machiavellian essay thesis

Ten Theses on Machiavelli

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Machiavelli can be read as a plebeian thinker supportive of plebeian institutions that, as such, differentiate the few from the many and aim to regulate and burden the few. Yet, like numerous contemporary plebeian thinkers, Machiavelli is mostly silent about the moral transgressiveness required by the advocacy of plebeian institutions and ideas. The theses offered here argue that advocates of plebeianism will need, like the Machiavellian prince, to learn how not to be good. In explaining what this means in practice, the theses also defend the propriety of anachronistic readings, caution again plebeian violence, and explain other dynamics of plebeian leftism.

Machiavelli is an essential figure in the history of political thought, above all because of his teaching from Chapter 15 of The Prince that one must ‘learn how not to be good’. This teaching is on the one hand modern – it represents a clear break from classical and ancient political theory – and on the other hand tragic in its teaching that there is a divergence between political ethics and ethics as such. 1

To be sure, there were other contemporaries and predecessors of Machiavelli who also claimed that princes had to do certain things that were distinct to them. Machiavelli stands out, though, for suggesting that not only would a leader's responsibility be different from that of ordinary citizens, but that a leader's duties would also sometimes lead to violating conventional moral norms. 2 This violation, Machiavelli implies, will not be easy, as it is something that one has to learn to do, and there is a parallel suggestion that there is a technologically correct way of committing politically efficacious but morally ambiguous wrongdoing.

There are a few other figures from the history of political thought who themselves could be considered as teachers of learning how not to be good: for example, Thucydides in the ancient context and more recently Max Weber (2004) . But Machiavelli explores the idea of learning how not to be good with unmatched intensity, unmatched rigor, and unmatched impact on the history of political thinking.

My overall purpose is to ask what Machiavelli's philosophy might have to offer to contemporary efforts to better realise a liberal-democratic society which aims to treat its citizens as free and equal members of a political community and which, beyond mere juridical equality, also aims to realise equality of opportunity with regard to education and politics. Historians might object that this interest is misguided because it is anachronistic. Liberal democracy after all is a later commitment than the concerns typically found in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century political thought in Italy, and popular republicanism of Machiavelli's day meant something less ambitious than the contemporary liberal-democratic variant. Furthermore, it is debatable whether or not Machiavelli even was unambiguously a popular republican. Interpreters like Leo Strauss (1958) , for example, have suggested that Machiavelli's ultimate teaching was the inability of the people to rule. And others like Harvey Mansfield (1979) have suggested that Machiavelli stands for a kind of mix between principalities and republics that would bring these institutions into a third kind of form.

As factual matters, these criticisms could be correct. That Machiavelli did not have a concept of liberal democracy seems fairly straightforward. And that he may not have supported popular republics unambiguously also seems at least plausible. But I do not think we should worry about avoiding anachronism; Machiavelli is actually a great theorist of our not worrying about it.

• Thesis 1: Machiavelli Calls for Anachronistic Reading

Niccolò Machiavelli (1998: 61 ) himself calls for anachronistic readings of great texts from the past. Consider what he writes in Chapter 15 of The Prince : ‘My intent is to write something useful to whoever understands it’. This raises the question of who we are, we who are trying to understand Machiavelli. If we were monarchists, we could no doubt find something of value in The Prince. But if we are mostly democrats, then we also follow Machiavelli's intentions in trying to read his ideas from that vantage point as well.

Machiavelli's expressed intention here explodes the Cambridge School insistence on reading authors in their historical contexts. Machiavelli, in saying his intention is to write something useful to whoever understands it, seems to be writing to posterity. So to read Machiavelli in the light of his historical intention is actually to read Machiavelli unhistorically in so far as he asks us in a future moment to take him seriously and try to learn from him.

Machiavelli's preface to the first book of the Discourses on Livy, which promises that his work will pursue ‘a path as yet untrodden by anyone’ but will do so above all by manifesting what he calls ‘a true knowledge of histories’ (1996: 5–6), might be considered a manifesto for political theory that is neither history nor philosophy but both combined: a kind of political theory that is always connected to both history and philosophy and yet one that invites us to read and think anachronistically.

• Thesis 2: Machiavelli's Most Obvious Contribution Concerns Basic Plebeian Institutions

Machiavelli's most obvious contribution to republicanism and by extension to contemporary liberal democrats concerns, above all, what can be described as his support of basic plebeian institutions: institutions that differentiate the few from the many, not as oligarchies would to aggrandise the few, but rather to contest and to regulate the few. 3

There is great value in trying to introduce plebeian institutions into contemporary liberal democracy. In a situation of permanent unfairness, which I submit is the situation faced by any liberal democracy whose commitment to fair equality of opportunity in politics and education is severely weakened by the existence of private property and the family, plebeian institutions can protect against the potential usurpations of economic and political elites. Plebeian institutions, by burdening those who have prospered the most under conditions of unfairness, also have the potential to enable a society to publicly acknowledge its unfairness and take some small but meaningful steps to redress it.

Evidence of Machiavelli's support of plebeian-differentiated citizenship comes from numerous sources. In Machiavelli's 1519 ‘Discourses on Florentine Affairs’, for example, in which he makes recommendations for Florence, he proposes reserving certain offices – sixteen Provosts – to come exclusively from ordinary citizens and to give their holders a seat in the Signoria and Senatorial Council. His subtle proposal it makes clear that these Provosts would have the power to both delay the decisions of the elites in the Signorial class and also to appeal these decisions to more popular assemblies.

In the Discourses on Livy, thinking of the example of ancient Rome, Machiavelli voices support for the Tribunes of the Plebs who, chosen exclusively by ordinary citizens, could veto decisions of elite magistrates ( intercessio ), refer certain cases to popular assemblies for adjudication ( provocatio ad populum ), and bring criminal accusations against Roman elites. 4

These proposals clearly not only differentiate the few from the many, but also put special regulatory pressure on the few. And this focus on contesting elites can also be found in Machiavelli's further discussion in the Discourses, again with the ancient Roman example in mind, of supporting giving ordinary citizens the right to initiate accusations and investigations against citizens and to sit in judgement against those who are accused. These accusations and investigations could be made against anyone, but Machiavelli (1996: 23–26 ) clearly anticipates that they would typically be lodged against the political leaders and rich families that tend to hold disproportionate power and influence even in popular republics.

Machiavelli thus anticipates ordinary citizens being able to accuse and launch investigations against the elite and also to make judgements against them. Machiavelli's republican theory seems to support institutions of differentiated citizenship with the purpose of contesting, not further aggrandising, elite power.

These plebeian institutional proposals have informed the work of recent commentators on Machiavelli who draw on Machiavelli to support the reform of liberal-democratic regimes in a plebeian direction. John McCormick's influential book, Machiavellian Democracy (2011), for instance, draws on Machiavelli's teaching to propose a revived Tribunate in contemporary democratic societies which, comprised of the bottom 90 per cent of the economic distribution, would be empowered to veto governmental decisions, call for a national referendum, and initiate impeachment proceedings against high officials.

At the most basic and general level, Machiavellianism has had this as its clearest and most discussed implication for contemporary liberal democracy: the introduction of the few–many distinction into institutional life for the purpose of empowering the many and containing the wealthy and influential. Machiavelli's message to liberal democrats would seem to be to make use of the few–many distinction and to overcome any excessive attachment to the norm of undifferentiated citizenship – at least on the level of institutional design.

• Thesis 3: A Curious Absence in Machiavelli's Plebeian Proposals Leaves his Contribution to Popular Republicanism Underdeveloped

While Machiavelli directly provides many institutional suggestions, the moral philosophy for which he is most famous – the profoundly provocative idea that one must learn how not to be good – is almost altogether missing from his explicit analysis of republics. It has also been de-emphasised by various interpreters, and this absence, this non-application of learning how not to be good to ordinary citizens, prevents a fuller appreciation of what Machiavelli might have to say to contemporary liberal democrats.

Machiavelli's famous teaching of learning how not to be good is clearly directed to princes, whether in the literal sense of leaders of principalities or in the sense of leading politicians in republics (whom Machiavelli [1996: 131] calls ‘princes of republics’). Machiavelli's core teachings on how not to be good involve the capacity to generate fear, to deceive, to break promises, to put on a fake display of piety, to remain focussed on the military underpinnings of legal orders, and to administer ‘well-used cruelty’ – that is, to lie, usurp and kill. These all have as their explicit target the ethical horizon of elite political leaders as opposed to the ethical situation of ordinary citizens.

When Machiavelli does discuss the ethics required by the many, by the ordinary people within a healthy republic, he seems to appeal to the very traditional moral norms that princes need to learn how to transcend. Consider Machiavelli's use of the concept of non-corruption in his discussion of ordinary civic ethics or, relatedly, his invocation of the qualities of goodness ( bontà ) and decency ( onestà ) in discussing plebeian civic norms. 5

Further, at various points in the Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli clearly states the importance of citizens possessing genuine religious piety and moral goodness if they are to perform the self-sacrifice and law-abidingness required for a healthy political community. Machiavelli argues that in Rome ‘religion served to command armies, to animate the plebs, to keep men good [ buoni ], to bring shame to the wicked’ (1996: 34–35). Machiavelli praises the plebeian soldiers of the early Roman Republic who abided by the Senate's directive that they contribute one-tenth of their war booty on their honour – that is, without additional devices from above that verified their contributions. For Machiavelli, this example ‘shows how much goodness and how much religion were in the people, and how much good was to be hoped from it’ (1996: 110). Machiavelli repeats the same phrase (‘how much goodness and how much religion’) in his analysis of German tribes whose ‘goodness and religion’ (1996: 111) make it so that ordinary tribal members contribute whatever taxes are required of them without additional oversight or threat of force.

There are certain hints in Machiavelli suggesting something counter to his more general moral traditionalism regarding the people. But we are still left with the striking fact that Machiavelli, the great teacher of a political ethics discontinuous with ethics as such, confines this teaching, at least explicitly, to the few. This imbalance is repeated in other instances of the so-called ‘dirty hands’ tradition. One encounters in Thucydides, and Max Weber as well, the same problem that their tragic teaching of having to break moral norms for political necessity is intended for holders of high political power. 6

This imbalance is deserving of critique. For one thing, it seems unegalitarian. Machiavellianism, if it is to exist at all, ought not be confined to the few. Perhaps it should not exist at all; perhaps we should not learn how not to be good – but if anyone is going to learn how not to be good, then there ought to be implications for all civic classes. Consequently, this imbalance, this inability to fully explain what learning how not to be good might mean for ordinary citizens, leaves Machiavelli's ultimate contribution to popular republicanism underdeveloped.

If we correct this imbalance, we can better understand the ultimate meaning of plebeianism – that is, we can better understand how plebeianism might be implemented. And we can better understand the challenges that advocates of plebeianism are likely to face. We should thus turn to Machiavelli's idea of learning how not to be good to say what he does not himself seem to say: what this learning how not to be good might look like for ordinary citizens. We should think with and through Machiavelli to articulate something that he does not himself fully think.

This imbalance, this tendency to have learning how not to be good apply only to the purview of elite citizens, is repeated by contemporary democrats who have drawn on Machiavelli to elaborate their own accounts of plebeianism. McCormick, for example, continually applauds the people on traditional moral terms, speaking of ‘the trustworthy motives of the people’ and their superior capacity to embody norms of goodness and decency (2011: 48; see also 5–6, 24–25, 43–45, 70–76). Martin Breaugh's recent book, The Plebeian Experience: A Discontinuous History of Political Freedom, which draws on Machiavelli, equates plebeianism with the entirely blameless and moralised pursuit of freedom. He writes: ‘‘The Plebs’ is the name of an experience, that of achieving human dignity through political agency’ (2013: xv).

The subsequent four theses are suggestions about what learning how not to be good might look like for ordinary citizens, especially plebeians who accept the wisdom of implementing institutions of differentiated citizenship which make use of the few–many distinction in order to contest elite power.

• Thesis 4: The Plebeian Regulation of the Few Always Suffers from Ethical Ambiguity

One aspect of learning how not to be good for ordinary citizens is to understand that the central function of plebeian institutions, to regulate and contest the few, will always suffer from an element of ethical ambiguity. The plebeian regulation of the few does not quite take the form of a criminal trial in which individuals are punished for violating laws and in which presumably everyone who violates those laws are punished in the same way. With the plebeian regulation of the few, there is a desire to burden the few as such. This means that sometimes the few who are burdened will not have done anything wrong beyond prospering the most within an unfair social system. They will not necessarily have broken any laws or committed any moral transgressions. And it means that not everyone will be equally burdened; only a representative member or set of members in any one instance will be burdened.

Consequently, the primary function of plebeian institutions – contesting elite power as such – can never be entirely free from accusations that such institutions are grounded in an envy or in a vengeance that exceeds the facts of the case. This circumstance is not entirely consonant with reigning legal and moral norms.

Consider the Athenian practice of ostracism, in which Athenians would vote to exile one of their fellow citizens, usually an elite member, for ten years. Remarkably, every year in Athens there would be two votes: first, the Athenians would gather and decide if they should ostracise anyone that year. And only if the vote were positive would they meet again to decide who that ostracised person should be. It is clear from this procedure that ostracism was not modelled on a trial. Indeed, it was not at all guaranteed that the person who suffered the ostracism had even committed a wrong. And even if the person had committed a wrong, it was hardly the case that other people in Athens who had done the same thing would also be ostracised. Here, then, we have a plebeian institution that burdens the few but in a manner that is discontinuous with criminal justice and not in full harmony with prevalent, contemporary ideas of what constitutes a just punishment.

In the Discourses, Machiavelli seems to be tacitly aware of this ethical ambiguity when he says that the investigations and accusations that he favours are motivated not by one but by two justifications. The first is the more blameless one: having investigations and trials will make it so that elites are afraid to ‘attempt things against the state’. In other words, a political community can protect against elite usurpation by threatening to conduct trials and investigations against the few and by sometimes actually conducting them. However, the other justification for accusations and trials is not entirely blameless, but stems from the fact that such accusations and trials will allow the people a chance to vent, specifically to ‘vent those humors that grow up in cities’ ( Machiavelli 1996: 23–24 ).

The people's need to vent is an important theme that recurs throughout Machiavelli's work. Machiavelli seems to understand that this need stems from general sources of frustration and not just from concern with a particular activity of the person targeted by the venting. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (1996: xxix) are perceptive in their interpretation of Machiavelli, in my view, when they write that the ill humour of the people is something the ‘people . . . harbors toward the whole government, or toward the class of the nobles ’, even if its venting is directed ‘against one individual, whose punishment satisfies the people and excuses everyone else’. 7 There is thus a kind of scapegoat function at play in these accusations, trials and investigations.

In The Prince, Machiavelli speaks of the greater hatred and greater desire for revenge that characterises popular mentalities. 8 This ethical ambiguity does not mean that liberal democrats should not regulate the few in accordance with plebeian institutions. In so far as any existing liberal democracy operates in a situation of permanent unfairness, in which socio-economic class continues to disproportionately impact political voice and educational access, there is a logic to insisting upon and pursuing a kind of symbolic redress: the public burdening of otherwise powerful people who have prospered the most in an unfair society, forcing them to thereby acknowledge that unfairness and in a small but meaningful way reduce it.

Yet even if it has a worthy purpose, the point I mean to emphasise is that there is something uncomfortable and transgressive about the plebeian regulation of the few. Specifically, it will not satisfy widely endorsed legal or moral criteria, because those who suffer popular venting will not always have done something wrong, because the punishment will often exceed the threat that the punished (conceived as specific individuals) pose, and because not everyone amongst the few will necessarily be treated identically – only a few of the few sometimes will be burdened.

