On July 1, 2024, Florida Session Law 2024-44 (the Act) takes effect, providing homeowners a swift new process for removing unauthorized persons (squatters) from their property without judicial action. The new law, passed unanimously by the Florida Legislature, is in response to high-profile squatter cases nationwide and creates criminal penalties for persons unlawfully occupying residential property and refusing to leave when asked.
Cause of Action for Wrongful Removal
Critics of the Act warn that the new non-judicial remedy raises due process concerns and that unscrupulous landlords may use it as a shortcut to the regular eviction process. However, the Act creates a civil cause of action for a wrongly removed person to regain possession and recover from the landlord actual damages and statutory damages equaling three times the fair market rent of the dwelling, in addition to court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
Source: New Florida Law Leads the Way in Ending Squatter Scams, Practical Law Legal Update w-042-9583
Practical Law Connect: New Florida Law Leads the Way in Ending Squatter Scams
|
Identifying the cause of action requires consideration of two factors – the legal theory and remedy . In the United States, CoA is defined from the standpoint of the rights of plaintiffs and duties of defendants with the breach of duty that resulted in loss and damage .
To institute a lawsuit, a plaintiff must prove all the elements of CoA including wrongful action such as threats . However, wrongful action alone does not trigger a CoA – It is the existence of the injury, damage, or loss that happened due to that wrongful action.
The following 6-step process gives attorneys confidence to specify CoA for their particular case.
1. Establish the existence of a legal possessory right
2. Determine defendant’s legal duty to act
3. Prove wrong or violation toward the plaintiff
4. Establish the concurrence of right, duty, and wrong
5. Prove damage or loss
6. Demonstrate concurrence of wrong and damage
1 – Existence of a legal possessory right in the plaintiff over the matter
The possessory rights, in this case, mean that the plaintiff’s legal right exists and where the defendant’s act affects that right.
For instance:
Case example: Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc .
The court ascertained the cause of action essentially with regard to the conversion in this matter. The court reasoned that for the cause of action to arise, the plaintiff’s possessory right or interest must exist and the defendant must have dominion over the property or interference with it, in derogation of the plaintiff’s rights.
Back to steps
2 – Corresponding legal duty in the defendant toward the plaintiff
The second element of the cause of action corresponds to the primary right of the plaintiff. This duty may arise from a contract or may be imposed by positive law independent of the contract, or it may arise ex contractu or ex delictu (consequences from breaching the contract).
There are several ways to determine whether the defendant had a duty to act:
Case example: Solomon v. Bates (N. C.)
In this case, the theory involves directors that are trustees for creditors, and individually owe a legal duty to them. The directors were wrong acting in a fraudulent, negligent, mismanagement affecting the creditor’s rights.
Case example: Purcell vs R.R 108 N.C 414
The court gave the verdict that the failure to discharge the duty required by the laws was a wrong caused by the defendant’s negligence -tort- and is properly united by the tort by fraud and deceit form part of the complaint.
3 – Wrong or violation of the plaintiff’s right, or breach of duty on the part of the defendant
Duty is the action which is to be done or not done by the person in obligation of it. A cause of action arises wherever there is proof that there was the existence of a duty towards the plaintiff by him which he failed to procure resulting in a breach. For instance, negligence as a Tort is a breach of duty that is not desired by the plaintiff but committed by the defendant.
The Wrongful Act or Omission forms part of the action that leads to affecting the right of the plaintiff.
Case example: Hart v. Hanson , 14 N.D. 570, 105 N.W. 942 (1905)
The defendants were directors of the State Bank of Northwood, the plaintiff and his assignors became sureties on the such-depositary bond, and the same was delivered to and accepted by the county. County funds were thereupon deposited in the bank and were closed by the state authorities by reason of its insolvency. Here the defendant’s activities are part of the question since they acted fraudulently, as they already knew the insolvency of county funds but they remained silent . They were also the trustees in whose name the creditors invested money. Consequently, the directors were held completely liable to creditors.
When the defendant intentionally interferes with the rights of the plaintiff they lay the foundation for the lawsuit with the cause of action.
Case example: Davenport v. Underwood
The court held the defendant liable. The bank directors were held responsible for causing losses for the bank as they were directly liable to depositors on the grounds of fraud and negligence while performing the corporation’s duties.
Case example: Delano v. Case
In this case, the defendant committed a wrongful act on the ground of negligence. The court ruled that the purpose of cause of action could exist where there has been a liability in the right of the corporation to be enforced.
4 – Concurrence of right, duty, and wrong
According to Salmond “no right can exist without any corresponding duty and vice versa”.
Every person is rendered some rights which are granted to him against individuals or some against the public at large. These rights cannot be taken away. On the other hand, it’s the duty of individuals around him to let him enjoy his right by doing or restraining from doing anything which may hinder it. Rights and duties exist simultaneously.
A right is an interest protected by the law or the state, and it’s the duty that mandates the protection of the right. But when the protection is infringed by a failure to follow the duty, it gives rise to the wrong committed and hence, to a cause of action. This renders another right to claim the damage suffered for the one whose right was infringed.
5 – Damage
When the duty obliged is not performed, the right is infringed causing loss or damage and can be claimed with the cause of action that arose. Damages can be defined as the injury caused or loss incurred by the plaintiff due to the failure of the defendant and can be remedied by issuing the cause of action claiming damages.
Case example: Marzetti v. Williams (1830) 1 B & Ad 41
This case stated that every contract implies a duty to be performed by the parties and in the event of breach, cause of action arises against the party at fault mandating the use of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium . Where there is action given by law, there are damages to the violated right.
6 – Concurrence of wrong and damage
The maxims damnum sine injuria and injuria sine damnum are elaborative of the relationship between the wrong and damage. Damnum sine Injuria refers to damages without injury or damages where there is no infringement of any legal right in spite of the loss which might have been incurred.
On the other hand, Injuria sine damno refers to infringement of legal right without causing any harm, loss, or damage to the plaintiff. Whenever any legal right is infringed, the plaintiff or the one who suffers can bring a cause of action against the one who infringed the right. Therefore, damages are the result of the cause of action through an actionable wrong.
Case example: Clark v. McClurg 215 Cal 279
In order to establish that there was breach of duty, the plaintiff must not only prove the existence of actionable wrong but also damages thereof. It was emphasized that the concurrence of actionable wrong and damages are important for the cause of action to be advanced.
Case example: Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co [1892] AC 25
This case established that immoral acts done in a lawful manner led to no legal injury, hence no damages to be claimed by the plaintiff, and no point of the cause of action.
Case law research tools: The most useful free and paid offerings
|
Although this guide is limited in scope and purpose, it’s clear that your own duty as a lawyer is to be well-versed with the facts of a case and to competently analyze similar cases where possible. This demands significant time and effort in both research and analysis, and understandably so. Yet the energy spent in gathering pertinent definitions and requirements don’t need to be so cumbersome.
