylor-Joy is kidnapped and held in a basement by a freaky killer (James McAvoy) with multiple personalities, then Glass , set mostly in an insane asylum, which ties Unbreakable and Split into a trilogy, and then two of the best movies of the current decade, Old and Knock at the Cabin .

Old , loosely based on a preexisting graphic novel, is absolutely idiotic. A group of tourists, including a family of four, goes to a secluded beach near an odd resort and … physically can’t leave. Some kind of force is preventing them. If that weren’t weird enough, something on the beach causes them to age rapidly. They are trapped on a beach that makes you old.

Why? Oh, please, don’t ask such questions. Ask, instead, how would people actually react. There is paranoia, disbelief, violence, anger, sadness, and finally, acceptance. There is also humor and tenderness. Little kids must soon care for their geriatric parents, and also care for children of their own (don’t ask too much about that one!). It’s a preposterous scenario, but it works because its logic, like its setting, is completely sealed. The characters are tormented in ways that make perfect sense when you realize the puppet master is a pesky philosopher who refuses to stop asking the nuns “why?” (And, in Old , Shyamalan casts himself as a sniper on the perimeter of the beach; a nice moment of self-awareness.)

Even more heart-on-its-sleeve is Knock at the Cabin , where a loving family of three is confronted by a group of kind-seeming-strangers-turned-home-invaders with horrible news. Unless someone in the family sacrifices someone else, the entire world will violently end. It’s the classic little kid question to a parent: “If someone said you had to shoot me or [insert someone else in the family’s name here], who would you choose? And no, you can’t say you’d kill yourself!” (One of the stipulations in Knock at the Cabin .)

This film is played absolutely straight-faced, and part of what makes it work is that even the zealot intruders can’t believe what they are being forced to do. Like the toxin-infected suicides of The Happening , they are driven to their task—they will convince this family and kill themselves one by one to prove it—but this time they aren’t zombies. They are terrified, but, for them, it isn’t an act of faith. They know (or so they believe) what will happen if they don’t succeed. It’s a marvelous and shocking film that goes from zero to 60 in moments and sustains itself throughout. And like Signs , it hinges on someone renouncing their atheism. In our current cinematic marketplace, anyone else making “faith-based” films is sent to a very specific marketing ghetto. Shyamalan, by adding some brutal kills and edge-of-your-seat suspense, reaches similar conclusions but maintains a wide audience. It’s a neat trick.

From left, Josh Hartnett, Saleka Shyamalan, and M. Night Shyamalan on set of the 2024 film Trap . Sabrina Lantos/Warner Bros. Entertainment

Shyamalan’s newest film, Trap , is somehow more playful, even though it is about a serial killer. Josh Hartnett is a goofy, dad-joke spewing father taking his teen daughter (Ariel Donoghue) to see the pop act “Lady Raven” (Saleka Shyamalan—yes, the daughter of M. Night Shyamalan). While at the arena, he notices a heavy police presence. He discovers (via ridiculous means) that the authorities know that the “Butcher,” a murderer who has terrorized the area, will attend the concert, and that no one will be allowed to leave without getting inspected. And wouldn’t you know that our polite, well-meaning pop is actually the Butcher (!!), and now he’s got to figure out a scheme to get out of there alive—all without ruining his daughter’s time at the concert.

As with, say, Hitchcock’s Dial M for Murder , we in the audience find ourselves transgressing every ethical instinct we have as we root for our hero to accomplish his terrible goal. (We slip out of morality so easily with well-crafted movies, we don’t even realize it sometimes.) But Trap , apart from celebrating father-daughter love both onscreen and in the casting, is imbued with a poptimist attitude. Far be it from me to spoil the specifics of a movie that’s still in theaters, but it’s the purity and adoration of teen fandom that saves the day, rescues a kidnap victim, and ends the Butcher’s rampage. The picture stands in awe of the power of sincerity.

Shyamalan still has his critics, and this newer wave of lower-budget features won’t win over those who refuse to suspend their disbelief for the sake of a good thrill. ( Trap , for example, posits a current concert-going climate in which everyone has paper tickets and receipts, not mobile entry apps.) Clearly, I’m a fan of the man’s work, and not just because no one else exploits the full power of a close-up the way he does these days. Good suspense is rare (and there’s one “oh, get out of there now!” moment in Trap that has audiences screaming), but it’s Shyamalan’s willingness to stick with his initial, very basic questions about life that I continue to find surprising. Even Trap —a film mostly filled with surface pleasures in tune with its pop music setting—finds room to question the irrational nature of human cruelty. At this point in his career, for Shyamalan to produce something that’s simply mindless would be an unexpected twist.

Jordan Hoffman is a film critic and entertainment journalist living in Queens, New York. Twitter:  @jhoffman

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