• Thesis 5: Drawing the Line between The Few and The Many Is Untidy and Always Contestable

Drawing the line between the few and the many is not an easy task. There will always be the problem of arbitrariness. McCormick draws the line between the bottom 90 per cent and the top 10 per cent. The Occupy Movement from a decade ago suggested that perhaps the plebeians were the bottom 99 per cent. I myself would support conceiving of the plebeians – the many – as the bottom 99.9 per cent of an economic distribution, if not an even larger proportion of the population. I do not mean to settle this question. Rather, the point in this context is that anyone committed to plebeianism has to face an inescapable arbitrariness in the division between the few and the many, and thus from the other side, those who resist plebeianism – for instance, mainstream liberal democrats holding on to the pure dream of free and equal citizenship for all – have a rhetorical advantage, as their perspective, which rejects the permanence of the few–many division and seeks to overcome it, enables them to avoid arbitrariness in this regard. To be an advocate of plebeianism is to engage in messy, contestable sociological categorisations. The accusation of arbitrariness is something the engaged plebeian will have to endure. 9

Closely connected to the problem of where to draw the economic boundary separating the few and the many is the problem that any economic conception of ‘manyness’ is itself crude. One can at least hypothesise those who are very rich but, for other reasons, do not feel themselves – and possibly are not considered by others – to be members of an elite. Likewise, one can imagine a poor citizen who nonetheless enjoys fame and power. While I think it is easy to overstate this kind of concern – as in practice, the overlap of wealth, fame and political power is all too common – it is worth acknowledging that the imperfection of an economic conception of manyness is another criticism that will be lodged against advocates of plebeianism and something against which they can only partially defend themselves.

This issue of arbitrariness is not a reason to reject plebeian proposals. Such proposals have value as a way to regulate elite power. Further, societies already make use of the ‘least advantaged class’, the class that deserves poverty assistance and other kinds of welfare for example. Plebeianism stands for evolving a liberal-democratic society's willingness to transact in somewhat arbitrary but useful class designations so that within the project of realising a stronger and truer democracy the more familiar concept of the least advantaged would come to be joined by the parallel notion of the most advantaged.

Still, the point that should be acknowledged is that there is something that is not quite ironclad about such a perspective. Plebeians who make use of the few–many distinction will be doing something seen by others – if not at times themselves – as not quite good, something that is not quite in accord with the highest standards of sociological precision and accuracy.

• Thesis 6: Plebeian Empowerment Requires Generating Spectacles that Suit the Needs and Interests of Ordinary Citizens

The sixth thesis and third instance of what learning how not to be good might mean for ordinary citizens involves the realm of appearances. Citizens are likely to be spectators of politics – that is, for the vast majority of us our experience of politics is that our opportunities for concrete decision-making are few and far between and that, much more often, we are consigned to watch others who are specially empowered to make the fateful decisions determining the direction of a polity.

Part of what plebeian empowerment means is generating spectacles that suit the interests and needs of ordinary citizens. Machiavelli provides the context of but not the solution to this important dimension of plebeian experience. As Machiavelli teaches in The Prince, astute political leaders will be masters of deception. If the classical idea from Cicero (1899: chapter 98) onwards was ‘to be and not to seem’, then Machiavelli explicitly inverts this and says that the wise ruler will ‘seem rather than be’ (1998: 68–71).

In Chapter 18 of The Prince, Machiavelli argues that the prince should appear to embody traditional standards of moral virtue even when actually violating these standards. And in this chapter, he provides the model for the public relations of the prince. He tells the prince: ‘Everyone sees how you appear, few touch what you are’ (1998: 71). This is a reminder that contesting elites should not only involve formal trials and accusations but also disrupting elites’ control of their publicity – that is, disrupting their penchant for propagandistic, acclamatory and empty forms of political rhetoric.

In my book The Eyes of the People, I discuss the principle of candour, the principle that, as a condition of living in a democratic society, people should not only strive for control of the means of law-making, but should also struggle for control of the means of publicity. People should – on democratic grounds – try to expose leaders to unscripted, unrehearsed, risk-ridden and above all contested public appearances in which the meaning of the event is not controlled from the start or from above (2010: 13–22, 130, 135–136, 182–198). Examples of candour might be leadership debates where rival candidates have to cross-examine each other, or hard-hitting press conferences and interviews – in short, anything that imposes risk and unpredictability on leaders as they appear on the public stage. In other words, we should not just focus on the content of political speech but also on its form. A candid form has democratic value compared to a controlled, unidirectional, managed form of publicity.

Candour then can be seen as building off of, yet also reversing, Machiavelli's focus in The Prince, in which he described the wise ruler as one who successfully manages his or her appearances. Candour challenges leaders’ management of their appearances. Its purpose is to ‘touch’ the leader – that is, to penetrate propagandistic falsity and expose leaders as their characters and behaviours really are.

Candour has numerous positive qualities. Its pursuit promises to generate solidarity amongst ordinary, plebeian citizens consigned to watch political elites – citizens who might otherwise remain disaggregated and divided due to ideological, partisan differences yet possess a genuine commonality in their spectatorial relation to politics and second-class political status indicated by this relation. Further, a focus on candour would arguably improve the ‘watchability’ of what is watched. While one can rightly say that ideally we would all be making decisions equally as fellow democratic citizens, it is a basic premise of plebeianism that this aspiration is impossible. As a result, it is important to pursue secondary democratic objectives (beyond the customary focus on representation and participation). I have already discussed burdening the few as one such plebeian proposal – indeed it is the core project of plebeianism. But another proposal, stemming from candour, is to make our political spectacles more worthy of the attention we devote to them by having them less shaped by orchestration from above and more characterised by spontaneity and risk for those who participate in them. In fact, candour is itself a form of burdening elites as they appear on the public stage, but it also has the additional function of refining the ‘watchability’ of what is watched.

Candour also has the virtue of being outside of the rubric of representation. Representation is of course an important metric of popular empowerment in a liberal-democratic society, but there are problems with it. For instance, it is very difficult to measure and, as a result, is too easily circumvented as a rigorous criterion of popular empowerment. Candour, by contrast, is much more straightforward. The question of whether leaders appearing on the public stage are or are not in control of the conditions of their publicity is not so opaque.

While candour cannot entirely replace pre-existing democratic commitments, it can therefore supplement them in crucial, productive ways. Still, and this is the key point to emphasise in this context, to pursue candour is not fully good. In getting beyond the content of speech and the criterion of representation, the concern with candour leads to a pursuit of politics that ceases to only be about decisions and laws and other strictly ‘rational’ or ‘responsible’ goals and, instead, also involves pursuing political aims without clear policy consequences. Jan Bíba writes, in regard to my proposal of candour: ‘Green offers a theory of popular sadistic voyeurism’. Bíba goes on to argue that candid spectacles reflect ‘malignity, a malicious joy of someone else's failure’ (2017: 86–87). Rather than defend myself from this critique, I actually want to acknowledge that Bíba is correct to remind us about what is uncomfortable and ambiguous about candour. Pursuing candour leads to pursing what is so often criticised in contemporary politics – the concern with gaffs and ‘gotcha’ moments or contestation detached from issues and their solutions.

As with the other elements of learning how not to be good for ordinary plebeian citizens, candour is still valuable, but we must admit why it is not fully consonant with the highest aspirations of a purer, more idealised, more completely well-ordered liberal-democratic regime. The rationale for candour – and plebeianism more generally – is that there is something constitutively out of reach about this more familiar liberal-democratic idealism, but the realism of plebeianism – even if appropriate – does not thereby make it easy to digest.

• Thesis 7: Plebeian Proposals Imply that Our Liberal-Democratic Polities Will Never Be Fully Just

Plebeian proposals imply not just that advocates of plebeian reform are not fully good, but that our liberal-democratic polities – even when reformed in plebeian ways – will never be fully good or satisfactorily just themselves. This is difficult to acknowledge. Indeed, one rarely sees this kind of claim being made by liberal democrats of any complexion, perhaps because doing so is somewhat deflating and demoralising. Yet there is productive and generative truth here.

Why will we never achieve full liberal democracy? One reason is that plutocracy – the unfair power of money in politics and education – is a permanent feature of life in liberal-democratic states, at least so long as there is private property and the family. To appreciate this phenomenon, it is best to set aside its most egregious examples, such as in places like the United States with the excessive influence of corporate money in politics, the development of predatory state practices that increasingly prey upon the poor, and extreme inequalities in wealth and income. To understand the permanence of plutocracy within liberal democracies, it is better to focus on the world's most progressive and egalitarian liberal-democratic regimes – such as the social democracies in Northern Europe today – and appreciate how, even there, the wealthy are more likely to have greater political access and educational attainment (see Green 2016a: 59–61 ).

Private property and the family are too potent to be satisfactorily contained in any liberal-democratic regime. It is a widely held belief amongst liberal democrats and citizens more generally that ideally it should not matter how wealthy you are with regard to your political voice and with regard to how well you can educate your children. If you have two people, one rich and one poor, and they are similarly talented and motivated, ideally they should each have roughly equal prospects of being involved in politics, of accessing government, and of influencing political decisions. Likewise, there is a parallel and equally widespread ideal within liberal-democratic societies that similarly talented and motivated children ought to grow up with roughly equal career prospects and that their socio-economic backgrounds therefore ought not to interfere with their educational and professional expectations.

These are noble goals, and we can always do better to realise them. Northern Europe realises them better than the United States, but it is naïve not to acknowledge that we will always come very far short of those goals, that private property is too potent to be kept out of politics, and that the family is too formative an institution not to have its effects also be translated into education.

Decades of social science literature back up this pessimistic but realistic view (see Green 2016b ). In the words of recently deceased Harvard political scientist Sidney Verba: ‘The political advantage of those citizens more advantaged in socioeconomic terms is found in all nations, certainly in all those for which we have data’ ( Verba et al. 1978: 1 ). A follow up study by Verba and colleagues repeated: ‘No democratic nation . . . lives up to the ideal of participatory equality’ (1995: 1). Troves of additional, more recent studies could likewise be cited. 10 One sees that even in the most egalitarian Northern European countries, being wealthier makes a person more likely to participate in politics, especially in the voluntary organisations of civil society. Money allows increased access to politics and influence over government. On the educational level, coming from a wealthier background makes a person more likely to attend university. As even advocates of fair equality of opportunity with regard to education have acknowledged, the family is so formative an institution for child-raising that it presents permanent obstacles to the realisation of fair equality of opportunity. 11

Machiavelli's style of analysis itself encourages seeing plutocracy as inevitable. As is well known, Machiavelli (1998: 39 ) claims that there are two diverse humours amongst any populace: the few who want to dominate and the many who do not want to be dominated. This insight can be developed in many ways, but the underlying sociological idea presupposes the few-many distinction as permanent and thus dispenses with any expectation of full-fledged civic equality. As Machiavelli says in the The History of Florence, enmities between the people and the nobles are both ‘serious and natural’ (1989: 1140).

Machiavelli, as many commentators have observed, rehabilitates conflict between the few and the many, and shows how it can be relatively healthy for a republic. This idea has recently been emphasised by Gabriele Pedullà (2018: 3 ), who approvingly cites another commentator describing Machiavelli's perspective here ‘not only [as] one of the most striking and original theses of his political thought, but also one of the most controversial in the whole history of western political thought’ ( Del Lucchese 2015: 49 ). I share Pedullà’s judgement, but it should not obscure how this tumult and discord is still caught up with a view of politics that will always fall short of genuine democratic equality.

It is not easy to accept this – it is hard to admit that no liberal democracy will satisfactorily realise its own ambitions. There is something demoralising about this thought. Thus there will always be a temptation to deny it and to hold on to the dream of purity: the possibility that future reforms in education and politics will somehow let us achieve full-fledged free and equal citizenship more generally. But another meaning of learning how not to be good for ordinary citizens is to accept that their polities, even when reformed, will not be fully good or just. This is both true and also generative of the plebeian institutions and plebeian ethics thus far described. Because plutocracy is permanent, we will have the few–many distinction in the first place. Because plutocracy is permanent, there is a basis for imposing burdens on the few to protect against the potential usurpation they threaten. And because plutocracy is permanent, there is also a basis for the regulation of the few which seeks, through the burdens placed upon them, to have a society publicly acknowledge – and in a partial way lessen – the unfairness that will always be with us.

• Thesis 8: Leftists Need Not Rely on the Alleged Justice of Their Cause

If the above analysis is correct, then Machiavelli suggests a fairly remarkable idea to leftists: that they ought not to rely as heavily as they currently do on the alleged justice of their cause. We are used to the self-understanding of leftists that they are interested in social justice, whereas their opponents are interested in the status quo, the perpetuation of privilege, amoral markets, and hopelessness regarding the future. But what if this is unhelpful and ineffective? Note the striking absence in Machiavelli's political philosophy: the notion of justice rarely appears in any kind of explicit way. There is a parallel absence, itself no less striking, in that the notion of popular sovereignty also does not seem to appear in any direct or explicit manner in Machiavelli's thought. These absences seem to follow from the few–many distinction. Because we will always have our polities divided between the few and the many, we should not expect full justice, Machiavelli seems to say. And for the same reason, we should not expect full popular sovereignty.

Perhaps these absences are themselves instructive. Maybe advocates of improving liberal democracy should desist from claims about justice, because their reticence in some way would be honest, because a satisfactory amount of justice is unlikely to be achieved by any reform, and because advocacy for plebeian reforms in particular has something not quite good about it.

In other words, perhaps desisting from describing one's progressive reforms simply as just might have some rhetorical advantage. It might lead leftists to avoid grandiosity and focus on what is actually being accomplished with their reforms – that is, challenging but not cancelling elite power, achieving the partial but not the full reduction of plutocracy, improving but not fixing the role of money in politics and education, and realising greater but not full political equality.

Here the Machiavellian exhortation to avoid looking at ‘imagined republics’ and instead aim to achieve the ‘effectual truth’ (1998: 61) within politics could be read not as an abandonment of idealism for realism but as a strategy for pursing idealistic aims in a more concrete, accurate and honest way.

• Thesis 9: People May Have Good Reasons Not to Be Plebeian Leftists

A corollary to the last thesis is that some people will not want to be plebeian leftists and that they will have understandable reasons for holding this view.

Machiavelli can be interpreted as teaching us why we would not want to be princes or live under principalities. This was Jean-Jacques Rousseau's interpretation of The Prince in The Social Contract (1968: 118): Machiavelli's secret meaning was not to advise princes but to show how dastardly and devastating princes are. But if we extend this style of reading to Machiavelli's plebeian politics, then we also understand why not everyone would want to be a plebeian leftist. Not everyone would want to impose burdens on people who may be personally blameless, whose only sin is being rich and powerful within an unfair society. Not everyone will want to adopt the vengeance and envy that seem inseparable from Machiavelli's conception of the plebeian left. Not everyone will want to impose candour on leaders when this does not have a clear legislative function. Not everyone will want to divide the citizenry on the basis of somewhat arbitrary sociological criteria. Above all, not everyone will want to accept the few–many division as something inevitable and permanent; rather, some will want to hold on to the ideal of full-fledged political equality and the idea that future reforms in education and politics could somehow bring us to a point of genuine, fully-free-and-equal relations of citizenship. One need not agree with these refusals in order to understand why they are likely to persist.

Yet, this circumstance raises the question of how these two constituencies on the left are supposed to relate to each other. How should Machiavellian plebeian leftists who have learnt how not to be good deal with more mainstream liberal democrats who do not want to learn how not to be good? Following Machiavelli, we can sketch two different and opposed paradigms.

