impact of covid 19 on economy of developing countries essay

COVID-19’s Economic Impact around the World

Key takeaways.

• Although the COVID-19 pandemic affected all parts of the world in 2020, low-, middle- and high-income nations were hit in different ways.
• In low-income countries, average excess mortality reached 34%, followed by 14% in middle-income countries and 10% in high-income ones.
• However, middle-income nations experienced the largest hit to their gross domestic product (GDP) growth, followed by high-income nations.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020, the world economy has been affected in many ways. Poorer countries have suffered the most, but, despite their greater resources, wealthier countries have faced their own challenges. This article looks at the impact of COVID-19 in different areas of the world.

First, I put 171 nations into three groups according to per capita income: low, middle and high income. Second, I examined health statistics to show how hard-hit by the virus these nations were. Then, by comparing economic forecasts the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made in October 2019 (pre-pandemic) for 2020 with their actual values, I obtained estimates for the pandemic’s impact on growth and key economic policy variables.

Low- and high-income groups each compose 25% of the world’s countries, and the middle-income group makes up 50%. Average income per capita in 2019 was more than five times larger in the middle-income group than in the low-income group. In the high-income countries, it was almost 20 times larger.

Health Outcomes and Policies

The first table shows that COVID-19 had a significant impact on all three groups. Average excess mortality, which indicates how much larger the number of deaths was relative to previous years, was more than 34% in low-income countries, almost 14% in middle-income countries and about 10% in high-income countries. And even though poorer countries were more affected by deaths, their COVID-19 testing was much more limited given their smaller resources.

Since the beginning of the pandemic, high-income countries did more than one test per person, while low-income countries did only one test per 27 people (or 0.037 per person). Given the significant differences in testing, it is not surprising that reported cases were much higher in wealthier countries. Finally, note that there were significant differences in the progress of vaccination. As of June 2021, nearly 20% of the population in the wealthiest countries was fully vaccinated compared to about 2% in the poorest countries.

Impact on GDP Growth

COVID-19-related lockdowns were very common during 2020-21, directly impacting economic activity. The figure below shows the impact on GDP. To isolate the impact of COVID-19 from previous trends, I plotted the difference between the actual GDP growth in 2020 and the IMF forecast made in October 2019.

The immediate consequence of closing many sectors of the economy was a significant decline in GDP growth, which was as large as 8.7 percentage points for the median middle-income countries. Wealthier countries suffered a bit less, with a median of 6.4 percentage points, mainly because they began to recover before the end of 2020. The impact of COVID-19 was smaller in poorer countries because many did not have the resources to implement strict lockdowns. However, even in this group of countries, median GDP growth was 5.2 percentage points lower than expected.

SOURCES: IMF World Economic Outlook Reports (April 2021 and October 2019), Penn World Table (version 10.0) and author’s calculations.

NOTE: The COVID-19 impact is the difference between the actual gross domestic product growth rate in 2020 and the IMF forecast for it made in October 2019.

Economic Policies

Differences in GDP performance are not only related to lockdowns but also to economic policy responses. The second table contains information about six policy variables.

In particular, the first three rows present the fiscal response to the pandemic computed as the difference between the actual value in 2020 and the IMF forecast made before the pandemic in October 2019 relative to GDP. Revenue relative to GDP declined slightly in all regions, but mostly in middle-income countries, reaching more than 1 percentage point of GDP.

Expenditures relative to GDP, however, increased in middle- and high-income countries while remaining stable in low-income countries. These expenditures increased by nearly 7 percentage points of GDP in high-income countries. The more significant fiscal deficit relative to GDP implied a larger increase in net government borrowing, which reached 7 percentage points of GDP in the median high-income countries.

Finally, COVID-19 also had a clear impact on the evolution of monetary aggregates such as cash and deposits. In the table, to isolate the impact of COVID-19 from previous trends, I present the growth rate of M1 and M2 M1 generally includes physical currency, demand deposits, traveler’s checks and other checkable deposits. M2 generally includes M1 plus savings deposits, money market securities, mutual funds and other time deposits. Note that the above definitions can differ slightly by country. net of the yearly growth rates of these variables between 2017 and 2019. The pandemic implied an increase in the growth rate of monetary aggregates across countries in all income groups, but more significantly in wealthier countries.

For instance, the growth rate in M1 was over 10 percentage points larger than in the previous two years in the median high-income countries. Without a change in money demand, such an acceleration in the quantity of money would have implied increasing inflation.

However, the last row of the table shows that inflation remained stable in 2020. In fact, for middle- and high-income countries, inflation in 2020 was lower than the IMF forecast made in October 2019.

Conclusions

COVID-19 impacted health outcomes in all regions of the world. Wealthier countries responded with more testing and quicker vaccination rates. Comparing actual outcomes with pre-pandemic forecasts, I found a significant impact of the pandemic on GDP growth, which is more prominent in middle-income countries.

I conjecture that the impact on GDP growth was less significant in the poorest countries because of less restrictive lockdowns and in the wealthiest countries because of more aggressive economic policies.

• M1 generally includes physical currency, demand deposits, traveler’s checks and other checkable deposits. M2 generally includes M1 plus savings deposits, money market securities, mutual funds and other time deposits. Note that the above definitions can differ slightly by country.

Juan M. Sánchez is an economist and senior economic policy advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. He has conducted research on several topics in macroeconomics involving financial decisions by firms, households and countries. He has been at the St. Louis Fed since 2010. View more about the author and his research.

Related Topics

Views expressed in Regional Economist are not necessarily those of the St. Louis Fed or Federal Reserve System.

For the latest insights from our economists and other St. Louis Fed experts, visit On the Economy and subscribe .

Media questions

Publications

• Analysis & Opinions
• News & Announcements
• Newsletters
• Policy Briefs & Testimonies
• Presentations & Speeches
• Reports & Papers
• Quarterly Journal: International Security
• Artificial Intelligence
• Conflict & Conflict Resolution
• Coronavirus
• Economics & Global Affairs
• Environment & Climate Change
• International Relations
• International Security & Defense
• Nuclear Issues
• Science & Technology
• Student Publications
• War in Ukraine
• Asia & the Pacific
• Middle East & North Africa
• North America
• South America
• Infographics & Charts

US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace

The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”

The Geopolitics of Renewable Hydrogen

Renewables are widely perceived as an opportunity to shatter the hegemony of fossil fuel-rich states and democratize the energy landscape. Virtually all countries have access to some renewable energy resources (especially solar and wind power) and could thus substitute foreign supply with local resources. Our research shows, however, that the role countries are likely to assume in decarbonized energy systems will be based not only on their resource endowment but also on their policy choices.

What Comes After the Forever Wars

As the United States emerges from the era of so-called forever wars, it should abandon the regime change business for good. Then, Washington must understand why it failed, writes Stephen Walt.

Telling Black Stories: What We All Can Do

Full event video and after-event thoughts from the panelists.

• Defense, Emerging Technology, and Strategy
• Diplomacy and International Politics
• Environment and Natural Resources
• International Security
• Science, Technology, and Public Policy
• Africa Futures Project
• Applied History Project
• Arctic Initiative
• Asia-Pacific Initiative
• Cyber Project
• Defending Digital Democracy
• Defense Project
• Economic Diplomacy Initiative
• Future of Diplomacy Project
• Geopolitics of Energy Project
• Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
• Homeland Security Project
• Intelligence Project
• Korea Project
• Managing the Atom
• Middle East Initiative
• Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship
• Security and Global Health
• Technology and Public Purpose
• US-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

Special Initiatives

• American Secretaries of State
• An Economic View of the Environment  
• Cuban Missile Crisis  
• Russia Matters
• Thucydides's Trap

Views on the Economy and the World

A blog by jeffrey frankel.

Blog Post - Views on the Economy and the World

• Jeffrey Frankel

The Covid-19 pandemic has had differentiated impacts across countries. This is true even among the set of Emerging Market and  Developing Economies  (EMDEs), which share the disadvantages of more poverty, less adequate health care, and fewer jobs that can be done  remotely , compared to Advanced Economies.

Differentiation across continents

Surprisingly, the  rates of infection and death  have so far been lower in most EMDEs than in the US and Europe, as pointed out by  Pinelopi Goldberg  and Tristan Reed, and by  Raghuram    Rajan . Undercounting is undoubtedly massive, however. Furthermore,  the situation  is  evolving rapidly .

Across continents, health in Latin America has been the hardest hit in general among EMDEs.  Southeast Asia has been the least affected; for example, Vietnam and Thailand report extraordinarily few cases.

Why has the coronavirus hit Latin America so hard?  Obvious possible reasons include the region’s inequality, large densely populated cities, many workers in the informal sector, inadequate public health systems, and many internal migrants (a problem that also looms large in India).  A less obvious factor is that Latin America — like North America and Europe — had had less experience with pandemics in recent decades, as compared to East Asia or Africa, where SARS and Ebola made people more familiar with the dangers, and the consequent need for social distancing.

The situation in sub-Saharan Africa is unclear. On the one hand, the  numbers  of cases and deaths have been relatively low, at least up to now.  The young population may help explain this.  On the other hand, testing is probably even more inadequate here than elsewhere and  the situation is worsening rapidly  in South Africa.  Apparently hotspots start in major metropolises with busy international airports – think Milan, London, New York, and now Johannesburg — and then inevitably spread out to neighboring regions with a lag. 

Differentiation within Latin America

There is also a differentiation of the impact within continents. In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico are suffering especially badly.  Brazil ranks #2 in the world, in absolute numbers of reported cases and deaths, after the United States.  Uruguay is apparently doing the best.  It is not that Uruguay is following the  Trump philosophy  and reporting few cases by means of a few tests; it has a low rate of positive results per test, which is the more meaningful statistic.

There is a ready explanation for why Brazil and Mexico are suffering such high  rates of infection and mortality : poor political leadership.  Their presidents are following the strategy that Trump has pioneered since the start:  denying the seriousness of the situation and visibly undermining experts’ recommended responses such as campaigns to get people to wear masks.  (Nicaragua probably belongs on this list of ostrich-leaders, but test numbers are unavailable.)

Then there is the case of Peru.  It is hard to say what the government has done wrong, and yet reported cases and deaths  per capita  are worse than Brazil and almost as bad as the U.S.  Similarly, one can’t explain why Chile reports more cases per capita than virtually any country.

Economic impact

The economic impact of the pandemic shock is worse in  EM and Developing Economies  than in advanced economies.  Besides the direct health impact, including lockdowns as in advanced countries, they have lost major sources of foreign exchange:  export revenue (especially in the case of oil exporters), tourism, and remittances from emigrants.  In March, global investors pulled out of emerging markets, in a switch to risk-off attitudes in financial markets generally.   Subsequently, as a tremendous stimulus by the Fed restored investors’ reach for yield, capital flows returned to some countries. The current easy conditions in global financial markets mean that the much-invoked “perfect storm” analogy does not quite apply.  But the situation facing EMDEs is bad enough as it is. Moreover, the current risk-tolerance in financial markets may not hold up.

The US and other advanced countries have been able to respond to the coronavirus recession with massive domestic government spending. EMDEs, in contrast, lack the fiscal space to respond with big  spending programs , even for public health and support for hard-hit households, let alone for general macroeconomic stimulus.  (The US can get away with running record deficits, not because it has been prudent in the past – it hasn’t – but because of its “exorbitant privilege”: investors everywhere are happy to hold dollars and US treasury bills.)

Some debtors, including Argentina, Ecuador, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Venezuela, already had severe debt troubles even before the pandemic, and have had to restructure their debts or default.  Some others like Peru entered 2020 with relatively strong debt and reserve positions (due to prudent policies put in place when mineral prices were high) and yet have been badly hit by both the pandemic and the global recession nonetheless.

The G20 moratorium and what it leaves out

In recognition of acute financing constraints, the G20 in April offered to suspend bilateral official debt payments for the year, for the world’s 73 poorest countries.  But this step falls short in four different ways.

The suspension is of course not the same as debt forgiveness. There is little reason to think that the situation will be better at the end of the year. Further debt  restructuring  will be needed in some cases.

It is very unclear to what extent China will participate among the creditors offering relief. This matters a lot.  As  Carmen Reinhart and co-authors  have uncovered, China is not merely the largest official creditor; its outstanding claims surpass “the loan books of the IMF, World Bank and of all other 22 Paris Club governments combined.”

The G20 moratorium also  doesn’t include private creditors . Indeed, many debtors are showing themselves reluctant to take up the G-20 suspension offer for fear that  downgrading  would lose them access to private capital markets. In past debt crises, the international community (there used to be such a thing), asked the private sector to participate simultaneously with the IMF and rich-country governments:  Rescue packages associated with IMF programs took steps so that the foreign exchange freed up by new public loans to the debtor country, conditional on sacrifices by its population, did not just go to paying off private creditors.  In the 1990s currency crises, it was called Private Sector Involvement.  Similarly, in the 1982 international debt crisis, rich-country banks were “bailed in” to the rescue effort rather than being “bailed out.”  Where restructuring is necessary, private creditors should do their share.

The G-20 moratorium doesn’t extend to middle-income countries. But some of them will need accommodation too.

What else is to be done?  EMDEs need to be able to export to the rest of the world, to restore growth and to earn the foreign exchange to service their international debts.  But global trade has collapsed. The twin reasons are the worst tariff war since the 1930s followed by the worst global recession since the 1930s.  The whole world is paying a cost for an absence of political leadership and a virtual breakdown in the multi-lateral order.

• James W. Harpel Professor of Capital Formation and Growth
• Member of the Board, Belfer Center
• Climate agreements
• Environmental economics
• U.S. foreign policy
• Monetary policy
• Economic policy
• Globalization
• International development
• International finance
• National security economics
• Bio/Profile
• Media Inquiries
• (617)-496-3834
• More by this author

Related Posts

Belfer center email updates, belfer center of science and international affairs.

79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1400

COVID-19: Effects in Developing Countries

In this section.

• Helping the Media to Strengthen Democracy
• How can the private sector promote social change?
• How to Achieve Social Change Through Governments
• Restoring Health and Economic Growth in Developing Countries
• Social Change Through Public Organizing and Social Movements

July 22, 2020

Four Harvard Kennedy School scholars offered a worrying picture of the current impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on developing countries and an equally daunting assessment of the medium-term outlook. In a virtual discussion on July 22, these faculty members provided examples of how individual countries are reeling from the pandemic as well as macro-economic perspectives on broader trends for regional trade and recovery from severe lockdowns. The participants were Eliana Carranza, adjunct lecturer in public policy and a senior economist at the World Bank Jobs Group; Rema Hanna, the Jeffrey Cheah Professor of South-East Asia Studies; Jeffrey Frankel, the James W. Harpel Professor of Capital Formation and Growth; and Isabel Guerrero Pulgar, adjunct lecturer in public policy and a development economist. The session was part of the Dean’s Discussion series, hosted by Kennedy School Dean Douglas Elmendorf, the Don K. Price Professor of Public Policy, and moderated by his chief of staff, Sarah Wald, an adjunct lecturer.

Jeffrey Frankel

Jeffrey Frankel sketched a varied set of economic and public health policy responses by developing countries to the pandemic, with similarly varied outcomes. He said Latin America had been hit particularly hard, while Southeast Asia far less so, and that South Africa could be hitting a crisis stage. Heavy concentrations of populations in cities are among the explanations for negative effects for Latin America. The hardest-hit countries there, Mexico and Brazil, had suffered failures of leadership that magnified the negative effects, he said, “just as our leaders have failed us in the United States.” Developing countries are constrained by their balance of payments, as the global shock has hit their commodity exports, tourism, remittances and capital inflows.

Eliana Carranza

Eliana Carranza said the policy choice during the pandemic often has been framed as either saving lives or saving economies. “We should not think about those as opposing goals,” she said, and the cost-benefit tradeoff from policy choices does not need to be as steep as it is being framed. She also said it is important to think not only about the health emergency and economic reactivation phases, but also about a longer-term rebuilding phase that addresses the structural weaknesses that have been exposed in the pandemic.

Isabel Guerrero

Isabel Guerrero emphasized that the pandemic has been a moving target that requires an adaptive response. There are no best practices, she said; “it needs a lot of co creation with the community on what works.” She argued that a top- down approach doesn’t work in such a fluid crisis and pointed to the successful response by some countries to the Ebola virus outbreak in which “governments were smart enough to reach out to community organizations” that helped meet challenges including getting services the last mile to reach victims. In India, she said, social enterprise organizations stepped in and helped farmers by distribution food and buying up excess crops that couldn’t otherwise get to markets in the lockdown.

Rema Hanna said the pandemic is prompting nations to develop new ways to bring people together and strengthen their economies at a time of immense uncertainty. These innovations in turn force researchers and policymakers to develop new ways of thinking about public policy. She said that in such a downturn there is a need for increased spending and social protection even as tax revenues have declined. “We are in a situation where we have to think about this tradeoff,” Hanna said. A key to making these assessments successfully is finding reliable evidence. One example: gathering evidence to assess the value of cash transfer programs requires engaging with communities to see how policy translates into action at the local level. Some research has had to shift from in-person contact to online and mobile phone surveys to collect data. Hanna has worked closely with officials in Indonesia, where local conditions vary greatly by state. The challenge becomes one of trying to move quickly to get data in real time—and “to make sure the work we are doing at HKS is relevant to the crisis at large.”

Isabel Guerrero Pulgar

Douglas Elmendorf

The Global Economy: on Track for Strong but Uneven Growth as COVID-19 Still Weighs

A year and a half since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy is poised to stage its most robust post-recession recovery in 80 years in 2021. But the rebound is expected to be uneven across countries, as major economies look set to register strong growth even as many developing economies lag.

Global growth is expected to accelerate to 5.6% this year, largely on the strength in major economies such as the United States and China. And while growth for almost every region of the world has been revised upward for 2021, many continue to grapple with COVID-19 and what is likely to be its long shadow. Despite this year’s pickup, the level of global GDP in 2021 is expected to be 3.2% below pre-pandemic projections, and per capita GDP among many emerging market and developing economies is anticipated to remain below pre-COVID-19 peaks for an extended period. As the pandemic continues to flare, it will shape the path of global economic activity.

The United States and China are each expected to contribute about one quarter of global growth in 2021. The U.S. economy has been bolstered by massive fiscal support, vaccination is expected to become widespread by mid-2021, and growth is expected to reach 6.8% this year, the fastest pace since 1984. China’s economy – which did not contract last year – is expected to grow a solid 8.5% and moderate as the country’s focus shifts to reducing financial stability risks.

Lasting Legacies

Growth among emerging market and developing economies is expected to accelerate to 6% this year, helped by increased external demand and higher commodity prices. However, the recovery of many countries is constrained by resurgences of COVID-19, uneven vaccination, and a partial withdrawal of government economic support measures. Excluding China, growth is anticipated to unfold at a more modest 4.4% pace. In the longer term, the outlook for emerging market and developing economies will likely be dampened by the lasting legacies of the pandemic – erosion of skills from lost work and schooling; a sharp drop in investment; higher debt burdens; and greater financial vulnerabilities. Growth among this group of economies is forecast to moderate to 4.7% in 2022 as governments gradually withdraw policy support.

Among low-income economies, where vaccination has lagged, growth has been revised lower to 2.9%. Setting aside the contraction last year, this would be the slowest pace of expansion in two decades. The group’s output level in 2022 is projected to be 4.9% lower than pre-pandemic projections. Fragile and conflict-affected low-income economies have been the hardest hit by the pandemic, and per capita income gains have been set back by at least a decade.  

Regionally, the recovery is expected to be strongest in East Asia and the Pacific, largely due to the strength of China’s recovery. In South Asia, recovery has been hampered by serious renewed outbreaks of the virus in India and Nepal. The Middle East and North Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to post growth too shallow to offset the contraction of 2020. Sub-Saharan Africa’s recovery, while helped by spillovers from the global recovery, is expected to remain fragile given the slow pace of vaccination and delays to major investments in infrastructure and the extractives sector.  

Uncertain Outlook

The June forecast assumes that advanced economies will achieve widespread vaccination of their populations and effectively contain the pandemic by the end of the year. Major emerging market and developing economies are anticipated to substantially reduce new cases. However, the outlook is subject to considerable uncertainty. A more persistent pandemic, a wave of corporate bankruptcies, financial stress, or even social unrest could derail the recovery. At the same time, more rapid success in stamping out COVID-19 and greater spillovers from advanced economy growth could generate more vigorous global growth.

Even so, the pandemic is expected to have caused serious setbacks to development gains. Although per capita income growth is projected to be 4.9% among emerging market and developing economies this year, it is forecast to be essentially flat in low-income countries. Per capita income lost in 2020 will not be fully recouped by 2022 in about two-thirds of emerging market and developing economies, including three-quarters of fragile and conflict-affected low-income countries. By the end of this year, about 100 million people are expected to have fallen back into extreme poverty. These adverse impacts have been felt hardest by the most vulnerable groups – women, children, and unskilled and informal workers.

Global inflation, which has increased along with the economic recovery, is anticipated to continue to rise over the rest of the year; however, it is expected to remain within the target range for most countries. In those emerging market and developing economies in which inflation rises above target, this trend may not warrant a monetary policy response provided it is temporary and inflation expectations remain well-anchored.

Climbing Food Costs

Rising food prices and accelerating aggregate inflation may compound rising food insecurity in low-income countries. Policymakers should ensure that rising inflation rates do not lead to a de-anchoring of inflation expectations and resist using subsidies or price controls to reduce the burden of rising food prices, as these risk adding to high debt and creating further upward pressure on global agricultural prices.

A recovery in global trade after the recession last year offers an opportunity for emerging market and developing economies to bolster economic growth. Trade costs are on average one-half higher among emerging market and developing economies than advanced economies and lowering them could boost trade and stimulate investment and growth.

With relief from the pandemic tantalizingly close in many places but far from reach in others, policy actions will be critical. Securing equitable vaccine distribution will be essential to ending the pandemic. Far-reaching debt relief will be important to many low-income countries. Policymakers will need to nurture the economic recovery with fiscal and monetary measures while keeping a close eye on safeguarding financial stability. Policies should take the long view, reinvigorating human capital, expanding access to digital connectivity, and investing in green infrastructure to bolster growth along a green, resilient, and inclusive path.  

It will take global coordination to end the pandemic through widespread vaccination and careful macroeconomic stewardship to avoid crises until we get there.  

• Foreword by World Bank Group President David Malpass
• Report website
• Report download
• Press Release
• Blog: The Global Economic Outlook in five charts
• Download report data
• Download all charts (zip)

This site uses cookies to optimize functionality and give you the best possible experience. If you continue to navigate this website beyond this page, cookies will be placed on your browser. To learn more about cookies, click here .

The Economic Impact of COVID-19 around the World

Working Paper 2022-030A by Fernando M. Martin, Juan M. Sánchez, and Olivia Wilkinson

For over two years, the world has been battling the health and economic consequences of the COVID‐19 pandemic. This paper provides an account of the worldwide economic impact of the COVID‐19 shock, measured by GDP growth, employment, government spending, monetary policy, and trade. We find that the COVID‐19 shock severely impacted output growth and employment in 2020, particularly in middle‐income countries. The government response, mainly consisting of increased expenditure, implied a rise in debt levels. Advanced countries, having easier access to credit markets, experienced the highest increase in indebtedness. All regions also relied on monetary policy to support the fiscal expansion. The specific circumstances surrounding the COVID‐19 shock implied that the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies did not put upward pressure on prices until 2021. We also find that the adverse effects of the COVID‐19 shock on output and prices have been significant and persistent, especially in emerging and developing countries.

Read Full Text

https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2022.030

• Subscribe to Our Newsletter

Related Links

• Economist Pages
• JEL Classification System
• Fed In Print

SUBSCRIBE TO THE RESEARCH DIVISION NEWSLETTER

Research division.

• Legal and Privacy

One Federal Reserve Bank Plaza St. Louis, MO 63102

Information for Visitors

• Get involved

Socio-economic impact

The  UN’s Framework for the Immediate Socio-Economic Response to the COVID 19 Crisis  warns that “The COVID-19 pandemic is far more than a health crisis: it is affecting societies and econ­omies at their core. While the impact of the pandemic will vary from country to country, it will most likely increase poverty and inequalities at a global scale, making achievement of SDGs even more urgent.

Assessing the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on societies, economies and vulnerable groups is fundamental to inform and tailor the responses of governments and partners to recover from the crisis and ensure that no one is left behind in this effort.

Without urgent socio-eco­nomic responses, global suffering will escalate, jeopardizing lives and livelihoods for years to come. Immediate development responses in this crisis must be undertaken with an eye to the future. Development trajectories in the long-term will be affected by the choices coun­tries make now and the support they receive.”

The United Nations has mobilized the full capacity of the UN system through its 131 country teams serving 162 countries and territories, to support national authorities in developing public health preparedness and response plans to the COVID-19 crisis.

Over the next 12 to 18 months, the socio-economic response will be one of one of three critical components of the UN’s COVID-19 response, alongside the health response, led by WHO, and the Global Humanitarian Response Plan.

As the technical lead for the socio-economic response, UNDP and its country offices worldwide are working under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinators, and in close collaboration with specialized UN agencies, UN Regional Economic Commissions and IFIs, to assess the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on economies and communities. The assessment reports available on this site contain the preliminary findings of regional and country analyses.

Massive production disruptions that started in China have led to a lower supply of goods and services that reduces overall hours worked, leading to lower incomes.

Briefs and Reports

Brief #2: Putting the UN Framework for Socio-Economic Response to COVID-19 into Action: Insights

Across the globe, the UN is supporting countries in preparing assessments of the socio-economic impacts of Covid-19. What are these assessments saying and what are the key socio-economic issues caused by the pandemic that the UN and its partners are seeing on the ground?

On behalf of the UN, UNDP prepares the monthly briefs  Putting the UN Framework for Socio-Economic Response to Covid-19 Into Action  exploring latest trends and providing key insights and analysis on the socio-economic impacts of Covid-19 on economies and societies.

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• Elsevier - PMC COVID-19 Collection

A critical analysis of the impacts of COVID-19 on the global economy and ecosystems and opportunities for circular economy strategies

T. ibn-mohammed.

a Warwick Manufacturing Group (WMG), The University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom

K.B. Mustapha

b Faculty of Engineering and Science, University of Nottingham (Malaysia Campus), Semenyih, Selangor43500, Malaysia

c School of The Built Environment and Architecture, London South Bank University, London SE1 0AA, United Kingdom

K.A. Babatunde

d Faculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Selangor43600, Malaysia

e Department of Economics, Faculty of Management Sciences, Al-Hikmah University, Ilorin, Nigeria

D.D. Akintade

f School of Life Sciences, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2UH United Kingdom

g Kent Business School, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7PE, United Kingdom

h Faculty of Economics, Kyushu University, 744 Motooka, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka 819-0395, Japan

M.M. Ndiaye

i Department of Industrial Engineering, College of Engineering, American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, UAE

F.A. Yamoah

j Department of Management, Birkbeck University of London, London WC1E 7JL United Kingdom

k Sheffield University Management School (SUMS), The University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 1FL, United Kingdom

• • COVID-19 presents unprecedented challenge to all facets of human endeavour.
• • A critical review of the negative and positive impacts of the pandemic is presented.
• • The danger of relying on pandemic-driven benefits to achieving SDGs is highlighted.
• • The pandemic and its interplay with circular economy (CE) approaches is examined.
• • Sector-specific CE recommendations in a resilient post-COVID-19 world are outlined.