The steps laid out above to specify causes of action serve only as basic principles so you can confidently proceed to the next phase of thorough analysis and file a lawsuit.
Originally published on November 17, 2022
The content appearing on this website is not intended as, and shall not be relied upon as, legal advice. Although this content was created to provide you with accurate and authoritative information, it was not necessarily prepared by attorneys licensed to practice law in a particular jurisdiction. It is general in nature and may not reflect all recent legal developments. Thomson Reuters is not a law firm and an attorney-client relationship is not formed through your use of this website. You should consult with qualified legal counsel before acting on any content found on this website.
Sign up for industry-leading insights, updates, and all things AI @ Thomson Reuters.
Legal technology has quickly evolved from a books-only exercise to outmatched AI-supported technology - with predictive analytics, precision research capabilities and powerful new citator tools.
Innovative tools deliver advanced speed and accuracy, providing you with greater confidence in your legal research
Bringing together generative AI, trusted content, and expert insights for a new era of work.
Learn more about how Thomson Reuters informs the way forward in The Power of Purpose
More answers.
A brief history
As a general proposition, a purported assignment of a cause of action that savours of maintenance will be void. A bare right of litigation, for example a right to recover damages in tort, has traditionally been considered not to be assignable either at law or in equity. 2 The cases have sometimes drawn a distinction between a so-called “personal right to litigate” as against an “impersonal right” in the nature of a proprietary right. 3 However, the distinction between so-called “personal rights” and “impersonal rights” is often elusive.
Historically, the courts have been reluctant to condone assignments of causes of action generally. Parker J in Glegg v. Bromley 4 observed:
“Equity on the grounds of public policy did not give validity to the assignment of what is in the cases referred to as a bare right of action, and this was so whether the bare rights were legal or equitable. I have looked at a good many authorities on that point, and I am satisfied that the real reason why equity did not allow the assignment of a bare right of action, whether legal or equitable, was on the grounds that it savoured of or was likely to lead to maintenance.”
The trial was heard by Fullagar J in the High Court. His Honour held that if there had been a tortious taking of the wool by the Commonwealth, the growers’ rights of action in tort against the Commonwealth could not be assigned at law or in equity to Mr Poulton. However, his Honour’s conclusions in that regard were obiter , given that his Honour found that the relevant regulations were valid and thus there had been no tort committed.
An appeal to the Full Court constituted by Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ was dismissed. At page 602, the Full Court said:
“. . . If it were true that the Commonwealth were guilty of conversion of the [growers’] wool, it would be the [growers] alone who could elect to waive the tort and take the proceeds of sale. This would be so, both because there was not in fact any purported assignment to the plaintiff of the right of action for the tort, and because, according to well established principle, the right was incapable of assignment either at law or in equity . . . ”.
Modern developments
In 1981, the House of Lords in Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Credit Suisse 6 liberalised the hitherto relatively strict rules against assignment of causes of action. Roskill LJ delivered the leading judgment. His Honour re-stated that it is a fundamental principle of English law that one cannot assign a bare right to litigate. However, if the assignment is of a property right or interest, or if the assignee has a genuine commercial interest in taking the assignment and in enforcing it for his or her own benefit, there is no reason why the agreement should be struck down as an assignment of a bare cause of action, or as savouring of maintenance. 7
Trendtex was a decision relating to the assignment of a contractual cause of action. In Giles v. Thompson, 8 the House of Lords extended the application of the Trendtex principle to tortious causes of action. The House of Lords determined that the question was whether there had been “wanton and officious intermeddling with the disputes of others in which the meddler has no interest whatever and where the assistance he renders to one or the other party is without justification or excuse.” 9
Australian cases post- Trendtex
There is a division in the cases that have been decided in Australia since the House of Lords decision in Trendtex as to whether the Trendtex approach is to be preferred over the stricter approach set out in the dicta of the four judges of the High Court in Poulton . Decisions that support the adoption of the Trendtex principle in Australia are largely decisions in the State Supreme Courts. 10 In contrast, a number of single judges of the Federal Court have declined to apply the Trendtex approach and, instead, have expressed the view that the dicta in Poulton ought to be followed until the High Court determines otherwise, 11 although two recent Federal Court decisions suggest that Court may also be moving towards adoption of the Trendtex approach. 12
The Federal Court decisions have generally reflected the view that it is not open to courts of first instance to depart from the considered statements of the High Court in Poulton and that, in consequence, bare rights of action in tort should be regarded as incapable of assignment, whether or not the tort is of a personal kind. This view is reflected in the observations of the authors of Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (4 th Ed, 2002) at [6-480] that “. . . it is not easy for courts below the High Court legitimately to depart from the considered dicta of three [sic] High Court justices”. In fact, the dicta in Poulton are those of four High Court justices when one includes Fullagar J, who delivered the first instance decision.
The High Court considered in some detail the history of maintenance and champerty. At para [73], Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ said:
“Assignment of a chose in action ‘made with the improper purpose of stirring up litigation’ would raise questions of maintenance and champerty. But the mere assignment of the proceeds of litigation would not. If the assignment stipulated that the assignee should participate in the litigation, the assignment was lawful only ‘if he have some legal interest (independent of that acquired by the assignment itself) in the property in dispute; but that where his interest is generated only by the assignment itself, such a stipulation would be improper’”. 14
Commencing at para [79] of the joint judgment, the Court referred in detail to the decision in Trendtex , without apparent approval or disapproval of the approach of the House of Lords. Gleeson CJ concurred in the reasons of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ on this public policy point. Their Honours concluded that the fact that Firmstones had sought out retailers with claims and had control of the litigation and that they hoped to profit from the litigation was not sufficient to warrant condemnation of the arrangements as being contrary to public policy or as leading to any abuse of process. 15 Callinan and Heydon JJ dissented on this point and found that the arrangements did constitute an abuse of process.
The Full Court of the Federal Court in Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v. J P Morgan Portfolio Services Ltd, 16 found the issue, like that in Fostif , was whether a litigation funding agreement constituted an abuse of process. Once again, there was no assignment of any cause of action to the litigation funder. Tamberlin and Jacobson JJ (Rares J dissenting), held that it was not an abuse of process and that the litigation funder did have a genuine commercial interest in the enforcement of the claim. Both Fostif and Trendtex were cited in support. Rares J noted that it was common ground between the parties that the causes of action in question “ were not capable of assignment to [the litigation funder]”. 17
Of the exceptions to the more restrictive approach of the Federal Court to this question are two recent cases. The first was that of Finkelstein J in TS&B Retail Systems Pty Ltd v 3 Fold Resources Pty Ltd & Ors. 18 In obiter , his Honour said:
“In Australia there is a debate whether the Trendtex principle should be adopted. The cases for and against (the latter all being decisions of the Federal Court) are collected in Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v. Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd . . . It may be that the debate is now over for the High Court in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v. Fostif Pty Ltd . . . seems to have approved Trendtex . . . In any event, my own view is that the logic of Lord Roskill’s view [in Trendtex] is inescapable. That is especially so when, as here, the cause of action is connected with, or relates to, rights or interests owned, or that will fall into the ownership, of the assignee”.