One strategy would be for plebeian leftists to engage in deception. Machiavelli, after all, advises princes to engage in all sorts of forms of manipulation and deceit. Perhaps plebeian leftists should democratise this teaching and themselves engage in various kinds of lies, including the lie that plebeian politics is not in fact ethically ambiguous even though, for reasons I have discussed here, it clearly is.

A very different paradigm follows from the way Machiavelli addresses Lorenzo de Medici, to whom he dedicates The Prince. When Machiavelli advises in The Prince that princes ought to deceive, he is at once being deceptive (advocating lies) and being honest (telling Lorenzo and other would-be princes precisely what he thinks they should do). Perhaps plebeian leftists can find inspiration from this latter construct and explain to mainstream liberals why it is important for them to ‘learn how not to be good’ in a plebeian way. In other words, according to this second model, plebeians would be advised to be out in the open about their transgressive, ambiguous politics and aim to persuade non-plebeian leftists about the need for a morally ambiguous leftist politics.

It is not clear to me which of these two strategies plebeian leftists should adopt. But, however it is resolved, this divergence within the left between plebeian leftists who want to learn how not to be good and more mainstream liberal democrats who do not – and the resulting need to seek some sort of cooperation between these two groups – is a reason to be cautious about violence. It is a reason not to understand the condoning of violence as part of what it would mean for ordinary citizens to learn how not to be good. I turn now to this point in my final thesis.

• Thesis 10: Violence Should Be Limited

The account of Machiavellianism I have provided as a perspective for ordinary citizens helps explain why violence should be limited. In Yves Winter's (2018) recent book Machiavelli and the Orders of Violence, he provides a critique of elements of the theory of plebeianism that I have been relating in these theses. Winter approves of my interest in expanding the Machiavellian dictum of learning how not to be good to encompass ordinary civic ethics, but he thinks the substance of my suggestions in this regard are too meagre. As Winter (2018: 185 ) puts it: ‘Like most contemporary champions of radical democracy, Green studiously avoids the question of political violence . . . By restricting discussion to what are ultimately minor breaches of the protocols of civility, Green appropriates the radical language of plebeianism to advance another version of political docility’. Winter further writes that my version of plebeianism ‘is cleansed of blood and gore and hence of those features of historical plebeian movements’ (2018: 188). Winter claims both that Machiavelli supported plebeian violence and that we today should see it as a legitimate popular strategy. Winter speaks approvingly of the idea of public executions of those who have betrayed the people, and he explicitly argues that plebeian susceptibility to engaging in violence is ‘the single political advantage that the politically excluded and economically disadvantaged classes have against the establishment’ (2018: 190).

Did Machiavelli support plebeian violence and should we support it as a strategy for contemporary plebeian leftism? With regard to Machiavelli, perhaps Winter is right that Machiavelli did support plebeian violence. There is, however, a pervasive competing theory that says that Machiavelli wanted conflicts to be limited to speech and to legal institutions – and that he opposed extrajudicial murder and other acts of violence such as occurred in Florentine history. This reading may be wrong, but it reminds us that the place of violence in Machiavelli is hotly debated. In particular, it is not clear that the perspective of the anonymous Ciompo advocating violence – to whom Machiavelli refers in his The History of Florence in the context of the 1378–1382 Ciompi Revolt – is clearly a perspective that Machiavelli himself endorses (1989: 1159–1160). The anonymous Ciompo leader's speech advocates violence on two grounds: one, so that we can live with more freedom and more satisfaction than we had in the past, might seem appealing to plebeian leftists. But the other justification is that we who have committed crimes must continue to commit crimes in order to survive, which is perhaps not quite as persuasive. As Winter also knows, the violence in the Ciompi Revolt was itself contained. The only physical violence Machiavelli describes is directed at the police official appointed by the grandi, Ser Nuto (2018: 181). Machiavelli sees plebeian hatred of elites as a universal and natural passion, but it is not entirely clear that this hatred justifies for Machiavelli violence above and beyond legalistic punishments.

But, even if Machiavelli did support plebeian violence, this is not, in my view, part of what learning how not to be good should mean for contemporary liberal-democratic citizens. Why this hesitance about plebeian violence? One familiar reason is that violence tends to be indiscriminate and chaotic and self-generating. But beyond this rather generic issue, consider the specific context of plebeian politics. The unfairness besetting plebeian political life is not a situation of gross and correctible oppression shaped by repression, brutality, gratuitous cruelty, omnipresent fear and the deprivation of basic rights. In such deeply oppressive regimes, perhaps violence is an important strategy for resistance and change. But the context of plebeian politics is different. It is the context of how to construct even more egalitarian and even more effective popular republics within societies in which plutocracy limits just how much can be achieved in the way of fair and equal citizenship. It is the context, in other words, of trying to create the most politically enlightened societies that have ever been achieved. As much as plebeianism insists on the darkened prospects for full-fledged liberal democracy, it also aspires to achieve new heights by paradoxically accepting the ‘shadow of unfairness’ that will always afflict us. 12 But if this is the situation of plebeianism – trying to advance beyond conventional liberal democracy to achieve an alternate liberal democracy that is aware of its constitutive shortcomings and, as a result, newly willing to burden and regulate its most advantaged citizens – then extrajudicial violence seems to me to be an unappealing plebeian strategy of action.

Another reason to be cautious about violence is that it would likely make it impossible for the two progressive groups I have mentioned – conventional liberal democrats and plebeians – to operate successfully together.

Further, at some level defences of violence like Winter's violate the very premises of a Machiavellian or plebeian politics. What is the ultimate purpose of violence were we to support it? Winter is too ambitious when he explicates his defence of violence in these terms: ‘In order to free themselves from domination by the grandi and the wealthy, the plebs must seize the state. Their task, then, is equivalent to that of the new prince: aquistare lo stato ’ (2018: 191). The seizure or acquisition of the state is not something that is ever going to happen for the plebs, and Machiavellianism is not a theory for that realisation. The idea underlying plebeianism is the permanence of the few–many distinction, not its overcoming as Winter's defence of violence seems to imagine. A Machiavellian perspective is not one that would justify revolutionary violence because it is a perspective that is profoundly non-revolutionary in its acceptance of the few and the many as inevitable categories shaping social life. It is not in my view persuasive to invoke Machiavelli as a supporter of violence for an end he would not recognise as achievable. The romanticism of empty revolutionary rhetoric is the very falsity from which Machiavelli-inspired plebeianism aims to free us.

For these reasons, it is better to limit plebeian contestation of elites to institutional and legal channels. There is plenty of force in non-violent legal punishment such as ostracism, investigations, trials and incarceration. If there were a justification for violence, perhaps it would be only to set up such institutions in the first place or, to repeat, to counteract problems outside of the parameters of the discussion: gross and deeply repressive correctable oppression. Violence, therefore, should not be invoked in the name of seizing the state or otherwise ending the few–many distinction – a distinction that is sadly permanent but also a key and underappreciated lever for improving what is possible in a democratic society.

By way of conclusion, let me summarise the main implications of these theses as they relate to contemporary discourses in political theory. In general, plebeianism is at present a nascent idea in contemporary political thought, dwarfed in its influence by competing paradigms such as mainstream liberalism and various forms of Marxism. Unlike these rivals, plebeianism insists upon the few–many distinction as a permanent division in political and social life. In emphasising this division, plebeian proposals are not oligarchical (focussed on empowering the few) but the opposite: aimed at contesting and burdening the few for both symbolic and redressive purposes.

How should this project of burdening the few be understood in the practical, moral sense? In my view, leading theorists of plebeianism today – McCormick and Breaugh, for example – go wrong when they imagine that plebeian reforms can be implemented entirely via strictly pure, morally blameless means. Indeed, what is so interesting about plebeianism, philosophically speaking, is that, properly understood, it indicates what the Machiavellian dictum of learning how not to be good would mean on the ordinary civic level. True, Machiavelli himself, as much as he can be understood as a plebeian thinker, did not develop the morally transgressive features of plebeian politics, as he suggests that learning how not to be good is an education intended much more for the elite than for ordinary citizens. But I think this imbalance is mistaken both ethically and as a diagnosis of what is needed to realise plebeian ambitions.

Still, Machiavelli's thought itself suggests some of the principles and paths by which this imbalance might be corrected. Just as Machiavelli read Livy to understand politics in his own time and in his own way, so we can read Machiavelli – thinking with him but also for ourselves – with an eye to how our present-day liberal-democratic regimes might be improved through the application of plebeian institutions and moral ideas.

• Acknowledgements

The author thanks Nancy Ameen and Josh Stanfield for their research assistance.

Scholars who emphasise Machiavelli's modernity include Strauss (1958) , Bloom (1974: 384 ), and Mansfield (1979). For a partial challenge to this interpretation, which affirms Machiavelli's novelty but not his modernity, see Parel (1991) .

Machiavelli was not the first to suggest that a successful political leader would need to have a political ethics distinct from traditional accounts of virtue. Humanists in the fifteenth century, for instance, argued that princes had political responsibilities unique to them – such as the provision of security, the management of military affairs, and the practice of such kingly virtues as magnificentia and majestas. See, e.g., Skinner (1978 : 118–128 ) and Gilbert (1939) . However, Machiavelli departed from other humanists – figures such as Francesco Patrizi, Oliviero Carafa, and Bartolomeo Sacchi – in claiming that abiding by a distinctly princely ethics required the violation of conventional moral norms.

On this definition of plebeianism, see Green (2016a) . For related conceptions of plebeianism, see McCormick (2011) and Breaugh (2013).

On the tribunes’ power to accuse, see Millar (1998: 14 ).

For non-corruption, see Machiavelli (1996: I.16, I.18 ); for goodness ( bontà ), see Machiavelli (1996: I.17, I.55 ); for decency ( onestà ), see Machiavelli (1998: 39 ).

For Weber, ordinary citizens are excluded from the examination of morally ambiguous political ethics. Their role in politics is at best occasional and constrained by the ‘spiritual proletarianization’ of being followers. See Weber (2004: 74–75, 90 ). Also see Green (2016a: 207, n. 36 ).

Emphasis added.

As Machiavelli puts it, ‘In republics there is greater life, greater hatred, [and] more desire for revenge’ (1998: 21).

In claiming that the dividing line between the few and the many is arbitrary, I do not mean to say that it is entirely random. In general, a more populous country may be drawn to define the few in terms of a smaller percentage of the overall population. Also, the more the purpose of the plebeian burdening of the few is symbolic (involving the public acknowledgement of the constitutive unfairness infecting any liberal-democratic regime), the likelier it is to define the few as a smaller number of persons; whereas the more the purpose of plebeian regulation is redressive (ameliorating the material effects of unfairness), it may be that a larger number of persons ought to define the few. Finally, the degree of inequality in a particular state may also impact the division between the few and the many, with extremely high levels of inequality suggesting the propriety of a more restrictive (i.e., smaller) conception of the few. These are only rules of thumb, not definitive principles. In any case, even if these notions suggest some logic by which plebeian sociological divisions are to be made, they do not prevent the circumstance that any division between the few and the many will be susceptible to the criticism that it is arbitrary.

For an overview of some of these, see Green (2016a, 43–61 ).

On this acknowledgement, see Rawls (1999: 64 ): ‘It is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed . . . at least as long as the institution of the family exists’.

On the aspirational quality of plebeianism, see Green (2016a: 7 ).

Bíba , J. 2017 . ‘ Democratic Spectatorship beyond Plebiscitarianism: On Jeffrey Green's Ocular Democracy ’, Filosofický časopis 65 ( 1 ): 71 – 91 . https://tinyurl.com/mr4356pv .

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Contributor Notes

Jeffrey Edward Green is a political theorist with broad interests in democracy, ancient and modern political philosophy, and contemporary social theory. He is the author of three books: the forthcoming Bob Dylan: Prophet Without God (Oxford, expected 2023); The Shadow of Unfairness: A Plebeian Theory of Liberal Democracy (Oxford, 2016), which was named a Choice Outstanding Academic Title; and The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship (Oxford, 2010), which was awarded the First Book Prize in political theory from the American Political Science Association and is the topic of the German-language edited volume Okulare Demokratie (Transcript, 2017). He is also the co-editor of the recently published volume, The Changing Terrain of Religious Freedom (Penn, 2021). E-mail: [email protected]

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Florentine Street Scene with Twelve Figures (Sheltering the Traveller) (1540-60), anonymous artist. Courtesy the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam

The battles over beginnings

Niccolò machiavelli’s profound insights about the violent origins of political societies help us understand the world today.

by David Polansky   + BIO

Friedrich Nietzsche once wrote: ‘Mankind likes to put questions of origins and beginnings out of its mind.’ With apologies to Nietzsche, the ‘questions of origins and beginnings’ are in fact more controversial and hotly debated. The ongoing Israel-Gaza war has reopened old debates over the circumstances of Israel’s founding and the origins of the Palestinian refugee crisis. Meanwhile, in a speech he gave on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vladimir Putin insisted that ‘since time immemorial’ Russia had always included Ukraine, a situation that was disrupted by the establishment of the Soviet Union. And in the US, The New York Times ’ 1619 Project generated no small amount of controversy by insisting that the United States’ real origins lay not with its formal constitution but with the introduction of slavery into North America.

In other words, many conspicuous political disputes today have a way of returning us to the beginnings of things, of producing and being waged in part through strong claims about origins. Yet doing so rarely helps resolve them. Because these debates have become ubiquitous, we may not realise how unusual our preoccupation with political origins really is. Beginnings are, after all, far removed from the issues at hand as to be a source of leverage in ongoing controversies or a source of controversy themselves. Why should the distant past matter more than the recent past or the present? To better understand why we remain bedevilled by the problem of origins, and perhaps to think more clearly about them in the first place, it may help to turn to a familiar but unexpected source: Machiavelli.

Niccolò Machiavelli is better known for his hard-headed political advice – it was he who wrote ‘it is better to be feared than loved’ – but he was also preoccupied with the role of violence in establishing (and re-establishing) political societies. Few thinkers have dealt so thoroughly and so troublingly with the theme of political origins as Machiavelli, leading the French philosopher Louis Althusser to call Machiavelli the ‘theorist of beginnings’. For Machiavelli, origins are chiefly of interest for two reasons: first, they reveal essential truths about the impermanence of political life that are otherwise obscured by ordinary politics; and, second, their violent conditions are in principle replicable always and everywhere.

Machiavelli’s perspective is moreover useful to us – because of the way he stands outside of our liberal tradition. Every society in history has had its origin stories, but the question of beginnings poses particular challenges for those of us living in the kinds of modern states that first began to take shape in the 17th century. For their legitimacy rests upon their deliberative and representative character. Nearly all existing states – even non-democratic ones – have some claim to represent a given people. Representative government is one of the ways that we assure ourselves that political power isn’t mere domination, and its rules and processes are intended to preserve the rights of the people who establish them. Consequently, we locate the origins of political society with that moment of establishment. The great liberal philosopher John Locke, for example, insists in the Second Treatise of Government (1689) that ‘the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit.’

However, what about the right of any given people to establish political orders in the first place? And if some do claim to establish a new political order, who gets to decide which individuals are included among ‘the people’ and which are not? Who decides what territory is rightfully theirs for establishing government? And how did it happen in the first place?

T hese are questions that modern liberalism is largely unable to face. John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971), perhaps the most influential work of political theory in the past 50 years, admits that his considerations of justice simply assume the existence of a stable and self-contained national community. Earlier, Thomas Hobbes and, later, Immanuel Kant had faced this question more squarely, but both warned against enquiring about the origins of our societies at all, for, as Hobbes wrote in 1651, ‘there is scarce a commonwealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.’