The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic on the 11th of March 2020, but the world is still reeling from its aftermath. Originating from China, cases quickly spread across the globe, prompting the implementation of stringent measures by world governments in efforts to isolate cases and limit the transmission rate of the virus. These measures have however shattered the core sustaining pillars of the modern world economies as global trade and cooperation succumbed to nationalist focus and competition for scarce supplies. Against this backdrop, this paper presents a critical review of the catalogue of negative and positive impacts of the pandemic and proffers perspectives on how it can be leveraged to steer towards a better, more resilient low-carbon economy. The paper diagnosed the danger of relying on pandemic-driven benefits to achieving sustainable development goals and emphasizes a need for a decisive, fundamental structural change to the dynamics of how we live. It argues for a rethink of the present global economic growth model, shaped by a linear economy system and sustained by profiteering and energy-gulping manufacturing processes, in favour of a more sustainable model recalibrated on circular economy (CE) framework. Building on evidence in support of CE as a vehicle for balancing the complex equation of accomplishing profit with minimal environmental harms, the paper outlines concrete sector-specific recommendations on CE-related solutions as a catalyst for the global economic growth and development in a resilient post-COVID-19 world.

1. Introduction

The world woke up to a perilous reality on the 11th of March, 2020 when the World Health Organization (WHO) declared novel coronavirus (COVID-19) a pandemic ( Sohrabi et al., 2020 ; WHO, 2020a ). Originating from Wuhan, China, cases rapidly spread to Japan, South Korea, Europe and the United States as it reached global proportions. Towards the formal pandemic declaration, substantive economic signals from different channels, weeks earlier, indicated the world was leaning towards an unprecedented watershed in our lifetime, if not in human history ( Gopinath, 2020 ). In series of revelatory reports ( Daszak, 2012 ; Ford et al., 2009 ; Webster, 1997 ), experts across professional cadres had long predicted a worldwide pandemic would strain the elements of the global supply chains and demands, thereby igniting a cross-border economic disaster because of the highly interconnected world we now live in. By all accounts, the emerging havoc wrought by the pandemic exceeded the predictions in those commentaries. At the time of writing, the virus has killed over 800,000 people worldwide ( JHU, 2020 ), disrupted means of livelihoods, cost trillions of dollars while global recession looms ( Naidoo and Fisher, 2020 ). In efforts to isolate cases and limit the transmission rate of the virus, while mitigating the pandemic, countries across the globe implemented stringent measures such as mandatory national lockdown and border closures.

These measures have shattered the core sustaining pillars of modern world economies. Currently, the economic shock arising from this pandemic is still being weighed. Data remains in flux, government policies oscillate, and the killer virus seeps through nations, affecting production, disrupting supply chains and unsettling the financial markets ( Bachman, 2020 ; Sarkis et al., 2020 ). Viewed holistically, the emerging pieces of evidence indicate we are at a most consequential moment in history where a rethink of sustainable pathways for the planet has become pertinent. Despite this, the measures imposed by governments have also led to some “accidental” positive effects on the environment and natural ecosystems. As a result, going forward, a fundamental change to human bio-physical activities on earth now appears on the spectrum of possibility ( Anderson et al., 2020 ). However, as highlighted by Naidoo and Fisher (2020) , our reliance on globalization and economic growth as drivers of green investment and sustainable development is no longer realistic. The adoption of circular economy (CE) – an industrial economic model that satisfies the multiple roles of decoupling of economic growth from resource consumption, waste management and wealth creation – has been touted to be a viable solution.

No doubt, addressing the public health consequences of COVID-19 is the top priority, but the nature of the equally crucial economic recovery efforts necessitates some key questions as governments around the world introduce stimulus packages to aid such recovery endeavours: Should these packages focus on avenues to economic recovery and growth by thrusting business as usual into overdrive or could they be targeted towards constructing a more resilient low-carbon CE? To answer this question, this paper builds on the extant literature on public health, socio-economic and environmental dimensions of COVID-19 impacts ( Gates, 2020b ; Guerrieri et al., 2020 ; Piguillem and Shi, 2020 ; Sohrabi et al., 2020 ), and examines its interplay with CE approaches. It argues for the recalibration and a rethink of the present global economic growth model, shaped by a linear economy system and sustained by profit-before-planet and energy-intensive manufacturing processes, in favour of CE. Building on evidence in support of CE as a vehicle for optimizing the complex equation of accomplishing profit while minimizing environmental damage, the paper outlines tangible sector-specific recommendations on CE-related solutions as a catalyst for the global economic boom in a resilient post-COVID-19 world. It is conceived that the “accidental” or the pandemic-induced CE strategies and behavioural changes that ensued during coronavirus crisis can be leveraged or locked in, to provide opportunities for both future resilience and competitiveness.

In light of the above, the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 , the methodological framework, which informed the critical literature review is presented. A brief overview of the historical context of previous epidemics and pandemics is presented in Section 3 as a requisite background on how pandemics have shaped human history and economies and why COVID-19 is different. In Section 4 , an overview of the impacts (both negative and positive) of COVID-19 in terms of policy frameworks, global economy, ecosystems and sustainability are presented. The role of the CE as a constructive change driver is detailed in Section 5 . In Section 6 , opportunities for CE after COVID-19 as well as sector-based recommendations on strategies and measures for advancing CE are presented, leading to the summary and concluding remarks in Section 7.

A literature review exemplifies a conundrum because an effective one cannot be conducted unless a problem statement is established ( Ibn-Mohammed, 2017 ). Yet, a literature search plays an integral role in establishing many research problems. In this paper, the approach taken to overcome this conundrum involves searching and reviewing the existing literature in the specific area of study (i.e. impacts of COVID-19 on global economy and ecosystems in the context of CE). This was used to develop the theoretical framework from which the current study emerges and adopting this to establish a conceptual framework which then becomes the basis of the current review. The paper adopts the critical literature review (CLR) approach given that it entails the assessment, critique and synthetisation of relevant literature regarding the topic under investigation in a manner that facilitates the emergence of new theoretical frameworks and perspectives from a wide array of different fields ( Snyder, 2019 ). CLR suffers from an inherent weakness in terms of subjectivity towards literature selection ( Snyder, 2019 ), prompting Grant and Booth (2009) to submit that systematic literature review (SLR) could mitigate this bias given its strict criteria in literature selection that facilitates a detailed analysis of a specific line of investigation. However, a number of authors ( Morrison et al., 2012 ; Paez, 2017 ) have reported that SLR does not allow for effective synthesis of academic and grey literature which are not indexed in popular academic search engines like Google Scholar, Web-of-Science and Scopus. The current review explores the impacts of COVID-19 on the global economy and ecosystems and opportunities for circular economy strategies, rather than investigating a specific aspect of the pandemic. As such, adopting a CLR approach is favoured in realising the goal of the paper as it allows for the inclusion of a wide range of perspectives and theoretical underpinnings from different sources ( Greenhalgh et al., 2018 ; Snyder, 2019 ).

Considering the above, this paper employed archival data consisting of journal articles, documented news in the media, expert reports, government and relevant stakeholders’ policy documents, published expert interviews and policy feedback literature that are relevant to COVID-19 and the concept of CE. To identify the relevant archival data, we focused on several practical ways of literature searching using appropriate keywords that are relevant to this work including impact (positive and negative) of COVID-19, circular economy, economic resilience, sustainability, supply chain resilience, climate change, etc. After identifying articles and relevant documents, their contents were examined to determine inclusions and exclusions based on their relevance to the topic under investigation. Ideas generated from reading the resulting papers from the search were then used to develop a theoretical framework and a research problem statement, which forms the basis for the CLR. The impact analysis for the study was informed by the I = P × A × T model whereby the “impact” (I) of any group or country on the environment is a function of the interaction of its population size (P), per capita affluence (A), expressed in terms of real per capita GDP, as a valid approximation of the availability of goods and services and technology (T) involved in supporting each unit of consumption.

As shown in the methodological framework in Fig. 1 , the paper starts with a brief review of the impacts of historical plagues to shed more light on the link between the past and the unprecedented time, which then led to an overview of the positive and negative impacts of COVID-19. The role of CE as a vehicle for constructive change in the light of COVID-19 was then explored followed by the synthesis, analysis and reflections on the information gathered during the review, leading to sector-specific CE strategy recommendations in a post-COVID-19 world.

Methodological framework for the critical literature review.

3. A brief account of the socio-economic impacts of historical outbreaks

At a minimum, pandemics result in the twin crisis of stressing the healthcare infrastructure and straining the economic system. However, beyond pandemics, several prior studies have long noted that depending on latency, transmission rate, and geographic spread, any form of communicable disease outbreak is a potent vector of localized economic hazards ( Bloom and Cadarette, 2019 ; Bloom and Canning, 2004 ; Hotez et al., 2014 ). History is littered with a catalogue of such outbreaks in the form of endemics, epidemics, plagues and pandemics. In many instances, some of these outbreaks have hastened the collapse of empires, overwhelmed the healthcare infrastructure, brought social unrest, triggered economic dislocations and exposed the fragility of the world economy, with a knock-on effect on many sectors. Indeed, in the initial few months of COVID-19 pandemic, it has become more evident that natural, accidental or intentional biological threats or outbreak in any country now poses an unquantifiable risk to global health and the world economy ( Bretscher et al., 2020 ).

Saunders-Hastings and Krewski (2016) reported that there have been several pandemics over the past 100 years. A short but inexhaustible list of outbreaks of communicable diseases include ‘the great plague’ ( Duncan-Jones, 1996 ; Littman and Littman, 1973 ), the Justinian plague ( Wagner et al., 2014 ), the Black Death ( Horrox, 2013 ), the Third Plague pandemic ( Bramanti et al., 2019 ; Tan et al., 2002 ), the Spanish flu ( Gibbs et al., 2001 ; Trilla et al., 2008 ), HIV/AIDS ( De Cock et al., 2012 ), SARS ( Lee and McKibbin, 2004 ), dengue ( Murray et al., 2013 ), and Ebola ( Baseler et al., 2017 ), among others. The potency of each of these outbreaks varies. Consequently, their economic implications differ according to numerous retrospective analyses ( Bloom and Cadarette, 2019 ; Bloom and Canning, 2004 ; Hotez et al., 2014 ). For instance, the Ebola epidemic of 2013-2016 created socio-economic impact to the tune of $53 billion across West Africa, plummeted Sierra Leone's GDP in 2015 by 20% and that of Liberia by 8% between 2013 and 2014, despite the decline in death rates across the same timeframe ( Fernandes, 2020 ).

As the world slipped into the current inflection point, some of the historical lessons from earlier pandemics remain salutary, even if the world we live in now significantly differs from those of earlier period ( McKee and Stuckler, 2020 ). Several factors differentiate the current socio-economic crisis of COVID-19 from the previous ones ( Baker et al., 2020 ), which means direct simple comparisons with past global pandemics are impossible ( Fernandes, 2020 ). Some of the differentiating factors include the fact that COVID-19 is a global pandemic and it is creating knock-on effects across supply chains given that the world has become much more integrated due to globalisation and advancements in technology ( McKenzie, 2020 ). Moreover, the world has witnessed advances in science, medicine and engineering. The modest number of air travellers during past pandemics delayed the global spread of the virus unlike now where global travel has increased tremendously. From an economic impact perspective, interest rates are at record lows and there is a great imbalance between demand and supply of commodities ( Fernandes, 2020 ). More importantly, many of the countries that are hard hit by the current pandemic are not exclusively the usual low-middle income countries, but those at the pinnacle of the pyramid of manufacturing and global supply chains. Against this backdrop, a review of the impact of COVID-19 is presented in the next section.

4. COVID-19: Policy frameworks, global economy, ecosystems and sustainability

4.1. evaluation of policy frameworks to combat covid-19.

The strategies and policies adopted by different countries to cope with COVID-19 have varied over the evolving severity and lifetime of the pandemic during which resources have been limited ( Siow et al., 2020 ). It is instructive that countries accounting for 65% of global manufacturing and exports (i.e. China, USA, Korea, Japan, France, Italy, and UK) were some of the hardest to be hit by COVID-19 ( Baldwin and Evenett, 2020 ). Given the level of unpreparedness and lack of resilience of hospitals, numerous policy emphases have gone into sourcing for healthcare equipment such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and ventilators ( Ranney et al., 2020 ) due to global shortages. For ventilators, in particular, frameworks for rationing them along with bed spaces have had to be developed to optimise their usage ( White and Lo, 2020 ). Other industries have also been affected, with shocks to their existence, productivity and profitability ( Danieli and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2020 ) including the CE-sensitive materials extraction and mining industries that have been hit by disruption to their operations and global prices of commodities ( Laing, 2020 ).

As highlighted in subsequent sub-sections, one of the psychological impacts of COVID-19 is panic buying ( Arafat et al., 2020 ), which happens due to uncertainties at national levels (e.g. for scarce equipment) and at individual levels (e.g. for everyday consumer products). In both instances, the fragility, profiteering and unsustainability of the existing supply chain model have been exposed ( Spash, 2020 ). In fact, Sarkis et al. (2020) questioned whether the global economy could afford to return to the just-in-time (JIT) supply chain framework favoured by the healthcare sector, given its apparent shortcomings in dealing with much needed supplies. The sub-section that follow examines some of the macro and micro economic ramifications of COVID-19.

4.1.1. Macroeconomic impacts: Global productions, exports, and imports

One challenge faced by the healthcare industry is that existing best practices, in countries like the USA (e.g. JIT macroeconomic framework), do not incentivise the stockpiling of essential medical equipment ( Solomon et al., 2020 ). Although vast sums were budgeted, some governments (e.g. UK, India and USA) needed to take extraordinary measures to protect their supply chain to the extent that manufacturers like Ford and Dyson ventured into the ventilator design/production market ( Iyengar et al., 2020 ). The US, in particular activated the Defense Production Act to compel car manufacturers to shift focus on ventilator production ( American Geriatrics Society, 2020 ; Solomon et al., 2020 ) due to the high cost and shortage of this vital equipment. Hospitals and suppliers in the US were also forced to enter the global market due to the chronic shortfall of N95 masks as well as to search for lower priced equipment ( Solomon et al., 2020 ). Interestingly, the global production of these specialist masks is thought to be led by China ( Baldwin and Evenett, 2020 ; Paxton et al., 2020 ) where COVID-19 broke out, with EU's supply primarily from Malaysia and Japan ( Stellinger et al., 2020 ). Such was the level of shortage that the US was accused of ‘pirating’ medical equipment supplies from Asian countries intended for EU countries ( Aubrecht et al., 2020 ).

France and Germany followed suit with similar in-ward looking policy and the EU itself imposed restrictions on the exportation of PPEs, putting many hitherto dependent countries at risk ( Bown, 2020 ). Unsurprisingly, China and the EU saw it fit to reduce or waive import tariffs on raw materials and PPE, respectively ( Stellinger et al., 2020 ). Going forward, the life-threatening consequences of logistics failures and misallocation of vital equipment and products could breathe new life and impetus to technologies like Blockchain, RFID and IoT for increased transparency and traceability ( Sarkis et al., 2020 ). Global cooperation and scenario planning will always be needed to complement these technologies. In this regard, the EU developed a joint procurement framework to reduce competition amongst member states, while in the US, where states had complained that federal might was used to interfere with orders, a ventilator exchange program was developed ( Aubrecht et al., 2020 ). However, even with trade agreements and cooperative frameworks, the global supply chain cannot depend on imports – or donations ( Evenett, 2020 ) for critical healthcare equipment and this realisation opens doors for localisation of production with consequences for improvements in environmental and social sustainability ( Baldwin and Evenett, 2020 ). This can be seen in the case of N95 masks which overnight became in such high demand that airfreights by private and commercial planes were used to deliver them as opposed to traditional container shipping ( Brown, 2020 ).

As detailed in forthcoming sections, a significant reduction in emissions linked to traditional shipping was observed, yet there was an increase in use of airfreighting due to desperation and urgency of demand. Nevertheless, several countries are having to rethink their global value chains ( Fig. 2 ) as a result of realities highlighted by COVID-19 pandemic ( Javorcik, 2020 ). This is primarily because national interests and protectionism have been a by-product of COVID-19 pandemic and also because many eastern European/Mediterranean countries have a relative advantage with respect to Chinese exports. As shown in Fig. 2 , the global export share which each of these countries has, relative to China's share of the same exports (x-axis) is measured against the economies of countries subscribing to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (y-axis). For each product, the ideal is to have a large circle towards the top right-hand corner of the chart.

A summary of how some Eastern European / Mediterranean countries have advantages over China on certain exports – based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System from 2018, where export volume is represented by dot sizes in millions of USD; Source: Javorcik (2020) .

4.1.2. Microeconomic impacts: Consumer behaviour

For long, there has been a mismatch between consumerist tendencies and biophysical realities ( Spash, 2020 ). However, COVID-19 has further exacerbated the need to reflect on the social impacts of individual lifestyles. The behaviour of consumers, in many countries, was at some point alarmist with a lot of panic buying of food and sanitary products ( Sim et al., 2020 ). At private level, consumer sentiment is also changing. Difficult access to goods and services has forced citizens to re-evaluate purchasing patterns and needs, with focus pinned on the most essential items ( Company, 2020 ; Lyche, 2020 ). Spash (2020) argued that technological obsolescence of modern products brought about by rapid innovation and individual consumerism is also likely to affect the linear economy model which sees, for instance, mobile phones having an average life time of four years (two years in the US), assuming their manufacture/repair services are constrained by economic shutdown and lockdowns ( Schluep, 2009 ). On the other hand, a sector like healthcare, which could benefit from mass production and consumerism of vital equipment, is plagued by patenting. Most medical equipment are patented and the issue of a 3D printer's patent infringement in Italy led to calls for ‘Open Source Ventilators’ and ‘Good Samaritan Laws’ to help deal with global health emergencies like COVID-19 ( Pearce, 2020 ). It is plausible that such initiatives/policies could help address the expensive, scarce, high-skill and material-intensive production of critical equipment, via cottage industry production.

For perspective, it should be noted that production capacity of PPE (even for the ubiquitous facemasks) have been shown by COVID-19 to be limited across many countries ( Dargaville et al., 2020 ) with some countries having to ration facemask production and distribution in factories ( San Juan, 2020 ). Unsurprisingly, the homemade facemask industry has not only emerged for the protection of mass populations as reported by Livingston et al. (2020) , it has become critical for addressing shortages ( Rubio-Romero et al., 2020 ) as well as being part of a post-lockdown exit strategy ( Allison et al., 2020 ). A revival of cottage industry production of equipment and basic but essential items like facemasks could change the landscape of global production for decades, probably leading to an attenuation of consumerist tendencies.This pandemic will also impact on R&D going forward, given the high likelihood that recession will cause companies to take short-term views, and cancel long and medium-term R&D in favour of short-term product development and immediate cash flow/profit as was certainly the case for automotive and aerospace sectors in previous recessions.

4.2. Overview of the negative impacts of COVID-19

The negative effects have ranged from a severe contraction of GDP in many countries to multi-dimensional environmental and social issues across the strata of society. In many respects, socio-economic activities came to a halt as: millions were quarantined; borders were shut; schools were closed; car/airline, manufacturing and travel industries crippled; trade fairs/sporting/entertainment events cancelled, and unemployment claims reached millions while the international tourist locations were deserted; and, nationalism and protectionism re-surfaced ( Baker et al., 2020 ; Basilaia and Kvavadze, 2020 ; Devakumar et al., 2020 ; Kraemer et al., 2020 ; Thunstrom et al., 2020 ; Toquero, 2020 ). In the subsections that follow, an overview of some of these negative impacts on the global economy, environment, and society is presented.

4.2.1. Negative macroeconomic impact of COVID-19

Undoubtedly, COVID-19 first and foremost, constitutes a ferocious pandemic and a human tragedy that swept across the globe, resulting in a massive health crisis ( WHO, 2020b ), disproportionate social order ( UN DESA, 2020 ), and colossal economic loss ( IMF, 2020 ). It has created a substantial negative impact on the global economy, for which governments, firms and individuals scramble for adjustments ( Fernandes, 2020 ; Pinner et al., 2020 ; Sarkis et al., 2020 ; Sohrabi et al., 2020 ; Van Bavel et al., 2020 ). Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic has distorted the world's operating assumptions, revealing the absolute lack of resilience of the dominant economic model to respond to unplanned shocks and crises ( Pinner et al., 2020 ). It has exposed the weakness of over-centralization of the complex global supply and production chains networks and the fragility of global economies, whilst highlighting weak links across industries( Fernandes, 2020 ; Guan et al., 2020 ; Sarkis et al., 2020 ). This has had a direct impact on employment and heightened the risk of food insecurity for millions due to lockdown and border restrictions ( Guerrieri et al., 2020 ). To some extent, some of the interventional measures introduced by governments across the world have resulted in the flattening of the COVID-19 curve (as shown in Fig. 3 ). This has helped in preventing healthcare systems from getting completely overwhelmed ( JHU, 2020 ), although as at the time of writing this paper, new cases are still being reported in different parts of the globe. Fernandes (2020) and McKibbin and Fernando (2020) reported thatthe socio-economic impact of COVID-19 will be felt for many months to come.

Daily confirmed new COVID-19 cases of the current 10 most affected countries based on a 5-day moving average. Valid as of August 31st, 2020 at 11:46 PM EDT ( JHU, 2020 ).

Guan et al. (2020) submitted that how badly and prolonged the recession rattles the world depends on how well and quickly the depth of the socio-economic implications of the pandemic is understood. IMF (2020) reported that in an unprecedented circumstance (except during the Great Depression), all economies including developed, emerging, and even developing will likely experience recession. In its April World Economic Outlook, IMF (2020) reversed its early global economic growth forecast from 3.3% to -3 %, an unusual downgrade of 6.3% within three months. This makes the pandemic a global economic shock like no other since the Great Depression and it has already surpassed the global financial crisis of 2009 as depicted in Fig. 4 . Economies in the advanced countries are expected to contract by -6.1% while recession in emerging and developing economies is projected (with caution) to be less adverse compared to the developed nations with China and India expected to record positive growth by the end of 2020. The cumulative GDP loss over the next year from COVID-19 could be around $9 trillion ( IMF, 2020 ).

Socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 lockdown: (a) Comparison of global economic recession due to COVID-19 and the 2009 global financial crisis; (b) Advanced economies, emerging and developing economies in recession; (c) the major economies in recession; (d) the cumulative economic output loss over 2020 and 2021. Note: Real GDP growth is used for economic growth, as year-on-year for per cent change ( IMF, 2020 ).

With massive job loss and excessive income inequality, global poverty is likely to increase for the first time since 1998 ( Mahler et al., 2020 ). It is estimated that around 49 million people could be pushed into extreme poverty due to COVID-19 with Sub-Sahara Africa projected to be hit hardest. The United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs concluded that COVID-19 pandemic may also increase exclusion, inequality, discrimination and global unemployment in the medium and long term, if not properly addressed using the most effective policy instruments ( UN DESA, 2020 ). The adoption of detailed universal social protection systems as a form of automatic stabilizers, can play a long-lasting role in mitigating the prevalence of poverty and protecting workers ( UN DESA, 2020 ).

4.2.2. Impact of COVID-19 on global supply chain and international trade

COVID-19 negatively affects the global economy by reshaping supply chains and sectoral activities. Supply chains naturally suffer from fragmentation and geographical dispersion. However, globalisation has rendered them more complex and interdependent, making them vulnerable to disruptions. Based on an analysis by the U.S. Institute for Supply Management, 75% of companies have reported disruptions in their supply chain ( Fernandes, 2020 ), unleashing crisis that emanated from lack of understanding and flexibility of the several layers of their global supply chains and lack of diversification in their sourcing strategies ( McKenzie, 2020 ). These disruptions will impact both exporting countries (i.e. lack of output for their local firms) and importing countries (i.e. unavailability of raw materials) ( Fernandes, 2020 ). Consequently, this will lead to the creation of momentary “manufacturing deserts” in which the output of a country, region or city drops significantly, turning into a restricted zone to source anything other than essentials like food items and drugs ( McKenzie, 2020 ). This is due to the knock-on effect of China's rising dominance and importance in the global supply chain and economy ( McKenzie, 2020 ). As a consequence of COVID-19, the World Trade Organization (WTO) projected a 32% decline in global trade ( Fernandes, 2020 ). For instance, global trade has witnessed a huge downturn due to reduced Chinese imports and the subsequent fall in global economic activities. This is evident because as of 25 th March 2020, global trade fell to over 4% contracting for only the second time since the mid-1980s ( McKenzie, 2020 ). Fig. 5 shows a pictorial representation of impact of pandemics on global supply chains based on different waves and threat levels.

Impact of pandemics on global supply chains. Adapted from Eaton and Connor (2020) .

4.2.3. Impact of COVID-19 on the aviation sector

The transportation sector is the hardest hit sector by COVID-19 due to the large-scale restrictions in mobility and aviation activities ( IEA, 2020 ; Le Quéré et al., 2020 ; Muhammad et al., 2020 ). In the aviation sector, for example, where revenue generation is a function of traffic levels, the sector has experienced flight cancellations and bans, leading to fewer flights and a corresponding immense loss in aeronautical revenues. This is even compounded by the fact that in comparison to other stakeholders in the aviation industry, when traffic demand declines, airports have limited avenues to reducing costs because the cost of maintaining and operating an airport remains the same and airports cannot relocate terminals and runaways or shutdown ( Hockley, 2020 ). Specifically, in terms of passenger footfalls in airports and planes, the Air Transport Bureau (2020) modelled the impact of COVID-19 on scheduled international passenger traffic for the full year 2020 under two scenarios namely Scenario 1 (the first sign of recovery in late May) and Scenario 2 (restart in the third quarter or later). Under Scenario 1, it estimated an overall reduction of: between 39%-56% of airplane seats; 872-1,303 million passengers, corresponding to a loss of gross operating revenues between ~$153 - $ 231 billion. Under Scenario 2, it predicted an overall drop of: between 49%-72% of airplane seats; 1,124 to 1,540 million passengers, with an equivalent loss of gross operating revenues between ~$198 - $ 273 billion. They concluded that the predicted impacts are a function of the duration and size of the pandemic and containment measures, the confidence level of customers for air travel, economic situations, and the pace of economic recovery ( Air Transport Bureau, 2020 ).

The losses incurred by the aviation industry require context and several other comparison-based predictions within the airline industry have also been reported. For instance, the International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO (2020) predicted an overall decline ininternational passengers ranging from 44% to 80% in 2020 compared to 2019. Airports Council International, ACI (2020) also forecasted a loss of two-fifths of passenger traffic and >$76 billion in airport revenues in 2020 in comparison to business as usual. Similarly, the International Air Transport Association IATA (2020) forecasted $113 billion in lost revenue and 48% drop in revenue passenger kilometres (RPKs) for both domestic and international routes ( Hockley, 2020 ). For pandemic scenario comparisons, Fig. 6 shows the impact of past disease outbreaks on aviation. As shown, the impact of COVID‐19 has already outstripped the 2003 SARS outbreak which had resulted in the reduction of annual RPKs by 8% and $6 billion revenues for Asia/Pacific airlines, for example. The 6‐month recovery path of SARS is, therefore, unlikely to be sufficient for the ongoing COVID-19 crisis ( Air Transport Bureau, 2020 ) but gives a backdrop and context for how airlines and their domestic/international markets may be impacted.

Impact of past disease outbreaks on aviation ( Air Transport Bureau, 2020 ).

Notably, these predictions are bad news for the commercial aspects of air travel (and jobs) but from the carbon/greenhouse gas emission and CE perspective, these reductions are enlightening and should force the airline industry to reflect on more environmentally sustainable models. However, the onus is also on the aviation industry to emphasise R&D on solutions that are CE-friendly (e.g. fuel efficiency; better use of catering wastes; end of service recycling of aircraft in sectors such as mass housing, or re-integrating airplane parts into new supply chains) and not merely investigating ways to recoup lost revenue due to COVID-19.