The second recent case in the Federal Court is Tosich v Tasman Investment Management Ltd 19 where Gyles J, having noted the divergence in the cases as to the application of Trendtex , expressed his view that the approach of the High Court in Fostif supported the reasoning of Finkelstein J in TS&B Retail.
However, Heerey J as recently as October 2007 expressed a contrary view that the decision of the High Court in Poulton retains its authority, and that Trendtex is not good law in Australia. 20 Although the decision of Heerey J was appealed, the appeal was determined without reference to this point. 21
Assignment of contractual causes of action
The issue that then arises is as to whether a right to sue for unliquidated damages for breach of contract is capable of assignment. Meagher, Gummow and Lehane give a somewhat abbreviated answer in the negative, 25 and refer to cases such as Torkington v. Magee 26 and County Hotel Co v. London and Northwestern Railways. 27 Likewise, Cheshire & Fifoot’s Law of Contract suggests that a bare right to litigate for a past breach of contract is generally not assignable, 28 although there is a suggestion that there may be exceptions to this proposition as set out in Trendtex .
If the Trendtex principle is applied, then bare rights to litigate for unliquidated damages for breach of contract may be assignable provided either:
(a) they are annexed to a right of property; or
(b) the assignee has a genuine and substantial, or genuine commercial, interest in the enforcement of the cause of action.
Poulton dealt with the assignability of tortious causes of action. There is no High Court authority directly on the issue as to whether contractual causes of action may be assigned. The position so far as contractual causes of action were concerned was summarised by McDougall J in Rickard Constructions v. Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd, 29 in the following terms:
“In relation to contractual causes of action, I find the distinction between liquidated and unliquidated claims difficult to follow. I have already noted that a debt is assignable even if it is overdue. As is pointed out in Meagher, Gummow and Lehane at 281 [6-480], where the debt is overdue, ‘there has been a breach of the contract to pay and . . . in fact, all that is assigned is the right to sue to recover the debt. The case of an overdue debt merely points up the problem inherent in the distinctions drawn in this breach [sic] of the law: for what is a debt but a right to sue to recover a sum certain? In what other sense is a debt to be regarded as property?’ I do not think that a rule based on public policy which encourages illogical distinctions of this sort should be applied unless there is no alternative. I do not regard the obiter statements in Poulton, limited as they are to an assignment of bare causes of action in tort, as providing a compelling reason to accept such illogical distinctions and their consequences”.
Accordingly, his Honour found that, in principle, an assignment of a cause of action in contract to recover unliquidated damages should be accepted where the assignee has a sufficient interest to support the assignment.
Assignment of causes of action in tort
A right to sue in tort is never itself property: it is a bare right of action. 30 The position of the assignability of causes of action in tort (at least non-personal causes of action) remains somewhat in a state of flux. Notwithstanding the High Court’s liberalisation of the law concerning maintenance and champerty in Fostif , the High Court has not expressly overruled the earlier strong dicta of four judges of the Court in Poulton . However, there is a sense that the march of the law is generally heading away from the strict approach exemplified by Poulton and towards a more general acceptance of the approach adopted by the House of Lords in Trendtex .
Nevertheless, the position of the majority of the Federal Court cases is exemplified generally by the approach Rares J in Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v. G E Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd 31 where it was said:
“New Boston argued that I should not follow the decision of the High Court in Poulton . . . which denied that a right of action in tort was assignable at all. It was suggested that this was the old view of the law. New Boston argued that I should follow what was said by Debelle J in South Australian Management Corp v. Sheahan . . . namely that the decision could be explained as relating to an assignment of a claim in tort where the assignee had no genuine commercial interest. However, in Garcia v. National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 . . . at [17] Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ made it clear that the doctrine of precedent in Australia binds me to follow the decisions of the High Court unless and until that court decides that the time is right for a change in the law. I propose to do that. There is no basis to read down the considered judgment of Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ in Poulton . . . that a right of action in tort is incapable of assignment at law or in equity. I am of opinion that Debelle J was wrong not to have applied this binding authority”.
This approach seems to have been generally reflected in the Federal Court decisions (with the exception of the decisions of Finkelstein J in T S & B Retail Systems Pty Ltd 32 and Gyles J in Tosich v Tasman Investment Management Ltd 33 ). However, the almost universal approach of the State Supreme Courts has been to apply the Trendtex doctrine and to conclude that a cause of action in tort may be assigned (at least not a personal cause of action) provided that the assignee has the necessary interest in the litigation. 34
There remains some question as to whether causes of action for personal torts (such as damages for personal injury, defamation or false imprisonment) may ever be capable of being assigned. 35
Assignment of causes of action in equity
A bare right to sue in equity has traditionally been considered not able to be assigned. 36 However, one must question the appropriateness of maintaining a distinction between equitable causes of action and contractual or tortious claims. Indeed, it may be that the courts are moving towards a position that even equitable causes of action may be assigned provided that the assignee has the necessary interest in the outcome of the litigation.
Nevertheless, this matter has not been the subject of much judicial consideration in recent times.
Assignability of statutory causes of action
Whether a statutory cause of action is assignable will turn on the terms of the statute. To take but one example, there has been frequent litigation concerning the assignability of causes of action under sections 82 or 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. It is well established that causes of action for recovery of damages under either of those sections are not capable of assignment. 37 A cause of action under the corresponding provisions of the Fair Trading Act of the States is also not able to be assigned. 38
The necessary interest to support an assignment
It is clear that, even if Trendtex is good law in Australia, any assignee must have more than a mere personal interest in profiting from the proceedings. Cohen J in Monk v. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 39 said:
“In my opinion [the interest claimed by the plaintiff] is not a genuine commercial interest in the way that the phrase has been used in the judgments. Examples may be given from the facts in the various cases concerned. For instance it was held that there was such an interest where the assignee was already a substantial creditor of the assignor with a right to enforce the debt (Trendtex, re Timothy’s) or where the assignee was the sole shareholder who was a guarantor of the overdraft of the assignor (re Daley) or where the assignee was a debenture holder with an interest in protecting the value of its security (First City Corporation)”.
Lindgren J in National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v. Citibank Savings Limited 40 said:
“. . . The genuine commercial interest referred to in Trendtex is not a nebulous notion of the general commercial advantage of the assignee but something more specific and limited. In particular, it does not embrace an interest arising from an arrangement voluntarily entered into by the assignee of which the impugned assignment is an essential part, like the arrangement in the present case. Rather, the expression refers to a commercial interest which exists already or by reason of other matters, and which receives ancillary support from the assignment”.