It is not that the liberal political tradition (which is the tradition of most of the world’s developed countries) is simply unaware of political origins; but it deals with them in a deliberate and abstract way that is removed from the messy historical realities behind the formation of states and nations. The opening words of the ‘Federalist’ essay, written by Alexander Hamilton in defence of the nascent US Constitution, posed the question two and a half centuries ago:

whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.

The US founders, in other words, consciously sought to create a wholly new society based upon just principles rather than the contingent events that gave rise to past governments, thus providing a model for future liberal constitutions. But accident and force are simply mainstays of history. And, as it happens, they are also Machiavelli’s bread and butter (or bread and olive oil).

Two of Machiavelli’s major political works, both published posthumously in 1531-32 – the Discourses on Livy , his magisterial treatment of the ancient Roman republic, and his Florentine Histories – open with discussions of the sources of populations themselves. Such questions concerning the origins of populations remain pressing even today, as indicated by the trendiness of the concept of ‘indigeneity’ – that is, the attempt to identify an authentically original people with a title to the land that precedes all others – which has been applied to places as disparate as Canada, Palestine, Finland and Taiwan. One sees a similar impulse behind certain Right-wing nationalist claims, like Jean-Marie Le Pen’s insistence that the true French nation traces back to the 5th-century coronation of Clovis I. We want an unambiguous point of origin to which a legitimate claim to territory might be fixed. Machiavelli, however, denies us such a stable point.

All natives were once foreign, their situation but the end result of some prior (possibly forgotten) conquest

At the outset of the Discourses , Machiavelli claims that all cities are built by either natives or foreigners, but then proceeds to give examples – such as Rome, Athens and Venice – consisting solely of peoples who were either dispersed or compelled to flee from their ancestral place into a new one by an invading force – that is to say, by foreigners. In many cases, the invaders who sent the natives fleeing were themselves fleeing conditions of war. Migrations, forced or voluntary, are very difficult to prevent. It is not the case, for example, that a general improvement of living conditions might ensure demographic stability. Desperation is only one cause of migrations. In the case of the Franks and Germans, not desperation but prosperity, leading to overpopulation, compelled men to find new lands to inhabit. Such was the origin of the populations that destroyed the Roman Empire, according to Machiavelli, reproducing the cycle that initially produced Rome in the first place by invading Italy and establishing the kingdoms of the early medieval period.

Machiavelli thus makes clear that all natives were once foreign (either the possibility of an ‘original’ people is ruled out or they are too archaic to speak of), and further that it may be assumed that their situation is but the end result of some prior (and possibly forgotten) conquest.

With this discussion of the foundation of Rome, Machiavelli illustrates the artificiality of ‘legitimate’ origins. He first claims that Rome had both a native founder in Romulus and a foreign founder in his ancestor, Aeneas, who settled in Latium after escaping the destruction of Troy. But this immediately undercuts any ancestral claim Romulus might have to the territory, insofar as it derives from the Trojan Aeneas’ conquest of the Latins (chronicled in Virgil’s Aeneid ).

Moreover, Romulus is compelled to replicate the actions of his ancestor – for, as Machiavelli sees it, the founding of a new society is always a violent affair, entailing a crime of some great magnitude. Romulus provides the paradigmatic example with the killing of his brother Remus and his ally Titus Tatius. Of these terrible acts, Machiavelli makes the striking remark that ‘while the deed accuses him, the effect excuses him’. That is to say, the extraordinary act of founding a new city (and ultimately an empire) absolves – and, for that matter, requires – the crimes committed in the process. Romulus is just one among a number of quasi-mythical founders whom Machiavelli exalts as the most ‘excellent’ examples in The Prince , along with Theseus, Cyrus, and Moses. All secured the establishment of their new societies through violence. Even for Moses, the most consequential act is not the flight from Egypt or receiving the Commandments at Sinai but the slaughter of 3,000 Israelites (a number Machiavelli raises to ‘infinite men’) for the sin of worshipping a golden calf.

The mythopoeic truths societies offer for their origins can still be truths, even when the first beginnings remain shrouded in myth. Machiavelli claims he could provide ‘infinite examples’ – a favourite term of his – of the role of violence in forming and reforming political societies.

Machiavelli adds that the example of Hiero of Syracuse may also serve as a useful model. This move, however, pulls the whole discussion sideways: first, Hiero did not found anything – the city of Syracuse already existed when he came to power; and second, though Machiavelli will not tell us this here, Hiero is more commonly known as a tyrant, which is to say someone who acquires monarchical power rather than inheriting it. Machiavelli’s description of how Hiero acquired power is amusing and brief: ‘Hiero eliminated the old military and organised a new one; he left his old friendships and made new ones. And when he had friendships and soldiers that were his, he could build any building on top of such a foundation. So, he made a great deal of effort to acquire power, but little to maintain it.’

Machiavelli subsequently reveals that Hiero came to power through a conspiracy – employing mercenaries to seize control of Syracuse and then brutally cutting them to pieces while claiming political power for himself. In other words, if we want to understand what the origins of things really look like, we must consult such troubling histories.

E arly in The Prince , Machiavelli notes of established rulers: ‘In the antiquity and continuity of the dominion, the memories and causes of innovations are eliminated …’ That is to say, most rulers – what he calls ‘hereditary princes’ – are the beneficiaries of some prior terrible actions on the part of a conquering ancestor who initially took the throne. To us they may not be soaked in blood but, go back far enough, and you will find a Romulus – or a Hiero.

Later in the work, Machiavelli remarks that it is relatively easy for a ruler to hold provinces with similar customs that he has already controlled for a long time. But by way of example, he offers France’s rule over Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony and Normandy; of these, the first two had been conquered only within Machiavelli’s own lifetime, and the third in 1453, less than two decades before Machiavelli’s birth. The ease with which the French crown held these possessions – as well as the fact that these regions are now simply thought of as French – is due not to their lasting ties but to the success with which they were initially pacified.

Whenever one identifies a situation of stable and orderly government, it can be traced back to some form of conquest, whether ancient or recent. The story of political societies is much like Woody Allen’s definition of comedy: tragedy plus time. As Machiavelli’s French examples indicate, the amount of time required may not even be significant if the act of conquest is a successful one.

You might have to kill your brother to found a great city, but what about your proposal on urban streetlights?

Machiavelli even emphasises that the violence involved in establishing societies can never be left fully behind. Machiavelli praises Cleomenes of Sparta for slaughtering the magistrates who stood in his way of renewing the laws of the city’s founder, Lycurgus – in an act that earns him comparison with Romulus himself. He also acknowledges the 15th-century Florentine rulers for their insight when they say it was necessary to put ‘that terror and that fear in men’ of the violence of foundings ‘every five years’.

Many readers of Machiavelli have difficulty reconciling his account of origins with our actual experience of political life. It is all well and good, they may think, to know that you might have to kill your brother to found a great city, but what if you just want to find a quorum for your proposal on urban streetlights?

Or, how does Machiavelli’s teaching about political origins help us understand the present world? For one thing, it offers insight into the recurring forms of violence that continue (and will continue) to break out along unstable borders and in places where states are still in the process of being formed.

The list of horrors surrounding the creations of 20th-century nation-states alone would include ( inter alia ): the genocidal expulsion of the Armenians in 1915; the postwar expulsions of ethnic Germans from neighbouring eastern European states; the mutual expulsions of Hindus and Muslims from Pakistan and India (respectively) during partition in 1947; the mutual expulsion of Arabs and Jews from Israel and its neighbours (respectively) from 1947-49; the flight of the pieds-noirs from Algeria in 1962; the displacement of Armenians and Azeris from Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1980s and ’90s; the mutual ethnic cleansings throughout the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, and more. Yet we still see these as exceptions to the rule of political order.

The chain of events that we associate with the formation of our modern states (and that provide the source of much ongoing controversy) is really only the latest series of links in a much longer chain that has no known beginning.

A ccident and force still lie beneath the surface of our day-to-day politics, threatening to re-emerge. This is not an easy thing to accept. Even in quieter times, our consciences still trouble us, like Shakespeare’s Bolingbroke after he deposes Richard II. Moreover, we want to see our own foundations as not only just but secure . To see them otherwise is to acknowledge that our circumstances remain essentially in a state of flux. If all things are in motion, then what shall become of us?

Something like this anxiety seems to lie behind how we talk about political origins today. And, thinking with Machiavelli, we can see how the liberal tradition of political thought going back hundreds of years now has not prepared us well to think ethically about our historical origins. The result, when confronted with the subject, tends to be either a flight into defensive nationalism or moralistic condemnation.

While Machiavelli’s work can easily read like cynicism, a decent measure of cynicism is just realism. And an attitude of realism about political life can inoculate us from both sanctimony and despair, allowing us to honestly acknowledge the crimes that contributed to the formations of our own political societies without requiring us to become despisers of our countries.

We may learn from examples of the dramatic stakes involved in maintaining our political order

Similarly, it would be easy enough to read Machiavelli as debunking the edifying tales that surround the foundation of new societies, from the myths of ancient Greece to modern Independence Day celebrations. ‘This is what really happened,’ he seems to say. But it is important to recognise that his account of political origins is not intended to be incriminating but instructive.

For his work also bears a warning: the lawless and uncertain conditions surrounding our origins reflect enduring possibilities in political life. These are crucial moments in which our existing laws are revealed to be inadequate, because they were formulated under different circumstances than those we may presently face, thus requiring daring acts of restoration undertaken in the same spirit in which the laws were originally established.

We may not be obliged to follow directly in the footsteps of such tyrannical figures as Cleomenes of Sparta or the Medici of medieval Florence, all of whom employed terrible violence in the acts of restoration. But we may learn from such examples of the dramatic stakes involved in maintaining our political order – as the philosopher Claude Lefort put it in his magisterial 2012 work on Machiavelli: ‘This is the truth of the return to the origin; not a return to the past, but, in the present, a response analogous to the one given in the past.’

This is part of the value we gain from reading Machiavelli: facing the troubling implications of our own origins may help us better prepare ourselves for the continued vicissitudes of political life. After all, it may be that our own established order is the only thing standing in the way of someone else’s new origins.

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Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Philosophers — Machiavelli

Essays on Machiavelli

Niccolò Machiavelli was an Italian diplomat, philosopher, and writer who is best known for his political treatise, ""The Prince."" His work has had a profound impact on political thought and has sparked numerous debates and discussions about ethics, power, and leadership. As a result, there are countless essay topics that can be explored in relation to Machiavelli's ideas and theories.

The Importance of the Topic

Machiavelli's writings have had a lasting impact on political theory and have influenced the way we think about power and leadership. As such, exploring essay topics related to Machiavelli can provide valuable insights into the nature of politics and the complexities of human behavior. Additionally, by studying Machiavelli's ideas, students can gain a deeper understanding of the historical and cultural contexts in which he lived and wrote.

Advice on Choosing a Topic

When choosing a topic for an essay on Machiavelli, it is important to consider the specific aspects of his work that interest you the most. Do you want to explore the ethical implications of Machiavelli's advice for rulers? Or do you want to examine the historical and political context in which he wrote? Perhaps you are interested in comparing Machiavelli's ideas to those of other political theorists. By narrowing down your focus and choosing a specific aspect of Machiavelli's work to explore, you can create a more focused and compelling essay.

There are countless essay topics that can be explored in relation to Machiavelli's work. Whether you are interested in the ethical implications of his ideas, the historical context in which he wrote, or the impact of his work on political thought, there are numerous avenues for exploration. By choosing a topic that resonates with you and delving into the complexities of Machiavelli's theories, you can gain a deeper understanding of the nature of power and leadership. As you embark on your essay writing journey, consider the advice provided and take the time to carefully choose a topic that will allow you to engage with Machiavelli's ideas in a meaningful and thought-provoking way.

Machiavelli's Perspective on Politics in The Prince

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How Political Ideas in Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince Relate The Modern Politics

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The Concept of Virtu in Machiavelli's The Prince

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The Political calculus; essays on Machiavelli's philosophy

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Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict

David Johnston, Nadia Urbinati, and Camila Vergara (eds.), Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict , University of Chicago Press, 2017, 423pp., $50.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780226429304.

Reviewed by Kenneth Winston, Harvard University

This volume originated at a conference in 2013 at Columbia University to celebrate the 500 th anniversary of The Prince . It was an opportune occasion, as the editors note, to examine the foundations, meaning, and legacy of Machiavelli's thought. The result is an engaging, insightful collection of sixteen essays by scholars from Australia, England, France, Italy, and the United States presenting contemporary lines of research and interpretation. In subject matter, they range widely: from small-scale readings of selected texts, to historical and contextual studies of leading ideas, to assessments of Machiavelli's continuing influence.

The editors have divided the essays into four sections: on Machiavelli's relation to previous, especially ancient, political thinkers; Machiavelli's political realism and moral provocations; the features and problems of republican polities; and Machiavelli's influence as reflected in a few 20th century thinkers. However, the essays overflow or elude these categories, as one would expect in dealing with a thinker as complex -- and elusive -- as Machiavelli.

I should emphasize that I approach this collection not as a scholar of Machiavelli but as a long-time teacher of practical ethics to mid-career practitioners, including government officials and other laborers in the public sector. Practitioners discover that Machiavelli speaks directly and candidly to their professional preoccupations and concerns. With his resistance to philosophical system, they appreciate his genius in uncovering truths about ethics and power which otherwise remain concealed in the idealizations of most theorists. He grasps their experience and speaks credibly about it. Because of that, they are eager to ponder (even if not necessarily follow) his advice.

Why does Machiavelli speak so powerfully to people of experience? In the first instance, it is because of his down-to-earth treatment of moral conundrums and the well-known (albeit controversial) teaching that a good person is not necessarily a good leader -- leadership requires skills that a good person may lack. And, conversely, that a good leader is not necessarily a good person -- the goodness that forms an integral part of good leadership gets its content from the leader's public responsibilities, which set it apart from, and sometimes in conflict with, personal beliefs and aspirations.

Equally important is Machiavelli's message that practical moral thinking is strategic. By this I mean that pursuit of the public good is contingent on available resources and the authority to act. It recognizes the recalcitrance of the world, including the difficulty of aligning interests with the public good, as well as the role of fortune and thus the importance of opportunism in the pursuit of moral ends. It is also as much about appearances and communication (persuasion and the arts of oratory) as about substance. As a result, the good practitioner is someone with the requisite competence to act effectively for the public good in circumstances that are conflictual, fleeting, and partially out of control. Hence the importance of Machiavelli's focus on the qualities of the good leader, especially the virtue of prudence. These themes speak powerfully to practitioners.

Although written by academics, the essays touch on these themes in various ways. I will briefly discuss the essays -- I do not have space for all of them -- that address three related issues: the autonomy of politics from ethics, the problem of dirty hands, and conflict in political society.

[1] The (possible) autonomy of politics from ethics is a thread that runs through many of the essays. In an elegant bit of textual analysis, Erica Benner observes what she regards as a kind of ambivalence in Machiavelli's realism, based on different perceptions of human nature. In one set of passages (reflecting the conventional view of Machiavelli), human beings are so universally untrustworthy that rulers are required to adopt a purely instrumental posture toward morality and thus believe they are justified in committing evil deeds as necessary. In other passages, however, a different kind of realism shows through. Benner sees Machiavelli displaying more confidence in the human capacity to develop relations of trust and collaboration, which are critical for good governance and require a non-instrumental view. This is a persuasive riff on the adage that the best way to appear to be good is to be good; it holds out the possibility of a benign reading in which politics and ethics are fully integrated. Benner's second kind of realism is only suggestive, however, and takes for granted the conventional reading of Machiavelli as an amoral theorist.