4.2.4. Impact of COVID-19 on the tourism industry

Expectedly, the impact of COVID-19 on aviation has led to a knock-on effect on the tourismindustry, which is nowadays hugely dependent on air travel. For instance, the United Nation World Tourism Organization UNWTO (2020) reported a 22% fall in international tourism receipts of $80 billion in 2020, corresponding to a loss of 67 million international arrivals. Depending on how long the travel restictions and border closures last, current scenario modelling indicated falls between 58% to 78% in the arrival of international tourists, but the outlook remains hugely uncertain. The continuous existence of the travel restrictions could put between 100 to 120 million direct tourism-related jobs at risk. At the moment, COVID-19 has rendered the sector worst in the historical patterns of international tourism since 1950 with a tendency to halt a 10-year period of sustained growth since the last global economic recession ( UNWTO, 2020 ). It has also been projected that a drop of ~60% in international tourists will be experienced this year, reducing tourism's contribution to global GDP, while affecting countries whose economy relies on this sector ( Naidoo and Fisher, 2020 ). Fig. 7 depicts the impact of COVID-19 on tourism in Q1 of 2020 based on % change in international tourists’ arrivals between January and March.

The impact of COVID-19 on tourism in quarter 1of 2020. Provisional data but current as of 31st August 2020 ( UNWTO, 2020 ).

4.2.5. Impact of COVID-19 on sustainable development goals

In 2015, the United Nations adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with the view to improve livelihood and the natural world by 2030, making all countries of the world to sign up to it. To succeed, the foundations of the SDGs were premised on two massive assumptions namely globalisation and sustained economic growth. However, COVID-19 has significantly hampered this assumption due to several factors already discussed. Indeed, COVID-19 has brought to the fore the fact that the SDGs as currently designed are not resilient to shocks imposed by pandemics. Prior to COVID-19, progress across the SDGs was slow. Naidoo and Fisher (2020) reported that two-thirds of the 169 targets will not be accomplished by 2030 and some may become counterproductive because they are either under threat due to this pandemic or not in a position to mitigate associated impacts.

4.3. Positive impact of COVID-19

In this section, we discussed some of the positive ramifications of COVID-19. Despite the many detrimental effects, COVID-19 has provoked some natural changes in behaviour and attitudes with positive influences on the planet. Nonetheless, to the extent that the trends discussed below were imposed by the pandemic, they also underscore a growing momentum for transforming business operations and production towards the ideal of the CE.

4.3.1. Improvements in air quality

Due to the COVID-19-induced lockdown, industrial activities have dropped, causing significant reductions in air pollution from exhaust fumes from cars, power plants and other sources of fuel combustion emissions in most cities across the globe, allowing for improved air quality ( Le Quéré et al., 2020 ; Muhammad et al., 2020 ). This is evident from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ( NASA, 2020a ) and European Space Agency ( ESA, 2020 ) Earth Observatory pollution satellites showing huge reductions in air pollution over China and key cities in Europe as depicted in Fig. 8 . In China, for example, air pollution reduction of between 20-30% was achieved and a 20-year low concentration of airborne particles in India is observed; Rome, Milan, and Madrid experienced a fall of ~45%, with Paris recording a massive reduction of 54% ( NASA, 2020b ). In the same vein, the National Centre for Atmospheric Science, York University, reported that air pollutants induced by NO 2 fell significantly across large cities in the UK. Although Wang et al. (2020) reported that in certain parts of China, severe air pollution events are not avoided through the reduction in anthropogenic activities partially due to the unfavourable meteorological conditions. Nevertheless, these data are consistent with established accounts linking industrialization and urbanization with the negative alteration of the environment ( Rees, 2002 ).

The upper part shows the average nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ) concentrations from January 1-20, 2020 to February 10-25, 2020, in China. While the lower half shows NO 2 concentrations over Europe from March 13 to April 13, 2020, compared to the March-April averaged concentrations from 2019 ( ESA, 2020 ; NASA, 2020a ).

The scenarios highlighted above reiterates the fact that our current lifestyles and heavy reliance on fossil fuel-based transportation systems have significant consequences on the environment and by extension our wellbeing. It is this pollution that was, over time, responsible for a scourge of respiratory diseases, coronary heart diseases, lung cancer, asthma etc.( Mabahwi et al., 2014 ), rendering plenty people to be more susceptible to the devastating effects of the coronavirus ( Auffhammer et al., 2020 ). Air pollution constitutes a huge environmental threat to health and wellbeing. In the UK for example, between ~28,000 to ~36,000 deaths/year was linked to long-term exposure to air pollutants ( PHE, 2020 ). However, the reduction in air pollution with the corresponding improvements in air quality over the lockdown period has been reported to have saved more lives than already caused by COVID-19 in China ( Auffhammer et al., 2020 ).

4.3.2. Reduction in environmental noise

Alongside this reduction in air pollutants is a massive reduction in environmental noise. Environmental noise, and in particular road traffic noise, has been identified by the European Environment Agency, EEA (2020) to constitute a huge environmental problem affecting the health and well-being of several millions of people across Europe including distortion in sleep pattern, annoyance, and negative impacts on the metabolic and cardiovascular system as well as cognitive impairment in children. About 20% of Europe's population experiences exposure to long-term noise levels that are detrimental to their health. The EEA (2020) submitted that 48000new cases of ischaemic heart disease/year and ~12000 premature deaths are attributed to environmental noise pollution. Additionally, they reported that ~22 million people suffer chronic high annoyance alongside ~6.5 million people who experienceextreme high sleep disturbance. In terms of noise from aircraft, ~12500 schoolchildren were estimated to suffer from reading impairment in school. The impact of noise has long been underestimated, and although more premature deaths are associated with air pollution in comparison to noise, however noise constitutes a bigger impact on indicators of the quality of life and mental health ( EEA, 2020 ).

A recent study on the aftereffect of COVID-19 pandemic on exercise rates across the globe concluded that reduced traffic congestions and by extension reduced noise and pollution has increased the rate at which people exercise as they leveraged the ensued pleasant atmosphere. Average, moderate, and passive (i.e. people who exercised once a week before COVID-19) athletes have seen the frequency of their exercise regime increased by 88%, 38%, and 156% respectively ( Snider-Mcgrath, 2020 ).

4.3.3. Increased cleanliness of beaches

Beaches constitute the interface between land and ocean, offering coastal protection from marine storms and cyclones ( Temmerman et al., 2013 ), and are an integral part of natural capital assets found in coastal areas ( Zambrano-Monserrate et al., 2018 ). They provide services (e.g. tourism, recreation) that are crucial for the survival of coastal communities and possess essential values that must be prevented against overexploitation ( Lucrezi et al., 2016 ; Vousdoukas et al., 2020 ). Questionable use to which most beaches have been subjected have rendered them pollution ridden ( Partelow et al., 2015 ). However, due to COVID-19-induced measures, notable changes in terms of the physical appearance of numerous beaches across the globe have been observed ( Zambrano-Monserrate et al., 2020 ).

4.3.4. Decline in primary energy use

Global energy demand during the first quarter of 2020 fell by ~3.8% compared to the first quarter of 2019, with a significant effect noticeable in March as control efforts heightened in North America and Europe ( IEA, 2020 ). The International Energy Agency (IEA) submitted that if curtailment measures in the form of restricted movement continue for long and economic recoveries are slow across different parts of the globe, as is progressively likely, annual energy demand will plummet by up to 6%, erasing the last five years energy demand growth. As illustrated in Fig. 9 , if IEA's projections become the reality, the world could experience a plunge in global energy use to a level not recorded in the last 70 years. The impact will surpass the effect of the 2008 financial crisis by a factor of more than seven times. On the other hand, if COVID-19 is contained earlier than anticipated and there is an early re-start of the economy at a successful rate, the fall in energy could be constrained to <4% ( IEA, 2020 ). However, a rough re-start of the economy characterised by supply chain disruptions and a second wave of infections in the second half of the year could further impede growth ( IEA, 2020 ).

Annual rate of change in primary energy demand, since 1900, with key events impacting energy demand highlighted ( IEA, 2020 ).

Coal was reported to have been hit the hardest by ~8% in comparison to the first quarter of 2019 due to the impact of COVID-19 in China whose economy is driven by coal, reduced gas costs, continued growth in renewables, and mild weather conditions. Oil demand was also strongly affected, plummeting by ~5% in the first quarter driven mainly by restrictions in mobility and aviation activities which constitute ~60% of global oil demand ( IEA, 2020 ). For instance, global road transport and aviation activities were respectively ~50% and 60% below the 2019 average. Global electricity demand declined by >20% during full lockdown restrictions, with a corresponding spill over effect on the energy mix. Accordingly, the share of renewable energy sources across the energy supply increased due to priority dispatch boosted by larger installed capacity and the fact that their outputs are largely unconstrained by demand ( IEA, 2020 ). However, there was a decline for all other sources of electricity including gas, coal and nuclear power ( IEA, 2020 ).

4.3.5. Record low CO 2 emissions

Unprecedented reduction in global CO 2 emissions is another positive effect that can be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic.The massive fall in energy demand induced by COVID-19 accounted for the dramatic decline in global GHG emissions. The annual CO 2 emissions have not only been projected to fall at a rate never seen before, but the fall is also envisioned to be the biggest in a single year outstripping the fall experienced from the largest recessions of the past five decades combined ( IEA, 2020 ).The global CO 2 emissions are projected to decline by ~8% (2.6 GCO 2 ) to the levels of the last decade. If achieved, this 8% emissions reduction will result in the most substantial reduction ever recorded as it is expected to be six times larger than the milestone recorded during the 2009 financial crisis, ( Fig. 10 ). Characteristically, after an economic meltdown, the surge in emissions may eclipse the decline, unless intervention options to set the economy into recovery mode is based on cleaner and more resilient energy infrastructure ( IEA, 2020 ).

Global energy-related emissions (top) and annual change (bottom) in GtCO 2 , with projected 2020 levels highlighted in red. Other major events are indicated to provide a sense of scale ( IEA, 2020 ).

4.3.6. Boost in digitalisation

The COVID-19 pandemic has been described as an opportunity to further entrench digital transformation without the ‘digitalism’ which is an extreme and adverse form of connectedness ( Bayram et al., 2020 ). Protecting patients from unnecessary exposure was a driver for telemedicine ( Moazzami et al., 2020 ) and virtual care would become the new reality ( Wosik et al., 2020 ). The necessity for social distancing under lockdown circumstances has also highlighted the importance (and need) for remote working ( Dingel and Neiman, 2020 ; Omary et al., 2020 ), which has had implications for broadband connectivity ( Allan et al., 2020 ) as well as reductions in transportation-related pollution levels ( Spash, 2020 ). The impact of COVID-19 on remote working and digitalisation of work is expected to constitute long-term implications for reduced fossil fuel consumption due to mobility and commuting ( Kanda and Kivimaa, 2020 ). Besides, the survival and thriving of many small business restaurants during the lockdown period depended on whether they had a digital resilience, via online platforms, through which they could exploit the home delivery market via Uber Eats ( Raj et al., 2020 ). For consumers, the pandemic has seen a noticeable increase in online orders for food in many countries such as: Taiwan ( Chang and Meyerhoefer, 2020 ); Malaysia ( Hasanat et al., 2020 ); Germany ( Dannenberg et al., 2020 ) as well as Canada ( Hobbs, 2020 ).

4.4. Unsustainability of current economic and business models amidst COVID-19

It is interesting to observe that while COVID-19 has led to a very steep reduction in air pollution in advanced economies due to reduced economic activity imposed by the lockdown, this pandemic-driven positive impact is only temporary as they do not reflect changes in economic structures of the global economy ( Le Quéré et al., 2020 ). The changes are not due to the right decisions from governments in terms of climate breakdown policies and therefore should not be misconstrued as a climate triumph. More importantly, life in lockdown will not linger on forever as economies will need to rebuild and we can expect a surge in emissions again. To drive home the point, we conducted a decomposition analysis of key drivers (accelerators or retardants) of four global air pollutants using Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) framework ( Ang, 2005 ; Fujii et al., 2013 ), with the results shown in Fig. 11 . The drivers of the pollutants considered based on the production side of an economy include: (i) economic activity effect, given thatemissions can increase or decrease as a result of changes in the activity level of the entire economy; (ii) industrialeconomy structure effect, based on the fact thatthe growth in emissions is a function of the changes in the industrial activity composition; (iii) emissions intensity effect, which can be improvements or deteriorations at the sectoral level, depending on theenergy efficiency (e.g. cleaner production processes) of the sector; (iv) fuel mix or fuel dependency effect, given that its composition influences the amount of emissions; and (v) emission factors effect, because these factors, for different fuel types, changes over time due toswitching from fossil fuels to renewables, for example.

Drivers of representative four (4) global pollutants: a) CO 2 emissions; b) NO x emissions; c) SO x emissions; d) CO emissions. All data for the decomposition analysis of the four pollutants were obtained from the WIOD database ( Timmer et al., 2012 ).

As shown in Fig. 11 a, for example, between 1995 and 2009, global change in CO 2 emission was 32%, where economic activity (+48%) and emission factor (+2%) acted as accelerators, while economic structure (-8%), emission intensity (-9%) and fuel mix (-1%) acted as retardants, of the global CO 2 emission dynamics and trajectory.This implies that although economic activities, as expected, alongside emission factor drove up emissions, however, the upward effect of both drivers was offset by the combined improvements of other driving factors namely economic structure, emission intensity, and fuel mix. Indeed, cutting back on flying or driving less as we have experienced due to COVID-19 contributed to ~8% in emission reduction, however, zero-emissions cannot be attained based on these acts alone. Simply put, emissions reduction cannot be sustained until an optimal balance across the aforementioned drivers informed by structural changes in the economy is attained. As Gates (2020a) rightly stated – the world should be using more energy, not less, provided it is clean.

Characteristically, after an economic meltdown, like the global recession in 2008, there is a surge in emissions ( Feng et al., 2015 ; Koh et al., 2016 ). The current social trauma of lockdown and associated behavioural changes tends to modify the future trajectory unpredictably. However, social responses would not drive the profound and sustained reduction required to attain a low-carbon economy ( Le Quéré et al., 2020 ). This is evident given that we live on a planet interlinked by networked product supply chains, multidimensional production technologies, and non-linear consumption patterns ( Acquaye et al., 2017 ; Ibn-Mohammed et al., 2018 ; Koh et al., 2016 ). Additionally, post COVID-19, the society may suffer from green bounce back– there appears to be an increasing awareness of climate change and air pollution because of this pandemic (though the linkages are non-causal). On the one hand this might promote greener choices on behalf of consumers, but on the other it may result in increased car ownership (at the expense of mass transit), driving up emissions. As such, establishing approaches that ensure an optimal balance between quality of life and the environmental burden the planet can bear is pertinent, if the boundaries of environmental sustainability informed by the principles of low-carbon CE are to be extended. In the next section, the role of the CE as a potential strategy for combating pandemics such as COVID-19 is discussed.

5. The role of circular economy

For long, the central idea of the industrial economy rests on the traditional linear economic system of taking resources, making products from them, and disposing of the product at the end of life. Experts referred to this as “extract-produce-use-dump”, “take-make-waste”, or “take-make-dispose” energy flow model of industrial practice ( Geissdoerfer et al., 2017 ; Kirchherr et al., 2017 ; MacArthur, 2013 ). However, the unlimited use of natural resources with no concern for sustainability jeopardizes the elastic limit of the planet's resource supply. For instance, Girling (2011) submitted that ~90% of the raw materials used in manufacturing become waste before the final product leaves the production plant while ~80% of products manufactured are disposed of within the first 6 months of their life. Similarly, Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata (2012) reported that ~1.3 billion tonnes of solid waste with a corresponding cost implication of $205.4 billion/year is generated by cities across the globe and that such waste might grow to ~2.2 billion tonnes by 2025, with a corresponding rate of $375.5 billion. This is further compounded by the fact that at the global level, the demand for resources is forecasted to double by 2050 ( Ekins et al., 2016 ).

Against this backdrop, the search for an industrial economic model that satisfies the multiple roles of decoupling of economic growth from resource consumption, waste management and wealth creation, has heightened interests in concepts about circular economy ( Ekins et al., 2016 ; MacArthur, 2013 ).In theory, CE framework hinges on three principles: designing out waste, keeping products and materials in use and regenerating the natural systems ( MacArthur, 2013 ). Practically, CE is aimed at: (i) emphasizing environmentally-conscious manufacturing and product recovery ( Gungor and Gupta, 1999 ); (ii) promoting the avoidance of unintended ecological degradation in symbiotic cooperation between corporations, consumers and government ( Bauwens et al., 2020 ); and (iii) shifting the focus to a holistic product value chain and cradle-to-cradle life cycle via promotion of product repair/re-use and waste management ( Duflou et al., 2012 ; Lieder and Rashid, 2016 ; Rashid et al., 2013 ).

Given the current COVID-19 pandemic, there has never been a more adequate time to consider how the principles of CE could be translated into reality when the global economy begins to recover. This is pertinent because the pandemic has further exposed the limitations of the current dominant linear economy regarding how it is failing the planet and its inhabitants, and has revealed the global ecosystem's exposure to many risks including climate breakdown, supply chain vulnerabilities and fragility, social inequality and inherent brittleness ( Bachman, 2020 ; Sarkis et al., 2020 ). The pandemic continues to amplify the global interlinkages of humankind and the interdependencies that link our natural environment, economic, and social systems ( Haigh and Bäunker, 2020 ). In the subsections that follow, the potentials of CE as a tool for: (i) climate change mitigation; (ii) crafting a more resilient economy, and ; (iii) facilitating a socially just and inclusive society, is briefly discussed.

5.1. Circular economy as a tool for climate breakdown mitigation

As highlighted in Section 4.3.5 , a CO 2 emission reduction of 8%, which in real terms implies an equivalent of ~172 billion tCO 2 will be released instead of ~187 billion tCO 2 , is indeed unprecedented. Nevertheless, the peculiar conclusion from the lockdown is that it still entails emissions of 92% of the initial value while there was restrictions to mobility and other related leisure activities. Measures for mitigating climate change have often been presented dramatically as a "prohibition of the nice things of life", but as shown, a cut-off of such an amount of nice things only delivers an 8% reduction. More importantly, it comes at a heavy cost of between $3,200/tCO 2 and $5,400/tCO 2 in the US, for example, based on data from the Rhodium Group ( Gates, 2020a ). In other words, the shutdown is reducing emissions at a cost between 32 and 54 times the $100/tCO 2 deemed a reasonable carbon price by economists ( Gates, 2020a ). This suggests that a completely different approach to tackling climate issue is required.

Accordingly, there is the need for a system that calls for greater adoption of a more resilient low-carbon CE model, given the predictions by experts that climate breakdown and not COVID-19 will constitute the biggest threat to global health ( Hussey and Arku, 2020 ; Watts et al., 2018a ; Watts et al., 2018b ). International bodies and country-level environmental policies have highlighted the fact that a significant reduction in GHG emissions cannot be achieved by transitioning to renewables alone but with augmentation with CE strategies. The demands side CE strategies such as (i)material recirculation (more high-value recycling, less primary material production, lower emissions per tonne of material); (ii)product material efficiency (improved production process, reuse of components and designing products with fewer materials); (iii)circular business models (higher utilisation and longer lifetime of products through design for durability and disassembly, utilisation of long-lasting materials, improved maintenance and remanufacturing), could reduce emissions whilst contributing to climate change mitigation ( Enkvist et al., 2018 ). CE principles, when adopted in a holistic manner provide credible solutions to the majority of the structural weaknesses exposed by COVID-19, offering considerable opportunities in competitiveness and long-term reduced GHG emissions across value chains. Investments in climate-resilient infrastructure and the move towards circular and low-carbon economy future can play the dual role of job creation while enhancing environmental and economic benefits.

5.2. Circular economy as a vehicle for crafting more resilient economies

Haigh and Bäunker (2020) reported that if we muddle through every new crisis based on the current economic model, using short-term solutions to mitigate the impact, future shocks will continue to surpass capacities. It is, therefore, necessary to devise long-term risk-mitigation and sustainable fiscal thinking with the view to shift away from the current focus on profits and disproportionate economic growth. Resilience in the context of the CE largely pertains to having optimized cycles (i.e. products are designed for longevity and optimized for a cycle of disassembly and reuse that renders them easier to handle and transform). Some cycles can be better by being closed locally (e.g. many food items), and for other cycles, a global value chain could be a better option (e.g. rare earth elements). Due to globalization, all cycles have become organized at the global level, diminishing resilience. COVID-19 has further shown how some particular cycles had the wrong scale level, as such, the adoption of CE can be seen as an invitation to reconsider the optimal capacity of cycles.

Sustainability through resilience thinking would have a positive and lasting impact as reported by the Stockholm Resilience Centre (2016) , which concluded that prosperity and sustainability cannot be accomplished without building “ resilient systems that promote radical innovation in economic policy, corporate strategy, and in social systems and public governance”. It calls for sustainability through resilience thinking to become an overarching policy driver and encourages the application of the principles of such thinking to enhance social innovation. Haigh and Bäunker (2020) concluded that when resilience thinking is employed as a guide, all innovations emanating from circular thinking would extend beyond focusing mainly on boosting the market and competitiveness and recognise the general well-being of the populace as an equal goal. As the global economy recovers from COVID-19, it has become more apparent that there is a strong sense of interconnectedness between environmental, economic and social sustainability ( Bauwens et al., 2020 ).

5.3. Circular economy as a facilitator of a socially just and inclusive society

Advanced economies have mainly focused on maintaining the purchasing power of households through the establishment of the furlough scheme (in the UK, for example). Most developing countries have also adopted a similar approach through the integration of containment measures with a huge increase in social protection spending. However, these intervention strategies in response to the pandemic have further revealed the social injustice and inequality between countries and communities given that the deployment of such strategy in advanced economies could devastate developing countries and communities ( Ahmed et al., 2020 ; Haigh and Bäunker, 2020 ). Guan and Hallegatte (2020) revealed that developing and underdeveloped economies face tougher and more challenging situation in comparison to their developed counterparts, because even under the assumption that social protection systems could fully replace income and shield businesses from bankruptcy, maintaining access to essential commodities is impossible if the country is lacking in production capabilities in the first place. Furthermore, in the underdeveloped world, the idea of working from home is very difficult due to the lack of infrastructure and access to health facilities is severely cumbersome. As such, short-term fixes adopted by governments cannot adequately address deep-rooted inequality and social injustice.

Accordingly, Preston et al. (2019) submitted that CE has the potential to minimise prevailing pressures and struggles regarding conflicts due to imbalanced distribution of resources, through participatory forms of governance that entails the inclusion of local stakeholders in resource management initiatives. This can be achieved through the adoption of CE strategy such as closed-loop value chains, where wastes are transformed into resources with the view to not only reduce pollution but to simultaneously aid the pursuance of social inclusion objectives. A number of companies are already embracing this idea. For instance, under the Food Forward SA initiative, “ the world of excess is connected with the world of need ” through the recovery of edible surplus food from the consumer goods supply chain and gets redistributed to the local community. This ensures loops are closed and the needy receive nourishment ( Haigh and Bäunker, 2020 ). With sufficient investment in the CE, developing countries can leapfrog their developed counterparts in digital and materials innovation to integrate sustainable production and consumption and low-carbon developments at the core of their economies. Additionally, Stahel (2016) reported that another benefit of the CE as a facilitator of a socially just and inclusive society is that it is likely to be more labour-intensive due to the variety of end-of-life products and the high cost of automating their processing compared to manual work. As such, CE can enable the creation of local jobs and “reindustrialisation of regions” ( Stahel, 2019 ) through the substitution of: manpower for energy, materials for (local) labour, and local workshops for centralised factories ( Stahel, 2019 ), while boosting the repair economy and local micro industries. Of course, not everybody will see this as a benefit, and many would like to see more automation, not less. However, this is a political/economic argument, not an engineering or scientific one. In the next section, barriers to CE in general and in the context of COVID-19 is discussed.

5.4. Barriers to CE in the context of COVID-19

On the surface, the benefits of CE should be obvious as it strives for three wins in the three dimensions of social, economic and environment impacts through a symbiotic vision of reduced material usage, reduced waste generation, extending value retention in products and designing products for durability. However, limiting barriers obviating the success of CE have existed around technical implementation, behavioural change, financial and intellectual investments, policy and regulations, market dynamics, socio-cultural considerations as well as operational cost of transforming from the linear economy to one based on circularity ( Friant et al., 2020 ). In more concrete terms, the barriers dwell within the ecosystem of actors (and the interactions within the actors) involved in the move towards CE ( Lieder and Rashid, 2016 ).

Pre-COVID-19, Korhonen et al. (2018) enumerated six fundamental factors hindering the promise of CE: (i) thermodynamic factors (i.e. limit imposed by material and energy combustion in recycling/re-manufacturing); (ii) complexity of spatial and temporal boundaries (i.e. material and energy footprints for a product cannot be easily reduced to a point in space and time for an in-depth analysis of environmental impacts); (iii) interlink of governance and nation's economy; (iv) consumer and organizational inertia (i.e. reluctance to embrace new way of doing things due to uncertainty about the success of business models as well as fuzziness around organizational culture and management models that rely on CE); (v) fragile industrial ecosystems (featuring the difficulty of establishing and managing intra-/inter-organizational collaboration along with local/regional authorities); and (vi) lack of consensus on what the many Rs (re-use, recycle, recover, repurpose, repair, refurbish, remanufacture) embedded in CE framework really means ( Kirchherr et al., 2017 ). Challenges in data sharing between product end points and stakeholders, complexity in the supply chain with unclear details of product biography over time, and prohibitive start-up investment costs have also been identified as CE barrier in other climes ( Jaeger and Upadhyay, 2020 ; Manninen et al., 2018 ). Other issues along similar lines were captured in the work by several other authors including Galvão et al. (2020) , Kirchherr et al. (2018) , Govindan and Hasanagic (2018) , De Jesus and Mendonça (2018) and many more.

The paradox of COVID-19 is grounded on creating a once in a lifetime opportunity to re-examine the difficulty of some of these barriers, but it also unveiled a new set of challenges. For instance, the sharing economy models that have been hitherto hailed as exemplars of CE strategy is now perceived differently by many urban dwellers because of the behavioural change embedded in “social distancing”, which is necessary to limit the spread of the virus. Although if concepts such as “access over ownership” or “pay for performance” service have become fully operational, they could have constituted a significant solution to offer flexibility. Additionally, it has been argued that COVID-19 will ‘disrupt some disruptors’ peer-to-peer (P2P) providers such as Airbnb, which has reported a 4.16% drop in local bookings for every doubling new COVID-19 cases ( Hu and Lee, 2020 ). In transportation, demand from ride-sharing modes could increase due to commuters wanting to minimise exposure to COVID-19 in mass transport systems like buses and trains ( Chandra, 2020 ). However, the risks of human-to-human transmission of COVID-19 for passengers not wearing facemask have been noted ( Liu and Zhang, 2020 ), including when either passengers or drivers in ride-hailing and car-sharing disruptors like Uber do not wear facemasks ( Wong et al., 2020 ).

Reducing emissions, in the long run, requires large investments, from both the public and private sectors, in low-carbon technologies and infrastructure in terms of both innovation and diffusion ( OECD, 2018 ). Given the downturn of the global economy due to COVID-19, the prospects of significant low-carbon investments from the private sector have significantly reduced compared to pre-COVID-19. This view is not just limited to the private sector, but also to the public sector, as echoed by Naidoo and Fisher (2020) . Hence, post COVID-19, accelerating progress towards CE still requires: (i) a decisive legal and financial championships from local, regional and national authorities; (ii) innovation across multiple domains (product design, production technologies, business models, financing and consumer behaviours); (iii) governments to promote green logistics and waste management regulations with reasonable incentives to aid producers and manufacturers in minimizing loss while maximizing value. It is therefore recommended that governments provide the much-needed policy framework that will eliminate some of aforementioned barriers to facilitate the urgent transition to CE. Doing this will build resilience for community response to future pandemic and it also aligns with some of the existing roadmaps for resource efficiency ( European Commission, 2011 ).