These reasons were approved by Heerey J in Salfinger v. Nuigini Mining (Australia)Pty Ltd. 41
Mere personal interest of the assignee will therefore be insufficient. General commercial advantage will also be an insufficient ground to found an assignment. The assignee must have some commercial interest which the assignment may in some way protect.
The issue of the assignability of causes of action is an area of the law that has been in a state of some flux for many years. Notwithstanding this, it is somewhat surprising that there is little direct High Court or intermediate Appellate Court authority on the issues that have been explored in this paper.
There has been a clear divergence between the general approach of the Federal Court (preferring to adopt the approach in Poulton and eschewing the Trendtex approach) and that of the State Supreme Courts which have instead embraced the Trendtex position. There is a suggestion in some of the most recent Federal Court cases that that jurisdiction may be moving towards embracing Trendtex as good law, although this is certainly not a uniform phenomenon.
The effect of the divergence is that particular care should be taken when determining which court to proceed in if reliance is to be placed upon an assignment of causes of action, whether in contract, tort, or equitable causes of action. The Federal Court has shown a much more marked reluctance to uphold assignments of causes of action generally.
The inconsistencies between the various single court decisions will ultimately have to be resolved by a decision of the High Court. Given the decision in Fostif , where a rather more liberal view of the law of maintenance and champerty was expressed in the majority decision, one might expect that the Trendtex approach will ultimately prevail. However, until the High Court has given that pronouncement, practitioners should be alive to the differing approaches by the courts in this complex area of the law.
Matthew Brady
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
An assignment of a legal claim occurs when one party (the “assignor” ) transfers its rights in a cause of action to another party (the “assignee” ). 1 Footnote Black’s Law Dictionary 136 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “assignment” as “the transfer of rights or property” ). The Supreme Court has held that a private litigant may have standing to sue to redress an injury to another party when the injured party has assigned at least a portion of its claim for damages from that injury to the litigant. The Supreme Court in the 2000 case Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens held that private individuals may have Article III standing to bring a qui tam civil action in federal court under the federal False Claims Act (FCA) on behalf of the federal government if authorized to do so. 2 Footnote 529 U.S. 765, 768, 778 (2000) . The FCA imposes civil liability upon “any person” who, among other things, knowingly presents to the federal government a false or fraudulent claim for payment. 3 Footnote 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) . To encourage citizens to enforce the Act, in certain circumstances, a private individual, known as a “relator,” may bring a civil action for violations of the Act. Such plaintiffs sue under the name of the United States and may receive a share of any recovered proceeds from the action. 4 Footnote Id. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) . Under the FCA, the relator is not merely the agent of the United States but an individual with an interest in the lawsuit itself. 5 Footnote Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. , 529 U.S. at 772 ( “For the portion of the recovery retained by the relator . . . some explanation of standing other than agency for the Government must be identified.” ) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730 ).
Ordinarily, if the relator’s financial interest in the outcome of the case were merely a byproduct of the suit itself, there would be no injury sufficient for standing. 6 Footnote Id. at 772–73 ( “An interest unrelated to injury in fact is insufficient to give a plaintiff standing. . . . A qui tam relator has suffered no [invasion of a legally protected right]—indeed, the ‘right’ he seeks to vindicate does not even fully materialize until the litigation is completed and the relator prevails.” ) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that a litigant’s interest in recovering attorneys’ fees or the costs of bringing suit by itself normally does not confer standing to sue. E.g. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) ( “The litigation must give the plaintiff some other benefit besides reimbursement of costs that are a byproduct of the litigation itself.” ); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70–71 (1986) ( “[T]he mere fact that continued adjudication would provide a remedy for an injury that is only a byproduct of the suit itself does not mean that the injury is cognizable under Art. III.” ). In Stevens , however, the Supreme Court recognized a distinction that confers standing upon qui tam plaintiffs in FCA cases. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, determined that assignments of claims are distinguishable from cases in which a litigant has a mere financial interest in the outcome of the suit because the assignee-plaintiff actually owns a stake in the dispute as a legal matter. 7 Footnote Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. , 529 U.S. at 773 . Justice Scalia drew support for this distinction from the long-standing historical practice of the government assigning a portion of its damages claim to a private party and allowing that party to assert the injury suffered by the federal government as a representative of the United States. 8 Footnote Id. at 774, 778 The Court noted the “long tradition of qui tam actions in England and the American colonies,” 9 Footnote Id. concluding that “Article III’s restriction of the judicial power to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ is properly understood to mean ‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’” 10 Footnote Id. Although the Court held that the relator had standing to sue under the qui tam provision, it ultimately determined that the plaintiff could not maintain the action against a state agency for allegedly submitting false grant claims to the EPA because states were not “persons” subject to liability under the False Claims Act. Id. at 787 .
Eight years after deciding Stevens , the Supreme Court again found that an assignee of a claim had standing, even when the assignee had promised to remit all of the money it recovered in the proceedings to the assignor. 11 Footnote Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc. , 554 U.S. 269 , 271 (2008) . In Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. , payphone operators had assigned their legal claims for money owed to them by long-distance communications carriers to third-party collection agencies. 12 Footnote Id. at 271–72 . The agencies were authorized to bring suit on behalf of the payphone operators and promised to pay all of the proceeds of the litigation to the payphone operators for a fee. 13 Footnote Id. at 272 . The Court held that these collection agencies had standing to pursue the operators’ claims because of the long history of courts’ acceptance of such claims. 14 Footnote Id. at 273–75 . The Court noted that “federal courts routinely entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that are not themselves directly bringing suit. Trustees bring suits to benefit their trusts; guardians ad litem bring suits to benefit their wards; receivers bring suit to benefit their receiverships; assignees in bankruptcy bring suit to benefit bankrupt estates; executors bring suit to benefit testator estates; and so forth.” Id. at 287–88 . Assignment was sufficient to transfer the injury to the collections agencies, and the injury to the operators that had been transferred to the collection agencies would be redressed by a favorable judicial decision, even if the agencies would subsequently pay all of the proceeds to the operators. 15 Footnote Id. at 286–87 ( “[I]f the [collection agencies] prevail in this litigation, the long-distance carriers would write a check to [them] for the amount of dial-around compensation owed. What does it matter what the [agencies] do with the money afterward?” ).