The conventional view is shared by Harvey C. Mansfield and Paul A. Rahe, in their contributions, but most of the authors in this collection adhere to a humanist reading of Machiavelli as a moralist grappling with some of the complexities (not to say, dark corners) of common morality. Curiously, no one observes that the issue of autonomy from ethics arises in every major profession; it is not peculiar to politics. Although the scale is different, every profession develops a distinctive code of conduct and poses the question whether, in cases of conflict, its practitioners are exempt from common morality. What is it about professional (or public) life that generates this idea? It is easy to see that practitioners take on new responsibilities and new duties. Do they, thereby, have permission -- conferred by a special ethic -- to engage in acts that would be immoral if performed by someone else?

Quentin Skinner's essay is helpful here, although it does not provide a full answer. He observes that Machiavelli's account of the princely virtues builds on the work of classical Roman moralists and draws the same distinction they draw between personal virtues (such as charity and piety) and political virtues (liberality, clemency, good faith). The latter are distinct in being qualities that contribute to prudent conduct in public affairs. What Skinner adds is that, when Machiavelli contends that rulers sometimes must act in defiance of the virtues (that is, immorally), it is the personal virtues that Machiavelli sees as obstacles, not the political virtues. (Thus, the good leader is not necessarily a good person.) In a corrupt world, Machiavelli says, people are confused sometimes about what these virtues require or are thought to prescribe. The prudent ruler is skilled in discerning what is or is not consistent with political virtue.

This is important because it highlights Machiavelli's awareness of how personal and political virtue can diverge and conflict, illustrating the disorderly character of moral life in our non-ideal world. When scholars focus on Machiavelli's instruction about consciously committing evil (when necessary), they typically fail to notice this disorderliness and thus the numerous -- and perfectly cogent -- ways ethical conflicts can arise. They treat morality as a clear, uniform, unproblematic set of requirements, without recognizing that its personal, professional, conventional, and aspirational dimensions produce constant instability and test the limits of human powers. In such a world, even the most conscientious person can face intractable problems.

[2] An inevitable outcome of this moral fragmentation is the problem of dirty hands, which practitioners frequently encounter -- or believe they encounter -- in their daily work. (It is because of the widespread belief that it is so important to work through the problem with an astute observer like Machiavelli.) The term dirty hands , briefly, refers to situations in which it appears that the morally better course of action is to do something morally wrong. Which, of course, is paradoxical: how can it be morally better to do something morally wrong?

Reading Machiavelli through the lens of Max Weber, Giovanni Giorgini observes that Machiavelli did not advocate a new morality and did not believe that politicians enjoy a special dispensation from common morality. Thus, implicitly, he rejects a special ethic. Rather, politicians sometimes confront tragic dilemmas, which are part of common morality. But what are tragic dilemmas? Giorgini observes that, while the existence of true dilemmas has no place in Christian thought, they were effectively portrayed in Greek tragedy and Machiavelli learned from them. But how are we to understand dilemmas today? Giorgini notes that Machiavelli never says the end justifies the means, but how then are we to understand Machiavelli's teaching on committing evil? Even if Giorgini is right, as I believe he is, it is only the beginning of discussion.

Here as elsewhere, constructive interpretation of Machiavelli would be aided by contemporary work on practical ethics, but such references are missing from these essays. An extensive literature on moral dilemmas exists: why they arise, how to frame the problem, what solutions do or do not make sense. (I have in mind the writings of Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, Martha Nussbaum, David Luban, and others.) This work offers conceptual distinctions, frameworks, forms of practical argumentation that would be helpful in reading classic texts. Consistent with her benign reading of Machiavelli, Benner sees his appeal to necessity, not as an invitation to moral deviation, but as an occasion for exercising imagination and devising alternative (moral) courses of action. Benner seems to acknowledge that this is a bit wistful; at any rate, it strikes me as an evasion. Benner insists on the difficulty of coming up with plausible instances of unavoidable wrongdoing, but she does not discuss any of the standard cases in the literature. Meanwhile, she misses the nuance in Machiavelli's famous discussion in Discourses I.9 of Romulus killing Remus, where he consistently uses the language of excuse, not justification.

Stephen Holmes employs Benner's two kinds of realism to argue that the prudent ruler, recognizing the need to maintain the loyalty of subjects in times of adversity, will have the foresight to invest in institutions and policies that incline citizens to offer support in a crisis. This includes the rule of law, respect for personal property, and avoidance, so far as possible, of a politics of fear and cruelty. In a clever rhetorical inversion, Holmes suggests that, to maintain such loyalty, the prudent ruler is "forced to be good." This phrase neatly captures Benner's hopeful reading of Machiavelli, but it reflects the same dichotomous choice: either Machiavelli is completely amoral, or he is unproblematically moral.

[3] The problem of dirty hands is perhaps the most obvious manifestation of fragmentation and conflict in moral life. But Machiavelli goes a step further in his discussion of ideal polities by stressing the virtue of social conflict for preserving liberty. Many of the essays touch on this topic in one way or another, and I learned more from them than from any of the others. In one formulation, the central question is whether conflict or harmony is the preferred political ideal, or in more contemporary terms, is Machiavelli best understood as a republican or as a democratic theorist? Jean-Fabien Spitz and John P. McCormick argue against the republican reading, largely because it is less useful, they believe, as a resource for reinvigorating contemporary democracies.

McCormick's pro-democracy interpretation is well known from his book Machiavellian Democracy ; here he extends it to his reading of Machiavelli's Florentine Histories . Spitz offers a more direct argument, targeting in particular the republican reading of Machiavelli promoted by Skinner and Philip Pettit (who is not included in this collection). These authors, Spitz says, "fear majority rule much more than elitist domination" and favor institutional mechanisms "that are meant to prevent political conflicts (something Machiavelli was not afraid of) but that, in fact, tend to enhance the power of experts over the power of the people." When it is claimed that the popolo and the grandi share an interest in order, stability, and predictability, that opens the door to the rhetoric of harmony, which is a cover for elite domination. Machiavelli's view, rather, is that the desire to dominate is less decent than the desire not to be dominated. Because of the natural emergence of both desires (in different classes), the latter -- and its expression in political conflict -- is crucial to maintaining liberty and a well-ordered state.

It is important to stress that Machiavelli praises only a regulated kind of civic conflict, as may occur in a well-ordered republic, that is, where there are good laws and properly functioning institutions. Both Benedetto Fontana and Luca Baccelli, in separate essays, distinguish two kinds of conflict, which Fontana refers to as positive and negative and Baccelli as healthy and pathological. The first is conducive to a republic's viability and resilience; it enlarges citizenship and enhances freedom. The second is exemplified by the kind of factionalism that destabilizes a republic, especially divisiveness generated by conflicts over wealth and property among elites. Jérémie Barthas adds to this analysis in his essay by focusing on Machiavelli's sustained argument, while in office as well as in his writings, against the use of mercenary armies and in favor of "people in arms," which shifts power away from aristocratic and toward democratic elements. Barthas elaborates Machiavelli's insights about public debt and the financial system generally as key mechanisms by which the aristocratic "military-financial complex" exercises its influence.

In an interesting aside on this theme, Gabriele Pedullà argues that, in using Rome as a model of the good polity, Machiavelli attempted to counter the widespread criticism of Rome in the humanist literature of the 14th and 15th centuries, which favored princely rule over the tumultuous Roman republic, and the tendency in contemporary public discourse to blur the boundaries between Rome and Venice as possible exemplars. Machiavelli sharpens the distinction between Venice and Rome by emphasizing the former's preference for aristocratic dominance and commitment to harmony among social classes as against the latter's more fractious -- but liberty-preserving -- constitution. The tendency of later historians to accept the sharp distinction between Venice and Rome, Pedullà says, shows Machiavelli's success in shaping our thinking about his time.

I suppose Machiavelli's stance on conflict is troubling to theorists who are inclined to resist the idea that permanent social antagonism is a virtue. But, while Machiavelli does place great emphasis on constitutionalism and the rule of law in a well-ordered republic, he does not lose sight of the inevitable tendencies toward oligarchic control and corruption which generate a need for continual vigilance and even insurgency. As Marie Gaille observes in the final essay, this point was stressed in the 20th century by Louis Althusser: democratic citizens express their moral agency precisely by inscribing a resistance to institutionalization.

The extended attention to social conflict in democratic polities is especially salient given our current political crisis. On this topic, as with Machiavelli's teaching on morality, the essays in this collection are valuable in forcing us to deal with intrinsic features of the non-ideal world we live in, however disorderly and disagreeable. In the pursuit of ideals, what matters to practitioners is that the ideals are realistic, and the pursuit is informed by knowledge of the conditions under which they are likely to be fulfilled or frustrated. This is the quality that gives to Machiavelli's work its enduring significance.

HIEU 4501 B: Machiavelli and the Renaissance

Introductory/background information.

Subject encyclopedias can provide detailed and authoritative background information that can help you to begin your research. The articles can define terms, give an overview of a topic and suggest directions for narrowing your research. They can also provide bibliographies of books and articles for more in-depth research.

Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli -- Article-length essays covering various aspects of Machiavelli's life, thought, and influence.

Encyclopedia of the Renaissance . 6 volumes. Available in hard copy in Shannon Library Reference Room, call # CB361 .E52 1999. Covers topics and personalities of the era in which Machiavelli formed his thought.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Scholarly essays on Machiavelli and related topics like "Civic Humanism," and "Political Realism in International Relations." Useful for setting Machiavelli's ideas within a broader philosophical tradition, and for stimulating topic ideas and further reading.

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy -- Concise essays summarizing Machiavelli's life, writings, and thought. Useful for getting a sense of different interpretations of Machiavelli's ideas, and for stimulating further reading.

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Online Books by N iccolo Machiavelli -- Bibliography compiled by John Mark Ockerbloom, a librarian at the University of Pennsylvania. Includes different English translations of T he Prince , as well as other works in English and Italian . Use in combination with Google Book s and VIRGO's Online facet to find Machi avelli's works online .

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Machiavelli

• Literature Notes
• Machiavelli the Devil
• Book Summary
• About The Prince
• Character List
• Summary and Analysis
• Chapters 1-2
• Chapters 4-5
• Chapters 22-23
• Character Analysis
• The Medici Family
• The Borgia Family
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• Niccolò Machiavelli Biography
• Critical Essays
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• Virtù, Fortuna, and Free Will
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Critical Essays Machiavelli the Devil

Few writers have inspired the kind of personal hatred that Machiavelli has throughout the centuries, and few works have been as vilified—or as popular—as The Prince . Machiavelli has been condemned as a defender of tyranny, a godless promoter of immorality, and a self-serving manipulator. Today, almost 500 years after The Prince was written, the dictionary still defines "Machiavellian" as "of, like, or characterized by the political principles and methods of expediency, craftiness, and duplicity set forth in Machiavelli's book, The Prince ; crafty, deceitful, and so on." One popular, though untrue, story holds that "Old Nick," a slang term for the Devil, is derived from Machiavelli's first name, Niccolò.

Machiavelli's reputation as a diabolical figure began almost immediately after publication of The Prince . In 1559, not only The Prince but all of Machiavelli's works were placed on the Catholic church's "Index of Prohibited Books," presumably because of Machiavelli's perceived offenses against Christian ethics. Machiavelli has often been accused of being an atheist or even actively anti-Christian. His thinly veiled contempt for the papacy and the political ambitions of the Catholic church is evident in The Prince , and in the Discourses , he states that Christian piety robs its adherents of the energy necessary for the creation of a good society. Much of The Prince denies or even negates the moral basis of government that Christian thinkers insisted upon. The medieval Christian notion that good government is ordained by God for the promotion of virtue and the protection of the faithful against evil is distinctly absent from the world of The Prince . Perhaps more importantly, the quality that Machiavelli values most highly, virtù , is not a moral quality at all. Infamous criminals such as Agathocles or outrageously cruel rulers like Severus can still possess virtù . Debate continues as to whether Machiavelli can be called a Christian thinker or whether he adheres to some other standard of morality, such as those of the pagan Classical authors whose work he draws on. Some critics have proposed that Machiavelli simply substitutes an entirely new moral standard, one that is centered on the state, rather than on God or on pagan ethics.

While Machiavelli was officially banned in the Catholic world, he was also hated by the Protestants. In 1572, the Catholic leadership of France attempted to wipe out France's Protestant population, the Huguenots. In several weeks of massacres beginning on St. Bartholomew's Day, an estimated 50,000 Huguenots were killed. The power behind the throne of France was Catherine de Medici, an Italian and a Catholic, and a member of the family for whom Machiavelli had written The Prince . Long-dead Machiavelli took blame for the incident, as it was supposed that Catherine had looked to his philosophies in planning the massacres. In Protestant England, Machiavelli became a stock character of evil on the theatrical stage. For example, in Christopher Marlowe's play The Jew of Malta , the character of "Machiavel" presents the prologue introducing the play's villainous title character, who gleefully follows Machiavellian precepts. To be so universally hated, however, Machiavelli also had to be widely read, as Marlowe's Machiavel points out: "Admir'd I am of those who hate me most. Though some speak openly against my books, Yet will they read me. . . ."

Of the many books specifically refuting The Prince , two deserve special mention. The first, written in 1576, was the Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner contre Nicolas Machiavel by Innocent Gentillet. Gentillet, a Huguenot author protesting the St. Bartholomew's Day massacres, did more to establish Machiavelli's devilish reputation than did The Prince itself. The most famous response to The Prince came from Frederick the Great, King of Prussia. In 1740 he wrote, with the help of the French philosopher Voltaire, the Anti-Machiavel , a vigorous condemnation of Machiavelli's principles. Frederick, like many other royalists, feared the implication in The Prince that anyone who was strong enough to seize power was entitled to keep it, seeing it as an invitation to regicide. Ironically, Frederick would prove to be a true Machiavellian—treacherous, ruthless, and enthusiastic in his pursuit of power.

Modern scholars have applied a variety of interpretations to Machiavelli's work. Some view The Prince as an anti-Christian work, a celebration of Classical pagan philosophy, while others have attempted to portray Machiavelli as a Christian moralist, pointing out the political evils of the world around him. Some see The Prince as a book of despair, an anguished chronicle of fallen human nature, while others find in Machiavelli a clear-eyed realist and an accurate observer of the political sphere of life. Some have explained The Prince 's apparent immorality as amorality, a morally-neutral scientific analysis of the workings of politics, without approval or disapproval. More than one writer has proposed that The Prince is in fact a satire, a warning of what may happen if rulers are allowed to pursue power unchecked. In this view, Machiavelli is the passionate defender of republicanism, the champion of liberty, who describes the workings of tyranny so they can be resisted. Others find in The Prince a blueprint for totalitarianism, carried to its logical and horrible conclusion in regimes like Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia. Bertrand Russell called The Prince "a handbook for gangsters," and Leo Strauss called Machiavelli "a teacher of evil."

In more recent times, popular interest in Machiavelli's philosophy has focused more on money than on politics or morality. In an age in which democratic governments predominate, the last arena in which princely power can be pursued with abandon is that of business. Modern business executives seeking advice on effective leadership have resurrected Machiavelli, along with a host of other military and political strategists. One can find any number of contemporary advice books purporting to offer Machiavelli's insights, including What Would Machiavelli Do? (a devilish subversion of the popular catch-phrase "What would Jesus do?"), which may or may not be a satire.

Previous Niccolò Machiavelli Biography

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The Machiavelli effect

A review of Machiavelli’s Effectual Truth by Harvey C. Mansfield .