6. Opportunities for circular economy post COVID-19

COVID-19 has instigated a focus on vibrant local manufacturing as an enabler of resilient economy and job creation; fostered behavioural change in consumers; triggered the need for diversification and circularity of supply chains, and evinced the power of public policy for tackling urgent socio-economic crises. As we rise to the challenges imposed by COVID-19, the question is no longer should we build back better, but how. Consequently, going forward, crafting a roadmap for a sustainable future is as much about the governmental will to forge a new path to socio-economic growth as it is about local businesses joining forces with the consumers to enable the transition to CE. As already documented in the earlier sections of this paper, governments around the world have deployed many financial policy instruments to combat the short-term consequences of COVID-19 pandemic. Still, in the long-term, the adoption of circular economy principles across various technological frontiers holds the promise to bring about a desired technical and behavioural change that will benefit many nations around the world.

Specifically, adopting the CE principle will alleviate some of the detrimental effects of COVID-19 pandemic in the future. To mention just a few: (i) a national level adoption of CE will reduce the over-reliance on one country as the manufacturing hub of the world; (ii) a systematic shift away from the traditional polluting, energy-intensive, manufacturing-driven economy to a CE, based on renewable energy, smart materials, smart re-manufacturing, and digital technology will strengthen the fight against pollution; and (iii) the transition to CE will also spur local job creation along several of the axes of societal needs (e.g. built environment, mobility, health, consumables, etc.). Accordingly, in the subsections that follow, an overview of recommendations as well as policy measures, incentives, and regulatory support for advancing sector-specific CE strategies in a post-COVID-19 world is presented.

6.1. Local manufacturing and re-manufacturing of essential medical accessories

Disruptions due to COVID-19 has been attributed to unprecedented demand, panic buying, and intentional hoarding of essential medical goods for profit ( Bradsher and Alderman, 2020 ; Fischer et al., 2020 ). The shortage of many items was so dire in many countries that the principle of CE, such as re-use, is already been unwittingly recommended ( Gondi et al., 2020 ), by respectable bodies such as the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) ( Ranney et al., 2020 ). However, designed and produced from non-CE compliant processes, medical accessories such as PPE cannot be easily refurbished for re-use without leading to severe degradation in their efficiencies, as noticed for example, in the case of particulate respirators ( Liao et al., 2020 ). Accordingly, it is recommended that companies strive to establish competencies in eco-design and environmentally beneficial innovation to facilitate product re-use in the long run. Some of the desired competencies centre on design strategies for closing resource loops (e.g. designing for technological and biological cycles) as pioneered by McDonough and Braungart (2010) .

A detailed discussion of these competencies is also enunciated by Braungart et al. (2007) , where the authors differentiated between eco-efficiency (less desirable) and eco-effectiveness (the desired dream of CE), for companies to be compliant with the CE framework. Meanwhile, a starting point for companies to shift to eco-effectiveness at the product design level, which will facilitate product re-use, is to follow the five-step framework enumerated by Braungart et al. (2007) or to adopt the analytical framework to explore some of the key dimensions in eco-design innovations developed by Carrillo-Hermosilla et al. (2010) . During implementation, the preceding steps comport with the idea of eco-factories that take pride in design for effortless end-of-life product re-use and design for “upcycling” and remanufacturing ( Bocken et al., 2016 ; Herrmann et al., 2014 ; Ijomah, 2010 ), all of which falls under the umbrella of CE.

Another emerging evidence in favour of CE, also adopted inadvertently during this pandemic, is the ease with which several manufacturers have pivoted their factory floors to make different products in response to the shortage of medical accessories. Few examples of these companies in the UK include, but not limited to: AE Aerospace, which retooled its factory floor to produce milled parts for ventilators; Alloy Wire International re-purposed its machinery to make springs for ventilators; AMTICO (flooring manufacture) re-configured its production lines to make visors for front line workers; BAE Systems deployed its factory resources to produce and distribute over 40000 face shields; and BARBOUR (a clothing company) re-purposed to produce PPE for nurses ( Williamson, 2020 ).

6.2. CE strategies for managing hospital medical and general waste

Wastes generated by the healthcare industry (HCI) normally arouse concerns about operational, public, and environmental safety as a result of the awareness of the corrosive, hazardous, infectious, reactive, possibly radioactive, and toxic nature of the wastes’ composition ( Lee et al., 1991 ; Prüss-Üstün et al., 1999 ). Consequently, the management of the different categories of healthcare waste far removed from the traditional municipal wastes, falls under stringent national or local regulatory frameworks. Pre-COVID-19, the staggering scale of HCI waste is reported to reach into millions of tonnes per year and there have been many studies of national-level attempts at managing these wastes ( Da Silva et al., 2005 ; Insa et al., 2010 ; Lee et al., 1991 ; Oweis et al., 2005 ; Tudor et al., 2005 ). However, this problem is expected to worsen with the tremendous surge, in the last few months, in the volume of disposable medical hardware (PPE, masks, gloves, disposable gears worn by healthcare workers and sanitation workers as well as those contaminated by contacts with COVID-19 patients). Another allied problem is the troubling shift among consumers who now prioritize concerns for hygiene by leaning towards plastic packaging (e.g. in food delivery and grocery shopping) during this pandemic at the expense of environmental impacts ( Prata et al., 2020 ). Most of these products are derived from non-biodegradable plastics, and their disposal has not been given much thought. As a result, the management of these wastes has raised understandable angst in several quarters ( Klemeš et al., 2020 ; Xiao and Torok, 2020 ). Frustratingly, there is much less that can be done at the moment apart from devising judicious waste management policy for these potentially hazardous wastes.

The traditional steps concerning the treatment of HCI wastes (such as collection and separation, storage, transportation to landfill, and decontamination/disposal) suffer from many complications that make the management a challenging undertaking ( Windfeld and Brooks, 2015 ). To alleviate the complexity, the characterization of the physicochemical composition of HCI waste has become an important tool in devising crucial steps for setting up waste minimization and recycling programs ( Kaiser et al., 2001 ). This aligns with the objective of circular economy (CE), which prioritizes the prevention of waste, failing which it proposes the re-use/recyclability of materials from waste to close the loop.

Wong et al. (1994) reported that hospital wastes involve different types of materials: plastics (tubes, gloves, syringes, blood bags), metals (basins, aluminium cans), papers (towel papers, toilet papers, newspapers), cotton/textiles (drapes, table covers, diapers, pads, bandages), glass (bottles) etc. With this categorization in mind, a CE product design consideration that looks promising in the near future, as a way to avert some of the dangers that can be triggered by events such as COVID-19, is to increase the volume of recyclable materials and biodegradable bioplastics in the production of medical accessories. However, the reality is that not all medical gears and products can be derived from bio-plastics or recyclable materials, and some will inevitably continue to be fabricated with materials that need further downstream processing. Yet, the application of CE to the healthcare industry (HCI) remains a touchy subject. Understandably, health and safety concerns, as well as requirements to meet stringent regulations, tend to override the environmental gain from the 4R practice promoted by CE ( Kane et al., 2018 ). Nonetheless, the benefits of CE are starting to catch on in the HCI as a means of optimizing hospital supply chains and reduce overhead cost, all the while creating environmental benefits in the course of saving human lives.

Principally, the applications of CE in HCI, like in other fields, are tied to materials flow and an examination of the nature of wastes. Pioneering studies on hospital wastes characterizations ( Diaz et al., 2008 ; Eleyan et al., 2013 ; Özkan, 2013 ; Wong et al., 1994 ), revealed that close to 80% of the wastes can be classified as general wastes, while the remaining 20% falls under the infectious waste category ( WHO, 1998 ). A prevalent method of dealing with the two HCI waste categories has been incineration ( Wong et al., 1994 ). Although suitable for large volumes, incineration produces toxic pollutants such as heavy metals, dioxins, acid gases, and hydrogen chloride ( Yang et al., 2009 ). Consequently, pre-COVID-19, besides incineration, reducing or preventing the volume of wastes in both categories is also shaped by the adoption of green purchasing practices ( Wormer et al., 2013 ). While this may help in the short term, a holistic approach to confronting this problem is the adoption of CE, which can facilitate the shift towards eco-efficient HCI, starting with lifecycle evaluations of medical products to the proposal for re-usable medical instruments ( Cimprich et al., 2019 ; De Soete et al., 2017 ; Penn et al., 2012 ). Numerous CE strategies for healthcare waste management are detailed by Kane et al. (2018) and Voudrias (2018) . Undoubtedly, with COVID-19, there is an uptick in the percentage of waste under the infectious category due to hospitals taking various precautions to facilitate control of the pandemic ( Peng et al., 2020 ). Nevertheless, by subjecting the general waste category to proper sterilization procedure via any of thermal, microwave, bio-chemical sterilization, the huge potential from upcycling of the retrieved materials will edge towards fulfilling the promise of CE within the sector ( Yang et al., 2009 ).

6.3. Embracing resource efficiency in the construction and built environment

As with other economic sectors, COVID-19 has exposed the shortcomings of the built and natural environment's business-as-usual practices, highlighting the prevalence of poor-quality buildings, issues regarding affordability of decent housing and rigidity of the current building stocks ( EMF, 2020b ). Living in poor-quality houses and in small constricted energy inefficient homes, led to the in-house transmission of the virus in some cases ( Clair, 2020 ). This is particularly the case in poorer countries where inadequate access to sanitation amenities has prevented people from adopting best practices necessary for halting the transmission ( Andrew et al., 2020 ). These issues alongside the growing concern and awareness regarding the resource-wasting nature of the sector, present a strong case for rethinking it. The CE is well positioned to offer potential solutions to these problems.

CE can help balance behavioural challenges and opportunities from occupancy requirements. Humans spend up to 90% of their time indoors ( Marques et al., 2018 ; Pitarma et al., 2017 ). The pandemic has led to people spending more time at ‘home’ than at work, leading to massively underutilised office and business spaces, which is likely to increase due to on-going social distancing constraints ( Feber et al., 2020 ) or perhaps due to more organisation discovering the cost benefits of remote working. It is also plausible that upgrading of existing (or design of new) office and commercial spaces would require making them flexible and adaptable to cope with changing needs (e.g. occupant density, social distancing, ventilation, etc.) by using movable walls ( Carra and Magdani, 2017 ). Insufficient ventilation can increase the risk of infection to healthcare workers and susceptible patients in healthcare buildings, especially makeshift hospitals ( Chen and Zhao, 2020 ). The impact of these engineering measures on energy consumption of typical buildings and healthcare facilities needs to be considered because of social distancing measures, which may require a decrease in occupant density but an increase in ventilation rates. So, although energy recovery is high on the agenda for CE in the built environment ( Eberhardt et al., 2019 ), the additional requirement of more mechanical ventilation for less people will stretch the energy consumed by buildings. Some researchers have argued for buildings to avoid recirculation (essential for energy savings) and use 100% fresh outdoor air for mechanical ventilation systems ( Pinheiro and Luís, 2020 ). Such scenarios are likely to increase the adoption of renewable energy sources to support acceptable indoor air quality (IAQ).

The adoption of CE strategies such as material reuse and development of recycling infrastructure can facilitate value circulation and efficient use of resources within the built and natural environment, ensuring a more competitive and cost-effective post-COVID-19 recovery, while contributing to GHG emissions reduction and creating job opportunities ( EMF, 2020b ). For instance, a study by ARUP estimated that designing for steel reuse has the potential of generating savings of 6-27% and 9-43% for a warehouse and an office respectively, whilst constituting up to 25% savings on material costs ( SYSTEMIQ, 2017 ). The EU is leading in policy direction that would make it a legal requirement to introduce recycled content (i.e. material looping) in specific construction products, after the functionality and safety have been vetted ( European Commission, 2020 ). Such initiatives will encourage designers and researchers to incorporate material looping into their overall design strategy across the value chain to ensure they are fit for circulation ( Deloitte, 2020 ). This material looping has been shown to reduce disposal fees and generate new income streams from the secondary materials market ( Rios et al., 2015 ). It is an approach that would help reduce construction waste, which accounts for a third of all solid wastes in countries like India ( EMF, 2016 ). The adoption of digital material passports that supports end-to-end tracking of building materials has been reported by SYSTEMIQ (2017) to aid the identification of materials for reuse as they approach their end of first life, thereby allowing the longevity and encouraging tighter material looping.

COVID-19 in the context of CE will encourage prefabrication, design thinking and renovation. As the building industry moves towards the industrialisation of construction via prefabrication/offsite production, seven strategies have been suggested by Minunno et al. (2018) out of which the principle of designing for eventual disassembly and reuse is critical. With a combined smart and industrialised prefabrication (SAIP) process ( Abbas Elmualim et al., 2018 ), the intelligent performance and circularity of buildings can be boosted by advanced smart technologies ( Windapo and Moghayedi, 2020 ). The building of 1,000 bed Huoshenshan Hospital in Wuhan covering 34,000m 2 in ten days using modular pre-fabricated components, which can be disassembled and reused ( Zhou et al., 2020 ) has demonstrated the capability of the construction industry to deliver adaptable buildings in record time. But it is perhaps in the sphere of refurbishment and renovation that CE in the built environment would mostly be felt. A CE strategy that promotes repair and refurbishment is preferable to one which encourages recycling, since the economic and environmental value of a product is retained better by the former ( Sauerwein et al., 2019 ).

Renovation helps achieve carbon reduction targets while contributing to economic stimulation ( Ibn-Mohammed et al., 2013 ) . Retrofitting, refurbishing or repairing existing buildings leads to lower emission facilities, is less resource-intensive and more cost-effective than demolition or new construction ( Ardente et al., 2011 ; Ibn-Mohammed et al., 2014 ). Nevertheless, circular renovation of buildings must align with circular design thinking – as alluded to above, in terms of re-integrating materials back into the value chain – as well as the need to enhance material/product durability and energy efficiency ( Pomponi and Moncaster, 2017 ). In Europe, renovation of buildings decreases the residential sector's GHG emissions by 63%, with a reduction of up to 73% in the non-residential sector ( Artola et al., 2016 ). In meeting the emerging needs of the renovation sub-sector, digital infrastructure technologies (such as thermographic and infrared surveys, photogrammetry and 3D laser scanning, as well as BIM and Digital Twinning) will play a crucial role in ensuring the low carbon and energy-efficient future of the built environment ( ARUP, 2020 ).

6.4. Bio-cycle economy and the food sector

COVID-19 or not, the food sector is generally wasteful ( Dilkes-Hoffman et al., 2018 ), contributes to environmental degradation ( Beretta and Hellweg, 2019 ), disrupts nutrient flows due to the current linear nature of its value chain, thereby diminishing the nutritional quality of food ( Castañé and Antón, 2017 ). To address these issues, as part of a future resilience in the food sector, a number of CE levers applicable to the sector is highlighted: (i) closing nutrient loops through the adoption of regenerative agriculture ( Rhodes, 2017 ). The organic content of soil reflects its healthiness and propensity to produce nutritious crops. The adoption of regenerative agriculture can facilitate the preservation of soil health through returning organic matter to the soil in the form of food waste or composted by-products or digestates from treatment plants ( Sherwood and Uphoff, 2000 ); (ii) value recovery from organic nutrients through the adoption of anaerobic digestion facilities ( De Gioannis et al., 2017 ; Huang et al., 2017 ), which is related to controlled biogas production for onward injection into natural gas network or conversion to electrical energy ( Atelge et al., 2020 ; Monlau et al., 2015 ). This has the potential to transform ensuing methane from food waste into carbon-neutral energy; and (iii) the embrace of urban and peri-urban agriculture ( Ayambire et al., 2019 ; Lwasa et al., 2014 ; Opitz et al., 2016 ; Thebo et al., 2014 ), which entails the “ cultivation of crops and rearing of animals for food and other uses within and surrounding the boundaries of cities, including fisheries and forestry ”( EPRS, 2014 ). Indeed, by cultivating food in proximity to where it will be consumed, carbon footprint can be mitigated in numerous ways. For instance, through the adoption of urban agriculture, Lee et al. (2015) demonstrated GHG reduction of 11,668 t yr −1 in the transportation sector. The popularity of local farms has severely increased as a direct consequence of COVID-19, whereby people could experience the power of local food cycles and avoid perceived contamination risks in supermarkets. This will further bolster urban and peri-urban agriculture.

All the above-mentioned CE strategies will contribute towards the establishment of a better and more resilient future food system. However, in the context of COVID-19, transitioning to regenerative agricultural production processes and expanding food collection, redistribution and volarisation facilities constitute an integral part of a more resilient and healthy food system that allows greater food security and less wastage, post COVID-19 ( EMF, 2020a ). Investments towards accelerating regenerative agriculture offer economic benefits facilitated by reforms in food, land, and ocean use ( World Economic Forum, 2020 ). It also offer environmental benefits by supporting biologically active ecosystems ( EMF, 2020a ) and through numerous farming mechanisms including no-till farming, adoption of cover crops, crop rotations and diversification ( Ranganatha et al., 2020 ) as well as managed grazing for regenerative livestock rearing ( Fast Company, 2019 ). Similarly, expanding food collection, redistribution and volarisation facilities offers both economic and environmental benefits for the food system ( EMF, 2020a ). However, realising these benefits will require investment in: (i) physical infrastructure like cold chains that support the storage, processing, and supply of edible food, especially in low-income countries, and (ii) processing infrastructure for the collection and volarisation of waste food ( EMF, 2020a ). This will facilitate door-to-door waste food collection, offering avenues for municipal organic waste volarisation.

6.5. Opportunities for CE in the transport and mobility sector

Facilitating the movement of people, products and materials, transportation infrastructures are imperative to the success of circularity in the shift towards sustainable cities given its impact on the quality of life, the local environment and resource consumption ( Van Buren et al., 2016 ). As noted in an earlier section, the transport sector was one of the sectors most heavily impacted by COVID-19. Going forward, many CE strategies could be adopted as part of building a resilient transport sector. Development of compact city for effective mobility given their attributes in terms of being dense with mixed-use neighbourhoods and transit-oriented ( EMF, 2019 ), can create an enabling environment for both shared mobility options (e.g. trams, buses, ride-shares) and active mobility options (e.g. bicycling, walking) ( Chi et al., 2020 ; Shaheen and Cohen, 2020 ). This will help to re-organize urban fabric and promote intelligent use of transportation infrastructures ( Marcucci et al., 2017 ). However, the behavioural change embedded in “social distancing”, which is necessary to limit the contagion, may affect the perception of many urban dwellers about this. On the other hand, less compact cities require increased mobility infrastructure with a corresponding increase in operational vehicle use, leading to more traffic congestion, energy and resource depletion as well as pollution ( UN Habitat, 2013 ).

The use of urban freight strategies for effective reverse logistics and resource flows is also a viable CE strategy for the transport sector ( EMF, 2019 ) as it enables the provision of services in a manner that also supports similar priorities for economic growth, air quality, environmental noise and waste management ( Akgün et al., 2019 ; Kiba-Janiak, 2019 ). Beyond vehicles and infrastructure, the adoption of these strategies can enable the development of new technologies and practices such as virtualisation of products, digital manufacturing, waste collection, and sorting systems. Interestingly, innovative environmentally-friendly logistics solutions resting on the backbone of the CE framework are already materializing and being trialled in various capacities, including: urban consolidation centre (UCC) ( Johansson and Björklund, 2017 ), crowshipping ( Buldeo Rai et al., 2017a ; Rai et al., 2018 ) and off-hour delivery ( Gatta et al., 2019 ). UCC stresses the use of logistics facilities in city suburbs to ease good deliveries to customers ( Browne et al., 2005 ), while crowshipping is a collaborative measure that employs the use of free mobility resources to perform deliveries ( Buldeo Rai et al., 2017b ).

The availability of rich transport data (e.g. impacts of events on transport, commuter habits) and AI-enabled complex data processing technologies can be leveraged to inform the planning, management, and operations of transport networks over time. Real-time data can also be adopted for monitoring and for instant regulations of traffic flow based on route planning, dynamic pricing and parking space allocation. Noticeably, many of these innovative CE-related initiatives still need an efficient governance mechanism ( Janné and Fredriksson, 2019 ). However, coupling them with the deployment of environmentally efficient vehicles and superior technical solutions hinging on the internet-of-things will bring many nations closer to reaping the benefits of CE. Given that urban planning is most often within the remit of governmental agencies, they must therefore develop integrated pathways and strategies for urban mobility to ensure effective logistics and resource flows. Stakeholder engagements within the transport sector can also facilitate innovative solutions that enable better use of assets and big data solutions.

6.6. Sustaining improvements in air quality

Improvements in air quality is one of the positives recorded due to the COVID-19-imposed lockdown as transportation and industrial activities halted. To sustain such improvements, there is the need to facilitate a step change by ramping up the uptake of low emission vehicles through setting more ambitious targets for the embrace of electric vehicles, constructing more electric car charging points as well as encouraging low emissions fuels. This entails heightening investments in cleaner means of public transportation as well as foot and cycle paths for health improvements; redesigning of cities to ensure no proximity to highly polluting roads and the populace as well as preventing highly polluting vehicles from accessing populated areas using classifications such as clear air or low emission zones ( PHE, 2020 ).

Batteries constitute an integral part towards the decarbonisation of road transportation and support the move to a renewable energy system ( World Economic Forum, 2019 ). As such, it is important to establish a battery value chain that is circular, responsible and just, to realise the aforementioned transitions. This entails the identification of the ( World Economic Forum, 2019 ): (i) challenges inhibiting the scaling up of the battery value chain (e.g. battery production processes, risks of raw materials supplies); (ii) levers to mitigate the challenges such as a circular value chain (e.g. design for life extension, implementation of V1G and V2G and scaling up of electric shared and pooled mobility, coupling the transport and power sectors); sustainable business and technology (e.g. increasing the share of renewables and energy efficiency measures across the value chain, effective regulations and financial incentives to support value creation); and a responsible and just value chain based on a balanced view and interplay between environmental, social and economic factors. Indeed, cost-effective and sustainable batteries, as well as an enabling ecosystem for the deployment of battery-enabled renewable energy technologies backed with a dense infrastructure network for charging, will facilitate the transition towards broader acceptance of electric vehicles and by extension guarantees a sustained improvement in air quality ( Masiero et al., 2017 ; PHE, 2020 ; World Economic Forum, 2019 ).We recognize that if all cars are simply replaced by electricones, there will still be the same volume of traffic and an increased need for raw materials, posing significant social, environmental and integrity risks across its value chain. However, CE through the aforementioned levers can address these challenges and support the achievement of a sustainable battery value chain. This will entail lowering emission during manufacturing, eradicating human rights violations, ensuring safe working conditions across the value chain and improving reuse, recycling and remanufacturing ( World Economic Forum, 2019 ).

6.7. Digitalisation for supply chain resilience post COVID-19

Digitalisation of supply chains through leveraging disruptive digital technologies (DDTs) - technologies or tools underpinning smart manufacturing such as the Internet of Things (IoT), artificial intelligence, big data analytics, cloud computing and 3D printing - constitute an important step for companies to prepare for and mitigate against the disruptions and attain business resilience amidst global pandemics such as COVID-19. Circular supply chain value drivers’ entails elongation of useful lifespan and maximisation of asset utilisation. Intelligent assets value drivers entail gathering knowledge regarding the location, condition and availability of assets ( Morlet et al., 2016 ). Paring these drivers could provide a broad range of opportunities, which could change the nature of both products and business models, enabling innovation and value creation ( Antikainen et al., 2018 ; Morlet et al., 2016 ). For instance, big data analytics, when adopted properly can aid companies in streamlining their supplier selection processes; cloud-computing is currently being used to facilitate and manage supplier relationships; through automation and the IoT, logistics and shipping processes can be greatly enhanced ( McKenzie, 2020 ). Digitalisation enables predictive maintenance, preventing failures while extending the lifespan of a product across the supply chains. It therefore, constitutes an ideal vehicle for circular supply chains transitioning, providing opportunities to close material loops and improve processes ( Morlet et al., 2016 ; Pagoropoulos et al., 2017 ).

Indeed, COVID-19 has prompted renewed urgency in the adoption of automation and robotics towards mitigating against the disruptive impact on supply chains through restrictions imposed on people's movement. Numerous companies are taking advantage of this to automate their production lines. Prior to COVID-19, momentum towards adopting 5G mobile technology was mounting but delays caused by factors including anticipated use evaluations, security, competition and radio communications regulatory issues limited progress ( McKenzie, 2020 ). It is likely that the experience of COVID-19 may accelerate the provision of regulatory certainty for 5G, which will in turn fast-track the deployment of IoT-enabled devices for remote monitoring, to support supply chain resilience post COVID-19.

Despite the benefits of DDTs, tension exists between their potential benefits (i.e. ability to deliver measurable environmental benefits at an affordable cost), and the problems (i.e. heavy burden imposed during manufacturing and disposal phases of their lifecycle) they constitute, creating rebound effects. As such, the tension between the push for increasing digitalisation and the associated energy costs and environmental impacts should be investigated such that they do not exacerbate the existing problems of resource use and pollution caused by rapid obsolescence and disposal of products containing such technologies. This entails identifying, mapping and mitigating unintended consequences across their supply chains, whilst taking into account technological design embedded within green ethical design processes, to identify environmental sustainability hotspots, both in conception, application and end of life phases.

6.8. Policy measures, incentives and regulatory support for CE transitioning

Becque et al. (2016) in their analysis of the political economy of the CE identified six main types of policy intervention to facilitate, advance and guide the move to a CE by addressing either barriers that aim to fix the market and regulatory failures or encourage market activity. Some of the policy intervention options identified include: (i) education, information and awareness that entails the integration of CE and lifecycle systems thinking into educational curricula supported by public communication and information campaigns; (ii) setting up platforms for collaboration including public-private partnerships with ventures at the local, regional and national levels, encouraging information sharing as well as value chain and inter-sectoral initiatives, establishing research and development to facilitate breakthroughs in materials science and engineering, biomaterials systems etc.; (iii) introduction of sustainability initiatives in public procurement and infrastructure ; (iv) provision of business/financial/technical support schemes such as initial capital outlay, incentive programs, direct subsidies and financial guarantees as well as technical support, training, advice and demonstration of best practices; (v) regulatory frameworks such as regulation of products (including design), extension of warranties and product passports; strategies for waste management including standards and targets for collection and treatments, take-back systems and extended producer responsibility; strategies at the sectoral levels and associated targets for resource productivity and CE; consumer, competition, industry and trade regulations; introduction of standard carbon accounting standards and methodologies; and (vi) fiscal frameworks such as reductions of VAT or excise tax for products and services designed with CE principles.

7. Conclusion

COVID-19 has highlighted the environmental folly of ‘extract-produce-use-dump’ economic model of material and energy flows. Short-term policies to cope with the urgency of the pandemic are unlikely to be sustainable models in the long run. Nonetheless, they shed light on critical issues that deserve emphases, such as the clear link between environmental pollution and transportation/industrialization. The role of unrestricted air travel in spreading pandemics particularly the viral influenza types (of which COVID-19 is one) is not in doubt, with sectors like tourism and aviation being walloped (some airlines may never recover or return to profitability in a long time) due to reduced passenger volumes. The fallout will re-shape the aviation sector, which like tourism has been among the hardest to be hit economically, albeit with desirable outcomes for the reduction in adverse environmental impacts. Peer-to-peer (P2P) or sharing economy models (e.g. Uber, Airbnb) which have birthed a new generation of service providers and employees are found to be non-resilient to global systemic shocks.

The urgency of supply and demand led to a reduction in cargo shipping in favour of airfreights whose transatlantic cost/kg tripled overnight. This is matched by job losses, income inequalities, mass increase in global poverty levels and economic shocks across industries and supply chains. The practicability of remote working (once the domain of technology/service industries) has been tried and tested for specific industries/professions with its associated impacts on reduced commuting for workers. Remote healthcare/telemedicine/ and remote working, in general, is no longer viewed as unfeasible because it has been practiced with success over the best part of a four-month global lockdown period. There was a corresponding reduction in primary energy consumption due to the slowing and shutting down of production and economic activities, and the delivery of education remotely is also no longer questioned. The potential of automation, IoT, and robotics in improving manufacturing processes, as well as the use of cloud computing and big data analytics in streamlining supplier selection processes and management of supplier relationships and logistics are now better appreciated.