The Stevens and Sprint cases could have broader implications for Article III standing doctrine, as they suggest a way in which the constitutional limitations on standing may be bypassed through the assignment of rights to a third party. 16 Footnote See also ArtIII.S2.C1.6.4.3 Particularized Injury. For instance, if Congress enacts a federal statute recognizing an injury to the federal government that otherwise satisfies Article III’s requirements, it may assign a portion of its claim to a private party, thereby potentially giving that plaintiff standing to sue as a representative of the United States. 17 Footnote See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. , 529 U.S. at 773 . This is essentially the operation of the False Claims Act. 18 Footnote 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 . However, it is unclear whether every such statute would necessarily resolve all Article III standing concerns. In Stevens and Sprint , the Court gave significant weight to the lengthy history of courts recognizing the types of assignments at issue when determining that the litigants in those cases had standing to sue. 19 Footnote See id. at 774, 778 ; Sprint Commc’ns Co. , 554 U.S. at 273–75 . Moreover, there may be a number of concerns about the constitutionality and practicality of using assignments to delegate core government functions (e.g., criminal prosecutions) to private parties when courts have not historically recognized claims based on such assignments, including concerns about interference with the Executive Branch’s Article II powers and prosecutorial discretion. 20 Footnote See Heather Elliott , Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems , 91 B.U. L. Rev. 159 , 195–204 (2011) (questioning whether Congress’s assignment of claims to citizen suitors in order to confer standing would be constitutional or practical).
Practical law uk practice note 1-522-7861 (approx. 32 pages), get full access to this document with a free trial.
Try free and see for yourself how Practical Law resources can improve productivity, efficiency and response times.
This document is from Thomson Reuters Practical Law, the legal know-how that goes beyond primary law and traditional legal research to give lawyers a better starting point. We provide standard documents, checklists, legal updates, how-to guides, and more.
650+ full-time experienced lawyer editors globally create and maintain timely, reliable and accurate resources across all major practice areas.
83% of customers are highly satisfied with Practical Law and would recommend to a colleague.
81% of customers agree that Practical Law saves them time.
McCool Controls and Engineering Limited ( Company ) was the original plaintiff in proceedings against Honeywell Control Systems Ltd ( Honeywell ) for alleged breaches of an agreement between the parties. The proceedings were commenced in 2005. Mr McCool was the managing director and majority shareholder of the Company, and he brought an application to substitute him for the Company as the plaintiff in the proceedings, where the Company could no longer afford legal representation. The application was based on an assignment entered into between the Company and Mr McCool, whereby the Company assigned the cause of action to him for the nominal consideration of €1 ( First Assignment ). The First Assignment contained a clause allowing Mr McCool to reassign any or all the rights transferred ( onward transmission clause ).
Honeywell successfully applied to have the substitution order discharged. The High Court (Noonan J) found that the assignment was invalid and an abuse of process as it amounted to an impermissible attempt to circumvent the rule in Battle (as discussed in our article here ). The assignment was also found to savour of champerty (meaning it is conducive to carrying out champerty) because it expressly provided for the onward transfer of the cause of action to a disinterested third party. Mr McCool appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal ( COA ).
Despite the pending appeal, Mr McCool brought a second application to the High Court to be substituted as plaintiff. This application was grounded on a second assignment executed by the Company in favour of Mr McCool ( Second Assignment ). The Second Assignment was similar to the First Assignment, save that it omitted the onward transmission clause. Simons J refused this application on the basis that the matter was already decided by the High Court in 2018. Mr McCool also appealed this refusal to the COA.
The COA in 2022, dismissed both appeals upholding the findings of the High Court. The COA found that the First Assignment savoured of champerty because Mr McCool did not have a pre-existing legitimate interest in the transaction giving rise to the claim. Only the Company, which had entered the agreement with Honeywell, held that interest.
Mr McCool sought and obtained leave from the Supreme Court to appeal on the narrow grounds of whether an assignee of its interest in litigation by a corporate body can pursue the action by being substituted as a plaintiff in place of the company, irrespective of the purpose of the assignment.
An assignment of a chose of action, such as a cause of action in litigation, is not enforceable under Irish law if it “savours of” maintenance or champerty. “Savours of”, as explained by Murray J, means that the assignment offends the same public policy as maintenance and champerty. Champerty means an agreement to fund or support litigation in which the party providing that support has no legitimate interest, in return for some share in the proceeds of that litigation. Maintenance occurs when a person supports litigation in which they have no legitimate interest. Both are torts and offences under Irish law.
Assignments of bare causes of action have traditionally been regarded as commercialising litigation and therefore offensive. Such assignments formed the subject of the seminal Supreme Court decision of SPV Osus v HSBC International Trust Services (Irl) Ltd [2018] IESC 44, (discussed in our article here ) which is authority for the position under Irish law that the assignment of a bare cause of action is unenforceable unless the assignee had a genuine commercial interest in the assignment.
Although leave to appeal in this case was restricted to a very narrow point around the rule in Battle, Mr Justice Hogan and Mr Justice Murray nonetheless considered the public policy behind the tort of champerty as applied to the assignment of a cause of action. Hogan J found it impossible to avoid considering the question of whether the First Assignment was champertous.
Murray J after reviewing existing authorities on the assignment of a cause of action/ right to litigate, summarised the relevant rules concerning assignments of bare causes of action as follows:
Hogan J referring to the comments of O’Donnell J in SPV Osus , and disagreeing with the findings of the COA, concluded that the First Assignment was not champertous because Mr McCool had a clear personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings. As the principal shareholder in the Company, he had a legitimate interest in receiving the assignment of the cause of action. There was no question of him “investing in litigation”.
Whilst the validity of the assignment and the public policy issues regarding maintenance and champerty did not form part of the appeal to the Supreme Court, the comments of Murray and Hogan JJ are a welcome clarification of the principles that a court may apply in testing the validity of an assignment of a cause of action.
Notably, Hogan J applied a broader interpretation of the findings in SPV Osus than the COA had, in circumstances where Mr McCool and the Company had a shared mutual interest in the proceedings. This might suggest a growing tolerance by the courts of assignments of a right to litigate/ bare cause of action. It certainly shows that the law is continuing to develop in this area.
Regarding insolvent companies, and applying Murray J’s findings, such companies may face difficulties in establishing a pre-existing interest of sufficient substance to successfully stand over an assignment of a cause of action to their shareholders or creditors. However, in practice, large, interested creditors of insolvent companies often fund a liquidator to bring proceedings against third parties. The extent of their debt will most likely be of sufficient substance to take the assignment outside the rules against maintenance and champerty.
We will continue to monitor developments in this area. Should you wish to discuss this article or maintenance and champerty in general, please contact Ruairi Rynn , Paul Convery or Barbara Galvin .
To read more about maintenance and champerty please see our previous William Fry articles here .