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H ar vey Mansfield is a wonder. In the course of a long and distinguished career as a political scientist, he translated Machiavelli’s Prince . He co-translated that figure’s Florentine Histories and his Discourses on Livy as well as Tocque­ville’s Democracy in America . He edited a one-volume selection of the correspondence of Edmund Burke. He published books on Tocqueville and on party government as it is conceptualized in the writings of Burke and Bolingbroke. He devoted volumes to subjects as varied as manliness, the spirit of liberalism, America’s constitutional soul, and what undergraduates need to know about the study of political philosophy. He penned a lengthy commentary on Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy and wrote a monograph on the executive power as discussed in Machiavelli and his successors.

When, twenty-eight years ago on the eve of his sixty-fifth birthday, Mansfield ushered into print a collection of the essays he had written on the Florentine, one might have been forgiven for thinking that this was his valedictory contribution to the republic of letters. One would certainly not have supposed that in his ninety-second year he would bring forth yet another such volume—but here we have it, in Machiavelli’s Effectual Truth: Creating the Modern World . 1 It has been well worth the wait.

These two collections have something in common and should perhaps be read in tandem. Each boasts a title that is deliberately ambiguous. When one works one’s way through Machiavelli’s Virtue , the first of these two volumes, one quickly becomes aware that Mansfield has in mind not only the conception of virtù articulated in the Florentine’s works. He is also asking his readers to assess the man’s peculiar excellence. The like is true of the volume under review here.

Mansfield is interested not only in what Machiavelli had in mind when he coined the word effettuale and deployed it in the fifteenth chapter of The Prince , juxtaposing “the effectual truth of the thing” ( la verità effettuale della cosa ) with “the imagination of it”; when he dismissed as irrelevant “imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth”; and when he suggested that “a man who wants to make a profession of good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good.” He is also interested in Machiavelli’s achievement—the verità effettuale of his life and of the works that he penned. In short, he wants to see the man hoist by his own petard—judged by the standard he set up for weighing the significance of everything—and he shows us that this is what Machiavelli himself both expected and desired.

Mansfield and Machiavelli resemble one another in one particular. There is something boyish, something positively mischievous, something delightful and audacious about their prose, and they are both graced with wit. Mansfield had a good time in fashioning the essays collected in this volume, and those who have the patience to work their way through them will have a good time, too. All that it takes is time, determination, a taste for transgression, and a sense of humor. (Nor should readers be dissuaded by the hardcover edition’s hefty price tag; the paperback costs only $34.99.)

This is not an ordinary scholarly volume. There is nothing in it that smacks of the pedant. More often than not, Mansfield does not even bother to prove his point. In some passages, he even warns his readers that the point is beyond proof. In others, he asks them to compare one passage with another, and he suggests that there is more to what Machiavelli is attempting to convey than immediately meets the eye. Those who cannot imagine that a writer of yesteryear could pull one’s leg will hate this book.

When, for example, the Florentine tells his readers that Christianity “has shown the truth and the true way,” scholars bereft of literary instincts are apt to suppose that, for all of the criticism that he directs at what he sometimes pointedly calls “the present religion,” Machiavelli is a believer. Mansfield suggests the contrary—that “the truth and the true way” intended by the Florentine has to do with technique. On this reading, Christianity “ has shown the truth and the true way”—but only in the sense that, by dint of its success, it has disclosed “the effectual truth” of political life by revealing just how effective spiritual warfare by way of propaganda can be. On this reading, Jesus Christ was not a prophet unarmed—not in the most important regard.

To grasp what Mansfield is up to, one must first read The Prince (with special attention paid to chapters 6 and 15), then read and reread the preface of Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy , chapter 2 of the second part of that work, and the first chapter of its third part. In the end, everything turns on whether the “new orders and modes” said in the sixth chapter of The Prince to have been articulated by the “new” princes most to be admired are akin to the “new modes and orders” that Machiavelli claims, in the preface to his Discourses on Livy , to have discovered himself. If they are akin, one must accept that the Florentine thinks of himself as a new prince of sorts and that he regards himself as a prophet on the model of Jesus Christ . . . armed only with a book (but well-armed nonetheless). Mansfield’s audacity consists in this: he merely asks that one reread The Prince and the preface to the Discourses on Livy with such a possibility in mind, and then he encourages one to read on through the rest of these two works in the same fashion.

O f course, Mansfield is not the first to have suggested such a reading of these texts. As he himself makes abundantly clear, that honor belongs to Leo Strauss, who made this argument in his Thoughts on Machiavelli . What distinguishes Mansfield’s account from that of Strauss is the emphasis he places on the word effettuale . It was a new word in Machiavelli’s time, and it was quickly picked up—most tellingly, in the King James version of the New Testament where it is deployed again and again. The word’s virtue, as Machiavelli would have it, is not only that it redirects attention away from “what should be done” to “what is done.” It also forces one to attend to what is effective.

As Mansfield observes, when Machiavelli singles out necessity as a constraint on statesmanship, he is not simply suggesting that, in the political sphere, circumstances arise—war, for example—in which one must do what is otherwise forbidden. Classical and Christian political thinking encompassed this possibility. What Machiavelli is saying is something much, much harsher and much more subversive. The fifteenth chapter of The Prince does not describe how princes and others should treat enemies. Its focus is on their relations “with subjects and with friends.” The effectual truth of Machiavelli’s account of human relations is Hobbes’s war of all against all. The only difference is that Hobbes conceives of the social contract as a means of escape and that, had Machiavelli been confronted with Hobbes’s argument, he would have laughed out loud. His position is that what Aristotle and others called “friendship” is a snare and a delusion, that Christianity is an elaborate and very effective con worthy of imitation, and that there is no escape from what Hobbes terms “the state of nature.” What Hobbes says regarding the human condition before the emergence of civil society—that in it there is no justice and that “force and fraud” are therein “the cardinal virtues”—is true, in Machiavelli’s opinion, thereafter as well.

Mansfield’s Machiavelli harbors for weakness nothing but contempt. As “a form of education,” he explains, the Christian religion “makes us esteem less the honor of the world.” Thanks to the “ambitious idleness” ( ambizioso ozio ) of its clergymen, it confers “more glory on men who are humble and contemplative than on those who are active.” It lodges “the greatest good in humility, abjectness, and contempt for human things,” and it renders “the world weak” and gives “it in prey to wicked men, who can manage it securely, seeing that the collectivity [ università ] of men, in order to go to paradise, think more of enduring their thrashings than of avenging them.”

The Florentine’s aim is to restore “the honor of the world.” To this end, he embraces violence, cruelty, and war and suggests that this modus operandi is compatible with a Christianity liberated, under his influence, “from the cowardice of those who have interpreted our religion according to leisure and idleness [ ozio ] and not according to virtù .”

T he re are those—and they are numerous—who cannot stomach the idea that a thinker as incisive and entertaining as Machiavelli could be as committed to violence and cruelty as appears to be the case, and they attempt to turn him into an Italian patriot, a democrat, a proto-liberal, or a humanitarian of one sort or another. One of Mansfield’s great virtues is his refusal to give way to this temptation. He acknowledges that the author of The Prince is given to exaggeration—that he takes pleasure in shocking his readers. But he resists the inclination to moralize the man who was in later generations thought to have supplied the devil with his moniker “Old Nick.” There is nothing soft, gentle, or yielding about Mansfield’s Machiavelli. The Florentine’s occasional reference to “the common good” he rightly treats as trickery comparable to the assertion that Christianity “has shown the truth and the true way.” The “common good” in question is either the theft and redistribution of other peoples’ lands or “the common good of each”—which is to say, it is an individual good that other individuals also receive. The political community, for Mansfield’s Machiavelli, is no more communitarian than a band of thieves. “To want to acquire,” as the author of The Prince puts it, is “a very natural and ordinary thing.”

In the preface to his Discourses on Livy , Machiavelli compares himself with Christopher Columbus and his fellow Florentine Amerigo Vespucci. Therein, when he claims that he has discovered “new modes and orders,” he adds that he has charted a path hitherto “untrodden by anyone.” In this connection, Machiavelli attributes to himself an impresa , an enterprise. That he will not be able to carry this impresa to its conclusion he readily acknowledges. Others, he predicts, will complete the work.

Most scholars give this preface a pass. Their Machiavelli is an ordinary humanist, distinguished from his fellows only by his literary gifts and his predilection for boasting. Mansfield, by way of contrast, takes the Florentine at his word—in part because, as he demonstrates, Francis Bacon and Montesquieu did just that. It is his contention that, with the phrase la verità effettuale della cosa , Machiavelli really did effect a revolution—that he laid the foundation both for modern science, with its single-minded focus on what Aristotle’s followers called efficient causation, and for the Enlightenment, prepared by Hobbes and Locke and taken up by the likes of David Hume, Montesquieu, and Adam Smith.

At the end of the fifteenth chapter of his Prince , Machiavelli suggests that the virtues and vices examined by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas—the qualities, as they and he put it, for which men are praised and blamed—should not be judged for their intrinsic worth. Nor should they be assessed in light of their putative value in the eyes of an imaginary god. Instead, they should be regarded as poses to be adopted or avoided solely with an eye to their contribution to la securtà e il bene essere suo —i.e., to one’s own security and well-being. In Mansfield’s opinion, it was Machiavelli’s shocking critique of the Aristotelian and the Christian teachings concerning moral virtue that inspired the profound reorientation of learning and of politics championed by Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, and Smith.

T ho se familiar with the line of argument presented by the essays collected in this volume should probably read them in the order in which they are presented. Those to whom Mansfield’s account is unfamiliar and may seem far-fetched, if not preposterous, might profit from beginning with the appendix, wherein Mansfield takes on those who regard Machiavelli as a man of his time. They should then turn to the essay in which he compares Machiavelli with his Florentine predecessor Leonardo Bruni—for it is in the latter piece that he outlines in some detail the thinking of Aristotle and makes clear the character of Machiavelli’s radical break with classical political philosophy and the humanism of his own time. The remaining essays can then be read in the order in which they appear. In the first four, Mansfield lays bare the character of Machiavelli’s impresa and shows the manner in which, like David in his confrontation with Goliath, he pursues victory by taking up the arms of his foe. In the last two essays, mindful that Machiavelli’s aim was the conquest of fortuna , Mansfield examines the man’s own fortuna as an author, the verità effettuale of his literary endeavor: its impact on subsequent thinkers.

This examination is incomplete. What is said is meant to be suggestive. In it, Mansfield looks at two of the Florentine’s heirs, Montesquieu and Tocqueville. To the former, he devotes a chapter of ninety-seven pages in the form of a commentary on the man’s Spirit of the Laws . This chapter is much shorter and much more narrowly focused than the book-length commentary he devoted to Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy . Otherwise, it is similar. To read it with profit, one must review the material in Montesquieu about to be discussed, then read Mansfield’s discussion with the entirety of Montesquieu’s great tome ready to hand, and then reread the pertinent chapter in Montesquieu.

Mansfield’s interpretation of Montesquieu is no less speculative and audacious than his account of Machiavelli’s thinking. There will be some who find it outlandish. But, in one important particular, it may prove to be uncontroversial. For Mansfield demonstrates that, in The Spirit of the Laws , Montesquieu accepts Machiavelli’s challenge to restrict one’s purview to the verità effettuale ; that he follows Hobbes and Locke in deploying this weapon against Machiavelli himself; and that he carries their project further by putting commerce at the center of modern life. If the standards by which everything is to be judged is the individual’s securtà e bene essere and man really is by nature an acquisitive animal, then the mode of acquisition favored by Machiavelli, war and conquest, can hardly be preferred to technological progress and commerce.

The last chapter in the volume is brief. It was drafted by Mansfield’s late wife Delba Winthrop and recast by him. Its focus is Tocqueville, who mentions Machiavelli in Democracy in America only once. It is a fitting conclusion to this book nonetheless. For in that monumental study, as Winthrop and Mansfield demonstrate, Tocque­ville traces the effectual truth of the revolution that Machiavelli initiated and shows that it backfired on its instigator.

Machiavelli was an admirer of spiritedness. The Florentine wanted his readers to study and practice the art of war. He charged Christianity with rendering men weak and slavish. But, by debunking moral virtue and every species of highmindedness, by repudiating otherworldliness, by elevating acquisition, and by reorienting politics towards individual security and well-being in this world, he prepared the way for a new and, to Tocqueville’s way of thinking, far more debilitating species of weakness and slavishness. The Frenchman’s fear was that, under the tutelage of a polity devoted to promoting security, well-being, and the acquisition of property, the citizens would be nothing more than “a herd of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.” And the remedy he suggested included a revival of highmindedness and of the otherworldly Christianity that Machiavelli had spurned and sought to replace.

•   Machiavelli’s Effectual Truth: Creating the Modern World , by Harvey C. Mansfield; Cambridge University Press, 250 pages, $105.

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Table of contents (5 chapters)

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Joseph V. Femia

Antonio Labriola: a Forgotten Marxist Thinker

Gramsci’s patrimony, mosca revisited, pareto's concept of demagogic plutocracy, back matter.

• Machiavelli
• natural law
• Niccolò Machiavelli
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'...senstive, scholarly and thought provoking.' - Richard Bellamy, Political Studies

Book Title : The Machiavellian Legacy

Book Subtitle : Essays in Italian Political Thought

Authors : Joseph V. Femia

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379923

Publisher : Palgrave Macmillan London

eBook Packages : Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies Collection , Political Science and International Studies (R0)

Copyright Information : Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1998

Hardcover ISBN : 978-0-333-68937-0 Published: 19 October 1998

eBook ISBN : 978-0-230-37992-3 Published: 19 October 1998

Edition Number : 1

Number of Pages : VIII, 169

Topics : Political Theory , Political Philosophy , Religious Studies, general , Political Science

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Machiavelli’s vs. Plato’s Ideas of Political Morality Essay

The conflict between the optimal outcome and reality has long been a source of contention in the political domain. In this sense, some renowned philosophers have constructed envisioned situations for the betterment of the society upon which their whole body of work is based and their entire ideologies. Notwithstanding, several academics, like Machiavelli, have previously voiced doubt over the plausibility of such utopian governments. His famous saying the end justifies the means has long been a topic of constant discussion. In divergence, Plato’s notion of validation of achievement has since been celebrated by many. The two thinkers believe that an ideal state exists and that this perfect state functions as the fundamental objective of human civilization. Nevertheless, the contrast between the two idealists did not mean that Machiavelli’s idea was heinous compared to Plato’s. Instead, it was just a difference of seeking incongruence questions and ideas since both scholars’ ideas were conquered in some instances, as encompassed in this discussion.

The discrepancy between Plato and Machiavelli about objectives stems from the fact that Machiavelli’s signifiers prepare the way for the ultimate goal, which is unavoidably terrible. Thus, he favors procedural fairness in governance above fundamental justice, disconnecting the connection between politics and morality. Modern politics becomes petty as a result of this moral disengagement. He added that they convened to create laws and punish those who broke them. Therefore, this position emphasizes the need to regain the philosophical component of morality in political debate to attain fairness.

Nevertheless, based on Plato, the solitary concept of virtue can provide a republican with actual justice and operational justice and the power to defend human liberty from governmental intrusion. According to Machiavelli’s political philosophy, Plato’s political view is a compromise between the best and most pragmatic possibilities. While Plato’s political theory emphasizes ethical values as the city-major state’s objectives, he also believes that the flawless must be accomplished in reality in order to be considered legitimate. According to him, reconciling the gap between ideal and reality is necessary for the development of a political philosophy capable of guiding the Greeks in their quest for liberty.