The inadequacies of modern healthcare delivery systems to cope with mass casualties and emergencies are universally acknowledged, primarily due to the incapacity of hospital JIT procurement process to provide essential medical and emergency supplies in vast quantities at short notice. This had deadly consequences with thousands of patients and healthcare workers paying the ultimate price for lack of planning and shortfalls in PPE inventory and critical care equipment. Protectionism and in-ward looking policies on exports and tariff reductions/waivers on the importation of raw materials and critical PPE have emphasized the importance of cooperation to cope with shortages, which evolved in tandem with profiteering, thereby emphasizing the role/need for cottage industries to help meet global production of essentials (facemasks, 3D printed parts/equipment, etc.). The increase in infectious hospital wastes due to the pandemic was necessitated by precautionary measures to control the transmission, but proper/advanced sterilization procedures via thermal, microwave, biochemical processes can help in upcycling discarded or retrieved materials and PPE.

Changes in consumer behaviour with social distancing have necessitated a huge increase in online purchasing, which has benefitted the big players but seriously harmed SMEs, who were not exploiting web-based product and service delivery. A CE-based resilience of the consumer food sector was found to require: (i) closing nutrient loops with the use of regenerative agriculture; (ii) value recovery from organic nutrients via anaerobic digestion facilities; (iii) adoption of urban and peri-urban agriculture; and (iv) expanding food collection, redistribution and volarisation facilities. It is believed that CE will facilitate a socially just and inclusive society,driven by the need for resilience and sustainability goals, which could see a rise in bio-economy and sharing economy (SE). The consequences of these would be felt in terms of global cooperation and mutual interests; long-term planning as well as the need to strike an optimum balance between dependence on outsourcing/importation and local manufacturing/productivity. A realignment of value chains is likely to occur because of countries with raw materials exploiting this pandemic for their sustainable growth, and a new world order not shaped by the technological superiority of super-powers is likely to emerge.

During the lockdown, offices and commercial spaces were massively underutilized and the need to increase ventilation rates, e.g. in hospitals is leading to more energy consumption. However, there are opportunities to (re)design buildings to have movable walls for adaptable use. The use of modular techniques for fast construction of buildings that can be disassembled and re-configured for new needs, as demonstrated in China, is likely to increase. Renovation and refurbishment will witness a renewed vigour as existing buildings get a new lease of life with reduced carbon emissions and new jobs being created. Nonetheless, integrating circularity (product durability, energy efficiency, recyclability, etc.) via design thinking is essential from the onset if all these potential benefits are to be achieved. Digital technologies will play a crucial role in ensuring the low carbon and energy-efficient future of the built environment.

Governments are recognizing the need for national-level CE policies in many aspects, such as: (a) reducing over-reliance on other manufacturing countries for essential goods as massive shortages forced the unwitting adoption of CE principles such as re-use; (b) intensive research into bio-based materials for the development of biodegradable products and the promotion of bio-economy; (c) legal framework for local, regional and national authorities to promote green logistics and waste management regulations which incentivize local production and manufacturing; and (d) development of compact smart cities for effective mobility (with social distancing considerations) as well as enabling environment for shared mobility options (e.g. ride-shares) and active mobility options (e.g. bicycling, walking).

Going forward, resilience thinking should guide lessons learnt and innovations emanating from circular thinking should target the general well-being of the populace and not merely focus on boosting the competitiveness, profitability or growth of businesses and national economies. The post-COVID-19 investments needed to accelerate towards more resilient, low carbon and circular economies should also be integrated into the stimulus packages for economic recovery being promised by governments, since the shortcomings in the dominant linear economic model are now recognized and the gaps to be closed are known.

Credit author statement

IMT, MKB and GJ conceived the idea. IMT developed the methodological notes. IMT, MKB, AZ & FH conducted the analysis. IMT, MKB, AZ, BKA, ADD, AA and FH designed the structure and outline of the paper. All authors contributed to the writing the paper, with comments and feedback from GJ and KSCL.

Declaration of Competing Interest

• Abbas Elmualim S.M., Chileshe N., Rameezdeen R. Construction and the circular economy: smart and industrialised prefabrication. Unmak. Waste Product. Consump. 2018:323. [ Google Scholar ]
• ACI Policy Brief – COVID-19: Relief measures to ensure the survival of the airport industry. Airport Council Int. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Acquaye A., Feng K., Oppon E., Salhi S., Ibn-Mohammed T., Genovese A., Hubacek K. Measuring the environmental sustainability performance of global supply chains: A multi-regional input-output analysis for carbon, sulphur oxide and water footprints. J. Environ. Manag.187. 2017:571–585. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ahmed F., Ahmed N.e., Pissarides C., Stiglitz J. Why inequality could spread COVID-19. The Lancet Public Health. 2020; 5 :e240. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Air Transport Bureau . International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); Montréal, Canada: 2020. Effects of Novel Coronavirus (COVID‐19) on Civil Aviation: Economic Impact Analysis. [ Google Scholar ]
• Akgün E.Z., Monios J., Rye T., Fonzone A. Influences on urban freight transport policy choice by local authorities. Transport Policy. 2019; 75 :88–98. [ Google Scholar ]
• Allan J., Donovan C., Ekins P., Gambhir A., Hepburn C., Robins N., Reay D., Shuckburgh E., Zenghelis D. A net-zero emissions economic recovery from COVID-19. COP26 Univ. Netw. Brief. 2020 April. [ Google Scholar ]
• Allison A.L., Ambrose-Dempster E., Domenech Aparsi T., Bawn M., Casas Arredondo M., Chau C., Chandler K., Dobrijevic D., Hailes H.C., Lettieri P. The environmental dangers of employing single-use face masks as part of a COVID-19 exit strategy. UCL Open. 2020 Preprint. [ Google Scholar ]
• American Geriatrics Society American Geriatrics Society (AGS) policy brief: COVID‐19 and nursing homes. J. American Geriatrics Society. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Anderson R.M., Heesterbeek H., Klinkenberg D., Hollingsworth T.D. How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic? The Lancet. 2020; 395 :931–934. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Andrew A., Armand A., Augsburg B., Taveras I.K. Challenges of adopting coronavirus precautions in low-income countries. The IFS, Inst. Fiscal Stud. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Ang B.W. The LMDI approach to decomposition analysis: a practical guide. Energy Policy33. 2005:867–871. [ Google Scholar ]
• Antikainen M., Uusitalo T., Kivikytö-Reponen P. Digitalisation as an enabler of circular economy. Procedia CIRP. 2018; 73 :45–49. [ Google Scholar ]
• Arafat S.Y., Kar S.K., Marthoenis M., Sharma P., Apu E.H., Kabir R. Psychological underpinning of panic buying during pandemic (COVID-19) Psychiatry Res. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ardente F., Beccali M., Cellura M., Mistretta M. Energy and environmental benefits in public buildings as a result of retrofit actions. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.15. 2011:460–470. [ Google Scholar ]
• Artola I., Rademaekers K., Williams R., Yearwood J. Study for the iTRE Committee, Commissioned by DG for Internal Policies Policy Department A. Vol. 72. 2016. Boosting building renovation: What potential and value for Europe. [ Google Scholar ]
• ARUP . ARUP; 2020. Transform and Reuse:Low-Carbon Futures for Existing Buildings. [ Google Scholar ]
• Atelge M., Atabani A., Banu J.R., Krisa D., Kaya M., Eskicioglu C., Kumar G., Lee C., Yildiz Y., Unalan S. A critical review of pretreatment technologies to enhance anaerobic digestion and energy recovery. Fuel. 2020; 270 [ Google Scholar ]
• Aubrecht, P., Essink, J., Kovac, M., Vandenberghe, A.-S., 2020. Centralized and decentralized responses to COVID-19 in federal systems: US and EU comparisons. Available at SSRN 3584182.
• Auffhammer M., Burke M., Burney J., Hsiang S., Lobell D., Roberts M., Schlenker W. COVID-19 reduces economic activity, which reduces pollution, which saves lives. Global Food, Environment and Economic Dynamics (G-FEED), United States. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Ayambire R.A., Amponsah O., Peprah C., Takyi S.A. A review of practices for sustaining urban and peri-urban agriculture: Implications for land use planning in rapidly urbanising Ghanaian cities. Land Use Policy. 2019; 84 :260–277. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bachman D. COVID-19 could affect the global economy in three main ways. Deloitte. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Baker S.R., Bloom N., Davis S.J., Terry S.J. National Bureau of Economic Research; 2020. Covid-induced economic uncertainty. [ Google Scholar ]
• Baldwin R., Evenett S. CEPR Press; London: 2020. Covid-19 and Trade Policy: Why turning inward won't work. [ Google Scholar ]
• Baseler L., Chertow D.S., Johnson K.M., Feldmann H., Morens D.M. The pathogenesis of ebola virus disease. Annu. Rev. Pathol. 2017; 12 :387–418. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Basilaia G., Kvavadze D. Transition to Online Education in Schools during a SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic in Georgia. Pedag. Res.5. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Bauwens T., Hekkert M., Kirchherr J. Circular futures: what will they look like? Ecol. Econ.175. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Bayram M., Springer S., Garvey C.K., Özdemir V. COVID-19 digital health innovation policy: A portal to alternative futures in the making. OMICS J. Integrat. Biol. 2020 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Becque, R., Roy, N., Hamza-Goodacre, D., 2016. The Political Economy of the Circular Economy-lessons to date and questions for research. San Francisco, pp. 1-16.
• Beretta C., Hellweg S. Potential environmental benefits from food waste prevention in the food service sector. Resour. Conserv. Recycl.147. 2019:169–178. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bloom D.E., Cadarette D. Infectious disease threats in the 21st century: strengthening the global response. Front. Immunol.10. 2019:549. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bloom D.E., Canning D. Epidemics and economics. Interact. Glob. Chang. Hum. Health Scripta Varia. 2004; 106 :304–331. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bocken N.M., De Pauw I., Bakker C., van der Grinten B. Product design and business model strategies for a circular economy. J. Indust. Prod. Eng.33. 2016:308–320. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bown C.P. A CEPR Press; 2020. COVID-19: Demand spikes, export restrictions, and quality concerns imperil poor country access to medical supplies. VoxEU.org eBook, 31. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bradsher K., Alderman L. New York Times; 2020. The world needs masks. China makes them, but has been hoarding them. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bramanti B., Dean K.R., Walloe L., Chr Stenseth N. The third plague pandemic in Europe. Proc. Biol. Sci. 2019; 286 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Braungart M., McDonough W., Bollinger A. Cradle-to-cradle design: creating healthy emissions – a strategy for eco-effective product and system design. J. Clean. Prod.15. 2007:1337–1348. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bretscher, L., Hsu, A., Tamoni, A., 2020. The supply channel of uncertainty shocks and the cross-section of returns: evidence from the COVID-19 crisis. Available at SSRN 3588418.
• Browne M., Sweet M., Woodburn A., Allen J. Vol. 10. Transport Studies Group, University of Westminster; 2005. (Urban freight consolidation centres final report). [ Google Scholar ]
• Buldeo Rai H., Verlinde S., Merck J., Macharis C. Crowd logistics: an opportunity for more sustainable urban freight transport? Eur. Transp. Res. Rev. 2017; 9 (39) [ Google Scholar ]
• Buldeo Rai H., Verlinde S., Merckx J., Macharis C. Crowd logistics: an opportunity for more sustainable urban freight transport? Eur. Transp. Res. Rev.9. 2017:39. [ Google Scholar ]
• Carra G., Magdani N. Circular business models for the built environment. Arup BAM. 2017:1–44. [ Google Scholar ]
• Carrillo-Hermosilla J., Del Río P., Könnölä T. Diversity of eco-innovations: Reflections from selected case studies. J. Clean. Prod.18. 2010:1073–1083. [ Google Scholar ]
• Castañé S., Antón A. Assessment of the nutritional quality and environmental impact of two food diets: A Mediterranean and a vegan diet. J. Clean. Prod.167. 2017:929–937. [ Google Scholar ]
• Chandra, S., 2020. Speed, space and sustainability (3S) in transportation amid COVID-19 crisis. SSRN 3598501.
• Chang H.-H., Meyerhoefer C. National Bureau of Economic Research; 2020. COVID-19 and the Demand for Online Food Shopping Services: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan. [ Google Scholar ]
• Chen C., Zhao B. Makeshift hospitals for COVID-19 patients: where health-care workers and patients need sufficient ventilation for more protection. J. Hosp. Infect.105. 2020:98–99. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Chi M., George J.F., Huang R., Wang P. Unraveling sustainable behaviors in the sharing economy: An empirical study of bicycle-sharing in China. J. Clean. Prod. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Cimprich A., Santillán‐Saldivar J., Thiel C.L., Sonnemann G., Young S.B. Potential for industrial ecology to support healthcare sustainability: Scoping review of a fragmented literature and conceptual framework for future research. J. Indust. Ecol.23. 2019:1344–1352. [ Google Scholar ]
• Clair A. Social Market Foundation (SMF); 2020. Homes, health, and COVID-19: how poor housing adds to the hardship of the coronavirus crisis. Online. [ Google Scholar ]
• Company M. A global view of how consumer behavior is changing amid COVID-19. McKinsey. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Da Silva C., Hoppe A., Ravanello M., Mello N. Medical wastes management in the south of Brazil. Waste Manag.25. 2005:600–605. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Danieli, A., Olmstead-Rumsey, J., 2020. Sector-specific shocks and the expenditure elasticity channel during the covid-19 crisis. Available at SSRN 3593514.
• Dannenberg, P., Fuchs, M., Riedler, T., Wiedemann, C., 2020. Digital transition by COVID‐19 pandemic? The German food online retail. Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ]
• Dargaville T., Spann K., Celina M. Opinion to address a potential personal protective equipment shortage in the global community during the COVID-19 outbreak. Polym. Degrad. Stab. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Daszak P. Anatomy of a pandemic. The Lancet. 2012; 380 :1883–1884. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• De Cock K.M., Jaffe H.W., Curran J.W. The evolving epidemiology of HIV/AIDS. Aids. 2012; 26 :1205–1213. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• De Gioannis G., Muntoni A., Polettini A., Pomi R., Spiga D. Energy recovery from one-and two-stage anaerobic digestion of food waste. Waste Manag.68. 2017:595–602. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• De Jesus A., Mendonça S. Lost in transition? Drivers and barriers in the eco-innovation road to the circular economy. Ecol. Econ.145. 2018:75–89. [ Google Scholar ]
• De Soete W., Jiménez-González C., Dahlin P., Dewulf J. Challenges and recommendations for environmental sustainability assessments of pharmaceutical products in the healthcare sector. Green Chem.19. 2017:3493–3509. [ Google Scholar ]
• Deloitte . Deloitte; 2020. Understanding the sector impact of COVID-19: Engineering and Construction sector; p. 2. [ Google Scholar ]
• Devakumar D., Shannon G., Bhopal S.S., Abubakar I. Racism and discrimination in COVID-19 responses. The Lancet. 2020; 395 :1194. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Diaz L.F., Eggerth L., Enkhtsetseg S., Savage G. Characteristics of healthcare wastes. Waste Manag.28. 2008:1219–1226. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Dilkes-Hoffman L.S., Lane J.L., Grant T., Pratt S., Lant P.A., Laycock B. Environmental impact of biodegradable food packaging when considering food waste. J. Clean. Prod.180. 2018:325–334. [ Google Scholar ]
• Dingel J.I., Neiman B. National Bureau of Economic Research; 2020. How many jobs can be done at home? [ Google Scholar ]
• Duflou J.R., Sutherland J.W., Dornfeld D., Herrmann C., Jeswiet J., Kara S., Hauschild M., Kellens K. Towards energy and resource efficient manufacturing: A processes and systems approach. CIRP Anna.61. 2012:587–609. [ Google Scholar ]
• Duncan-Jones R.P. The impact of the Antonine plague. J. Roman Arch.9. 1996:108–136. [ Google Scholar ]
• Eaton J., Connor Y. How to strengthen your supply chain in the face of COVID-19 disruption: 8 Lessons for strengthening your supply chain today. Grant Thornton. 2020 Online. [ Google Scholar ]
• Eberhardt L.C.M., Birgisdottir H., Birkved M. IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering. IOP Publishing; 2019. Potential of circular economy in sustainable buildings. [ Google Scholar ]
• EEA . Vol. 2020. Publications Office of the European Union; Luxembourg: 2020. pp. 1–104. (Environmental noise in Europe — 2020. European Environment Agency (EEA)). [ Google Scholar ]
• Ekins, P., Hughes, N., Brigenzu, S., Arden Clark, C., Fischer-Kowalski, M., Graedel, T., Hajer, M., Hashimoto, S., Hatfield-Dodds, S., Havlik, P., 2016. Resource efficiency: Potential and economic implications.
• Eleyan D., Al-Khatib I.A., Garfield J. System dynamics model for hospital waste characterization and generation in developing countries. Waste Manag. Res.31. 2013:986–995. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• EMF . Ellen MacArthur Foundation; London: 2016. Circular economy in India: Rethinking growth for long-term prosperity; p. 86. [ Google Scholar ]
• EMF . Ellen MacArthur Foundation; 2019. Planning effective transport of people, products and materials; p. 6. [ Google Scholar ]
• EMF . Ellen MacArthur Foundation; 2020. 10 circular investment opportunities to build back better: food sector; p. 13. [ Google Scholar ]
• EMF . Ellen MacArthur Foundation; London: 2020. 10 circular investment opportunities to build back better: The built environment; p. 10. [ Google Scholar ]
• Enkvist P., Klevnäs P., Teiwik A., Jönsson C., Klingvall S., Hellberg U. Material Economics Sverige AB; Stockholm, Sweden: 2018. The circular economy–a powerful force for climate mitigation: transformative innovation for prosperous and low-carbon industry. [ Google Scholar ]
• EPRS . European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS); 2014. Urban And Peri-Urban Agriculture. [ Google Scholar ]
• ESA . European Space Agency (ESA); 2020. Air pollution remains low as Europeans stay at home. Online. [ Google Scholar ]
• European Commission . European Commission; 2011. The Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe; p. 26. [ Google Scholar ]
• European Commission . European Commission; 2020. EU Circular Economy Action Plan: A new Circular Economy Action Plan for a Cleaner and More Competitive Europe. [ Google Scholar ]
• Evenett S.J. Flawed prescription: Export curbs on medical goods won't tackle shortages. COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won't Work. 2020; 49 [ Google Scholar ]
• Fast Company . Fast Company; 2019. Is it possible to raise a carbon-neutral cow? [ Google Scholar ]
• Feber D., Lingqvist O., Nordigården D. McKinsey & Company McKinsey & Company; 2020. Shaping the next normal of packaging beyond COVID-19; p. 6. [ Google Scholar ]
• Feng K., Davis S.J., Sun L., Hubacek K. Drivers of the US CO2 emissions 1997-2013. Nat. Commun.6. 2015 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fernandes, N., 2020. Economic effects of coronavirus outbreak (COVID-19) on the world economy. Available at SSRN 3557504.
• Fischer R., Morris D.H., van Doremalen N., Sarchette S., Matson J., Bushmaker T., Yinda C.K., Seifert S., Gamble A., Williamson B. Assessment of N95 respirator decontamination and re-use for SARS-CoV-2. medRxiv. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ford T.E., Colwell R.R., Rose J.B., Morse S.S., Rogers D.J., Yates T.L. Using satellite images of environmental changes to predict infectious disease outbreaks. Emerg. Infect. Dis.15. 2009:1341. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Friant M.C., Vermeulen W.J., Salomone R. A typology of circular economy discourses: Navigating the diverse visions of a contested paradigm. Resour. Conserv. Recycl.161. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Fujii H., Managi S., Kaneko S. Decomposition analysis of air pollution abatement in China: empirical study for ten industrial sectors from 1998 to 2009. J. Clean. Prod.59. 2013:22–31. [ Google Scholar ]
• Galvão G.D.A., Homrich A.S., Geissdoerfer M., Evans S., Ferrer P.S.s., Carvalho M.M. Towards a value stream perspective of circular business models. Resour. Conserv. Recycl.162. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Gates B. COVID-19 is awful. Climate change could be worse. Clim. Coronavirus. 2020 GatesNotes. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gates B. Responding to Covid-19—a once-in-a-century pandemic? N. Engl. J. Med.382. 2020:1677–1679. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gatta V., Marcucci E., Delle Site P., Le Pira M., Carrocci C.S. Planning with stakeholders: Analysing alternative off-hour delivery solutions via an interactive multi-criteria approach. Res. Transp. Econ.73. 2019:53–62. [ Google Scholar ]
• Geissdoerfer M., Savaget P., Bocken N.M., Hultink E.J. The Circular Economy–A new sustainability paradigm? J. Clean. Prod.143. 2017:757–768. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gibbs M.J., Armstrong J.S., Gibbs A.J. Recombination in the hemagglutinin gene of the 1918" Spanish flu". Science. 2001; 293 :1842–1845. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Girling R. Random House; 2011. Rubbish!: Dirt on Our Hands and Crisis Ahead. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gondi S., Beckman A.L., Deveau N., Raja A.S., Ranney M.L., Popkin R., He S. Personal protective equipment needs in the USA during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Lancet. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gopinath G. Limiting the economic fallout of the coronavirus with large targeted policies. IMF. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Govindan K., Hasanagic M. A systematic review on drivers, barriers, and practices towards circular economy: a supply chain perspective. Int. J. Prod. Res.56. 2018:278–311. [ Google Scholar ]
• Grant M.J., Booth A. A typology of reviews: an analysis of 14 review types and associated methodologies. Health Inform. Libr. J.26. 2009:91–108. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Greenhalgh T., Thorne S., Malterud K. Time to challenge the spurious hierarchy of systematic over narrative reviews? Eur. J. Clin. Invest. 2018; 48 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Guan, D., Hallegatte, S., 2020. The containment divide: COVID-19 lockdowns and basic needs in developing countries.
• Guan, D., Wang, D., Hallegatte, S., Huo, J., Li, S., Bai, Y., Lei, T., Xue, Q., Davis, S.J., Coffman, D.M., 2020. Global economic footprint of the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Guerrieri V., Lorenzoni G., Straub L., Werning I. National Bureau of Economic Research; 2020. Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19: Can Negative Supply Shocks Cause Demand Shortages? [ Google Scholar ]
• Gungor A., Gupta S.M. Issues in environmentally conscious manufacturing and product recovery: a survey. Comp. Indust. Eng.36. 1999:811–853. [ Google Scholar ]
• Haigh, L., Bäunker, L., 2020. Covid-19 and the circular economy: opportunities and reflections.
• Hasanat M.W., Hoque A., Shikha F.A., Anwar M., Hamid A.B.A., Tat H.H. The impact of coronavirus (Covid-19) on e-business in Malaysia. Asian J. Multidiscipl. Stud.3. 2020:85–90. [ Google Scholar ]
• Herrmann C., Schmidt C., Kurle D., Blume S., Thiede S. Sustainability in manufacturing and factories of the future. Int. J. Precis. Eng. Manuf.-Green Tech.1. 2014:283–292. [ Google Scholar ]
• Hobbs J.E. Food supply chains during the COVID‐19 pandemic. Can. J. Agricult. Econ./Revue canadienne d’agroeconomie. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Hockley L. Coronavirus roundtable: How is the aviation industry responding to the COVID-19 pandemic? Int. Airport Rev. 2020 Online. [ Google Scholar ]
• Hoornweg, D., Bhada-Tata, P., 2012. What a waste: a global review of solid waste management.
• Horrox R. Manchester University Press; 2013. The Black Death. [ Google Scholar ]
• Hotez P.J., Alvarado M., Basáñez M.-G., Bolliger I., Bourne R., Boussinesq M., Brooker S.J., Brown A.S., Buckle G., Budke C.M. The global burden of disease study 2010: interpretation and implications for the neglected tropical diseases. PLoS Neglect. Tropic. Dis.8. 2014 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hu M.R., Lee A.D. Airbnb, COVID-19 risk and lockdowns: global evidence. COVID-19 Risk Lockdowns Glob. Evid. 2020 (April 30, 2020) [ Google Scholar ]
• Huang W., Zhao Z., Yuan T., Huang W., Lei Z., Zhang Z. Low-temperature hydrothermal pretreatment followed by dry anaerobic digestion: A sustainable strategy for manure waste management regarding energy recovery and nutrients availability. Waste Manag.70. 2017:255–262. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hussey L.K., Arku G. Are we ready for it? Health systems preparedness and capacity towards climate change-induced health risks: perspectives of health professionals in Ghana. Clim. Dev.12. 2020:170–182. [ Google Scholar ]
• IATA Air transport & COVID-19 coronavirus. Int. Air Transp. Assoc. 2020 www.airlines.iata.org [ Google Scholar ]
• Ibn-Mohammed T. Application of mixed-mode research paradigms to the building sector: a review and case study towards decarbonising the built and natural environment. Sustain. Cities Soc.35. 2017:692–714. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ibn-Mohammed T., Greenough R., Taylor S., Ozawa-Meida L., Acquaye A. Operational vs. embodied emissions in buildings—A review of current trends. Energy Build.66. 2013:232–245. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ibn-Mohammed T., Greenough R., Taylor S., Ozawa-Meida L., Acquaye A. Integrating economic considerations with operational and embodied emissions into a decision support system for the optimal ranking of building retrofit options. Build. Environ.72. 2014:82–101. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ibn-Mohammed T., Reaney I., Koh S., Acquaye A., Sinclair D., Randall C., Abubakar F., Smith L., Schileo G., Ozawa-Meida L. Life cycle assessment and environmental profile evaluation of lead-free piezoelectrics in comparison with lead zirconate titanate. J. Eur. Cer. Soc. 2018 [ Google Scholar ]
• ICAO Effects of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) on civil aviation: economic impact analysis. Unit. Aviat. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• IEA . International Energy Agency, IEA Publications; 2020. Global Energy Review 2020:The impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on global energy demand and CO2 emissions; pp. 1–56. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ijomah W.L. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers-Waste and Resource Management. Thomas Telford Ltd; 2010. The application of remanufacturing in sustainable manufacture; pp. 157–163. [ Google Scholar ]
• IMF . The International Monetary Fund (IMF); Washington, DC: 2020. World Economic Outlook: The Great Lockdown; p. 37. -37. [ Google Scholar ]
• Insa E., Zamorano M., López R. Critical review of medical waste legislation in Spain. Resour. Conserv. Recycl.54. 2010:1048–1059. [ Google Scholar ]
• Iyengar K., Bahl S., Vaishya R., Vaish A. Challenges and solutions in meeting up the urgent requirement of ventilators for COVID-19 patients. Diab. Metabol. Syndr. Clin. Res. Rev. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jaeger B., Upadhyay A. Understanding barriers to circular economy: cases from the manufacturing industry. J. Enterp. Inform. Manag. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Janné M., Fredriksson A. Construction logistics governing guidelines in urban development projects. Constr. Innov. 2019 [ Google Scholar ]
• Javorcik B. Global supply chains will not be the same in the post-COVID-19 world. COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won't Work. 2020; 111 [ Google Scholar ]
• JHU . Coronavirus Resource Center, Johns Hopkins University (JHU); 2020. MAPS & TRENDS: New Cases of COVID-19 In World Countries. [ Google Scholar ]
• Johansson H., Björklund M. Urban consolidation centres: retail stores’ demands for UCC services. Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist. Manag. 2017 [ Google Scholar ]
• Kaiser B., Eagan P.D., Shaner H. Solutions to health care waste: life-cycle thinking and“ green” purchasing. Environ. Health Perspect.109. 2001:205–207. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kanda W., Kivimaa P. What opportunities could the COVID-19 outbreak offer for sustainability transitions research on electricity and mobility? Energy Res. Soc. Sci.68. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kane G.M., Bakker C.A., Balkenende A.R. Towards design strategies for circular medical products. Resour. Conserv. Recycl.135. 2018:38–47. [ Google Scholar ]
• Kiba-Janiak M. EU cities’ potentials for formulation and implementation of sustainable urban freight transport strategic plans. Transp. Res. Procedia. 2019; 39 :150–159. [ Google Scholar ]
• Kirchherr J., Piscicelli L., Bour R., Kostense-Smit E., Muller J., Huibrechtse-Truijens A., Hekkert M. Barriers to the circular economy: evidence from the European Union (EU) Ecol. Econ.150. 2018:264–272. [ Google Scholar ]
• Kirchherr J., Reike D., Hekkert M. Conceptualizing the circular economy: An analysis of 114 definitions. Resour. Conserv. Recycl.127. 2017:221–232. [ Google Scholar ]
• Klemeš J.J., Fan Y.V., Tan R.R., Jiang P. Minimising the present and future plastic waste, energy and environmental footprints related to COVID-19. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.127. 2020 -109883. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Koh S., Ibn-Mohammed T., Acquaye A., Feng K., Reaney I., Hubacek K., Fujii H., Khatab K. Drivers of US toxicological footprints trajectory 1998–2013. Sci. Rep.6. 2016:39514. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Korhonen J., Honkasalo A., Seppälä J. Circular economy: the concept and its limitations. Ecol. Econ.143. 2018:37–46. [ Google Scholar ]
• Kraemer M.U., Yang C.-H., Gutierrez B., Wu C.-H., Klein B., Pigott D.M., du Plessis L., Faria N.R., Li R., Hanage W.P. The effect of human mobility and control measures on the COVID-19 epidemic in China. Science. 2020; 368 :493–497. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Laing T. The economic impact of the Coronavirus 2019 (Covid-2019): Implications for the mining industry. Extract. Indust. Soc. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Le Quéré C., Jackson R.B., Jones M.W., Smith A.J., Abernethy S., Andrew R.M., De-Gol A.J., Willis D.R., Shan Y., Canadell J.G. Temporary reduction in daily global CO 2 emissions during the COVID-19 forced confinement. Nat. Clim. Chang. 2020:1–7. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lee C., Huffman G., Nalesnik R. Medical waste management. Environ. Sci. Tech.25. 1991:360–363. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lee G.-G., Lee H.-W., Lee J.-H. Greenhouse gas emission reduction effect in the transportation sector by urban agriculture in Seoul, Korea. Landscape and Urban Plan.140. 2015:1–7. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lee J.-W., McKibbin W.J. National Academies Press; Washington, DC: 2004. Estimating the global economic costs of SARS, Learning from SARS: preparing for the next disease outbreak: workshop summary; p. 92. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Liao L., Xiao W., Zhao M., Yu X., Wang H., Wang Q., Chu S., Cui Y. Can N95 respirators be reused after disinfection? How many times? ACS Nano. 2020 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lieder M., Rashid A. Towards circular economy implementation: a comprehensive review in context of manufacturing industry. J. Clean. Prod.115. 2016:36–51. [ Google Scholar ]
• Littman R.J., Littman M.L. Galen and the Antonine plague. Am. J. Philol.94. 1973:243–255. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Liu X., Zhang S. COVID‐19: Face masks and human‐to‐human transmission. Influen. Other Respir. Virus. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Livingston E., Desai A., Berkwits M. Sourcing personal protective equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic. JAMA. 2020 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lucrezi S., Saayman M., Van der Merwe P. An assessment tool for sandy beaches: A case study for integrating beach description, human dimension, and economic factors to identify priority management issues. Ocean Coast. Manag. 2016; 121 :1–22. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lwasa S., Mugagga F., Wahab B., Simon D., Connors J., Griffith C. Urban and peri-urban agriculture and forestry: Transcending poverty alleviation to climate change mitigation and adaptation. Urban Climate. 2014; 7 :92–106. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lyche, H., 2020. Might a disaster trigger a new circular-economy?
• Mabahwi N.A.B., Leh O.L.H., Omar D. Human health and wellbeing: Human health effect of air pollution. Procedia-Soc. Behav. Sci.153. 2014:221–229. [ Google Scholar ]
• MacArthur E. Ellen MacArthur Foundation; Cowes, UK: 2013. Towards the circular economy, economic and business rationale for an accelerated transition. [ Google Scholar ]
• Mahler D.G., Lakner C., Aguilar R.A.C., Wu H. World Bank; Washington, D.C., United States: 2020. The impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) on global poverty: Why Sub-Saharan Africa might be the region hardest hit. [ Google Scholar ]
• Manninen K., Koskela S., Antikainen R., Bocken N., Dahlbo H., Aminoff A. Do circular economy business models capture intended environmental value propositions? J. Clean. Prod.171. 2018:413–422. [ Google Scholar ]
• Marcucci E., Le Pira M., Carrocci C.S., Gatta V., Pieralice E. 2017 5th IEEE International Conference on Models and Technologies for Intelligent Transportation Systems (MT-ITS) IEEE; 2017. Connected shared mobility for passengers and freight: Investigating the potential of crowdshipping in urban areas; pp. 839–843. [ Google Scholar ]
• Marques G., Roque Ferreira C., Pitarma R. A system based on the internet of things for real-time particle monitoring in buildings. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health15. 2018 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Masiero G., Ogasavara M.H., Jussani A.C., Risso M.L. The global value chain of electric vehicles: A review of the Japanese, South Korean and Brazilian cases. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.80. 2017:290–296. [ Google Scholar ]
• McDonough W., Braungart M. North point press; 2010. Cradle to cradle: Remaking the way we make things. [ Google Scholar ]
• McKee M., Stuckler D. If the world fails to protect the economy, COVID-19 will damage health not just now but also in the future. Nat. Med.26. 2020:640–642. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• McKenzie B. Beyond COVID-19: supply chain resilience holds key to recovery. Oxford Econ.24. 2020:20. [ Google Scholar ]
• McKibbin, W.J., Fernando, R., 2020. The global macroeconomic impacts of COVID-19: Seven scenarios.
• Minunno R., O'Grady T., Morrison G.M., Gruner R.L., Colling M. Strategies for applying the circular economy to prefabricated buildings. Buildings. 2018; 8 :125. [ Google Scholar ]
• Moazzami B., Razavi-Khorasani N., Moghadam A.D., Farokhi E., Rezaei N. COVID-19 and telemedicine: Immediate action required for maintaining healthcare providers well-being. J. Clin. Virol. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Monlau F., Sambusiti C., Antoniou N., Barakat A., Zabaniotou A. A new concept for enhancing energy recovery from agricultural residues by coupling anaerobic digestion and pyrolysis process. Appl. Energy. 2015; 148 :32–38. [ Google Scholar ]
• Morlet A., Blériot J., Opsomer R., Linder M., Henggeler A., Bluhm A., Carrera A. Ellen MacArthur Foundation; 2016. Intelligent assets: Unlocking the circular economy potential; pp. 1–25. [ Google Scholar ]
• Morrison A., Polisena J., Husereau D., Moulton K., Clark M., Fiander M., Mierzwinski-Urban M., Clifford T., Hutton B., Rabb D. The effect of English-language restriction on systematic review-based meta-analyses: a systematic review of empirical studies. Int. J. Tech. Assess. Health Care28. 2012:138. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Muhammad S., Long X., Salman M. COVID-19 pandemic and environmental pollution: A blessing in disguise? Sci. Total Environ. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Murray N.E.A., Quam M.B., Wilder-Smith A. Epidemiology of dengue: past, present and future prospects. Clin. Epidemiol.5. 2013:299. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Naidoo R., Fisher B. Nature Publishing Group; 2020. Reset Sustainable Development Goals for a pandemic world. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• NASA . National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); 2020. Airborne Nitrogen Dioxide Plummets Over China. Online. [ Google Scholar ]
• NASA . NASA; 2020. Airborne Particle Levels Plummet in Northern India. [ Google Scholar ]
• OECD . OECD; Paris: 2018. Financing Climate Futures - Rethinking Infrastructure. [ Google Scholar ]
• Omary M.B., Eswaraka J., Kimball S.D., Moghe P.V., Panettieri R.A., Scotto K.W. The COVID-19 pandemic and research shutdown: staying safe and productive. J. Clin. Invest.130. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Opitz I., Berges R., Piorr A., Krikser T. Contributing to food security in urban areas: differences between urban agriculture and peri-urban agriculture in the Global North. Agricult. Hum. Val.33. 2016:341–358. [ Google Scholar ]
• Oweis R., Al-Widyan M., Al-Limoon O. Medical waste management in Jordan: A study at the King Hussein Medical Center. Waste Manag.25. 2005:622–625. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Özkan A. Evaluation of healthcare waste treatment/disposal alternatives by using multi-criteria decision-making techniques. Waste Manag. Res.31. 2013:141–149. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Paez A. Gray literature: An important resource in systematic reviews. J. Evid.‐Based Med.10. 2017:233–240. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pagoropoulos A., Pigosso D.C., McAloone T.C. The emergent role of digital technologies in the Circular Economy: A review. Procedia CIRP. 2017; 64 :19–24. [ Google Scholar ]
• Partelow S., von Wehrden H., Horn O. Pollution exposure on marine protected areas: a global assessment. Mar. Pollut. Bull.100. 2015:352–358. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Paxton, N.C., Forrestal, D.P., Desselle, M., Kirrane, M., Sullivan, C., Powell, S.K., Woodruff, M.A., 2020. N95 respiratory masks for COVID-19: a review of the literature to inform local responses to global shortages.
• Pearce J.M. A review of open source ventilators for COVID-19 and future pandemics. F1000Research. 2020; 9 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Peng J., Wu X., Wang R., Li C., Zhang Q., Wei D. Medical waste management practice during the 2019-2020 novel coronavirus pandemic: Experience in a general hospital. Am. J. Infect. Control. 2020 S0196-6553(0120)30351-30355. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Penn E., Yasso S.F., Wei J.L. Reducing disposable equipment waste for tonsillectomy and adenotonsillectomy cases. Otolaryngol.–Head and Neck Surg.147. 2012:615–618. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• PHE . Public Health England (PHE); London: 2020. Review of interventions to improve outdoor air quality and public health; pp. 1–262. [ Google Scholar ]
• Piguillem F., Shi L. Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); 2020. The optimal COVID-19 quarantine and testing policies, EIEF Working Papers Series 2004; p. 40. [ Google Scholar ]
• Pinheiro M.D., Luís N.C. COVID-19 Could Leverage a Sustainable Built Environment. Sustainability. 2020; 12 [ Google Scholar ]
• Pinner D., Rogers M., Samandari H. McKinsey & Company; 2020. McKinsey Quarterly: Addressing climate change in a post-pandemic world; pp. 1–6. [ Google Scholar ]
• Pitarma R., Marques G., Ferreira B.R. Monitoring indoor air quality for enhanced occupational health. J. Med. Syst.41. 2017 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pomponi F., Moncaster A. Circular economy for the built environment: A research framework. J. Clean. Prod.143. 2017:710–718. [ Google Scholar ]
• Prata J.C., Silva A.L.P., Walker T.R., Duarte A.C., Rocha-Santos T. COVID-19 pandemic repercussions on the use and management of plastics. Environ. Sci. Tech.54. 2020:7760–7765. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Preston F., Lehne J., Wellesley L. CHATAM HOUSE, The Royal Institute of International Affairs; London: 2019. An Inclusive Circular Economy; Priorities for Developing Countries, Priorities for Developing Countries; pp. 1–82. [ Google Scholar ]
• Prüss-Üstün A., Prüss A., Giroult E., Townend W.K., Rushbrook P., Organization W.H. World Health Organization; 1999. Safe Management of Wastes from Health-care Activities. [ Google Scholar ]
• Rai H.B., Verlinde S., Macharis C. Shipping outside the box. Environmental impact and stakeholder analysis of a crowd logistics platform in Belgium. J. Clean. Prod.202. 2018:806–816. [ Google Scholar ]
• Raj, M., Sundararajan, A., You, C., 2020. COVID-19 and Digital Resilience: Evidence from Uber Eats. arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.07204.
• Ranganatha J., Waite R., Searchinger T., Zionts J. World Resources Institute; 2020. Regenerative Agriculture: Good for Soil Health, but Limited Potential to Mitigate Climate Change. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ranney M.L., Griffeth V., Jha A.K. Critical supply shortages—the need for ventilators and personal protective equipment during the Covid-19 pandemic. N. Engl. J. Med. 2020 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rashid A., Asif F.M., Krajnik P., Nicolescu C.M. Resource conservative manufacturing: an essential change in business and technology paradigm for sustainable manufacturing. J. Clean. Prod.57. 2013:166–177. [ Google Scholar ]
• Rees W.E. Footprint: our impact on Earth is getting heavier. Nature. 2002; 420 :267–268. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rhodes C.J. The imperative for regenerative agriculture. Sci. Progr.100. 2017:80–129. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rios F.C., Chong W.K., Grau D. Design for disassembly and deconstruction-challenges and opportunities. Procedia Eng.118. 2015:1296–1304. [ Google Scholar ]
• Rubio-Romero J.C., del Carmen Pardo-Ferreira M., García J.A.T., Calero-Castro S. Disposable masks: Disinfection and sterilization for reuse, and non-certified manufacturing, in the face of shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic. Safe. Sci. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• San Juan, D.M., 2020. Responding to COVID-19 through socialist (ic) measures: a preliminary review. Available at SSRN 3559398.
• Sarkis J., Cohen M.J., Dewick P., Schröder P. A brave new world: lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic for transitioning to sustainable supply and production. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sauerwein M., Doubrovski E., Balkenende R., Bakker C. Exploring the potential of additive manufacturing for product design in a circular economy. J. Clean. Prod.226. 2019:1138–1149. [ Google Scholar ]
• Saunders-Hastings P.R., Krewski D. Reviewing the history of pandemic influenza: understanding patterns of emergence and transmission. Pathogens. 2016; 5 :66. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Schluep M. UNEP; 2009. Recycling-from e-waste to resources: Sustainable innovation technology transfer industrial sector studies. [ Google Scholar ]
• Shaheen S., Cohen A. Elsevier; 2020. Mobility on demand (MOD) and mobility as a service (MaaS): early understanding of shared mobility impacts and public transit partnerships, Demand for Emerging Transportation Systems; pp. 37–59. [ Google Scholar ]
• Sherwood S., Uphoff N. Soil health: research, practice and policy for a more regenerative agriculture. Appl. Soil Ecol.15. 2000:85–97. [ Google Scholar ]
• Sim K., Chua H.C., Vieta E., Fernandez G. The anatomy of panic buying related to the current COVID-19 pandemic. Psychiatry Res. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Siow W.T., Liew M.F., Shrestha B.R., Muchtar F., See K.C. Springer; 2020. Managing COVID-19 in resource-limited settings: critical care considerations. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Snider-Mcgrath B. 2020. Exercise rates on the rise during COVID-19. [ Google Scholar ]
• Snyder H. Literature review as a research methodology: An overview and guidelines. J. Busi. Res.104. 2019:333–339. [ Google Scholar ]
• Sohrabi C., Alsafi Z., O’Neill N., Khan M., Kerwan A., Al-Jabir A., Iosifidis C., Agha R. World Health Organization declares global emergency: A review of the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) Int. J. Surg. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Solomon M.Z., Wynia M., Gostin L.O. Scarcity in the Covid‐19 pandemic. Hast. Cent. Rep.50. 2020:3. -3. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Spash C.L. ‘The economy'as if people mattered: revisiting critiques of economic growth in a time of crisis. Globalizations. 2020:1–18. [ Google Scholar ]
• Stahel W.R. The circular economy. Nature. 2016; 531 :435–438. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Stahel W.R. Routledge; 2019. The circular economy: A user's guide. [ Google Scholar ]
• Stellinger A., Berglund I., Isakson H. How trade can fight the pandemic and contribute to global health. COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won't Work. 2020; 21 [ Google Scholar ]
• Stockholm Resilience Centre . Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University; Stockholm: 2016. Through resilience thinking towards sustainability and innovation: recommendations for policy makers in the EU; pp. 1–20. [ Google Scholar ]
• SYSTEMIQ . SUN Institute Environment & Sustainability in collaboration with The Ellen MacArthur Foundation; 2017. ACHIEVING ‘GROWTH WITHIN’: A €320-billion circular economy investment opportunity available to Europe up to 2025; p. 149. [ Google Scholar ]
• Tan J., Liu Y., Shen E., Zhu W., Wang W., Li R., Yang L. Towards<< the atlas of plague and its environment in the People's Republic of China>>: idea, principle and methodology of design and research results. Huan jing ke xue= Huanjing kexue. 2002; 23 :1–8. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Temmerman S., Meire P., Bouma T.J., Herman P.M., Ysebaert T., De Vriend H.J. Ecosystem-based coastal defence in the face of global change. Nature. 2013; 504 :79–83. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Thebo A., Drechsel P., Lambin E. Global assessment of urban and peri-urban agriculture: irrigated and rainfed croplands. Environ. Res. Lett.9. 2014 [ Google Scholar ]
• Thunstrom, L., Newbold, S., Finnoff, D., Ashworth, M., Shogren, J.F., 2020. The benefits and costs of flattening the curve for COVID-19. Available at SSRN 3561934.
• Timmer M., Erumban A., Gouma R., Los B., Temurshoev U., de Vries G., Arto I. The world input-output database (WIOD): contents, sources and methods. WIOD Background. 2012 document available at www. wiod. org 40. [ Google Scholar ]
• Toquero C. Challenges and opportunities for higher education amid the COVID-19 pandemic: The Philippine Context. Pedag. Res.5. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Trilla A., Trilla G., Daer C. The 1918 “Spanish Flu” in Spain. Clin. Infect. Dis.47. 2008:668–673. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tudor T., Noonan C., Jenkin L. Healthcare waste management: a case study from the National Health Service in Cornwall, United Kingdom. Waste Manag.25. 2005:606–615. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• UN DESA Everyone included: social impact of COVID-19. UN Depart. Econ. Soc. Aff. (UN DESA) 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• UN Habitat . Taylor & Francis; 2013. Planning and design for sustainable urban mobility: Global report on human settlements 2013. [ Google Scholar ]
• UNWTO . World Tourism Organization; 2020. Impact assessment of the covid-19 outbreak on international tourism United Nation. [ Google Scholar ]
• Van Bavel J.J., Baicker K., Boggio P.S., Capraro V., Cichocka A., Cikara M., Crockett M.J., Crum A.J., Douglas K.M., Druckman J.N. Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response. Nat. Hum. Behav. 2020:1–12. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Van Buren N., Demmers M., Van der Heijden R., Witlox F. Towards a circular economy: The role of Dutch logistics industries and governments. Sustainability. 2016; 8 :647. [ Google Scholar ]
• Voudrias, E.A., 2018. Healthcare waste management from the point of view of circular economy. [ PubMed ]
• Vousdoukas M.I., Ranasinghe R., Mentaschi L., Plomaritis T.A., Athanasiou P., Luijendijk A., Feyen L. Sandy coastlines under threat of erosion. Nat. Clim. Chang.10. 2020:260–263. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wagner D.M., Klunk J., Harbeck M., Devault A., Waglechner N., Sahl J.W., Enk J., Birdsell D.N., Kuch M., Lumibao C. Yersinia pestis and the Plague of Justinian 541–543 AD: a genomic analysis. Lancet Infect. Dis.14. 2014:319–326. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wang P., Chen K., Zhu S., Wang P., Zhang H. Severe air pollution events not avoided by reduced anthropogenic activities during COVID-19 outbreak. Resour. Conserv. Recycl.158. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Watts N., Amann M., Arnell N., Ayeb-Karlsson S., Belesova K., Berry H., Bouley T., Boykoff M., Byass P., Cai W. The 2018 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: shaping the health of nations for centuries to come. The Lancet. 2018; 392 :2479–2514. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Watts N., Amann M., Ayeb-Karlsson S., Belesova K., Bouley T., Boykoff M., Byass P., Cai W., Campbell-Lendrum D., Chambers J. The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: from 25 years of inaction to a global transformation for public health. The Lancet. 2018; 391 :581–630. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Webster R.G. Predictions for future human influenza pandemics. J. Infect. Dis.176. 1997:S14–S19. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• White D.B., Lo B. A framework for rationing ventilators and critical care beds during the COVID-19 pandemic. JAMA. 2020 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• WHO . 1998. Safe Management of Wastes from Health-Care Activities. 2014. [ Google Scholar ]
• WHO . World Health Organization; 2020. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic. [ Google Scholar ]
• WHO, 2020b. Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Situation Report – 107, pp. 1-17.
• Williamson J. Every UK manufacturer helping to produce PPE and equipment for NHS workers. The Manufacturer. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Windapo A.O., Moghayedi A. Adoption of smart technologies and circular economy performance of buildings. Built Environ. Project Asset Manag. 2020 [ Google Scholar ]
• Windfeld E.S., Brooks M.S.-L. Medical waste management – A review. J. Environ. Manag.163. 2015:98–108. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wong H.J.Y., Deng Z., Yu H., Huang J., Leung C., Miao C. Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-20)Demonstrations Track. 2020. A testbed for studying COVID-19 spreading in ride-sharing systems; pp. 5294–5296. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wong K.-F.V., Narasimhan R., Kashyap R., Fu J. Medical waste characterization. J. Environ. Health. 1994:19–25. [ Google Scholar ]
• World Economic Forum . World Economic Forum; Geneva: 2019. A Vision for a Sustainable Battery Value Chain in 2030: Unlocking the Full Potential to Power Sustainable Development and Climate Change Mitigation; pp. 1–52. [ Google Scholar ]
• World Economic Forum . World Economic Forum; 2020. New Nature Economy Report II: The Future of Nature and Business. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wormer B.A., Augenstein V.A., Carpenter C.L., Burton P.V., Yokeley W.T., Prabhu A.S., Harris B., Norton S., Klima D.A., Lincourt A.E. The green operating room: simple changes to reduce cost and our carbon footprint. Am. Surg.79. 2013:666–671. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wosik J., Fudim M., Cameron B., Gellad Z.F., Cho A., Phinney D., Curtis S., Roman M., Poon E.G., Ferranti J. Telehealth transformation: COVID-19 and the rise of virtual care. J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc.27. 2020:957–962. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Xiao Y., Torok M.E. Taking the right measures to control COVID-19. The Lancet Infect. Dis.20. 2020:523–524. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Yang C., Peijun L., Lupi C., Yangzhao S., Diandou X., Qian F., Shasha F. Sustainable management measures for healthcare waste in China. Waste Manag. 2009; 29 :1996–2004. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Zambrano-Monserrate M.A., Ruano M.A., Sanchez-Alcalde L. Indirect effects of COVID-19 on the environment. Sci. Total Environ. 2020 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Zambrano-Monserrate M.A., Silva-Zambrano C.A., Ruano M.A. The economic value of natural protected areas in Ecuador: A case of Villamil Beach National Recreation Area. Ocean Coast. Manag.157. 2018:193–202. [ Google Scholar ]
• Zhou M., Chen Y., Su X., An L. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers-Civil Engineering. Thomas Telford Ltd; 2020. Rapid construction and advanced technology for a Covid-19 field hospital in Wuhan, China; pp. 1–29. [ Google Scholar ]