Contributed by Gail Nohilly
You can add this document to your study collection(s)
You can add this document to your saved list
(For complaints, use another form )
Input it if you want to receive answer
This chapter considers those scenarios in which the cause of action being assigned has been held to be capable of assignment as being incidental to, or aligned with, a property interest, and, hence, is distinguishable from a bare right to litigate. Given that these are categories of cases to which the courts have traditionally been more accommodating, a claimant will typically seek to prove that the assignment under challenge falls within one of these categories, or is sufficiently analogous to one of them to warrant validity. There are six such categories: claims which are incidental to the purchase of property, claims for statutory compensation associated with property damage, assignments of the ‘fruits of the litigation’, assignment of debts (even disputed debts), assignments of claims associated with intellectual property, and assignment of liquidated sums (even where in dispute).
Sign in with a library card.
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Month: | Total Views: |
---|---|
August 2023 | 2 |
September 2023 | 7 |
October 2023 | 6 |
November 2023 | 4 |
January 2024 | 4 |
February 2024 | 6 |
March 2024 | 6 |
April 2024 | 6 |
May 2024 | 9 |
June 2024 | 3 |
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide
Sign In or Create an Account
This PDF is available to Subscribers Only
For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.
add to folder:
Find out more about Lexology or get in touch by visiting our About page.
Global Corporate Limited v Dirk Stefan Hale [2017] EWHC 2277 (Ch)
A recent judgment re-iterates the importance of carefully drafting a deed of assignment when assigning claims.
In Global Corporate , the liquidators of a company assigned certain claims by way of a deed of assignment to Global Corporate Limited (the “ Assignee ”). The Assignee (the Applicant in this case) then brought several claims against the company’s former director and shareholder.
Two of the Assignee’s claims were dismissed because, as the High Court held, only the claims expressly set out in in the transfer documentation were transferred to the Assignee. As the other claims had not been provided for in the deed of assignment, they failed for lack of standing.
Powerstation UK Ltd (the “Company”) entered liquidation in November 2015 and liquidators were appointed.
The liquidators identified various claims against a former director of the Company. The claims related to payments to the former director which, in the liquidators’ view, constituted an unlawful dividend or, in the alternative, a transaction at an undervalue.
The Assignee agreed to purchase the claims from the liquidators. The assignment of claims was recorded in a deed of assignment dated 25 August 2016 between the liquidators and the Assignee (the “ Deed ”). Under the terms of the Deed, the liquidators assigned the ‘claim’. ‘Claim’ was defined as (emphasis added) “a potential debt to the company comprising alleged illegal dividends and/or transactions at an undervalue ”.
The Assignee subsequently brought claims against the former director on the basis that the payments to him constituted either:
On the unlawful dividends claim, the judge, His Honour Judge Matthews, concluded that the Company’s articles did not allow the former director to declare provisional dividends capable of being subsequently re-categorised (which the judge found was the nature of the payments made to the former director). Therefore, whatever the payments were, they were not dividends and so could not be unlawful. This removed the Assignee’s prospects of seeking recovery of unlawful dividends pursuant to section 847 of the Companies Act 2006.
The transaction at an undervalue claim failed on the basis that sufficient consideration had been given.
On the remaining claims (misfeasance and preference), HHJ Matthews said that the Assignee did not have standing as the Deed did not mention these claims.
At para 45 HHJ Matthews said, in respect of the misfeasance claim:
‘There is some difficulty here with the applicant’s title to sue, since the deed of assignment did not on its face extend to any claim in respect of director’s misfeasance.'
At para 66 HHJ Matthews noted that, as regards the preference claim:
‘The applicant is not an assignee of any claim of the company or the liquidators in respect of a preference...The first reference to a claim to set aside a preference that I have been able to find in the documents comes out in the application notice of 12 September 2016... But this cannot operate so as to confer on the applicant a title to sue that he otherwise would not have.’
HHJ Matthews emphasised that a preference claim could not be implied into the Deed due to the material differences between a transaction at an undervalue and a preference. If the Assignee wanted to acquire a right to bring a preference claim, the Deed should have expressly mentioned it.
At para 67 HHJ Matthews commented that:
‘A preference is not the same as a transaction at an undervalue, and neither is there necessarily an example of the former every time there is the latter. If the applicant wished to take an assignment of the claim to set aside a preference, it should have drafted the deed of 25 August 2016 so as to achieve this end.’
Finally, the court held that while the liquidators of the Company did retain the right to bring a claim to set aside a preference, they were not parties to the application and an effective order could therefore not be made.
Consequences
This case highlights the importance of thoroughly reviewing the deed of assignment where claims are being acquired.
Only those rights of action expressly mentioned in a deed of assignment will be transferred to the assignee. The court will not allow an assignee to bring an action which has not been included in the wording of the assignment. Further, the court will not imply alternative causes of action into deeds of assignment where those actions have material differences from those actually transferred.
Standard of repair put to the test - estates gazette q&a *, is a big mac meat or chicken thoughts on the recent general court decision *, employment law & worker rights - the conservative party’s manifesto *, employment law & worker rights - the liberal democrats manifesto *, million dollar footballer with no assets *.
If you would like to learn how Lexology can drive your content marketing strategy forward, please email [email protected] .
Definition of cause of action.
Specific causes of action, cause of action elements.
The facts a plaintiff must prove to win each specific cause of action are referred to as “elements.” Cause of action elements may vary greatly, or may overlap substantially, depending on the circumstances of the case. For example, elements for certain causes of action may include:
Consulting an attorney, related legal terms and issues.
Legal development
08 May 2023
Subject to limited and defined exceptions, the law does not usually permit a party to assign a 'bare right of action' to another party. For example, where Party B breaches the terms of its contract with Party A, Party A cannot usually assign to a third party (Party C) its right to sue Party B for unliquidated compensatory damages for that breach. This prohibition is presently justified by the public policy interest of avoiding otherwise unrelated and uninterested third parties meddling in litigation and propagating disputes.
One of the well-recognised exceptions to this prohibition arises where the purported assignee of the right of action (i.e. Party C) can establish that it has a genuine and substantial interest, or a genuine commercial interest, in enforcing the claim to be assigned (with that interest being distinct and separate from the interest merely derived from the assignment itself). In that situation, Party C is not an unrelated or uninterested third party and the policy reasons justifying the prohibition against assignment do not arise.
Against that background, WA's Court of Appeal in Billabong Gold Pty Ltd v Vango Mining Ltd [No 2] [2023] WASCA 58 ( Billabong Gold ) concluded that the relevant commercial interest did not need to arise or exist prior to the assignment. This decision suggests broader availability of the ability to assign rights of action, and should be borne in mind by parties taking assignments of contracts where there may be existing or potential claims or causes of action connected with those contracts that have not yet been made or litigated.
In the primary proceedings, Billabong Gold Pty Ltd ( Billabong ) sued Vango Mining Ltd ( Vango ) and Dampier (Plutonic) Pty Ltd ( Dampier ) in relation to alleged breaches of an Ore Treatment Agreement dated 23 September 2014 ( OTA ).