Regarding education, Machiavelli did not concentrate on how to educate citizens to establish competent institutions and the reverence of rights and liberties. A skill set is required to enhance sound performance in the relative duties, and the guardians should be trained to prevent war through physical training and music. Hence, nothing of this nature interested me. Machiavelli’s perspective was entirely focused on the prince’s authority, who should master the skill of utilizing both love and force when required. The consequences of this secular politics are incapable of providing moral or spiritual instruction to various classes since this is not the goal of their guide. Since individuals are compelled to violate the law, the city probably lacked a strict sense of justice, as the prince does not believe in moral equality and uses it only when required. To foster justice, the prince must feel in and cherish the ultimate truth; otherwise, ethics would deteriorate so that fairness would vanish.

However, Plato believes education is the city’s fundamental obligation since, minus it, people cannot consider what justice, morals, goodness, and evil are. So the leader must embody these principles and inspire others to do so. In this way, the virtues are vital in education so that everyone understands what they are doing in the city. Individuals should first be educated on how to rise above the apprehensions and defend the city’s borders with a Republican army. While the duties of auxiliaries vary from those of guardians, the lower class employees are considered subject to their whims.

Following that, in The Laws, Plato takes a distinct approach to the notion of democracy. He contends that there are two main types of the constitution: monarchy and democracy, which are mutually exclusive. He argues that the optimum form of government incorporates elements of two types of constitutions to construct a constitutional monarchy. As has already been noted, Plato is a vocal opponent of democracy and condemns it throughout his writings. Yet, in the Laws, he summarizes what he views to be the contrasting constitutions, democracy, and monarchy, to develop a constitutional monarchy philosophy that he calls a constitutional monarchy. Once again, his technique of inquiry informs his perspective of democratic institutions. He begins with the democratic political system, then examines its opponent, the monarchical system, and then synthesizes the two to get closer to an ideal.

On the other hand, Machiavelli departs from Plato’s ideas and technique, which define his view of democracy. Machiavelli’s philosophy is not always a dimension of reality, and semantics is the notion of actuality. While his approach and ontology are progressive, they are not directed toward a specific goal. He argues that man’s behaviors are determined by their free will only in part. Instead, Machiavelli urges people to aspire a bit oblivious to what would be anticipated to accomplish their objective. Thus, it boosts one’s chances of success, particularly given his perception of the future as unpredictable. Additionally, he asserts that when men do this, they may use their virtue to combat uncertainty. It relates to his view of democracy: since the future is unpredictable, kings cannot simply develop plans in isolation from the population.

On the same note, Plato is more concerned with its durability than whether a political philosophy is valid. He detailed the perfect constitution and lifestyle for the majority of city-states during his political career. In this respect, most people do not have a sort of education that demands all-natural abilities and assets based on chance, nor a flawless constitution, but rather laws in which the majority of cities may engage are the most critical factors to take into account. In other aspects, this stands in contrast to Machiavellian conceptions of heaven as a place reserved for the superior intellects. Plato may be called the inventor of pragmatic politics when it comes to political philosophy.

However, the fact that in some instances, the two philosophers conquered in ideas; for example, both Machiavelli and Plato believe in continuous political and social progress, requiring a competent leader to start a new cycle. According to Plato, there is only one kind of virtue in political structure, namely the proper rule of the philosopher-kings, but an endless variety of evil. Plato’s portrayal of subordinate sorts of governance in a historical series starts with the Republic and gradually fades away. A legitimate rule, according to Machiavelli and Plato, needed an inventive person who was beyond the structure he constructed. Further, according to Machiavelli, governance decays through time as it moves between people and the masses, ultimately succumbing to a more significant foreign force. Thence, a state sinks into turmoil; one person must renew the cycle, not by democracy or republic. Machiavelli explains this necessity by citing historical precedents, except when structured by one man, no republic or kingdom is founded or rebuilt successfully. Plato and Machiavelli both concentrate the weight of liberation on one leader, dubbed the founder-hero . In order to advance not his interests but the public good, the hero-founders must each descend in turn and dwell with others in the cave. Hence, it means that their laws are designed to promote the general benefit of society, not the welfare of any one group. Thus, one of the deemed hero founders is required to recreate a stable society from the ruins of its final deterioration.

Moreover, it symbolizes the height of ethical standards and morality. According to Plato, pleasure is ultimate and self-satisfying, and it is attained via the completion of the capacity for action. Further, he accentuates that the greatest and best good is the accomplishment of the science or art that has the most authority of all, which is the science of statesmanship. Yet, the political ideal is fairness; justice, as in politics, is a common benefit. As a result, it is evident that Plato’s politics of righteousness encompasses a diverse set of concepts and interpretations. In regards, to political morality, for example, it is the science of attaining enjoyment for the public, in opposition to Machiavelli’s violent and unethical regime. The ideal case scenario is one in which politics is motivated by a desire for justice, which is the only criterion of government efficacy, rather than by a passion for power, as Machiavellian philosophers believe.

Likewise, contrasting and comparing Plato’s and Machiavelli’s views on citizenship may guide us in determining what constitutes appropriate political ambitions. According to Machiavelli, man’s potential to engage in politics is contingent upon the state of the society in which he lives. While the essence of man’s nature is relatively steady, humanity is an ungrateful and voracious race. Thus, within the Republic’s social conditions, humankind is capable of making an excellent contribution to political life. While Plato argues that the metropolis is, humanity’s most sovereign and encompassing union and that man is inherently a city dweller. As a consequence, the objective of free men’s citizenship is to participate in the political process. Additionally, the Aristotelian political theory maintains that those unable to engage in the benefits of a political union are either gods or animals in terms of their social niche.

Similarly, Plato asserts that humans must be equipped with logical and religious traits. Thus, people may better understand acceptable political goals by opposing and comparing Plato’s and Machiavelli’s ideal citizen notions. Conversely, citizens under Plato’s government and Machiavelli’s Republicans are capable of adhering to and supporting the law and lobbying for legislative change. Additionally, they are capable of engineering, performing extraordinary creative feats, and campaigning for the state’s interests.

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• Niccolo Machiavelli’s Philosophy
• Niccolo Machiavelli's Virtue and Fortuna
• Machiavelli and Aristotle’s Idea of Virtue
• Machiavelli's Political and Moral Ambiguity
• Machiavelli: Modern Philosophy Against Ancient Greek
• Machiavelli and a Notion of Virtue as an Innovation
• The Prince Niccolo Machiavelli
• The Teachings of Plato Socrates and Machiavelli
• Machiavelli's Political Ideas
• Mixed Monarchies in Machiavelli's "The Prince"
• The Essay "Civil Disobedience" by Henry David Thoreau
• Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’ Views on Politics and Human Nature
• Hobbes’ View on Authorities and Rules
• Plato’s “Republic” and the Issues of Justice
• "Resistance to Civil Government" by Henry David Thoreau

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Machiavelli Essays (Examples)

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Machiavelli and evil the ideas.

46). These ideas are actually in direct contradiction to the prevailing religious philosophies of the time. Machiavelli does not seed men judged by God, or even by other men -- but instead by whether the deed one sought was accomplished or not; and if that deed has eventual ramifications that may be good. This Prince may come to power through evil means from himself, from others, or through historical forces. However, Princes who come to power based on criminal acts will not last in their position, nor will they be perceived as innately a leader. Cruelty, which by its very nature is evil, may be applied once at the outset and then only when the greater good of the subjects demands it. In seizing a state, the Prince ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict (evil), and to do them all at….

Machiavelli, N. The Prince. Translated by W.K. Marriott. Rockville, MD: Arc Manor, 2007.

Muchembled, R. A history of the Devil. New York: Wiley/Blackwell, 2003.

Machiavelli and Moses Machiavelli Has

hen he first came in contact with God in Midian where he was tending sheep for his father-in-law Jethro, he saw a burning bush and prostrated before God. After the mission was explained, "Moses said to God, "ho am I that I should go to Pharaoh, and bring the sons of Israel out of Egypt?" (Exodus 3:11). He questioned God continuously during this exchange and showed himself to be a coward even when he was repeatedly told that God would be with him. Another time, when the Israelites were marching across the desert, the people wanted Moses to find them a place to drink and water their animals. Moses applied to God, but Moses did not believe what God said. The account in Numbers 20:11,12 says "11 and Moses lifted up his hand and struck the rock with his rod twice; and water came forth abundantly, and the congregation drank,….

Works Cited

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Trans. Luigi Ricci. London: Grant Richards, 1903. Print.

Machiavelli in the Sixteenth Century Florence Was

Machiavelli In the sixteenth century, Florence was in a period of turmoil and political instability due to the clashes between different ruling elite. It was in this social and political climate that Niccolo Machiavelli wrote The Prince. The book is a practical guide to world leadership. The author focuses on the qualities of successful and unsuccessful leaders, the nature of their actions and decisions, and how they can and should react to various situations when they arise in the political arena. Machiavelli uses historical examples to substantiate his claims, when possible. One of the defining features of Machiavelli's The Prince is that the author is primarily concerned with maintaining political order and stability, rather than on making ethical choices. This stems directly from the historical context of political instability in which Machiavelli wrote. Similarly, Machiavelli's primary concerns are for how leaders can remain strong and powerful in their domains and not….

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Online version:  http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince00.htm

Machiavelli Niccolo Di Bernardo Dei Machiavelli Emerged

Machiavelli Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli emerged as one of the first true secularist philosophers to come out of the Christian est. In succeeding years his name would become infamous; his views, associated with Satan and immorality. However, Machiavelli's most significant contributions to estern thought never overtly favored scheming or devious methods to more morally acceptable ones. But rather, he generally acknowledged that any actions taken in the acquisition and sustention of power were tolerable and necessary for a lasting society. Essentially, Machiavelli threw out all previous notions regarding morality and ethical behavior. Instead, he adopted the premise that all people were prone to corruption and ambition; accordingly, they would employ any means at their disposal -- given the opportunity -- to achieve their goals. It was Machiavelli's insights into the workings of government -- presented in both The Prince and The Discourses -- that marked his true contribution to philosophy. The….

Bondanella, Peter and Mark Musa. The Portable Machiavelli. New York: Penguin Books, 1979.

Ledeen, Michael A. Machiavelli on Modern Leadership. New Yrok: St. Martin's Press, 1999.

Machiavelli's The Prince it Is

This belief came in response to the realities of the time that saw corruption and lust for riches as the main interests in the political life. oth Gandhi and Machiavelli saw self restrain as an important quality, even though the reasons deferred. In today's political life, there is more and more evidence of the applicability of the concepts advocated by Machiavelli centuries ago. The constant use of the notion Machiavellian is relevant in this sense. It comes to define the belief that the final outcome is the most important one in the overall process of history. In the end, according to Richelieu, who was inspired by the ideas of the Italian politician, history would eventually judge a leader not for the means he used, but for the aims, he had set beforehand. (Kissinger, 1995) the so-called raison d'etat governed international relations for centuries after the Westphalia Peace in 1648 and….

Bibliography

Calvocoressi, Peter. World politics since 1945. New York: Longman, 1987.

Chew, Robin. Mahatma Gandhi: Indian Spiritual/Political, Leader, and Humanitarian. 1995. 25 April 2007. http://www.lucidcafe.com/library/95oct/mkgandhi.html#resources

Gauss, Christian. Introduction. "The Prince," Niccolo Machiavelli. 1952. Oxford University Press, Chicago.

Huntington, Samuel. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998.

Machiavelli and the Role of Religion Machiavelli

Machiavelli and the Role of Religion Machiavelli, in his works, has used his political outlook and views about the power given to the Church and Christianity to present both his religious and political views to the readers keeping them in a constant thought process of what he really believes in and why. Throughout the paper we will discuss Machiavelli's political expressions and views in the light of his three writings; "The Prince," "The Discourses" and "The Florentine Histories." In all the three writings, the author has used his characters and plots to describe a setting that would eventually lead him to express his views about the political mishaps and mistakes that led to inflated problems. It is extremely vital to present, from the commencement of the essay, what Machiavelli's politics is and how he attains his viewpoint so as to comprehend and appreciate his point-of-view on religion in politics. Machiavelli can be categorized….

The textual citations have been taken from:

John William Allen. (1951). A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century. Reprint. New York: Barnes & Noble. And Hans Baron. (1954). The Concept of Nationalism in Machiavelli's Prince. Studies in the Renaissance 1:38-48.

Machiavelli as a Humanist Examples

Mainly, the ideals of modern science and philosophy have allowed the religious humanists to meet the stresses of modern life and they would state that their philosophy is for the here and now. Religious Humanism offers a foundation in philosophy which includes moral values, ideals, coping methods and ways to deal with adversity such as flood, hurricane or famine. How would a person like Machiavelli feel about the modern issues like teenage sex and how would his ideas be compared to the Catholics' view that protected sex and abortion should not be options for those sexually active teens. I believe that Machiavelli would side with religious humanists and therefore be more adaptive in use of science and principles of human rights. This notion is based on the fact that the Prince is a very philosophical study of political goals, objectives and concepts and it took a very scientific mind to….

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Bantam Books. (1984).

The Essence of Humanism. Ed. Flo Wineriter. November 1998. Humanists of Utah. Retrieved on 5 June, 2005 from  http://www.humanistsofutah.org/1993/gennov93.html .

Machiavelli

Machiavelli's the Prince a Number

As they approach Guhasena's home, they find a nun who would assist them in their venture. They lay their plan before the nun who agrees to help them. Again, this is a prime example of the rashness of youth. These four young men were traveling many miles on the idea that they would be able to take advantage of a young maiden's loneliness and solitude. They did not plan on Devasmita's ability to see through their machinations, and to plan retaliation accordingly. Fortune does not smile on these young men at all. They not only do not succeed at absconding with Devasmita's virtue, they also are marked for life as Devasmita's slaves. It is a simple matter to state that Machiavelli's premise that the young act in a much more rash manner than do the old. Both characters show that such rashness is the manner of youth. The young men….

Machiavelli's Virtue When Hearing the

Leaders today must regularly make decisions that may, at times, greatly impact the lives of thousands of people. In order to be successful, they have to be able to analyze as many of the choices, plans and strategies possible and determine which of these will be best for the most individuals. Sometimes such decisions have to be made very quickly. Executive power, Mansfield notes, is one of the most essential principles that comes from Machiavellian rationale to the separation of power in today's government. Every where in both the government and business institutions, it is possible to see examples of one-person rule, and it is readily accepted. This is an important constitutional principle retained from the past. The executive in charge can be strong or weak, according to the challenges that face him or her. However, the most successful executive is the individual who can govern under the acceptance of the….

Mansfield, Harvey. Machiavelli's Virtue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Masters, Roger. Maciavelli's Virtue. Ethics (1997). 107.4: 757-759

Muller, Jerry. The Princes Pay Tribute. Public Interest. (2001) [electronic version]

 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0377/is_2001_Summer/ai_76812259

Machiavelli and Thucydides Share Remarkable Similarities in

Machiavelli and Thucydides share remarkable similarities in their thoughts about human nature and the role of the state, but differ somewhat in their ideas about leadership. Machiavelli and Thucydides share a similar view of human nature as basically selfish, and both note that rule is most often disassociated from considerations of morality. Machiavelli argues that a ruler must ultimately be concerned with his own self-interest, while Thucydides noted that self-interest often came at the expense of the state. Machiavelli was born in 1469 in Florence, Italy to an influential but poor old Florentine family. He became involved in politics as early as 1498, when he was appointed as head of the Second Chancery, a government agency overseeing diplomacy and war. He traveled to France, Germany, and Rome, and played an important role in conquering Pisa in 1509, in addition to acting as an important advisor. After 14 years of service, Machiavelli was….