In developing countries, the COVID-19 crisis has not affected everyone equally

Tom bundervoet, maria eugenia davalos.

The past year has been one of the toughest in recent history, due to the harsh health, economic, and social impacts of the COVID-19 crisis.  The impacts have been felt everywhere, with no country spared. Yet, they have not been felt the same way by everyone.

Women, young and less-educated workers – groups that were likely at a disadvantage in the labor market even before the shock – were more likely to lose their job in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic. This is the main finding of our recent study using data collected at the onset of the crisis in 34 mostly low and middle-income countries around the world , which account for a combined population of almost 1.4 billion. Relative to men, women were 11 percentage points more likely to have lost their job  ; a similar gap was found between tertiary-educated workers and those with primary education or less. Young and older workers also bore the brunt of the pandemic’s jobs impact, compared to prime-age workers.

While many developing countries deployed emergency social transfers to try to mitigate the negative welfare impact of the pandemic, these have not been enough to offset the pandemic’s impact. For instance, low-income countries spent about $6 per person on COVID-19-related social protection, while lower middle-income countries spent an average of $26 per head. As a result, job losses translated into income losses for two-thirds of households on average – more severe for households with women, young and less-educated workers  – and deprived many of even the most basic needs.

The evidence from the study shows that, on average, 15.3 percent of people interviewed saw one or more adults in their household going without eating for a whole day because of lack of resources, and this was higher in households who were affected by jobs and income losses. This resonates with global estimates suggesting that between 119 and 124 million people were pushed into poverty in 2020, reverting years of hard-earned gains.

One of the most unfortunate and potentially most damaging effects of this crisis will however only be visible in the longer run: The impacts of the widespread and unprecedented disruption in learning. As schools around the world closed to contain the spread of the virus, a whopping 1.6 billion of children saw their education disrupted. The disruptions have been most severe in countries with the lowest human capital index to begin with, widening the gap with richer countries. Within countries too, the most disadvantaged children – children in rural areas in low-income households with little-educated parents – were most effected by the learning disruptions.  The magnitude of this effect is substantial and could put many children, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds, on a more unfavorable path throughout their life .

Across countries, as vaccines are being rolled out and prospects for economic growth point to some recovery this year, we are starting to finally see some light at the end of the tunnel. However, in the same way that impacts of the pandemic have been uneven, the recovery risks being uneven as well.  The evidence from the World Bank’s high-frequency surveys used for the study shows that, once more, women, little-educated workers, and young workers are returning to work at a slower pace than other groups.

Our study also shows that the pandemic’s effects have been most unequal in countries where pre-existing inequalities were greatest  – where access to such key opportunities as basic education, clean water, and electricity are largely determined by circumstances such as location, parental background, and household wealth. In these countries, the pandemic risks further cementing inequality of opportunity unless swift action is taken.

The crisis provides a reform opportunity to, once and for all, address the barriers to equal opportunities that existed pre-crisis (in access to learning, health, good jobs, child care services, and others), and that have made some groups more vulnerable. While policy efforts should not lose sight of mitigating the short-term negative impacts of the pandemic on the most disadvantaged households and workers, they can also work on fostering an inclusive recovery and strengthening people’s resilience to future shocks through better access to opportunities for all. It’s an opportunity we cannot afford to miss.

• Jobs & Development
• Social Protection
• COVID-19 (coronavirus)

Senior Economist, Poverty and Equity Global Practice

Join the Conversation

• Share on mail
• comments added

The impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis on development finance

This note discusses the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis on financing for sustainable development in low- and middle-income countries eligible for official development assistance (ODA). Levels and trends in domestic and external financing already fell short of the SDG spending needs prior to the COVID-19 crisis. The current global context, however, risks a significant reduction in the financing available to developing economies. In sum, external private finance inflows to developing economies could drop by USD 700 billion in 2020 compared to 2019 levels, exceeding the immediate impact of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis by 60%. This exacerbates the risk of major development setbacks that would, in turn, increase our vulnerability to future pandemics, climate change and other global public bads. While official development finance is an important countercyclical force in the short-term and tax revenues remain the only long-term viable source of financing for many public services, no single source of development finance can take up this challenge alone. Actors in development finance and beyond need to collaborate closely to “build back better” for a more equitable, sustainable and thus resilient world.

  Introduction

Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, levels and trends in domestic revenues and external flows to developing economies were already considered insufficient to support the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). With high levels of public debt and additional pressures induced by the pandemic on all major sources of development finance, low- and middle-income countries may struggle to finance their public health, social and economic responses to COVID-19. Early observations point to massive debt and equity outflows from developing economies that accompany a drop in remittances, and ripple effects on domestic finance already solicited by the unfolding public health and economic crises. In this challenging context, how can we avoid a development finance collapse that would send millions back into poverty, and compromise our capacity to reach the SDGs, our common blueprint for a stronger, fairer, and more sustainable world?