Importantly, Billabong was not a party to the OTA when it was formed. Rather, the OTA was originally between Northern Star Resources Ltd ( Northern Star ), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Vango and Dampier who were joint venture partners under the Plutonic Dome JV. The Plutonic Dome JV held a number of tenements, including tenements from which gold was produced at a deposit. The OTA relevantly granted Northern Star a 'right of first refusal' in relation to any transfer of the tenements subject to the Plutonic Dome JV.
On 11 May 2016, Vango and Dampier executed an agreement under which Vango agreed to acquire all of Dampier's interest in the tenements held by the Plutonic Dome JV ( May 2016 Vango/Dampier Sale Agreement ).
On 12 August 2016, Northern Star entered into an asset sale and purchase agreement with Billabong ( Billabong Sale and Purchase Agreement ) under which Northern Star agreed to sell its gold mining operations, including its tenements, to Billabong. As part of this process, Northern Star and Billabong also entered into a General Deed of Assignment and Assumption dated 11 October 2016 ( Billabong Assignment Deed ) which included an assignment by Northern Star to Billabong of its rights under the OTA.
Subsequently, on 24 August 2016, Vango acquired all of the shares in Dampier, and Dampier became a wholly owned subsidiary of Vango.
Relevantly, two important questions arose in the primary proceedings:
With respect to those two questions, the trial judge found that:
On appeal, among other things, Billabong challenged the primary judge's conclusion that Northern Star's right of action in respect of Vango/Dampier's breach of the first refusal clause under the OTA could not be assigned to Billabong by the Billabong Assignment Deed.
The Court commenced its analysis by noting that the rule prohibiting the assignment of bare rights of action is justified by the public policy notions related to the doctrines of maintenance and champerty. Maintenance refers to an unconnected third-party assisting to maintain litigation, commonly by providing financial assistance. Champerty is a form of maintenance whereby the third-party provides financial assistance in return for a share of the proceeds.
(It is worth noting that legal causes of action are assignable at law under s 20 of the Property Law Act 1969 (WA) and its equivalents in the other States. However, a bare right of action is not considered to be a legal chose in action, even though it is sometimes confusingly referred to as one.)
A number of well-recognised exceptions to this general rule were then identified.
The appeal was focussed on the second exception. The Court noted that in every case, the totality of the transaction must be considered and the concept of a genuine commercial interest is to be applied in a broad and practical way.
The Court looked at a number of earlier cases which appeared to suggest that the relevant commercial interest must exist prior to the assignment.
The Court found there was no such requirement and set out five reasons why the commercial interest need not pre-date the assignment.
For those reasons, the court held that the relevant commercial interest need not be pre-existing to the assignment of the cause of the action.
Notwithstanding the analysis outlined above, the Court also concluded that, in any event, Billabong did hold a pre-existing commercial interest sufficient to support the assignment of the causes of action for breach of the OTA.
In summary, this was because the Billabong Sale and Purchase Agreement (which was dated 12 August 2016 and pre-dated the Billabong Assignment Deed, which was dated 11 October 2016) gave Billabong a genuine and substantial interest or a genuine commercial interest in enforcing the relevant breaches of the OTA, beyond the assignment of the OTA itself.
This decision is relevant to parties taking assignments of contracts (or who are counter-parties to a contract under which rights are being assigned) where there may be existing or potential claims or causes of action connected with those contracts that have not yet been made or litigated.
Parties looking to take an assignment of rights under a contract should actively consider whether the proposed assignment will include rights to sue or enforce pre-existing or potential claims under or in connection with the contract.
Unless the rights fall into one of a number of well‑recognised categories of cases which are exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the assignment of a bare right of action, the rights will not 'follow the assignment'.
In cases where the proposed assignee is looking to rely on the exception involving a separate and distinct commercial interest in suing or enforcing the claim, this decision helpfully confirms that a pre-existing commercial interest is not strictly required.
On the other hand, counterparties to contracts which have been assigned who are facing claims by the assignee should carefully consider whether the assignee can still enforce or sue on such claims, especially in respect of claims which arose before the assignment occurred.
As the Court of Appeal noted, the rule prohibiting the assignment of bare rights of action has historically been justified by the public policy notions related to the doctrines of maintenance and champerty.
For those State jurisdictions where the tort of maintenance and champerty have been abolished (including, recently, Western Australia by virtue of s 36 of the Civil Procedure (Representative Proceedings) Act 2022 (WA) although the abolishment only applies to causes of action accruing after the provision came into operation), the underlying justification has now fallen away.
It remains to be seen whether courts will revisit the continued application of the rule prohibiting the assignment of bare rights of action. If the rule is also abolished, it will remove the need for contracting parties to grapple with the complexities of the exceptions to the rule.
Authors: Adrian Chai, Partner; Charles Dallimore, Senior Associate and Max Evangelisti, Graduate.
The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to. Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.
Sign-up to select your areas of interest
Published by a lexisnexis dispute resolution expert.
This Practice Note sets out the requirements and considerations for permitted assignment of claims or causes of action in English civil litigation.
For guidance on how to assign a claim or cause of action, with particular consideration as to what should be included in the assignment documentation, see Practice Note: How do I assign a claim or cause of action?
Note: in this Practice Note, we refer to the assignment of both causes of action and claims. We define a cause of action as '...a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person' ( Letang v Cooper ) and a claim as the formal assertion of a cause of action by a claimant against a defendant. In the authorities , the phrases 'assigning a cause of action' and 'assigning a claim' are sometimes used interchangeably. For the purposes of this Practice Note, unless the context indicates otherwise, we refer to:
assigning 'causes of action' when considering whether the assignment
** Trials are provided to all LexisNexis content, excluding Practice Compliance, Practice Management and Risk and Compliance, subscription packages are tailored to your specific needs. To discuss trialling these LexisNexis services please email customer service via our online form. Free trials are only available to individuals based in the UK, Ireland and selected UK overseas territories and Caribbean countries. We may terminate this trial at any time or decide not to give a trial, for any reason. Trial includes one question to LexisAsk during the length of the trial.
* denotes a required field
To view the latest version of this document and thousands of others like it, sign-in with LexisNexis or register for a free trial.
Existing user? Sign-in CONTINUE READING GET A QUOTE
Requirements definition, what does requirements mean.
A DCO should include “Requirements” to which the development authorised by the DCO is to be subject. Similar to planning conditions, a requirement specifies the matters for which detailed approval needs to be obtained before the development can be lawfully begin.
Limitation—professional negligence claims.