Hooker, Richard. Thucydides. Washington State University. Adapted from: Thucydides, translated by Benjamin Jowett, first edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1881), pages 125-135, 166-177. 26 November 2002.  http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GREECE/THUCY.htm 

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Translation from the Italian by Hill Thompson. Palm Springs, Calif.: ETC Publications, 1988.

The Literature Network. Niccolo Machiavelli. 27 November 2002.  http://www.online-literature.com/machiavelli/ 

Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Richard Crawley. 27 November 2002. Reproduced online at  http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.html

Why a Strong Defense is Needed at All Times

DefenselessnessMachiavelli's statement that "being disarmed makes you despised" suggests that in order to gain respect and maintain authority, a prince or leader must have a strong and capable military force. In fact, it suggests that any society that is defenseless is almost like a crime against nature. However, his assertion certainly stands up to the historical test.For instance, one historical example that supports his argument is the case of the Roman Empire. During the early days of the empire, the Roman military was known for its strength and efficiency, and the Roman legions were feared throughout the known world. This military might allowed the Roman Empire to expand its territory and maintain its dominance over its subjects. However, as the empire grew more decadent and complacent, its military strength declined, and it became vulnerable to external threats. In the end, the weakness of the Roman military was one of the….

Jacobus, Lee A. A world of ideas: Essential readings for college writers. Macmillan Higher Education, 2013.

Kwon, Ik Whan G., et al. \\\\\\"The effectiveness of gun control laws: multivariate statistical analysis.\\\\\\" American Journal of Economics and Sociology 56.1 (1997): 41-50.

Machiavellis The Prince

Introduction The hierarchy of politics in ancient times was clearly defined. Kings rules many kingdoms thus they were heads of the various kingdoms. Their sons inherited the thrones since the system was patriarchal. The women were to be princesses, but the sons took the throne and continued their duties as kings and princes. Machiavelli used his scholarly tricks to bring out the philosophy of the renaissance in that century. It is important to note that scholars and kings occupied the top echelons of the social class, and were charged mainly with major decision making responsibilities. This is as a result of the revelation and adoption of various classical works. The renaissance included the adoption of works from the Greek philosophers’ school of thought, philosophical theories on humanity and commercial revolution towards adoption of modern states. Machiavelli was an interesting character since he ensured that his theories were sold in various quarters….

Machiavelli's Literary Message Katherine Phillipakis

Cleandro has learned everything from Nicomaco, but is not grateful enough to share the prize with Nicomaco. (Phillipakis, 2011, p. 13). According to Phillipakis, "…they are competitors for a prize that cannot be shared. Fortune is a kingdom 'safeliest when with one man manned.'" (Phillipakis, 2011, p. 13) Phillipakis concludes that Machiavelli "must remain the philosopher who generates thoughts but not deeds," simply "…because he cannot be anything more." (Phillipakis, 2011, p. 13). Critique Phillipakis appears to have something against philosophers and bookish men in general. Men who are thinkers, rather than doers. Or perhaps only against bookish men who presume to be manly men, such as Machiavelli. Phillipakis' rage seems to stem from certain passages in Machiavelli's The Prince that could be perceived as misogynistic. She appears to dwell particularly on Machiavelli's comments about raping "Fortuna," the female characterization of fortune. Machiavelli is, of course, speaking metaphorically here. Though the language is….

Phillipakis, K. (2011). "On Machiavelli's Literary Message." APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper.

Machiavelli's The Prince According the

According to Machiavelli, there are several different characteristics that must be exhibited to include: balanced generosity, compassion, honesty and the ability to listen to only select advisors. When looking at the first characteristic, balanced generosity, this means that a leader can not be too generous with the citizens. Otherwise, they will expect this generosity at all times, the moment that the leadership must increase taxes and have other financial burdens on the citizens, is when they will turn on them. This can affect the stability of the state, where the revenues generated from taxes are used to provide various services to the citizens. During times of crisis, the government may not have the funds necessary to fight wars or other situations that can come out of nowhere. While doing the opposite, being to frugal, will result in resentment from the citizens. This is because of the lack of services….

Machiavelli, N. The Prince. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Print.

Machiavelli's the Prince What Elements

" ("Selections from the Prince" 281) What this shows, is that those leaders who engage the citizens in conquered territories by allowing them to maintain their laws will perceive the Prince to be weak. In order to rule effectively, the Prince must show that he is a strong leader. This is significant, because it highlights how the ideal leader is: someone who will show what they mean through actions. Once this take place, the conquered citizens of the Prince will have respect for his rule and policies. This has caused debate as to if the ideas of Machiavelli are more humanist or from a realist perspective. This is challenging, because he shows the importance of having a strong central government that will protect the general public. However, the tactics that he advocates using to achieve this objective are: questionable at best. As a result, Machiavelli is not a humanist, where he advocates….

Sayre, Henry. "Cultural Parallels." The Humanities: Culture, Continuity & Change. Book 3: The Renaissance and the Age of Encounter. Prentice-Hall, 2008: 600-601. Print.

"Selections from the Prince."

Writing a 3000 word essay on human condition and need help with an essay outline.

I. Introduction A. Definition of the Human Condition B. Importance of Studying the Human Condition C. Thesis Statement: Exploring key aspects of the human condition and their significance in shaping human existence.

II. Historical Perspectives on the Human Condition A. Ancient Philosophical Views (e.g., Aristotle, Plato) B. Medieval and Renaissance Perspectives (e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Machiavelli) C. Enlightenment Thinkers (e.g., Rousseau, Hobbes)

III. Psychological Dimensions of the Human Condition A. Human Emotions and Behavior B. Cognitive Processes and Perceptions C. Impact of Social and Environmental Factors

IV. Existential and Philosophical Views A. Existentialism: Meaning and Purpose B. Absurdity and Anxiety in Human Existence C.....

Could you provide some essay topic ideas related to Thomas Aquinas?

1. The Essence of Thomas Aquinas's Natural Law Theory: An Exploration of Its Foundations and Implications Discuss the metaphysical and ethical principles that underpin Aquinas's natural law theory. Analyze the concept of the eternal law and its relationship to the natural law. Examine the role of human reason in discerning the precepts of natural law and their binding force. 2. The Harmony of Faith and Reason in Aquinas's Summa Theologica: A Critical Examination Trace the development of Aquinas's understanding of the relationship between faith and reason. Explore the arguments Aquinas presents for the compatibility of faith and reason. Evaluate the strengths....

Black Studies - Philosophy

46). These ideas are actually in direct contradiction to the prevailing religious philosophies of the time. Machiavelli does not seed men judged by God, or even by other men…

Mythology - Religion

hen he first came in contact with God in Midian where he was tending sheep for his father-in-law Jethro, he saw a burning bush and prostrated before God.…

Machiavelli In the sixteenth century, Florence was in a period of turmoil and political instability due to the clashes between different ruling elite. It was in this social and political…

Machiavelli Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli emerged as one of the first true secularist philosophers to come out of the Christian est. In succeeding years his name would become infamous;…

Drama - World

This belief came in response to the realities of the time that saw corruption and lust for riches as the main interests in the political life. oth Gandhi…

Machiavelli and the Role of Religion Machiavelli, in his works, has used his political outlook and views about the power given to the Church and Christianity to present both his…

Mainly, the ideals of modern science and philosophy have allowed the religious humanists to meet the stresses of modern life and they would state that their philosophy is…

As they approach Guhasena's home, they find a nun who would assist them in their venture. They lay their plan before the nun who agrees to help them.…

Leaders today must regularly make decisions that may, at times, greatly impact the lives of thousands of people. In order to be successful, they have to be able to…

Machiavelli and Thucydides share remarkable similarities in their thoughts about human nature and the role of the state, but differ somewhat in their ideas about leadership. Machiavelli and Thucydides…

Creative Writing

DefenselessnessMachiavelli's statement that "being disarmed makes you despised" suggests that in order to gain respect and maintain authority, a prince or leader must have a strong and capable military…

Political Science / Politics

Introduction The hierarchy of politics in ancient times was clearly defined. Kings rules many kingdoms thus they were heads of the various kingdoms. Their sons inherited the thrones since the…

Cleandro has learned everything from Nicomaco, but is not grateful enough to share the prize with Nicomaco. (Phillipakis, 2011, p. 13). According to Phillipakis, "…they are competitors for…

According to Machiavelli, there are several different characteristics that must be exhibited to include: balanced generosity, compassion, honesty and the ability to listen to only select advisors. When…

" ("Selections from the Prince" 281) What this shows, is that those leaders who engage the citizens in conquered territories by allowing them to maintain their laws will perceive…

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The main tenets of ancient modern debate revolve around social, economic, and political issues. They deal with the acquisition of power, retention of power, and human control. Scholars like Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Plato have discussed the issues that even today continue shaping modern day politics. The initial belief of...

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The book of The Prince was written by Niccolo Machiavelli in 1513 and was intended to criticise the tradition of humanist government ruled by the prince. The author made use of the book to advance his agenda of power, leadership and the proper way of navigating the political landscape. The...

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Niccolo Machiavelli and "The Prince" Niccolo Machiavelli published The Prince to encourage leaders to practice proper governance despite the existence of unethical behaviors in the society. The book provides that good management and civilization are related elements that administrators should consider in a bid promote peace in a country (Machiavelli 12). The...

Between 1498 and 1512, Niccolo Machiavelli served as an Italian statesman. His political career came to an unpleasant conclusion after he was detained for 22 days and arrested. Niccolo wrote The Prince while he was away from politics in an effort to reclaim his position and job in politics. Despite...

Words: 1101

To grasp the two philosophers' concepts, it is necessary to first understand the meaning of virtue. One of the definitions of virtue is a skill. From a political standpoint, prowess can be defined as a man's ability to achieve his or her political objectives. The second interpretation is that virtue...

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Niccolo's Machiavelli's Influence Niccolo Machiavelli was a renowned writer who became famous for writing about how various world leaders should be able to thrive in the world as it is, not as it is intended to be. He wrote the famous book "The Prince," which examined how different rulers utilize various...

Niccol Machiavelli wrote The Prince, a book about Machiavellianism's political philosophy, which fundamentally means victory at any cost (Machiavelli & Viroli, 2008). Machiavelli addresses the relative importance of the terms fortuna and virt in The Prince, arguing that virt are acts, choices, and discoveries that arise out of desperation and...

Words: 1813

During the Renaissance period, Italy used to be undergoing many unsettling events politically. As such, there were works produced through various humanists and philosophers with the one standing out amongst them being Niccolo Machiavelli. He was a philosopher, humanist, and a politician who later got here to write his book...

Niccolo Machiavelli's The PrinceThesis: Great leaders are created from the perspectives of great leaders. The book by the author Niccolo Machiavelli, under consideration, is The Prince. Democratic events are the definition of study and debate. In most states around the world, politics is the avenue that people use to argue...

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The Embodiment of Machiavellian Theories by Donald Trump The papers address the embodiment by current US President Donald Trump of Machiavellian theories. The phenomena written by Machiavelli, according to the articles, include a political leader with the shrewdness, the duplicity, the power, the despondency, and the competence (Hamilton 128). A Machiavellian Leader...

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The role-playing game Broken Roads takes its environment seriously. The Aussie slang, the reddish outback soil, even the ruffling of emu feathers provide authenticity.

By Darryn King

The language barrier is just one of the obstacles that players will face in Broken Roads, a postapocalyptic role-playing game filled with thorny moral choices. With a distinctive nasal twang, the locals pepper their conversations with “crikey,” “sprog,” “yobbo,” “tinny,” “chunder,” “togs” and “hard yakka.” Early in the game, a cocky mercenary is called “a legend in his own lunchbox.”

Some of the terms are defined with an in-game glossary feature, but others need to be puzzled out via context. In other words: Have a go, yer mug.

Broken Roads, which was inspired by the “Mad Max” films as well as the dystopian Fallout games, follows an arduous journey from Brookton to Kalgoorlie in the Wheatbelt region of Western Australia. Yes, you can stop off at the pub on the way.

The team at Drop Bear Bytes worked hard to ensure that every aspect of the game conveys an authentic vision of the country, whether it was duplicating the distinctive reddish hue of outback soil or developing specialized technology that makes the ruffling of emu feathers feel true to life.

In Broken Roads, which releases on Wednesday for the PC and the PlayStation and Xbox consoles, the player leads a motley crew through a richly detailed, morally complex world. Through dialogue and action, the player is frequently forced to make choices — labeled humanist, utilitarian, Machiavellian or nihilist — that profoundly alter the way the story unfolds.

The game takes place about 150 years into the future, in the wasted ruins of a nuclear war. Some have joked that its vision of postapocalyptic Australia — a strange, forbidding landscape filled with bizarre-looking creatures and vegetation — bears an uncanny resemblance to parts of actual modern-day Australia.

“It’s this arid, inhospitable place that people still manage to live in,” Leanne Taylor-Giles, the game’s narrative lead, said of the Wheatbelt region, a vast tract of agricultural land that partly surrounds Perth. “And it’s extraordinarily beautiful.”

A 2022 research trip through the Wheatbelt allowed a few members of the team to observe aspects of the Australian persona — a working-class hardiness and humor — that Taylor-Giles sought to bring out in the characters in the game.

“I tried to capture the spirit of the people who live in those towns,” said Taylor-Giles, who lives in Queensland in eastern Australia. She added, “That sense of making do with the things they have, of coming together to make it against all odds, is something that I really love.”

While driving the route eventually replicated in Broken Roads, the Drop Bear Bytes team took thousands of reference photographs — many in-game locations are eerily faithful recreations of real places — and recorded some of the ambient audio that made it into the game’s soundscape.

“When you’re standing in Wave Rock” in Broken Roads, “you are literally hearing all the wildlife ambience and wind of Wave Rock,” said Tim Sunderland, the audio lead who also composed the didgeridoo-infused score.

Some aspects of the game verge on self-lampoonery, a very Aussie tendency. A cricket bat, festooned with saw blades, is wielded as a weapon; specially concocted craft beers work like magic potions.

Serious thought and care, though, went into the treatment and representation of Indigenous Australians. Since the game takes place on land traditionally owned by the Noongar people, the team worked with Karla Hart, a Noongar writer who signed on as a consultant.

Hart advised on parts of the game that allow the player to learn about Noongar culture and customs, including traditional foods and medicine.

“One of the Noongar characters works with fire,” Taylor-Giles said. “After some discussion with Karla, it turned out that the Noongar idea of fire is as a warming, benevolent presence, equated with safety, or home — very different from my own relationship with fire.”

The player will also encounter authentic Indigenous artwork, commissioned specially for the game. And in keeping with the linguistic element of Broken Roads, there are many Noongar words to learn. In this case, the words need to be heard a number of times before the game provides a definition.

“I hope gamers go away with a small experience of who we are as a people or something that they can identify with,” Hart said.

In addition to its Australian team, Drop Bear Bytes also has members in the United States, Britain, Spain and South Africa.

“You can call us honorary Aussies,” said Bianca Roux, a 3-D modeler, sculptor and texture artist based in Cape Town. When not sculpting the game’s kangaroos, wallabies and koalas, she has been bingeing episodes of the reality series “Outback Opal Hunters.”

Taylor-Giles is excited about sharing the Broken Roads vision of Australia with the rest of the world, but she is just as keen for Australian gamers to become acquainted with a less familiar part of their own country.

“We may come to appreciate what’s exceptional about ourselves,” she said. “The things that easily fade into the background when we live them, day in and day out.”

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