This note draws upon research carried out in the context of the OECD Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development (OECD, forthcoming[1]) and outlines the current and projected impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on major sources of financing required to deliver support to developing economies.

The COVID-19 crisis is hitting developing economies at a critical moment. Prior to the crisis, financing had already fallen short of the spending needs to achieve the SDGs by 2030, and fiscal space was limited by rising public debt levels and servicing costs.

The COVID-19 crisis risks creating major setbacks in financing for sustainable development. Domestic resource mobilisation will suffer as economic activity is reduced. Inflows of external private finance are projected to drop by USD 700 billion compared to 2019 levels, exceeding the impact of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis by 60%. Fiscal space is likely to narrow further with rising domestic spending and exchange rate movements against the USD.

In the short term, official development finance should be leveraged to contain the drop in other sources of financing. Already scarce resources coupled with the economic impact of the crisis imply that developing economies might struggle to finance adequate public health and social and economic responses. No single source of financing will be enough to close the COVID-19 financing gap.

In the medium-term, actors in development finance and beyond need to collaborate closely to “build back better” for a more equitable, sustainable and thus resilient world. In development finance, while domestic resource mobilisation will remain the only long-term viable source of financing for many public goods and services, building back better will require action from all financing sources with the common goal to aid national sustainable development strategies. Beyond development finance, there is, for instance, a need to revitalise trade and, in the case of small island developing states, promote a sustainable ocean economy.

  The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic is hitting developing economies at a critical moment

At the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, financing for sustainable development was already in a critical condition (OECD, 2018[2]) . In 2014, UNCTAD had estimated the SDG financing gap in developing economies at USD 2.5 trillion (2014[3]) . More recently, Gaspar et al. (2019[4]) estimated that low-income countries would need to spend, on average, an additional 15.4 percentage points of gross domestic product (GDP) and emerging economies an additional 4 percentage points of GDP to fill their SDG spending gaps. While the gap can be explained in part by sub‑par spending efficiency, it is well established that pre-COVID‑19 levels of domestic and external resources were insufficient to meet the SDGs (UN SG, 2019[5]) . In addition, margins of manoeuvre to close the gap had been limited by high debt levels.

  Pre-COVID-19 domestic finance

Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, tax revenue, the major form of domestic public resources and single largest source of development finance, had been insufficient in a large number of countries, particularly in comparison to the SDG spending needs. Out of 124 countries eligible for official development assistance (ODA) with published data on tax revenue in 2017, 1 more than one third (46) have had tax-to-GDP ratios below 15%, which is a widely considered benchmark for effective state functioning and to promote economic development (Gaspar, Jaramillo and Wingender, 2016[6]) . Almost two-thirds of countries in this sample (79) had collected tax revenue below 20% of GDP. 2

Further, it appears that average growth in tax revenue to GDP had decelerated in recent years. For a sample of 26 African countries, unweighted average tax-to-GDP ratios had remained stagnant at around 17.2% between 2015 and 2017 (OECD, 2019[7]) . In response to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-09, average tax revenue declined in lower and upper middle-income countries ( Figure 1 ). Since then, average revenue collected as a share of national income had not fully recovered with average growth remaining bumpy and fairly stagnant over a medium perspective. In contrast, low-income countries experienced more persistent increases in average tax revenue over 2002-17 but growth had decelerated somewhat after 2012. In Latin America and the Caribbean, tax revenues had been slowly increasing as a result of favourable economic conditions in 2017 and 2018, but the more recent resource price falls and social unrest meant that the revenue outlook had been weakening even prior to the COVID-19 crisis (OECD et al., 2020[8]) .

Other domestic resources similarly provide important financial means for spending and investment in support of sustainable development. Analysis carried out for the OECD Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development (OECD, forthcoming[1]) suggests that domestic savings had been increasing in developing economies as a share of GDP between 2016-18 but savings had remained significantly smaller in low-income than middle-income countries. Domestic private investment is the main source of fixed capital formation but data availability is only comprehensive for around one-third of developing economies. The domestic financial sector plays a central role in intermediating savings and borrowing (respectively investment) but access to financial institutions and markets had remained more limited in low- and lower middle-income countries, and borrowing costs are often high.

Note: The left panel shows unweighted average tax-to-GDP ratios for 113 countries (i.e. balanced panel). World Bank classification for income groups is used. In the right panel, the largest sample possible for ODA-eligible countries was used for each year. Based on research for the Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development (forthcoming[1]) .

Source: Tax revenue based on OECD Global Revenue Statistics Database (2020[9]) , IMF World Revenue Longitudinal Data (2020[10]) and ICTD/UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset (2020[11]) . Official development finance based on OECD DAC Tables 2a and 2b (2020[12]) . Remittances based on KNOMAD Remittances Inflows (2020[13]) . Foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and other investment are from IMF Balance of Payments (2020[14]) and refer to net incurrence of liabilities. World Bank World Development Indicators (2020[15]) are used to impute missing data on foreign direct investment.

  Pre-COVID-19 external finance

The pre-COVID-19 situation had been similarly grim for net inflows of external finance received by low- and middle-income countries. While overall external finance had recovered from a sudden stop of capital flows in 2015 driven by slowing growth in emerging economies and stock market turbulence following a devaluation of the renminbi, the USD 2 trillion of total external finance observed in 2018 had remained below the 2013 peak ( Figure 1 , right panel). More specifically, foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment and other investment (to a large part bank lending) had been lower than in 2013. In the same period, official development finance had remained stable and remittances had increased.

  Pre-COVID-19 debt levels

Fiscal space to increase resources had become limited in a number of countries in the years preceding COVID-19. Median public debt among 59 countries classified as low-income developing economies by the IMF had risen from 38.7% of GDP in 2010-14 to 46.5% in 2017 and had stagnated subsequently (IMF, 2019[16]) . For the same group of countries, debt servicing had represented, on average, 12.2% of government revenue in 2018, up from 6.6% in 2010 (Griffiths, 2019[17]) . African countries experienced the highest debt-to-GDP ratios since countries in the region had received substantial debt relief through programs such as the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) (Calderon and Zeugack, 2020[18]) . According to UNCTAD (2019[19]) , total external debt stocks of developing economies and economies in transition had more than doubled from USD 3.5 trillion in 2008 to USD 8.8 trillion in 2018, or from 22% of GDP to 29%. As of late 2019, 33 out of 69 countries for which analysis had been carried out were classified “in debt distress” or at “high risk” (IMF and World Bank, 2019[20]) .

In parallel, private debt levels had also been rising sharply (UNCTAD, 2019[19]) . Across developing economies, according to UNCTAD, private debt increased from 79% of GDP in 2008 to 139% in 2017. This increase was particularly steep in a number of emerging economies 3 for which corporate debt had risen from 83% of GDP in 2008 to 145% of GDP in 2018. While much of the overall private debt is accumulated in so-called high-income developing economies (corresponding somewhat to the World Bank’s upper middle-income classification), private debt levels had also risen in middle- and low-income developing economies and had done so at a faster rate than public debt levels. 4

With limited resources and fiscal space, the COVID-19 pandemic could push developing economies into great financial difficulties. Not only does the crisis demand large financing to cushion the negative health, social and economic consequences, it will also likely widen the SDG financing gap for years to come when previous progress to achieve sustainable development is reversed and available financing declines.

  Coronavirus (COVID-19) risks major setbacks for financing for sustainable development

  domestic resource mobilisation is likely to suffer as economic activity plunges.

The ongoing public health and economic crises will further deplete low- and middle-income countries’ domestic public resources by affecting tax and non-tax revenues. We calculate that in response to the Global Financial Crisis, median tax revenue to GDP had declined by 1 percentage point, or 5.8%, between 2007 and 2010 for a subsample of 113 ODA-eligible countries for which time series data is available. At present, there are concerns that domestic public revenues could be hit more strongly as a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis due to the combined effect of several mechanisms:

The plunge in global and domestic economic activity 5 affects all major sources of tax revenue. Estimates on tax buoyancy suggest that tax revenues could contract more strongly than economic output (OECD, 2020[21]) . Lower corporate profits, declining consumption and increases in unemployment will, respectively, cause declines in revenue from corporate income taxes, goods and services taxes and personal income taxes (Kapoor and Buiter, 2020[22]) . The decline in international trade, travel and domestic consumption will suppress revenue from consumption taxes on which the majority of low- and middle-income countries rely. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) projects global merchandise trade could decline by 13-32% in 2020 (WTO, 2020[23]) . According to the World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), international tourist arrivals could fall by 60-80% in 2020 compared to 2019 (UNWTO, 2020[24]) . 6 Shifting consumption during recessions towards goods that are often subject to reduced rates or exemptions could further decrease consumption tax revenue (Simon and Harding, 2020[25]) .

Many resource-rich countries who derive a high share of tax and non-tax revenues from commodities and natural resources will be particularly affected by the significant drop in global commodity prices (OECD, forthcoming[26]) . Compared to GDP, low-income countries rely more strongly on natural resource rents than other income groups (Steel and Phillips, 2020[27]) , and this dependence has increased over recent years (UNCTAD, 2020[28]) .

Governments are implementing a range of tax measures to lessen the burden on taxpayers and keep the cash-flows of businesses running; however, at the expense of lower public revenue, at least in the short-term. Measures include deadline extensions, payment deferrals and accelerated tax refunds (OECD/FTA, 2020[29]) . As of mid-April 2020, 104 countries (including 46 ODA-recipients) had implemented tax relief measures (OECD, 2020[30]) .

Taken together, these mechanisms could drastically lower domestic resource mobilisation in developing economies. For sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank (2020[31]) calculations suggest that government revenues could decline by 12% to 16% compared to a non-COVID-19 baseline scenario. As a consequence, fiscal deficits could deteriorate by about 2.7 to 3.5 percentage points of GDP. First evidence from monthly data supports this impression. In Peru, tax revenue decreased by 40% year-on-year in April 2020, while in Jordan, overall government revenue decreased by 49% year-on-year in April 2020.

Other domestic resources beyond public revenue will be affected, too. Domestic private investment is likely to decline due to the high degree of economic uncertainty, contraction of economic output, and binding liquidity constraints. The effect of the 2020 crisis on domestic savings depends on the relative change in consumption to that of national income. As one point of reference, gross domestic savings as a share of GDP had declined after the financial crisis in 2008 (OECD, forthcoming[1]) .

  External private finance is falling in the midst of global economic turmoil

The 2008 Global Financial Crisis showed that external finance to low- and middle-income countries is vulnerable to shocks. During the crisis, portfolio and other investment inflows instantly dropped (or even reversed to negative), while remittances and FDI decreased with a delay of one year ( Figure 1 ). Current evidence suggests a greater and more immediate impact of the COVID-19 crisis. While countries will feel this impact differently depending on their respective finance mix and level ( Figure 2 ), all are expected to experience financing drops.

Note: The values represent averages across the % of GDP levels of the country group members. For the external finance share, this average is weighted by GDP. Weighting was not performed for the tax revenue figure to ensure consistency with other OECD publications. World Bank classification for income and regional grouping.

External private investment plummeted following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. It is thus not surprising that we already see that the global economic fallout from COVID-19 has led to a flight to safety. However, the magnitude of this short-term reaction is unprecedented:

In March 2020 alone, the IIF Capital Flows Tracker (IIF, 2020[32]) observed USD 83.3 billion of non-resident portfolio outflows from emerging markets. This is twice as high as the non-resident portfolio outflows after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and more than the cumulative non-resident portfolio inflows to emerging markets in 2019. For now, this unprecedented outflow episode seems to have halted. Debt flows to emerging markets recovered in April and May 2020, and although outflows of equity continued, this has happened at a slower pace. Yet, the extent of this recovery is minor compared to the March outflows, so that cumulative portfolio outflows remain large (IIF, 2020[33])

OECD analysis indicates a significant slowdown across all FDI components (OECD, 2020[34]) . On the one hand, FDI via reinvested earnings, an increasingly important FDI component, is likely to suffer, but the impact varies greatly across sectors. According to Refinitiv (2020[35]) , there will be large year-over-year drops in multinational earnings in the energy, consumer discretionary, industrials and materials sectors. Multinationals in the health care, technology and communications sectors will, however, see increased earnings. As the primary and manufacturing sector are especially prominent in FDI flows to developing economies, these countries are likely to be hit harder. On the other hand, FDI flows will be impacted due to adjustments in equity capital flows, regardless of the mode of entry. First, completed cross-border mergers and acquisitions dropped globally in the first quarter of 2020. Second, announced FDI greenfield investment, which for developing economies is more important than cross-border mergers and acquisitions, declined significantly in the first two months of 2020. With the whole world having entered lockdown in March, the effect is likely to have magnified since (OECD, 2020[34]) .

Projections for external private investment support this foreboding evidence. Portfolio and other investment flows are not likely to recover quickly, given that the COVID-19 pandemic is still unfolding in most developing economies, possibly leading to a second wave of portfolio outflows and further reduced capital inflows. Even if international capital flows recover in the second half, the IIF (2020[36]) projects portfolio and other investment flows to drop by 80% and 123% compared to 2019, respectively. OECD projections indicate that even in the most optimistic scenario, global FDI will drop by at least 30%, with flows to developing economies likely falling more strongly (OECD, 2020[37]) . The World Bank (2020[38]) projection of a 35% drop of FDI flows to developing economies supports this figure. After the financial crisis of 2008, global FDI dropped with a lag of one year and affected developed economies more adversely than developing ones. This time, the impact on FDI will be immediate. It will also hit the weakest hardest, as sectors most prominent in FDI flows to developing economies will be most affected.

For remittances , the COVID-19 impact is expected to be immediate and stronger than the 7% year-on-year drop observed in 2009. Again, the first few months since the outbreak of the pandemic gave an indication of the magnitude of the impact. While remittances to Mexico have proven to be relatively resilient so far, a different picture emerges when looking at the top three countries in terms of remittances as a share of external finance – Guatemala, El Salvador and Kyrgyzstan. In these three countries, the largest monthly year-on-year drop of remittances between 2007 and 2009 ranged from 16% to 34%. For April and May 2020, the same data already show record year-on-year drops ranging from 20% to 62%.

The main reason for this impact is that sending countries experience unprecedented economic shocks which translate into lower incomes of individuals transferring remittances. In the United States, the country from which most remittances originate, job losses within only four weeks since mid-March 2020 equalled the number of jobs that had been created since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (CNBC, 2020[39]) . Similarly, migrants’ jobs will be at risk as oil-dependent sending countries will struggle due to the oil-price drop that again topped the post-2008 experience (UNCTAD, 2020[28]) . The current recovery from this oil-price drop is slow, with rising oil-prices in May 2020 being well below pre-COVID-19 levels (IEA, 2020[40]) . Despite the COVID-19-induced US dollar appreciation partially counteracting these effects, the World Bank (2020[38]) projects that remittances to developing economies will shrink by 20% in 2020 compared to 2019.

Altogether, projections suggest that inflows of external private finance to ODA-eligible countries in 2020 could plunge by USD 700 billion compared to 2019 levels (see Figure 3 ). With all sources of external private finance falling immediately, this presents an unprecedented pressure and financing void for developing economies, exceeding the post-2008 Global Financial Crisis experience by 60% and equalling 35% of the 2018 level of external finance.

Note: All data refer to ODA-eligible countries as of April 2020. The sudden stop of capital flows in 2015 is not shown here, as it would have included a USD 556 billion drop relating only to the People’s Republic of China. For details on the estimated COVID-19 impact on external private finance, the interested reader is referred to the Methodology .

Source: Historical remittance data based on KNOMAD Remittances Inflows (2020[13]) . Historical foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and other investment are from IMF Balance of Payments (IMF, 2020[14]) and national central bank data, and refer to net incurrence of liabilities. World Bank World Development Indicators (2020[15]) are used to impute missing data on foreign direct investment. COVID-19 projections are based on combining historical data with projections from World Bank (2020[38]) (remittances and FDI) and IIF (2020[36]) (portfolio and other investment).

  Official development finance can be a catalytic resource during the crisis but could be under budget pressure too

Official development finance has proven to be a key resource and countercyclical flow in past crises (OECD, 2020[41]) . Official development assistance (ODA), in particular, has played a key role in promoting health and social protection systems in developing economies – which are among the central pillars for countries’ response to COVID-19. While the global economic recession, declining public revenue and the fiscal stimulus implemented by members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) could pressure ODA levels, DAC members have declared their ambition to “strive to protect ODA budgets” during the COVID-19 crisis (DAC and OECD, 2020[42]) .

Ultimately, how official development finance will evolve in 2020 is a question of political will and global solidarity (OECD, 2020[41]) . Since many ODA budgets had been finalised before the outbreak of COVID-19, the effect of the global economic recession on ODA levels might not be immediate but lagged. The OECD (2020[41]) has outlined three possible scenarios how ODA levels could evolve in 2020:

Many countries have signalled political commitment in support of a global sustainable recovery. The COVID-19 crisis has exposed the interdependence of countries and the importance of global public goods. Increased solidarity could lead to increases in total ODA levels and would, in turn, increase ODA as a share of gross national income (GNI).

As highlighted in its statement, DAC members have expressed their will to protect ODA levels. In fact, OECD DAC Peer Reviews have previously found that protecting aid budgets against short-term shocks to public finance is an established practice. If ODA levels were to be maintained at 2019 levels, the ratio of DAC members’ ODA over GNI would increase from 0.29% in 2019 to about 0.32% in 2020.

Given DAC members’ own budget pressure in 2020, the overall level of ODA could decline in 2020. The OECD calculates that if DAC members were to keep the same ODA to GNI ratios as in 2019, total ODA could decline by USD 11 billion to USD 14 billion, depending on a single- or double-hit recession scenario on member countries’ GDP.

  Fiscal space is likely to narrow further with rising domestic public spending and exchange rate movements against the dollar

The current crisis and trends in financing for sustainable development are exacerbating the limited fiscal space already facing many low- and middle-income countries. 7 Both the public health crisis and the socioeconomic shock necessitate large and immediate public spending on health, social protection, and economic relief and liquidity, not to mention the amounts that will be required in the post-crisis recovery. For instance, were African countries to implement the same (proportional) fiscal measures adopted by the largest EU economies, the OECD estimates that debt levels in Africa, all else remaining constant, would increase from 57.6% of GDP in 2019 to about 85% (OECD, 2020[21]) . With rising spending needs and declining revenue, public debt is likely to increase further and sizeably in many countries. The risk of debt distress is particularly pronounced in the region’s fragile and oil-rich countries, where a significant share of public debt is short-term and expensive, often extended on non-concessional terms by private creditors and with repayment sometimes tied to strategic natural assets (OECD, forthcoming[26]) .

Increases in debt servicing costs will further reduce the available fiscal space. Debt servicing costs had already risen before the crisis (Griffiths, 2019[17]) but the devaluation of many countries’ currencies against the US dollar raises debt servicing costs as almost two-third of public external debt is USD denominated in low- and lower middle-income countries (IIF, 2020[43]) . Adjusted risk evaluations and downgrades in countries’ sovereign credit score as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic could further increase the cost of public borrowing, and limit countries’ ability to mobilise fiscal resources on international capital markets.

Overall, the described divergence in available financing (supply) and spending needs (demand) amplifies the so-called “scissor effect” of sustainable development finance identified in OECD (2018[2]) which refers to a simultaneous drop in available financing and increase in SDG spending needs.

  Short-term relief: Mobilise all sources of finance to meet the pressing needs

Already scarce resources coupled with the prospected impact of the COVID-19 crisis, imply that developing economies might struggle to finance adequate public health, social and economic responses. In the short term, official development finance will play an important countercyclical role – just as it has done in previous crises of global scale (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, 2020[44]) . Indeed, multilateral and bilateral donors have taken first steps to support developing economies:

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced over USD 100 billion in emergency lending and USD 1 trillion it could mobilise for its members. The World Bank Group will lend about USD 150 billion in the next 15 months. 8

Despite tightening national budgets due to increased domestic spending, members of the DAC have declared to “strive to protect ODA budgets” (DAC and OECD, 2020[42]) . Recent COVID-related commitments by bilateral donors might therefore reflect shifts in already planned assistance towards the health sector rather than increasing ODA budgets. Although crisis related funding seems to not have diverted ODA-funding from other areas in recent health crises such as the H1N1 pandemic and the Ebola outbreak (OECD, forthcoming, 2020[45]) , limited capacity in partner countries’ health sectors have meant stark consequences on other health areas: For example, in the space of 18 months, the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone led to a 75 per cent increase in maternal mortality across the three countries due to resources being diverted from the reproductive and maternal health sector (Davis and Bennett, 2016[46]) . Thus, DAC members need to remain attentive to not only supporting the COVID-19 response but also to helping partners maintain all essential health services. 9

The G20 have announced a freeze on debt payments by the 76 IDA-eligible countries (G20 FMCBG, 2020[47]) . The OECD estimates that the G20 debt moratorium will delay payments to public bilateral creditors worth USD 16.5 billion (OECD, 2020[48]) .

However, the official development finance response has room for improvement. IMF members have so far not agreed to an allocation of special drawing rights of a similar or higher scale as in 2009. Bilateral donors are yet to show willingness to increase their ODA commitments which would be critical to avoid negative consequences when diverting funds from other important areas in support of the COVID-response. The G20 debt moratorium so far fails to engage multilateral and private actors in pausing debt payments, and ignores emerging economies that also face severe debt distress. The G20 could look at mobilising all sources of finance, including the private sector, and highlighting principles of development co-operation (effectiveness, ownership), with modalities such as south-south and triangular co-operation.

Even without these shortcomings, it will be crucial not to solely rely on official development finance in providing relief. The IMF (2020[49]) estimates that emerging economies will require at least USD 2.5 trillion of funding with reserves and domestic resources insufficient to meet these needs. No single source of finance will be sufficient to close this COVID-19 financing gap. It will require coordinated policy responses across all sources of the finance mix to “stop the bleeding” and avoid a collapse of financing for development that would trigger major setbacks in our collective progress towards the SDGs and a more resilient world to future global shocks. Official development finance will therefore need to be complemented along the following dimensions:

A range of tax policy and administration measures can support governments’ responses to maintain household and business liquidity and to protect employment. 10 In developing economies, however, a smaller tax base (e.g. due to larger informal economies), weaker tax administration capacity and more limited social protection systems may limit the effectiveness of some broad-based tax measures and, in turn, call for more targeted policy responses.

OECD (2020[50]) , Steel and Phillips (2020[27]) and IMF (2020[51]) propose a range of targeted tax measures: Tax relief could be extended to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and to regions or industries most affected (e.g. the travel, tourism and hospitality industry). Such relief measures could include income tax credits, rate cuts and exemptions, deadline extension and deferral, extended loss carry-back rules or limiting advance tax payments. Temporary exemptions of payroll taxes could help safeguard existing formal employment. Tax waivers on mobile money and cash transfers could maximise financial support to individuals and households. Reduced taxes on digital communications could help enforce social distancing and reduce the cost of working remotely.

Social assistance measures are critical for social protection and are more common in developing economies than social insurance or short-time work schemes (OECD, 2020[50]) . These measures may be more able to reach individuals, but challenges in targeting workers in the informal economy must also be addressed. OECD (2020[52]) , for example, identifies that 65% of informal workers do not benefit from any form of social protection. Social assistance measures could include direct cash transfers, recurrent minimum income, or subsidies to the poorest. To identify and target the most vulnerable, local authorities could be key. Linking registration to such programmes with formal tax registration could help broaden the tax base after the crisis (Steel and Phillips, 2020[27]) .

Investment policy will be an important tool to cushion the impact of the crisis on external private investment flows (OECD, 2020[37]) . 11 In response to capital outflows, developing economies with sufficient fiscal space should relax macro-prudential policy. Capital account policy can involve easing inflow controls and, in extreme cases, introducing outflow controls, which should be coordinated internationally. To respond to the slowdown of FDI flows to developing economies, donor and investment policy communities should coordinate to mitigate global value chain disruptions and create additional incentives to maintain investment in these countries. Investment policy can also help mitigate the medical supply shortage if governments incentivise businesses to shift their production and imports towards essential healthcare goods and services. 12

The recovery of remittance flows will mainly depend on fiscal and monetary responses in developed economies. In addition to these macro-responses, policymakers in developed and developing economies can contribute by recognising remittance agents as essential services during lockdown and support remittance agents to manage their increased operating risks (World Bank, 2020[53]) . While the average cost of sending remittances to G20 countries remained at 6.37% in the last quarter of 2019, it could be further reduced to reach the below-5% objective set by the G20.

Philanthropic donors will need to jump in as well. Philanthropies are strongly represented in the health sector in developing economies: foundations as a provider group are the third largest funders in the health sector (Kim, Kessler and Poensgen, forthcoming[54] ; OECD, 2020[55]) . Given their greater flexibility and as a source of innovation, they can be an important complement to official development finance. Still, in total their contribution seems to remain limited in volumes compared to other sources of financing. A forthcoming OECD paper will shed more light on the philanthropic COVID-response.

Development co-operation providers could support these measures by assisting targeted tax and social assistance measures, supporting essential sectors both formal and informal (including health, finance, transport, tourism and retail), maintaining trade and investment flows by using innovative instruments (e.g. blended finance, trade finance, guarantees and equity), and facilitating remittances.

  Medium-term recovery: Build back better for people and planet

The COVID-19 pandemic reminds us of our global interconnectedness and common vulnerability to global public bads. It also reminds us that we are only as strong as our weakest link when it comes to facing global challenges. No one will be safe until everyone is safe. International co-operation with a focus on leaving no one behind, instead of a retreat into nationalism, is therefore required to fight the pandemic.

Once the pandemic is over, it will be key to apply the lessons learnt from COVID-19 to future global challenges. COVID-19 threatens to erase significant progress towards poverty eradication and sustainable development, and thereby to further widen the gap between developed and developing economies in their resilience to crises. 13 If we do not address these inequalities and accelerate progress towards the SDGs, the pandemic could be a mere teaser of worse global crises to come. With trillions to be mobilised for the post-COVID-19 recovery, we should use the opportunity to enhance crisis-resilience and to collectively put people and planet back at the heart of the agenda. We must not return to “business as usual” but we must build back better .

Building back better means integrating long-term risk management into policies and financing strategies while leaving no one behind. These risks encompass environmental, social and economic aspects and their interactions (e.g. biodiversity loss, climate change, migration) and could trigger the collapse of entire economies. Next to the political case of the need for a more equitable and resilient world, the economic case for taking an approach that considers long-term risks is strong. First, environmental, social and governance shocks risk lowering the long-term value of assets. Second, considering long-term risks does not imply forgoing short-term gains for long-term sustainability in a time of crisis. The transition to low-emission, climate-resilient economies is estimated by the ILO to create 18 million jobs net, while simultaneously supporting the 1.2 billion jobs (primarily in developing economies) that depend on direct ecosystems services (ILO, 2018[56]) . Additionally, every USD 1 invested into climate-resilient infrastructure averages a USD 4 return that safeguards the productivity gains and job creation that infrastructure supports (Hallegatte, Rentschler and Rozenberg, 2019[57]) .

The need to build back better applies to all actors of the development finance landscape – in developed and developing economies, and at the global level – with the common goal to aid national sustainable development strategies. Integrated National Financing Frameworks (INFF) could help to systematically link different financing sources with these national development plans. Importantly, building back better will also need to go beyond development finance by, for instance, revitalising trade and, in the case of small island developing states, contributing to a sustainable ocean economy.

  A holistic financing approach to building back better

Building back better in terms of domestic resource mobilisation will require focussing on building effective tax systems in developing economies. With fiscal headroom highly constrained, domestic resource mobilisation, and taxation in particular, will remain the only long-term viable source of sustainable financing for many public services, not least healthcare. As such, many countries will need to identify ways to increase tax revenue through both tax policy and tax administration measures. The joint Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) initiative by the OECD and UNDP provides one of the promising avenues to support tax audit capacity in developing economies. At the same time tolerance of tax avoidance and evasion will be at an all-time low, reinforcing the need for further progress in international tax co-ordination, led by the Inclusive Framework and Global Forum, to deliver strong outcomes for developing economies.