Limitation—professional negligence claimsThis Practice Note looks at the limitation period for professional negligence (prof neg) claims and explains how to determine the date of accrual in respect of claims in both contract and in tort.For more background information on limitation, see:
Letter of claim—breach of contract[ON THE HEADED NOTEPAPER OF THE CLAIMANT’S SOLICITORS]FAO [RELEVANT NAME][NAME OF DEFENDANT OR DEFENDANT’S SOLICITOR IF KNOWN][ADDRESS LINE 1][ADDRESS LINE 2][POSTCODE][DATE]Dear [insert name][PROSPECTIVE CLAIMANT’S NAME] AND [PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT’S NAME]LETTER OF
Dispute Resolution analysis: the Civil Procedure Rule Committee (CPRC) is in the process of making significant amendments to a number of the pre-action protocols and will be introducing a new debt protocol. We understand that it is likely that the following protocols will come into force on 6 April
The pre-action protocols and when they applyThis Practice Note details the pre-action protocols, referring to the Practice Direction Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols, as well as providing an overview of the various specific pre-action protocols which might be relevant to your dispute.It provides
0330 161 1234
IMAGES
VIDEO
COMMENTS
Assignment of claims. Civil Code section 954 states "[a] thing in action, arising out of the violation of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner.". The term "thing in action" means "a right to recover money or other personal property by a judicial proceeding." (Civ. Code, § 953.)
This assignment shall be made and become effective at the time the Department tenders Final Payment to the Progressive Contractor, without further action of the Parties. Sample 1. Assignment of Causes of Action. Seller hereby sells, assigns, transfers and conveys to Purchaser all right, title and interest it has in and to all causes of action ...
3. Insolvency office-holders are able to assign bare causes of action without attracting any public policy which prohibits trafficking in litigation. They can even assign a cause of action back to the bankrupt on the basis that he might have legal aid and/or on terms that he account for a
This note explains how a claim or cause of action may be assigned, whether by legal assignment or equitable assignment. It sets out the situations in which an assignment may be effected, including assignment in the context of an administration, liquidation or bankruptcy. The note provides guidance on drafting an assignment as well as the practical considerations, such as the recovery of costs.
Precedent cause of action. These actions arise depending upon the common law or precedents in which claims are based on certain facts identified by courts. 5. Equity-related cause of action. Unjust enrichment is an equity-related cause of action that applies when there is no express contract between the parties. This doctrine is based on ...
A brief history. As a general proposition, a purported assignment of a cause of action that savours of maintenance will be void. A bare right of litigation, for example a right to recover damages in tort, has traditionally been considered not to be assignable either at law or in equity. 2 The cases have sometimes drawn a distinction between a so-called "personal right to litigate" as ...
An assignment of a legal claim occurs when one party (the "assignor" ) transfers its rights in a cause of action to another party (the "assignee" ). 1. The Supreme Court has held that a private litigant may have standing to sue to redress an injury to another party when the injured party has assigned at least a portion of its claim for ...
Dr. David Capper's paper on The Assignment of a Bare Right to Litigate is a response to the Irish treatment of champerty and maintenance.1 It is judicious in its treatment of recent Irish and other common law precedent, and the conclusion it draws is a cautious one. Capper appears to sympathize with the concerns raised by courts in the United ...
Resource ID 1-522-7861. This note explains how a claim or cause of action may be assigned, whether by legal assignment or equitable assignment. It sets out the situations in which an assignment may be effected, including assignment in the context of an administration, liquidation or bankruptcy. The note provides guidance on drafting an ...
An assignment of a chose of action, such as a cause of action in litigation, is not enforceable under Irish law if it "savours of" maintenance or champerty. "Savours of", as explained by Murray J, means that the assignment offends the same public policy as maintenance and champerty. Champerty means an agreement to fund or support ...
We define a cause of action as '...a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person' ( Letang v Cooper) and a claim as the formal assertion of a cause of action by a claimant against a defendant. In the authorities, the phrases 'assigning a cause of action' and ...
Assignment of a claim or cause of action. An assignment is the transfer of a right from one party to another. A cause of action by which a party may be able to enforce a right is a. chose in action and, in principle, is capable of assignment. This note considers how a cause of action may be assigned and highlights.
for failure to state a cause of action, claiming Appellant failed to satisfy a condition precedent required by § 559.715, Fla. Stat., Assignment of Consumer Debts, because it failed to notify Appellee of the assignment of debt at least 30 days prior to bringing suit to collect the debt.
On the other hand, where the assignment of the cause of action in question is considered to be 'remote from and not incidental to the property interest' acquired by the assignee, then the Williams v Protheroe precedent cannot legitimize the assignment. The latter scenario occurred in Offer-Hoar v Larkstore Ltd, 10 albeit that the assignment in that case was nevertheless held to be valid ...
The assignment of claims was recorded in a deed of assignment dated 25 August 2016 between the liquidators and the Assignee (the " Deed "). Under the terms of the Deed, the liquidators ...
Sample 1. Assignment of Cause of Action. If requested by Purchaser, Seller shall assign to Purchaser Seller's cause of action respecting breach by former employee of Seller Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxx of non-compete agreement between Seller and Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxx, such assignment to be in form and substance satisfactory to Purchaser (the "Elliot ...
tract may effect an assignment of part of the recovery and a part of a cause of action to the attorney."16 In short, the Court was unwilling to undo a century of Texas precedent that had enforced lawyers' contractual assignments of clients' causes of action.17 Moreover, in Texas Ethics Opinion 395,18 cited in Opinion
In the legal system, a "cause of action" is a set of facts or legal theory that gives an individual or entity the right to seek a legal remedy against another. This applies to the filing of a civil lawsuit for such wrongs as property damages, personal injury, or monetary loss, as well as to criminal wrongs such as battery, theft, or kidnapping.
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130 appears to be a concise statement of what should and should not be attached to a pleading. Rule 1.130(a) states: Instruments Attached. All bonds, notes, bills of exchange, contracts, accounts, or documents upon which action may be brought or defense made, or a copy thereof or a copy of the portions thereof material to the pleadings, shall be incorporated in or attached to ...
Parties looking to take an assignment of rights under a contract should carefully consider whether any pre-existing or potential claims connected with that contract (for example, for breaches that may have occurred) will be included in and are enforceable following the assignment. Assignees need to ensure the assignment falls into one of a ...
View on Westlaw or start a FREE TRIAL today, § 12:12. Assignment of cause of action, Legal Forms
The assignment of a cause of action is usually documented in a Deed of Assignment. Depending on the terms of the deed, the assignment might also be subject to additional conditions such as approval of creditors or the Court. This is particularly the case if the assignment is intended to last more than three months.
We define a cause of action as '...a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person' ( Letang v Cooper) and a claim as the formal assertion of a cause of action by a claimant against a defendant. In the authorities, the phrases 'assigning a cause of action' and 'assigning a ...
This assignment shall be deemed an absolute and unconditional assignment of the Claim for the purpose of collection and satisfaction, and shall not be deemed to create a security interest. ... WAIVE, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, ANY RIGHT THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO TRIAL BY JURY OF ANY CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION, OR IN ANY LEGAL ...