For external private investment, building back better calls for a long-term investment approach to better align with sustainable needs and to strengthen resilience in times of crisis. Just as the banking system was reformed to better address endogenous financial shocks following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the investment landscape can be reformed to better respond to social and environmental shocks. Investment and development co-operation policies can enhance the qualities of trade by promoting sustainable value chains and investment, enforcing high social and environmental standards, and building climate-resilient infrastructure.

Official development finance remains a vital source supporting countries and sectors left behind. It can help leverage other financing resources including support to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, build public financial management capacity and mobilise additional private investment through blended finance. Official development finance can also contribute to further reducing transfer costs of remittances .

Building back better will also mean fighting the leakages in development finance. Illicit financial flows (including international tax evasion, corruption and money laundering) from developing economies are an important obstacle to securing sufficient financing for the SDGs. While figures are contested the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa estimates that illicit financial flows from the continent could be as much as USD 50 billion per annum (UNECA, n.d.[58]) . The consensus is that these illicit flows deprive developing economies of significant volumes of capital, outstripping ODA (OECD, n.d.[59]) . Transparency and international co-operation are the key tools to address illicit financial flows, and while progress has been made since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, many developing economies are still not part of, or benefitting from, new tools and agreements to increase transparency and co-operation. Attention should thus be given to continuing to increase transparency especially in the financial centres where illicit financial flows end up, and co-operation and exchange of information between financial centres and developing economies where illicit financial flows originate.

  Building back better beyond development finance

As a key transmitter of goods and services, technology, and knowledge, international trade is an essential means of building back better and implementing the SDGs . Successive rounds of multilateral trade liberalisation, increasing numbers of preferential market access schemes and regional free trade agreements have created many more trading opportunities. Yet, global trade halted as the coronavirus broke out and current discussions around regionalisation and on-shoring could affect global value chains in the medium- to long-term. Further, obsolete or ill-adapted infrastructure, limited access to trade finance, onerous regulatory requirements, cumbersome border procedures and the need to comply with an ever-broader array of standards, increase the cost of doing business. This leads to the key risk that firms in developing economies, particularly micro and small- and medium-sized enterprises, will be priced out of international markets. Aid for trade can help to tackle these barriers that limit the contribution of trade to sustainable and inclusive economic growth (OECD/WTO, 2019[60]) . The COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic costs make this more urgent, but also more daunting.

Tourism, sea transport, and other ocean-based sectors are being highly disrupted, with large economic ramifications for many developing economies, including some of the most vulnerable countries, such as small island developing states. The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic could have long-lasting effects on these industries. Nevertheless, it will be important for countries not to lose sight of the longer-term opportunities that a sustainable ocean economy can offer and to squarely integrate sustainability into stimulus packages and recovery efforts, with support from the international community. Governments and the international donor community have a critical role to play for integrating sustainability requirements into traditional financial services and investments, whether in financial markets (e.g. stocks and bonds), or in credit markets (e.g. loans or bonds) (OECD, 2020 forthcoming[61]) .

All actors in development finance and beyond need to collaborate closely to shape the building back better agenda. This agenda needs to be centred on sustainability in all its dimensions. Only then can we make successful use of the SDGs as a blueprint for building a more equitable, sustainable and thus resilient world.

[67] Bank, W. (2020), Global Economic Prospects June 2020 , World Bank, Washington D.C., https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects#a .

[31] Calderon, C. et al. (2020), Africa’s Pulse, No. 21 , World Bank, Washington D.C., https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33541/9781464815683.pdf?sequence=10&isAllowed=y .

[18] Calderon, C. and A. Zeugack (2020), Borrow with sorrow? The changing risk profile of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Debt , World Bank, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/370721580415352349/pdf/Borrow-with-Sorrow-The-Changing-Risk-Profile-of-Sub-Saharan-Africas-Debt.pdf.

[39] CNBC (2020), The US economy has erased nearly all the job gains since the Great Recession , https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/16/us-only-417000-jobless-claims-away-from-losing-gains-since-2009.html .

[42] DAC and OECD (2020), COVID-19 global pandemic: Joint statement by the DAC and the OECD , http://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee/DAC-Joint-Statement-COVID-19.pdf .

[46] Davis, S. and B. Bennett (2016), “A gendered human rights analysis of Ebola and Zika: locating gender in global health emergencies”, International Affairs , Vol. 92/2, pp. 1041-1060, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12704 .

[47] G20 FMCBG (2020), Communiqué G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting (April 15) , https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20_FMCBG_Communiqu%C3%A9_EN%20(2).pdf .

[4] Gaspar, V. et al. (2019), Fiscal Policy and Development: Human, Social, and Physical Investment for the SDGs , International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2019/01/18/Fiscal-Policy-and-Development-Human-Social-and-Physical-Investments-for-the-SDGs-46444 .

[6] Gaspar, V., L. Jaramillo and P. Wingender (2016), Tax capacity and growth: Is there a tipping point? , IMF Working Paper No. 16/234, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16234.pdf .

[17] Griffiths, J. (2019), Low-income country debt: three key trends (blog) , Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, https://www.odi.org/blogs/10801-low-income-country-debt-three-key-trends .

[57] Hallegatte, S., J. Rentschler and J. Rozenberg (2019), Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity , World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31805 .

[44] Horn, S., C. Reinhart and C. Trebesch (2020), Coping with disasters: Lessons from two centuries of international response , Vox CEPR Policy Portal, https://voxeu.org/article/coping-disasters-lessons-two-centuries-international-response .

[11] ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2020), Government Revenue Dataset (dataset) , https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/government-revenue-dataset .

[40] IEA (2020), Oil Market Report - May 2020 , IEA, Paris, https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-may-2020 .

[36] IIF (2020), Capital Flows Report – Sudden Stop in Emerging Markets , Institute of International Finance, Washington D.C., https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/2_IIF2020_April_CFR.pdf .

[32] IIF (2020), IIF Capital Flows Tracker – April 2020 – The COVID-19 cliff (blog) , Institute of International Finance, Washington D.C., https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/1_IIF_Capital%20Flows%20Tracker_April.pdf .

[33] IIF (2020), IIF Capital Flows Tracker – June 2020 – Timid Recovery in Flows (blog) , Institute of International Finance, Washington D.C., https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/IIF_Capital%20Flows%20Tracker_June.pdf .

[43] IIF (2020), Weekly Insight: COVID-19 hammers equity valuations (blog) , Institute of International Finance, Washington D.C., https://www.iif.com/Publications/ID/3836/Weekly-Insight-COVID-19-hammers-equity-valuations .

[56] ILO (2018), World Employment Social Outlook: Greening with Jobs , International Labour Organisation, https://www.ilo.org/weso-greening/documents/WESO_Greening_EN_web2.pdf .

[14] IMF (2020), Balance of Payments database (database) , http://data.imf.org/bop (accessed on 21 December 2018).

[70] IMF (2020), Confronting the crisis: priorities for the global economy (press release) , International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/04/07/sp040920-SMs2020-Curtain-Raiser .

[51] IMF (2020), Fiscal monitor (April 2020) , International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2020/04/06/fiscal-monitor-april-2020 .

[71] IMF (2020), The IMF’s response to COVID-19 (website) , International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., https://www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/imf-response-to-covid-19 .

[49] IMF (2020), Transcript of Press Briefing by Kristalina Georgieva following a Conference Call of the International Monetary and Financial Committee , International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/03/27/tr032720-transcript-press-briefing-kristalina-georgieva-following-imfc-conference-call .

[10] IMF (2020), World Revenue Longitudinal Data (database) , https://data.imf.org .

[16] IMF (2019), Macroeconomic developments and prospects in low-income developing countries 2019 , International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/PP/2019/PPEA2019039.ashx .

[69] IMF (2018), Assessing Fiscal Space: An Update and Stocktaking , International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2018/06/15/pp041118assessing-fiscal-space .

[20] IMF and World Bank (2019), List of LIC DSAs for PRGT-eligible countries as of November 30, 2019 , International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., https://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/ft/dsa/DSAlist.pdf .

[22] Kapoor, S. and W. Buiter (2020), To fight the COVID pandemic, policymakers must move fast and break taboos (blog) , VOX CEPR Policy Portal, https://voxeu.org/article/fight-covid-pandemic-policymakers-must-move-fast-and-break-taboos .

[54] Kim, J., M. Kessler and K. Poensgen (forthcoming), Financing transition in the health sector: What can DAC providers do? , OECD Publishing, Paris.

[13] KNOMAD (2020), Remittances inflows (database) , https://www.knomad.org/data/remittances .

[79] Mahler, D. et al. (2020), The impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) on global poverty: Why Sub-Saharan Africa might be the region hardest hit (blog) , World Bank Group, Washington D.C., https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/impact-covid-19-coronavirus-global-poverty-why-sub-saharan-africa-might-be-region-hardest .

[48] OECD (2020), A debt “standstill” for the poorest countries: How much is at stake? , OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/a-debt-standstill-for-the-poorest-countries-how-much-is-at-stake-462eabd8/ .

[21] OECD (2020), COVID-19 and Africa: Socio-economic implications and policy responses , OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-and-africa- socio-economic-implications-and-policy-responses-96e1b282 .

[75] OECD (2020), COVID-19 crisis response in Central Asia , http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-crisis-response-in-central-asia-5305f172/ .

[76] OECD (2020), COVID-19 crisis response in MENA countries , http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-crisis-response-in-mena-countries-4b366396/ .

[77] OECD (2020), COVID-19 crisis response in South East European economies , OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-crisis-response-in-south-east-european-economies-c1aacb5a/#tablegrp-d1e2853 .

[74] OECD (2020), COVID-19 in emerging Asia: Regional socio-economic implications and policy priorities , OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-in-emerging-asia-regional-socio-economic-implications-and-policy-priorities-da08f00f/ .

[52] OECD (2020), COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean: Regional socio-economic implications and policy priorities , OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-regional-socio-economic-implications-and-policy-priorities-93a64fde/ .

[66] OECD (2020), Economic Outlook June 2020 , OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/june-2020/ .

[34] OECD (2020), Foreign direct investment flows in the times of COVID-19 , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=132_132646-g8as4msdp9&title=Foreign-direct-investment-flows-in-the-time-of-COVID-19 .

[9] OECD (2020), Global Revenue Statistics Database (database) , http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/global-revenue-statistics-database.htm .

[78] OECD (2020), Investment promotion agencies in the time of Covid-19 , OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/investment-promotion-agencies-in-the-time-of-covid-19-50f79678/ .

[12] OECD (2020), OECD Development finance data , https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/data.htm .

[37] OECD (2020), OECD investment policy responses to COVID-19 , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=129_129922-gkr56na1v7&title=OECD-Investment-Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 .

[55] OECD (2020), Private philanthropy for the SDGs , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://issuu.com/oecd.publishing/docs/private-philanthropy-for-sdgs .

[41] OECD (2020), Six decades of ODA: insights and outlook in the COVID-19 crisis , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5e331623-en .

[50] OECD (2020), Tax and fiscal policy in response to the coronavirus crisis: Strengthening confidence and resilience , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=128_128575-o6raktc0aa&title=Tax-and-Fiscal-Policy-in-Response-to-the-Coronavirus-Crisis .

[30] OECD (2020), Tax policy responses to covid-19 (database) , OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, https://www.oecd.org/tax/covid-19-tax-policy-and-other-measures.xlsm .

[7] OECD (2019), Revenue Statistics in Africa 2019: 1990-2017 , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5daa24c1-en-fr .

[2] OECD (2018), Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2019: Time to face the challenge , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307995-en .

[59] OECD (n.d.), Anti-corruption and integrity hub (website) , Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development, https://www.oecd.org/corruption-integrity/fr/explorer/themes/development-assistance.html .

[1] OECD (forthcoming), Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2021 , OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/ .

[26] OECD (forthcoming), Impact of the COVID-19 and the global oil prive shock on oil-exporting developing countries , OECD Publishing, Paris.

[61] OECD (2020 forthcoming), Sustainable Ocean for All: Harnessing the benefits of sustainable ocean economies for developing countries .

[45] OECD (forthcoming, 2020), What have been development co-operation responses to recent epidemics and pandemics? , OECD Publishing, Paris.

[8] OECD et al. (2020), Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean 2020 , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/68739b9b-en-es .

[29] OECD/FTA (2020), Tax Administration Responses to COVID-19: Measures Taken to Support Taxpayers , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=126_126478-29c4rprb3y&title=Tax_administration_responses_to_COVID-9_Measures_taken_to_support_taxpayers .

[60] OECD/WTO (2019), Aid for Trade at a Glance 2019: Economic Diversification and Empowerment , OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/18ea27d8-en .

[63] Prichard, W. (2016), “Reassing tax and development research: A new dataset, new findings, and lessons for research”, World Development , Vol. 80, pp. 48-60, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.017 .

[35] Refinitiv (2020), S&P 500 Earnings Scorecard, March 30 .

[25] Simon, H. and M. Harding (2020), What drives consumption tax revenues?: Disentangling policy and macroeconomic drivers , OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1787/94ed8187-en .

[27] Steel, I. and D. Phillips (2020), How tax officials in lower-income countries can respond to the coronavirus pandemix , Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/200304_tax_corona_lt_ec_0.pdf .

[80] Sumner, A. and C. Hoy (2020), Estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on global , United Nations University, https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2020-43.pdf .

[5] UN SG (2019), Roadmap for financing the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development , United Nations, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/UN-SG- Roadmap-Financing-the-SDGs-July-2019.pdf .

[62] UNCTAD (2020), Global Investment Trend Monitor, No. 33 , https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaeiainf2020d1_en.pdf .

[28] UNCTAD (2020), The Covid-19 shock to developing countries: Towards a “whatever it takes” programme for the two-thirds of the world’s population being left behind , https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gds_tdr2019_covid2_en.pdf?user=1653 .

[19] UNCTAD (2019), Trade and development report 2019 , United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2019_en.pdf .

[3] UNCTAD (2014), World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan , United Nations Publications, Geneva, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf .

[64] UNCTAD Stat (n.d.), Composition criteria of economic groups , United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/en/Classifications/UnctadStat.EconomicGroupings.Criterias_EN.pdf .

[58] UNECA (n.d.), High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows (website) , United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, https://www.uneca.org/iff .

[24] UNWTO (2020), International tourist numbers could fall 60-80% in 2020 (press release) , United Nations World Tourism Organization, Madrid, https://www.unwto.org/news/covid-19-international-tourist-numbers-could-fall-60-80-in-2020 .

[38] World Bank (2020), Migration and Development Brief 32 - COVID 19 Crisis through a Migration Lense , https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/Migration%20and%20Development%20Brief%2032_0.pdf .

[53] World Bank (2020), Remittances in times of the coronavirus – keep them flowing (blog article) , https://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/remittances-times-coronavirus-keep-them-flowing .

[72] World Bank (2020), World Bank Group Increases COVID-19 Response to $14 Billion To Help Sustain Economies, Protect Jobs (press release) , World Bank Group, Washington D.C., https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/03/17/world-bank-group-increases-covid-19-response-to-14-billion-to-help-sustain-economies-protect-jobs .

[73] World Bank (2020), World Bank Group President David Malpass Remarks to G20 Leaders’ Virtual Summit (press release) , World Bank Group, Washington D.C., https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2020/03/26/world-bank-group-president-david-malpass-remarks-to-g20-leaders-virtual-summit?cid=ECR_TT_worldbank_EN_EXT .

[15] World Bank (2020), World Development Indicators (database) , https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators .

[65] World Bank (n.d.), World Bank Country and Lending Groups (website) , World Bank, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups .

[68] WTO (2020), The covid-19 pandemic and trade-related developments in LDCs , World Trade Organisation, Geneva, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/ldcs_report_e.pdf .

[23] WTO (2020), Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy , World Trade Organization, Geneva, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm .

Annex 1.A. Methodology

  deflator method.

All numbers presented for external sustainable development finance volumes are expressed in 2019 prices using a global GDP deflator for the United States provided from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. That is, we multiply the financial flow of year – originally in current USD – by

to obtain the financial flow in 2019 USD.

  Estimating the projected COVID-19 impact on external private finance

To estimate the projected COVID-19 impact on external private finance, we combine historical data for 2019 on remittances, FDI, portfolio investment and other investment with the percentage-drops of each component estimated for 2020 in other publications. The data sources of the historical data and the projected percentage-drops can be found in Table 1 . Concerning 2019, data on external private finance was compiled as follows:

For 2019 data on remittances, we are using preliminary figures from World Bank KNOMAD Remittance Inflows.

For 2019 data on FDI, we assume that FDI has remained stable since 2018; this is based on information provided by UNCTAD (2020[62]) .

For 2019 data on portfolio investment and other investment, we complemented IMF BOP data with data from national central banks. The resulting countries included in the 2019 data yield a (absolute USD) coverage of 96% of portfolio investment to ODA-eligible countries and 88% of other investment to ODA-eligible countries in previous years. Assuming that the countries available in 2019 would account for a similar share of the total in 2019, we applied these shares to estimate total portfolio investment and other investment to ODA-eligible countries in 2019.

Note: Other investment excludes IMF lending and SDR allocations to match the IIF definition.

A total of 143 countries are ODA-eligible in 2020. Our data complements the OECD Global Revenue Statistics Database with IMF World Revenue Longitudinal Data and ICTD/UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset.

We are aware of tax-to-GDP benchmarks in the literature ranging from 12.5% to 25% of GDP. Such benchmarks are not definite and are generally based on cross-country comparison. The “optimal” level of tax revenue depends on the specific country context. Using a data set including more countries, Prichard (2016[63]) finds that 65 countries collected less than 15% of GDP in non-resource taxation.

The emerging market economies referred to comprise Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey.

According to UNCTAD classifications (n.d.[64]) high-income developing countries are those with an average GDP per capita of more than USD 5 312 between 2013 and 2015, resembling an “upper” part of the World Bank’s upper-middle income countries classification. Middle-income developing countries, respectively, are countries with an average GDP per capita between USD 1 181 and USD 5 312. Low-income developing countries are those with an average GDP per capita below USD 1 181. For comparison, for the current 2020 World Bank fiscal year, low-income countries are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of USD 1 025 or less in 2018; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between USD 1 026 and USD 3 995; upper middle-income countries are those with a GNI per capita between USD 3 996 and USD 12 375; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of USD 12 376 or more (World Bank, n.d.[65]) .

In its more optimistic scenario, the OECD predicts a 6% contraction of world GDP in 2020 (OECD, 2020[66]) . The World Bank (2020[67]) forecasts a recession of 5.2% of world GDP in 2020. For emerging market and developing economies, the World Bank expects an economic contraction of 2.5%. For comparison, in 2009 world GDP contracted by only 0.1% and output grew by 2.8% among emerging market and developing economies. Low-income developing economies are expected to grow by just 1% in 2020, down from an initial projection of 5.4% growth in January 2020.

WTO (2020[68]) provides an analysis on the effects of declining global trade in 2020 on least developed economies. The drop in global tourism will be felt particularly in tourism-reliant economies such as many small developing island states. Tourism is a particularly labour-intensive sector and millions of jobs are at risk due to the decline of activity (UNWTO, 2020[24]) . Additionally, tourism exports are a vital source of foreign currency so that the decline could lead to balance of payments problems.

Fiscal space refers to the “room for undertaking discretionary fiscal policy relative to existing plans without endangering market access and debt sustainability” (IMF, 2018[69]) .

For more information, see IMF (2020[70]) , IMF (2020[71]) and World Bank (2020[72]) , World Bank (2020[73]) .

The results of an ongoing survey of bilateral and multilateral donor responses to the pandemic will shed more light on this and its findings will be published in future OECD publications and integrated in the 2020 edition of the OECD Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development (OECD, forthcoming[1]) .

More detailed notes on policy responses are provided by OECD (2020[21]) for African economies, OECD (2020[74]) for emerging Asia, OECD (2020[75]) for Central Asia, OECD (2020[52]) for Latin America and the Caribbean, OECD (2020[76]) for MENA countries and OECD (2020[77]) for South East European economies.

While this note focusses on external private investment, developing countries need to mobilise domestic investment, too. In this domain, financial sector development in addition to identifying strategic areas of investment (e.g. industrial policy, infrastructure) is important.

This is only a part of the investment policy considerations to be made. For more detail, the reader is referred to OECD (2020[37]) and OECD (2020[78]) .

The World Bank estimates that due to COVID-19 40 to 60 million people could be pushed into extreme poverty (Mahler et al., 2020[79]) . In the pessimistic scenario, this would “eliminate” the progress of the last three years in reducing extreme poverty lifting the number of people living in extreme poverty back to 2017 levels. However, estimates vary widely, Sumner, Hoy and Ortiz-Juarez (2020[80]) for example estimate that poverty could increase by 420-580 million people.

Content Search

World + 1 more

Covid-19 in developing countries: secondary impacts, Eighth Report of Session 2019–21

Attachments.

Covid-19 and its secondary impacts are causing suffering and disruption around the world, especially in developing countries. Poor, marginalised groups generally consider the pandemic a crisis on top of other, existing crises while donors, multilateral organisations and NGOs are warning that covid-19 and the response to it could undo the progress towards achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The dilemma of trying to stem the spread of infections while avoiding worse harm in other areas is at the heart of the global policy-making challenge. The Government has made countering the spread and impact of covid-19 one of its top priorities in its foreign and development policy. It has taken several measures in response—these include investing more than £700 million to date in responding to the primary and secondary impacts of the virus, creating the post of a Special Envoy for Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Affairs, and adapting pre-covid-19 contracts with aid partners in an attempt to make them more flexible and more responsive to the immediate needs of local communities.

Although these measures are commendable, we ask the Government to strengthen its longer-term response to covid-19. Significant challenges remain not only in terms of vaccine distribution, but also in responding to the longer-term social and economic impacts of the pandemic. The consequences of these impacts will last long after the headlines made by the virus have disappeared.

The Government made significant changes to its foreign and development policy in 2020. In June 2020, the Prime Minister announced the merger of the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. In July 2020, the Foreign Secretary announced that levels of UK aid spending in 2020 would be cut by £2.9 billion owing to a decline in Gross National Income (GNI). And in November 2020, the Foreign Secretary announced that, from 2021 until the fiscal circumstances allow, the Government would reduce the proportion of GNI spent on Official Development Assistance (ODA) each year from 0.7% to 0.5%. We urge the Government to ensure that its diminished ODA budget is spent all the more effectively and in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals as these reductions will hit the poorest and most vulnerable the hardest.

This report focuses on four areas in considering the effectiveness of the UK’s contribution: non-covid healthcare; economic performance and livelihoods; food security; and the well-being of women and girls.

We call on the Government to

uphold existing commitments to global health programmes,

persuade private lenders to join debt relief schemes and to reconsider its own position on debt cancellation

extend funding for programmes aimed at mitigating covid-19’s impact on livelihoods and food security, and

provide a gendered response to the pandemic: advocate for and increase longterm funding for initiatives which support gender equality, girls’ education, sexual and reproductive healthcare, as well as tackle gender-based violence

We further welcome the Government’s decision that this Committee will remain in place. We will hold the Government to account for its performance in terms of international development and will scrutinise UK aid expenditure, including the portion implemented by Departments other than the FCDO.

Related Content

Cerf annual results report 2023, asia and the pacific sdg progress report: showcasing transformative actions 2024, unhcr global report 2022.

World + 31 more

World Vision: Global Hunger Response Situation report #13 (September 2023)

This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy .

• AEA Papers and Proceedings

Gendered Impacts of COVID-19 in Developing Countries

• Matthias Doepke
• Kristina Manysheva
• Michèle Tertilt
• Article Information

Additional Materials

• Replication Package
• Online Appendix (788.06 KB)
• Author Disclosure Statement(s) (471.94 KB)

JEL Classification

• O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on the Small Medium Entity Growth: Evidence from GCC

• First Online: 29 May 2024

Cite this chapter

• Azzam Hannoon 3 &
• Abdalmuttaleb Al-Sartawi 4  

Part of the book series: Studies in Systems, Decision and Control ((SSDC,volume 528))

25 Accesses

The paper intends to understand the research trends in Covid-19 and SMEs through a literature review and explores the most affected areas of SMEs during the Covid-19 pandemic. The study attempts to highlight the struggles of SMEs during Covid-19 crisis in the GCC. This paper gives a clear understanding of the current state of the research regarding the topic, i.e., the impact of COVID-19 on SMEs in the GCC, being investigated in a comprehensive platform. This paper calls for crisis management during turbulent times such as pandemics. More particularly this paper suggests developing strategies for employee engagement and voice that would lead to solidarity behavior and comradery among employees and managers of SMEs under crisis.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Durable hardcover edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Qalati, S.A., Ostic, D., Sulaiman, M.A.B.A., Gopang, A.A., Khan, A.: Social media and SMEs’ performance in developing countries: effects of technological-organizational-environmental factors on the adoption of social media. SAGE Open 12 (2), 21582440221094590 (2022)

Article   Google Scholar  

Thorgren, S., Williams, T.A.: Staying alive during an unfolding crisis: How SMEs ward off impending disaster. J. Bus. Ventur. Insights 14 , e00187 (2020)

Zutshi, A., Mendy, J., Sharma, G.D., Thomas, A., Sarker, T.: From challenges to creativity: enhancing SMEs’ resilience in the context of COVID-19. Sustainability 13 (12), 6542 (2021)

Khalil, A., Abdelli, M.E.A., Mogaji, E.: Do digital technologies influence the relationship between the COVID-19 crisis and SMEs’ resilience in developing countries? J. Open Innovat.: Tech. Market, Complex. 8 (2), 100 (2022)

Burhan, M., Salam, M.T., Abou Hamdan, O., Tariq, H.: Crisis management in the hospitality sector SMEs in Pakistan during COVID-19. Int. J. Hosp. Manag. 98 , 103037 (2021)

Baker, S.R., Bloom, N., Davis, S.J., Terry, S.J.: COVID-Induced Economic Uncertainty. NBER Work. Pap (2020)

Google Scholar  

Hermann, C.F.: Some consequences of crisis which limit the viability of organizations. Adm. Sci. Q. 61–82 (1963)

Prouska, R., Nyfoudi, M., Psychogios, A., Szamosi, L.T., Wilkinson, A.: Solidarity in action at a time of crisis: the role of employee voice in relation to communication and horizontal solidarity behaviour. Br. J. Manag. 34 (1), 91–110 (2023)

Kato, M., Charoenrat, T.: Business continuity management of small and medium sized enterprises: evidence from Thailand. Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 27 , 577–587 (2018)

Stecke, K.E., Kumar, S.: Sources of supply chain disruptions, factors that breed vulnerability, and mitigating strategies. J. Mark. Channels 16 (3), 193–226 (2009)

Vogl, G.: Work as community: narratives of solidarity and teamwork in the contemporary workplace, who owns them? Sociol. Res. Online 14 (4), 27–36 (2009)

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

American University in the Emirates, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Azzam Hannoon

Ahlia University, Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain

Abdalmuttaleb Al-Sartawi

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Abdalmuttaleb Al-Sartawi .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

College of Business and Finance, Ahlia University, Manama, Bahrain

Abdalmuttaleb M. A. Musleh Al-Sartawi

An-Najah National University, Nablus, Palestine, State of

Abdulnaser Ibrahim Nour

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2024 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Hannoon, A., Al-Sartawi, A. (2024). Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on the Small Medium Entity Growth: Evidence from GCC. In: Musleh Al-Sartawi, A.M.A., Nour, A.I. (eds) Artificial Intelligence and Economic Sustainability in the Era of Industrial Revolution 5.0. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol 528. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-56586-1_46

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-56586-1_46

Published : 29 May 2024

Publisher Name : Springer, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-031-56585-4

Online ISBN : 978-3-031-56586-1

eBook Packages : Engineering Engineering (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research